A second phase in the development of the traditional HRM
(in North America) came during and after W.W.I, with the growth of the Human Relations
(HR) movement. The Human Relations movement was an outgrowth of a major attempt by
government, business, and unions to accommodate dramatic developments in manufacturing
with new forms of work organization. With the collapse of these attempts at worker
representation through collective structures (unions, shop committees, works councils),
the focus shifted to the individual employee and to how to alleviate alienation at work.
Employee Representation at Work
Mobilization of the economy for war production locked the administrative structure of
business and government tightly together, while full employment augmented workers' ability
to win strikes and improve their terms of employment. The government's wartime quest for
total mobilization of the American people's hearts, minds, and energies had prompted its
administrative agencies not only to promote national standards of wages and hours but also
to encourage corporate managers to bargain with elected representatives of their
employees. Collective consultation between representatives of the workers and local
managers could ensure that cordial cooperation which is likely to further industrial
efficiency and provide the company "a maximum of publicity with minimum of
interference in all that pertains to the conditions of employment" (Montgomery, 1987,
In other words, World War I raised a need to increase productivity by reducing
industrial disputes, absenteeism, turnover, and standardizing working conditions and pay
structures. Exactly the same problems that Taylor had hoped to solve with his Scientific
Management. To facilitate those objectives, managers were encouraged to adopt a new work
organization that emphasized worker representation. Perhaps, this was an early indication of the
limits of Scientific Management. When workers had an opportunity to rebel against
Scientific Management, they took it.
Shop committees and works councils were created to deal with grievances, payment, and
plans to improve productivity. A report from the Special Conference Committee in 1929
summed up the experience of the previous decade (quoted in Montgomery, 1987, p. 414):
"Employee representation, in fact, furnishes an effective means through which
management can exercise its normal function of leadership over the working force."
Job control unionism and Scientific Management
The need to improve
productivity -- through increased cooperation rather than repression -- created a need among managers to
introduce innovative means of control (e.g., shop committees, consultation,
higher wages) over the labor process,
which, in turn, meshed with the unions' need to increase their membership base and
resulted in an odd "marriage" between Taylorism and "progressive
unionism." Thus, while both union traditionalists and radicals believed that shop
committees were employers' instruments, to be infiltrated, smashed, and replaced with
closed-shop craft unionism, others saw them as a means to broaden the union ranks. The
latter were enthusiastically supported by personnel managers who believed that
union-employer cooperation was the best means to improve productivity. The reason being,
such cooperation reduces absenteeism and turnover, maintains an open-shop environment, and
keeps the unions content and docile. Still, there was no guarantee that increased
productivity would translate into pay increase or that the majority of the workers would
not be hired on a temporary basis without any seniority rights.
But after the end of the War, the doors of possibility that wartime experience had
opened slammed shut for many unions. The rising unemployment and the great crash of 1929
made it easy for management to seize all initiative in the area of employee
representation. Apparently, management had never been sold on the idea that they should
consult with unions over production issues. Managers believed that they could organize
worker cooperation without the American Federation of Labor's (AFL) help. And as new production methods and technologies
developed, managers lost interest in this unwanted child. But once unions were suppressed,
workers' dissatisfaction found individual, personal expression in doing as little as
possible for the wages they received and wasting as much material as possible. It was this
problem, restriction of output (soldiering in Taylor's
jargon), that Elton Mayo and his colleagues would seek to resolve.
The above implies that:
Scientific management, at least in its current form, was not embraced by American
When conflicts erupted, managers quickly understood that they had to cater to workers'
QWL (quality of worklife) needs in order to improve control and productivity.
Teams/cooperation/improved communication are not new ideas.
When changes in HRM practices are not underlain by a sound theory that relates new HRM techniques to a long-term transformation of management philosophy, values and behaviors, the changes will have little staying power. They will last until the unique circumstances that
have caused them disappear.
Frequently (perhaps always), disgruntled employees will find ways to circumvent and undermine the system, expressing their dissatisfaction with existing working conditions and management behavior.
Motivating the Individual
Mayo's basic thesis was that
"our understanding of human problems of civilization should be at least
equal to our understanding of its material problems. In the absence of
such understanding, the whole industrial structure is liable to destruction or
decay. A world-wide revolution of the Russian type would completely
destroy civilization" (quoted in Trahair, 1984: 163). He further
argued that with the industrialization of society no improvement had come in the
social status of the worker. Once workers had had skilled jobs with
necessary social functions but now they were dispossessed of decisions over
their work, and its important functions passed to scientists and
financiers. At the same time that workers became cogs in the machine, they
also were offered a vision of greater political freedom. But socialism and
syndicalism, thought Mayo, were charlatan remedies and quack political medicines
(Trahair, 1984: 163). Consequently, conflict was growing in industry, and
consequently the danger of the collapse of society was mounting. Through
psychological investigation the irrational causes of conflict may be found and
brought under rational control.
The Hawthorne Experiments (Trahair, 1984: 225-6)
The experiments began in 1927 at the Hawthorne Works of the Western
Electric Company in Cicero, Illinois
(1927-1932). Mayo joined in early 1928. The Western Electric Company,
manufacturer of telephone equipment at its Hawthorne Works, had a policy of
high wages and good working conditions for employees and of using modern
placement techniques. For twenty years before the research began,
mangers considered general morale high among employees and the incidence
of industrial conflict infrequent.
In collaboration with the National Research Council the company studied
the relationship between the intensity of illumination at work and the output of
workers. No simple direct relations appeared because many
psychological factors interfered. To control them, especially the
factor of fatigue, researchers asked six girls to work in a test room away
from their regular department; to be subject to changes in working hours,
rest pauses, and other conditions; and to have their comments on work
recorded while their output was measured. The girls agreed. Five girls
assembled telephone relays, one supplied the parts. For five years,
beginning in April 1927, accurate records were kept of the number of the
relays made, temperature and humidity of the test room, medical and personal
histories, eating and sleeping habits, and snatches of conversation on the
job. No one supervised the girls; instead, a test room observer, and later
his assistants, kept records, arranged work, and tried to keep up the spirit
of cooperation among the girls. The girls were told to work as they felt and
at a comfortable pace, and only with their consent would changes be made in
First, the researchers measured productive capacity by recording the
girls' output for two weeks before the test-room study began. Then for the
first five weeks no changes at work were made so that the mere effect on
output of being transferred was known. At the third stage, a pay system was
introduced that ensured each girl's earnings were in proportion to her
efforts, thereby centering her financial interests on the study. Eight
weeks later, two five-minute rest pauses -- one at 10 a.m., the other at 2
p.m. -- were introduced. Next, the girls were given a light lunch in the
mid-morning and afternoon pauses. In the eight phase, the workday
ended a half-hour early; in the ninth, the girls finished an hour earlier
than usual. Then a five-day week was introduced and it ran through the
summer of 1928. Results showed an unexpected gradual rise in daily output.
The researchers, believing that something other than the changes had
affected the output, asked the girls if they would return to the original
work conditions, i.e., no pauses or lunches and a full work week. The
girls agreed, and for twelve weeks output declined, but not to its original
The researchers expected that if output rate were directly related to the
physical conditions at work, then identical conditions would produce similar
output rates. Instead, the girls' output rose from one phase of the study to
the next. It remained on a high plateau until the depression ended the
study in 1933. Within the limits of the test room, physical changes
appeared to have no effect on output rate.
Researchers concluded that changes in output could be attributed to
changes not only in work conditions but also work attitudes and social
relations. They believed that the girls' behaviors were related not to
the technical but the social organization of work. The girls had no
close supervision, and always had the chance to originate and participate in
decisions affecting their work. Mayo (1945, p. 72) explained that:
happened was that six individuals became a team and the
team gave itself wholeheartedly and spontaneously to cooperation in the
experiment. The consequence was that they felt themselves to be
participating freely and without afterthought, and were happy in the
knowledge that they were working without coercion from above or limitation
According to Trahair (1984: 356-7), at
Hawthorne, Mayo did not initiate, direct, or control research. He played
four distinct roles:
- Appreciative helper. For the
first 18 months he was an "appreciative helper." He visited
Hawthorne to study the physiology of the women at work in the relay assembly
test room, but beyond that he advised on the health of a woman no longer in
- Counselor-cum-publicist. During the next 15 months he was a "counselor-cum-publicist." He
counseled executives on family and work problems, praised the study, thereby
helping its status within the Western Electric Company, and publicized the
results so that the research gained prestige in the United States and
- Cooperative collaborator.
For almost 30 months he was a "cooperative collaborator." He
encouraged the exchange of personnel between Harvard and Hawthorne and laid
the social basis for joint activities.
- Protective supporter. During the four years of close association with the Hawthorne Works, Mayo
was a "protective supporter." He helped the researchers to endure
destructive criticism of their work from inside the company and out, and to
tolerate their own doubts about the value of their work.
Relations at Work
Current problems at work are rooted in social disintegration. This
process began when industrialization increased labor mobility and weakened
communal ties, isolated family life, organized work so that obsessions (e.g.,
worker and management interests are and should be at odds) dominated mental
life, and justified all these changes by placing a high value on economic
growth. The practical consequences of destroying social functions for
individuals are divorce, crime, irregular living, resentment, and
paranoia. Because labor is highly mobile, the society disintegrates,
social functions blur, and, consequently, individuals become maladjusted.
At work, problems of industrial control arise because complex organizations curb
craftsmen's initiative and autonomy, devalue their intelligence and skill,
create monotonous tasks, and, as compensation, offer only money and leisure
time. Consequently, workers do not recognize that between them and management
must exist a knowledge of common interests from which would emerge mutual confidence,
trust, and effective collaboration. Instead, workers focus on undermining
management by restricting their output. Management, in turn, do not appreciate
how strong a need for belonging exists in their workers' minds and hearts.
The thesis of these HR writers is aptly captured by Mayo (1945, p. 10):
problems of absenteeism, labor turnover, 'wildcat' strikes, show that we do not know how
to ensure spontaneity of cooperation; that is teamwork. Therefore, collaboration in an industrial society
cannot be left to chance...
The single most important discovery of the Hawthorne experiments was that workers had a
strong need to cooperate and communicate with fellow workers.
In Mayo's words (1945, p. 112), "... the eager human desire for cooperative activity
still persists in the ordinary person and can be utilized by intelligent and
straightforward management." The best vehicle to its achieving was informal
groups (rather than formal work teams), as they provided their members with the
basic needs for communication and cooperation. Yet management should be
aware that once forged, the group
maintained a strong grip over worker behaviors and attitudes (productivity).
the working group as a whole actually determined the output of
individual workers by reference to a standard, predetermined but never clearly stated,
that represented the group conception (rather than management's) of a fair day's work.
This standard was rarely, if ever, in accord with the standards of the efficiency
engineers (Mayo, 1945, p. 79).
Taylor strived to minimize the likelihood and effect of the informal
group, Mayo wished to harness it (in a limited way), and TQM experts have formalized
it and expanded its boundaries.
The Emergence of the "Social Man:"
Implications for Managers
The Human Relations movement emphasized emotional aspects in human behavior, yet still
maintained the division of labor between those who planned and those who executed. Being
intellectually conservative, Human Relations advocates worked from assumptions of
underlying employee-employer harmony. They attributed restriction of output to the poor
communication between workers and managers, and inadequate attention to the human side of
worker. The latter resulted in a "false consciousness," whereby workers failed
to appreciate that their interests were identical to their managers'. To solve these
problems, managers should facilitate the formation of informal groups and be accepted as
figures of authority (managers should become culture builders). "...
the age-old human desire for persistence of human association will seriously
complicate the development of an adaptive society if we cannot devise systematic
methods of easing individuals from one group of associates to another,"
argues Mayo (1945, p. 81). "Management," he continues, "in any
continuously successful plant, is not related to single workers but always
to working groups." Therefore, a major "preoccupation of
management must be that of organizing teamwork, that is to say, of
developing and sustaining cooperation" (ibid, p. 84).
To be able to facilitate teamwork (i.e., the formation of informal
management was provided with a new set of tools -- social skills (ibid, pp. 19, 20). Managers
have to be patient with their workers, listen to them, and avoid creating emotional upsets
(ibid, pp. 108-9).
|Authority therefore in actual exercise demands a capacity for vision and
wise guidance that must be re-achieved daily: since the cooperation of others is a vital
element in it, social understanding and social skill are involved equally with
technical knowledge and capacity. ... we do nothing whatever to develop social insight or
to impart social skill. Indeed we provide an education that operates to hinder the
development of such skills. And the general public, business leaders, and politicians are
left with the implication that mankind is an unorganized rabble upon which order must be
imposed (Mayo, 1945, p. 50).
Managers should learn that employees' social needs were no less important than employees' economic needs and that the logic of cost efficiency should give some room to the logic of human sentiments. The good manager was the one who was able to blend technical expertise with social capabilities. The successful manager listened to his employees, introduced them to their new companions, and tried to get them congenial work associates
(Mayo, 1945, p. 108).
Such managers were able to facilitate the formation of informal groups and
gain the cooperation of their workers (be accepted as figure heads and
leaders) (Mayo, 1945, p. 9).
Like Taylor, the Human Relations advocates wanted to rationalize management in order to
increase workers' effort at work. However, their underlying assumptions were quite
different. Taylor believed in the "rabble hypothesis" -- Natural society
consists of a horde of unorganized individuals; every individual acts in a manner
calculated to secure his self-interest; every individual thinks logically, to the best of
his ability, in the service of this aim. This is why the best way to induce workers to
work harder is to offer them more money.
HR writers, on the other hand, dismissed the centrality of the cash nexus and instead
emphasized culture, interpersonal relations, and group coherence as the determinants of worker performance.
Mayo claimed that the rabble hypothesis that guided neo-classical economists is based on a
non-normal situation of total social disintegration (Mayo, 1945, pp. 40-44). The proponents of the
rabble hypothesis "have small knowledge-of-acquaintance (as opposed to knowledge about) of various
social situations, a negligible equipment of social skill, and are able to ignore the
facts of human organization, and the extreme importance of these facts for him who would
direct the work and thought of others" (Mayo, 1945, p. 46).
In Mayo's (1945, p. 111) words:
|Man's desire to be continuously associated
in work with his fellows is a strong, if not the strongest, human characteristic. Any
disregard of it by management or any ill-advised attempt to defeat this human impulse
leads instantly to some form of defeat for management itself.
to self-interest when social associations have failed them (Mayo, 1945, p. 43). In short, Taylor's
economic man gave way to the social man while the ultimate target remained intact -- the
rationalization of the managerial profession.
Mayo believed that industrialization and destruction of craft systems had
caused social disintegration and normless, maladjusted behavior. In the
past, men had lived in communities where their work was a part of communal
life and their morale and amusements derived from a sense of solidarity
among themselves and service to the community. But today, men drift
with no plans, go where work takes them, and must live in a society with an
unstable economy. Because communal life outside work is neglected, it
becomes urgently needed within the workplace; the need raises the requisites
of working together; cooperation and collaboration (Trahair, 1984: 254).
But at work, the
worker-management adversarial relationship stemmed from workers' misunderstanding and
distrust of management. Management contributed to this situation by being more concerned
with economic efficiency than with social solidarity, thereby driving alienated workers to
seek asylum in informal work groups. These groups were then used to undermine management.
Mayo's prognosis was twofold -- management should acquire social skills, and use them to
secure workers' cooperation. The primary vehicle to its achievement is informal groups.
Thus, nurturing supervisors can adjust workers to bureaucratic life by facilitating the
creation of informal work groups, and then taking control over them. Eventually, if
properly done, management should be able to align workers' interests with management's.
Workers would become convinced that managers were on their side, and that organizational
bureaucracies were communities of producers. This should result in workers having a sense
of participation, a feeling of release from constraint, and a desire to
organization's (i.e., management's) interests. But specialized jobs and existing power
structures would remain intact. Workers would participate only in marginal decisions, in
choosing such things as the colors of restroom walls, not in any strategic decisions.
In other words, little emphasis was placed on problem solving and the
process improvements that play such an important role today. Perhaps
because of its limited and manipulative objectives, the human relations
movement waned in the 1950s. Although Mayo's contribution had had a
pervasive effect on managerial ideology, it's effect on managerial practices
was rather limited.