The expression *tode ti*, commonly translated as ‘a this’, plays a key role in Aristotle’s metaphysics. For example, to be *tode ti* is a characteristic mark of at least some substances and so failing to be *tode ti* is a reason to reject such candidates for the substance of a thing as its matter. The nature of the expression, its extension and the interpretation of its role in Aristotle’s metaphysics, however, are all controversial. In this paper, I discuss the expression (§1), its extension and the various interpretations canvassed in the secondary literature of its philosophical role (§2). I offer an interpretation of the expression based on a discussion of demonstration (§3). I then address the questions whether matter (§4) or individuals in categories other than substance (§5) are demonstrable. And I conclude with a brief wrap-up (§6).

1

The meaning of the expression *tode ti* is unclear and even its morphology is controversial. One option is to take the second term to be a class-name and so the full expression means the same as ‘this one of the suches’—that is, one unspecified member of the class of qualifications or general natures. On this view, the expression is akin to

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1 An ancestor to this paper was presented at the American Philosophical Association Central Division Meeting. Thanks to my commentator, Christopher Frey, as well as Christopher Buckels, David Ebrey, Emily Fletcher, Dhananjay Jagannathan, Christopher Shields, Robin Smith and the other auditors. Thanks also to Howard Nye and Martin Tweedale for discussion. I gratefully acknowledge the support of a University of Alberta Vice President Research Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada 4A Grant.
hode ho anthrôpos, this man. Advocates of this interpretation include Patzig and Frede (1988). Smith (1921) rejects this reading on philological grounds: a more natural expression for ‘this one of the suches’ would be tode to ti, with a definite article between the demonstrative and the class-name.

Another option is to take both terms to be class-names and so the full expression refers to something which is both demonstrable and having a general nature. On this interpretation the expression might be translated ‘this such’. Smith influentially advocated this reading and it is endorsed in Owens (1978) and others. However, there are good reasons to reject the reading. First, on this view, the expression is akin to the conjunction tode kai ti. Without the conjunction, the expression strains grammaticality. And second, this reading yields an implausible dialectical role for the use of the expression. Advocates of the ‘this such’ reading tend to view the notion as presupposing several robust alleged Aristotelian theses. For example, Owens (1978, 211-19) views Aristotle’s ascription of tode ti to substance as characterizing substance as somehow beyond the individual-universal contrast. But, as we shall see in the next section, in Aristotle’s uses of the expression he may be relying on an intuitive or pre-theoretical notion.

Finally, some take the first term to be a class-name and so the full expression means the same as ‘some one of the thises’—that is, the expression denotes one unspecified member of the class of demonstrables. On this view, the expression is akin to anthrôpos tis, a certain man. Smith (1921) rejected this reading on the grounds that Aristotle would not recognize a class characterized by concrete individuality. However, the inference that Smith seems to be ascribing to Aristotle is fallacious: that a class isn’t
itself characterized by concrete individuality fails to entail that there could not be a class whose members are characterized by concrete individuality. There is no reason to ascribe this mistake to Aristotle. Moreover, on this reading the class’s members are characterized by demonstrability, not concrete individuality. This reading is now perhaps fairly standard, and I will assume it is correct.

Notice, however, that any of the above three readings entails that what is tode ti is demonstrable. This entailment is commonly but not universally held. For a dissenting view, see Burnyeat (2001, 49 n. 99), who takes tode to be a dummy sortal and ti a particularizing component; on this reading the expression has no demonstrative element and might be translated as ‘a thing of a certain sort’ or ‘a so-and-so’. But I will not assess this dissension. The aim of the paper is to discuss the significance of taking tode ti to entail demonstrability. And although I am following a fairly standard reading, I aim neither to defend further the view that tode ti entails demonstrability, nor to adjudicate further among readings with this entailment.

At the risk of pedantry, let me note that the fairly common translation of tode ti with the expression a ‘this’ suggests that we are mentioning the demonstrative. In calling something tode ti, Aristotle of course does not mean that it is a demonstrative; he implies that it is demonstrable, an item which can be demonstrated as the content of a demonstrative expression. I will use a this or this, without quotation marks, when a translation of tode ti is needed.
I turn to the extension of *tode ti*, and the interpretation of its philosophical role. Aristotle uses the expression in various, seemingly incompatible, ways and so has engendered a wide variety of interpretations. A partial and unsystematic survey of the recent secondary literature yields among interpretations the following referents for *tode ti*:

- a member of an extension and so associated with subjects of predications: Owen (1979, 2)
- something having a structure that is captured by a separate formula or definition: Wedin (2000, 218)
- something definite: Weigelt (2007, 531)
- anything which is both a this and a somewhat; a designated somewhat: Smith (1921, 19)
- sometimes specifies a particular falling under a kind, and sometimes a determinate kind: Gill (1989, 31)
- something determined, and so explanatorily prior to both particulars and universals: Owens (1978, 395)
- substance (perhaps including universal substances): Irwin (1997, 401)
- what can be picked out from its environment as a discrete entity: Sokolonski (1970, 282)
- a complete entity: Loux (1984, 254)
- something separate: Menn (1995, 334)
- something right here: Aygün (2017, 26)

In this section, I will draw on the textual evidence so to offer a *prima facie* argument that Aristotle views individual substances as demonstrable.

It may be useful to classify the textual evidence under four rough headings—rough since there is overlap in usage, as we will see. First, the expression *tode ti* is used to indicate a substance in opposition to items in the nonsubstance categories such as quality and quantity. For example, see the following passages:
Further, we speak in many ways of what is (for on the one hand it indicates a this, and on the other a quantity or quality or any other of the predicates we have distinguished. (De An. 1.5 410a13-15) [my translation]2

ἔτι δὲ πολλαχῶς λεγοµένου τοῦ ὄντος (σηµαίνει γὰρ τὸ μὲν τόδε τι, τὸ δὲ ποσὸν ἢ ποιὸν ἢ καί τίνα ἄλλην τῶν διαιρεθεισῶν κατηγοριῶν)

We speak in many ways of what is, i.e. the ways distinguished earlier in our work on the several ways in which things are spoken of. On the one hand it indicates what a thing is and a this, and on the other of what quality or quantity or any of the other things thus predicated. But while what is is spoken of in these various ways, it is clear that the primary thing that is is what thing is, which indicates substance. (Metaph. 7.1 1028a10-15) [modified from Bostock (1994)]

tὸ δὲ λέγεται πολλαχῶς, καθάπερ διειλόµεθα πρότερον ἐν τοῖς περὶ τοῦ ποσαχῶς: σηµαίνει γὰρ τὸ μὲν τί ἐστὶ καὶ τόδε τι, τὸ δὲ ποσὸν ἢ ποιὸν ἢ τὸν ἄλλον ἔκαστον τὸν οὕτω κατηγορουµένων. τοσαυταχῶς δὲ λεγοµένου τοῦ ὄντος φανερὸν ὅτι τούτων πρῶτον ὅν τὸ τί ἐστίν, ὅπερ σηµαίνει τὴν οὐσίαν

Both T1 and T2 contrast a way of speaking of what is that indicates a this with other categories. T2 notes that this way of speaking also indicates what a thing is (to ti esti) and a substance (ousia); T2 also explicitly references the Categories. Substances are contrasted with accidents at:

Again, certain items are not said of some other underlying subject: e.g. whereas what is walking is something different walking (and similarly for what is white), substances, i.e. whatever indicates a this, are not just what they are in virtue of being something different. Well, items which are not said of an underlying subject I call things in themselves, and those which are said of an underlying subject I call accidental. (APo 1.4 73b5-10) [modified from Barnes (2002).]

2 Except where noted, translations are from the Clarendon Aristotle Series.
Talk of what is not said of an underlying subject in T3 suggests that Aristotle is speaking of individual substances: Aristotle characterizes such items as not predicated of a subject at for example Cat. 5 2a11-14. Note that in T3 Aristotle contrasts being a this with being what an item is in virtue of also being something else: I will return to this contrast in the next section of the paper. Other examples of tode ti indicating substance in contrast to nonsubstances include 1030a19, b11 and 32a15.

At other times, the expression indicates substance without an explicit contrast. For example, Aristotle writes: "for a substance is a unitary thing, and indicates a this, as we say" (καὶ γὰρ ἡ οὐσία ἐν τι καὶ τόδε τι σημαίνει, ὡς φαμέν) (Metaph. 7.1 1037b26-27) [modified from Bostock (1994)]. Cf. 1039a30-32, b4. And Aristotle sometimes uses a conjunctive expression ‘a this and a substance’ (tode ti kai ousian), which may be pleonastic; see for example 1060b1, and compare the following passage:

T4 Further, it is absurd and impossible that a this and a substance, if it is composed of anything, should be composed not substances, nor of a this, but of a quality. For then the quality, which is not a substance, will be prior to the substance and the this. (Metaph. 7.13 1038b23-27)

ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἀδύνατον καὶ ἄτοπον τὸ τόδε καὶ οὐσίαν, εἰ ἔστιν ἐκ τινων, μὴ ἐξ οὐσίων εἶναι μηδ’ ἐκ τοῦ τόδε τι ἄλλ’ ἐκ ποιοῦ: πρῶτερον γὰρ ἔσται μὴ οὐσία τε καὶ τὸ ποιὸν οὐσίας τε καὶ τοῦ τόδε.

In T4 Aristotle conjoins ‘substance’ with todode, but the use may be equivalent to tode ti kai ousian at 1060b1, as Bostock’s translation suggests.

Aristotle also uses the expression to indicate a mark of substantiality, and so is used to support or reject a candidate for being the substance of a thing. The expression supports the candidacy of form, the formula, the what a thing is (ti esti), and the essence (to ti ēn einai). I will discuss this usage below. And the expression is used to reject an
item’s candidacy for being a substance or the substance of a thing. For example, Aristotle rejects that bodies and geometric properties of bodies are substances at

\[ T5 \]

A question connected with these [other aporia] is whether numbers and bodies and planes and points are substances of a kind, or not. If they are not, it baffles us to say what being is and what the substances of things are. For modifications and movements and relations and dispositions and ratios do not seem to indicate the substance of anything; for all are predicated of a subject, and none is a this. And as to things which might seem most of all to indicate substance, water and earth and fire and air, of which composite bodies consist, heat and cold and the like are modifications of these, but substances and the body which is thus modified alone persists as something real and as a substance. \( (\text{Metaph. } 3.5 \text{1001b}26-2\text{a}4) \) [modified from Ross (1941)]

\[ \tauούτων δ’ ἐχομένη ἄπορία πότερον οἱ ἀριθμοὶ καὶ τὰ σώματα καὶ τὰ ἐπίπεδα καὶ αἱ στιγμαὶ οὐσίαι τινὲς εἰσίν ἢ οὐ. εἰ μὲν γὰρ μὴ εἰσίν, διαφεύγει τί τὸ ὑπὸ καὶ τίνες αἱ οὐσίαι τῶν ὄντων: τὰ μὲν γὰρ πάθη καὶ αἱ κινήσεις καὶ τὰ πρός τι καὶ αἱ διαθέσεις καὶ οἱ λόγοι οὐθένος δοκοῦσιν οὐσίαν σημαίνειν (λέγονται γὰρ πάντα καθ᾽ ὑποκείμενον τινός, καὶ οὐθέν τὸ ὄν τὸ ὄνομα τὰ τούτα πεπονθὸς μονὸν υπομένει ὡς ὅν τι καὶ οὐσία τάς οὖσας.

Aristotle tentatively canvasses that elements are substances in \( T5 \) and in other passages, such as \( \text{De Caelo} \ 1.8 \text{298a}29-32; \) I will return to this point. The substantiality of so-called kooky objects such as pale man is rejected in the following passage:

\[ T6 \]

an essence is just what is a this, but when one thing is predicated of another we do not have just what is some this. Thus a pale man is not just what is some this, if indeed thisness belongs only to substances. \( (\text{Metaph. } 7.4 \text{1030a}3-5) \) [modified from Bostock (1994)]

\[ όπερ γὰρ τί ἔστι τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι: ὅταν δ’ ἄλλο κατ’ ἄλλου λέγηται, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπερ τὸ ὄνομα τὰς οὐσίας ὑπάρχει μόνον τὸ τὸ ὄνομα τὰς οὐσίας ὑπάρχει μόνον.

Bostock reasonably inserts a \( τοδε \) before the first \( τι \) at \( a3 \). Aristotle might show some mild hesitancy in \( T6 \) in associating \( τοδε τι \) with only substances. Notice that Aristotle here associates being a this with being an essence; I will return to this point. Other candidates rejected for being substance due to their not being thises include matter and universals;
these are discussed below. Gathering this first class of textual evidence together, one might hold that Aristotle intends to use the expression so to indicate substantiality or to pick out substances.

In a second class of textual evidence, Aristotle uses *tode ti* to indicate an individual in opposition to a universal. For example, he writes:

**T7**

All substances appear to indicate a this. In the case of primary substances, this is indisputably true, for they are clearly indivisible and numerically one. It seems from the form of speech—when we speak, for example, of ‘man’ or ‘animal’—that a secondary substance also indicates a this. But this is not strictly true: a secondary substance indicates more a certain quality (*poion ti*), for it is not one subject like a primary substance; but ‘man’ or ‘animal’ is predicated of many things. *Categories 5* (310-18) [modified from Ackrill (1963)]

Πᾶσα δὲ οὐσία δοκεῖ τόδε τι σημαίνειν. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν ἀναμφισβήτητον καὶ ἀληθὲς ἐστιν ὅτι τόδε τι σημαίνει• ἄτομον γὰρ καὶ ἐν ἀριθμῷ τὸ δηλούμενον ἐστιν. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν δευτέρων οὐσιῶν φαίνεται μὲν ὁμοίως τῷ σχήματι τῆς προσηγορίας τόδε τι σημαίνειν, ὅταν εἴπῃ ἄνθρωπον ἢ ζῶον• οὐ μὴν ἀληθὲς γε, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ποιόν τι σημαίνει, — οὐ γὰρ ἐν ἑστὶ τὸ ύποκείμενον ὃσπερ ἡ πρώτη οὐσία, ἀλλὰ κατὰ πολλῶν ὁ ἄνθρωπος λέγεται καὶ τὸ ζῶον.

In contrast with passages such as **T1** and **T2**, which contrast substances with nonsubstances, **T7** concerns a distinction within the category of substance between individual and universal substances. Aristotle suggests in **T7** that being the referent of a substantive term gives the misleading impression of being demonstrable. But where a primary or individual substance is *tode ti*, Aristotle denies that universals are demonstrable. Rather, he characterizes a universal with the expression *poion ti*—a certain nature, kind or quality. Elsewhere, Aristotle uses *toionde*—‘a such’ or ‘a so-and-so’. For example, Aristotle writes

**T8**

it is clear that none of the things that belong universally is a substance, and also because none of the things predicated in common indicates a this but
rather a so-and-so (toionde). *Metaphysics* 7.13 (1038\ber{35}-9\ser{2}) [modified from Bostock (1994)]

φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδὲν τῶν καθόλου ύπαρχόντων οὐσία ἐστὶ, καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲν σημαίνει τῶν κοινῆς κατηγορουμένων τόδε τι, ἄλλα τοιόνδε.

Aristotle appears to endorse several conditions in T7 and T8. Being *tode ti* is arguably a necessary condition for being a primary or individual substance. And being predicated of many subjects is arguably sufficient for being not *tode ti* but rather *toinde*. As in T8,

Aristotle also claims that no common term denotes a this in the following passage:

T9

> If [principles] are universal, they will not be substances. For nothing that is common indicates a this, but rather a such; but substance is a this. But if it is to be possible to posit that which is predicated in common as a this and one thing, then Socrates will be many animals: himself, the human, and the animal, if each of these indicates a this and one thing. (*Metaph.* 3.13 1003\ber{7}-12) [modified from Bostock (1994)]

> εἰ μὲν γὰρ καθόλου, οὐκ ἔσονται οὐσίαι (οὐθὲν γὰρ τῶν κοινῶν τόδε τι σημαίνει ἄλλα τοιόνδε, ἢ δὲ οὐσία τόδε τι: εἰ δὲ ἔσται τόδε τι καὶ ἐν θέσθαι τὸ κοινῆς κατηγοροῦμενον, πολλὰ ἔσται ζῷα ὁ Σωκράτης, αὐτὸς τε καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ ζῷον, εἶπερ σημαίνει ἐκαστὸν τόδε τι καὶ ἐν)

Although Aristotle is discussing an *aporia* in T9, he appears to endorse the rejection of demonstrability of universals. It is not clear whether being numerically one is a distinct mark of substance or a consequence of being a this. But Aristotle may view being demonstrable as sufficient for being numerically one. More controversially, some scholars take being indivisible and numerically one to be a sufficient condition for being *tode ti*. If this is right, then individuals in categories other than substance may also be thises. I will discuss this controversy in §5. Gathering this second class of textual evidence together, one might hold that Aristotle intends with the expression *tode ti* to indicate the particularity, individuality or numerical oneness of individuals.
A third class of textual evidence. The expression *tode ti* is used to indicate a form or essence in opposition to matter, accident or the hylomorphic compound. For example, form as contrasted with matter and the hylomorphic compound:

**T10** Now we speak of one particular kind of existent things as substance, and under this heading we so speak of one thing *qua* matter, which in itself is not a this, another *qua* shape (*morphēn*) and form (*eidos*), in virtue of which it is then spoken of as a this, and a third *qua* the product of these two. *De An.* 2.1 412a6-9 [modified from Hamlyn (1968)]

λέγομεν δὴ γένος ἐν τί τῶν ὄντων τῇ οὐσίαν, ταύτης δὲ τὸ μέν, ὡς ὑλὴν, δ' καθ' αὐτὸ ὡς ἔστι τὸδε τί, ἐπερον δὲ μορφήν καὶ εἶδος, καθ' ἦν ἦδη λέγεται τόδε τι, καὶ τρίτον τὸ ἐκ τούτων.

Notice that **T10** also associates *tode ti* with substance: it is the form insofar as it is a candidate for being the substance of a thing that it is a this. The term *morphē* is a common synonym for *eidos*. Form is also contrasted with matter or the hylomorphic compound in terms of demonstrability at 1017b25, 42a26-31, 49a35 and 70b9-13. In related usage, Aristotle takes *tode ti* to indicate the formula (*logos*) and the shape (*morphē*) in contrast to the matter, at **T14**, discussed below. The term *logos* is another common substitute for *eidos*. We have already seen Aristotle associating *tode ti* with what a thing is (*ti esti*) in **T2**, if *to men ti esti kai tode ti* is pleonastic. And he associates *tode ti* with the essence (*to ti en einai*) in **T6**, assuming the supplied *tode* is correct.

Perhaps on the basis of this evidence, some scholars hold that Aristotle intends to indicate the determinateness of individual substances or that individual substances are particular things of a certain nature. Bostock (1994: 83-4), for example, canvasses the suggestion that what is *tode ti* is something definite and determinate, and so opposed to what is indefinite and indeterminate. Bostock finds this suggestion promising, although he notes that it is difficult to explicate an account of definiteness that would be appropriate for all uses for the expression. Furthermore, as Bostock notes, it is curious
that Aristotle would mean determinate by *tode ti*, since ‘determinate’ is available in the Greek as *horiston*; and Aristotle calls ‘indefinite’ or *ahoriston* the universal as contrasted with the particular, and a privation or matter as contrasted with form. So much for the first three classes of textual evidence.

Here is a preliminary argument that *tode ti* picks out individual substances, essences or forms: the reading makes the best sense of the textual evidence which we have seen so far. Aristotle asserts that substances or the substance of a thing (characterized variously as its essence or form) and individuals are demonstrable. He denies the demonstrability of items in nonsubstance categories, along with accidents, privations, universals, hylomorphic compounds and matter. Putting the textual evidence together provides an argument by elimination. Aristotle sees individuals as demonstrable but we have yet to see good reason to include individuals in nonsubstance categories, and there is a reason to reject the inclusion, since Aristotle denies demonstrability of items in nonsubstance categories. (I will consider further whether there is indeed reason to include nonsubstantial individuals among the demonstrable items later in the paper.) Aristotle sees substances as demonstrable, but denies demonstrability of universal substances. And Aristotle sees as demonstrable essences and forms, which he associates with individual substances, and arguably views as the substance of individual substances, or as that in which lies the substantiality of individual substances.

The conclusion of this preliminary argument might be resisted. Here is a first line of resistance. One who holds that *tode ti* indicates substantiality might try to explain away the apparent prohibition against universal substances; and one who holds that *tode ti* indicates individuality, and so views nonsubstantial individuals as demonstrable, might
aim to explain away the apparent prohibition against items in nonsubstantial categories. But there is at least this *prima facie* argument for the view that only individual substances are demonstrable, and I will provide further support for the view in the coming sections of the paper. A second line of resistance. The preliminary argument might suggest that we ascribe to Aristotle individual forms and essences, and some scholars might balk at such a commitment. The association of individual substances, forms and essences as all demonstrable perhaps does not *force* the view that there are individual forms and essences, but the two views are natural allies. For what it’s worth, I am sympathetic to the view that there are individual forms. And again, further support for the association of individual substances and essences is forthcoming.

Before proceeding, let me present a fourth and problematic class of textual evidence. The expression *tode ti* is also rarely used to indicate matter or the hylomorphic compound of form and matter. For example, perhaps indicating the compound as opposed to the form at

**T11**  
Indeed everything has matter of some sort unless it is not a this but an essence and a form itself in its own right. (*Metaph.* 7.11 1037a1-2)  
καὶ παντὸς γὰρ ὕλη τις ἐστιν ὁ μὴ ἔστι τὶ ἢν εἶναι καὶ εἴδος αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ ἀλλὰ τόδε τι.

Aristotle is arguing in **T11** that even mathematical objects have a kind of matter, since only unembodied forms, which are not thises, lack matter. Aristotle appears to view matter as a this, in contrast to form and privation, at

**T12**  
Now the subject is one numerically, though it is two in form. (For it is the man, the gold—the ‘matter’ generally—that is counted, for it is more of the nature of a this, and what comes to be does not come from it in virtue of a concomitant attribute; the privation, on the other hand, and the contrary are incidental in the process.) (*Phys.* 1.7 190b23-27) [modified from Hardie and Gaye]
ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν ύποκείμενον ἄριθμῷ μὲν ἕν, εἰδεὶ δὲ δύο (ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ χρυσός καὶ ἄλλος ἡ ὕλη ἄριθμητη· τὸ δὲ γὰρ τι μᾶλλον, καὶ οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἢ αὐτοῦ γίγνεται τὸ γιγνόμενον· ἡ δὲ στέρησις καὶ ἡ ἕναντίωσις συμβεβηκός).

T12 occurs in context of a discussion of change where matter plays the role of the persistent substratum through changes from one form to its privation. And tote ti indicates the matter in qualified ways in the following two passages. First, matter is a this in appearance, as opposed to form, which is an unqualified this, at

T13 There are three kinds of substance—the matter, which is a this in appearance (for all things that are characterized by contact and not by organic unity are matter and substratum); the nature, which is a this or positive state towards which movement takes place; and again, thirdly, the particular substance which is composed of these two, e.g. Socrates or Callias. (Metaph. 12.3 1070a9-13) [modified from Ross (1941)]

οὐσίαι δὲ τρεῖς, ἢ μὲν ὕλη τόδε τι οὖσα τῷ φαίνεσθαι (ὅσα γὰρ ἂρ ἄρῃ καὶ μὴ συμφύσει, ὕλη καὶ ὑποκείμενον), ἢ δὲ φύσις τόδε τι καὶ ἔξις τις εἰς ἣν: ἔτι τρίτη ἢ ἐκ τούτων ἢ καθ’ ἔκκαστα, οἷον Σοκράτης ἢ Καλλίας. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τινὸν τὸ τόδε τι οὐκ ἔστι παρὰ τὴν συνθετὴν οὐσίαν, οἷον οἰκίας τὸ εἴδος

And second, matter is a this potentially, in opposition to form, which is again an unqualified this, at

T14 What underlies is a substance, and in one way this is the matter (by which I mean that which is not a this in actuality, but is a a this potentially), though in another way it is the formula and the shape (which is a this and is separable in formula). (Metaph. 8.1 1042b27-9)

ἔστι δ’ οὐσία τὸ ύποκείμενον, ἄλλως μὲν ἡ ὕλη (ὕλην δὲ λέγω ἢ μὴ τόδε τι οὖσα ἐνεργείᾳ δυνάμει ἔστι τόδε τι), ἄλλως δ’ ὁ λόγος καὶ ἡ μορφή, ὁ τόδε τι ὑν τῷ λόγῳ χωριστὸν ἔστιν.

I mentioned this passage earlier: as in T10, Aristotle is using synonyms for form, here logos and morphē. Explaining outliers such as T11-14 is a desideratum for any interpretation of tote ti. I will return in §4 to this issue.
To sum up this section, the four classes of textual evidence present a mixed picture, and this has given aid and comfort to the variety of interpretations surveyed at the beginning of the section. The first class of evidence has suggested to some that *tode ti* expresses substantiality; the second class, particularity, individuality or numerical oneness; and the third, determinateness. I have argued that the evidence of the first three classes of evidence suggests that individual substances, forms and essences are demonstrable. However, the expression *tode ti* certainly does not mean the same as expressions such as ‘individual’, ‘particular’, ‘substance’, ‘individual substance’, ‘form’, ‘essence’ or ‘determinate’. And although scholars take one stand or another on what feature of individual substances is that to which Aristotle is referring, there’s remarkably little discussion in the secondary literature on what Aristotle might mean by the expression. What is it to demonstrate? I turn next to this question.

In this section, I will draw lightly on recent work in linguistics and the philosophy of language on demonstratives. I do not ascribe to Aristotle a contemporary interest in offering a *theory* of demonstration. Rather, I aim to use our best current understanding of demonstratives as an interpretative tool so to better explain why Aristotle characterizes individual substances as *tode ti*.

Let me begin by contrasting indexicals and demonstratives. Both indexicals and demonstratives are contextually sensitive expressions. Indexicals pick up their referent from contextual parameters. For example, an utterance of ‘I’ refers to the speaker.
Demonstratives, by contrast, pick up a referent through an associated demonstration. For Kaplan (1989a), demonstrations typically present a demonstratum in a certain way that can be represented by a definite description. Kaplan introduces $dthat$ terms, which are terms with the form ‘$dthat[t]$’ with $t$ a singular term, such as a proper name or definite description. Then we can use ‘$dthat[the guy I am pointing to]$’ to represent the speaker’s use of ‘that’ while presenting someone through pointing.

Both indexicals and demonstratives are devices of direct reference: their content is an object, not a descriptive condition that determines a referent. In the case of a demonstrative, that object is the salient content for evaluating the truth of assertions that contain that demonstrative. We demonstrate a demonstratum and take that very object to the circumstances of evaluation. A demonstration might be represented with a description, as in our ‘$dthat[the guy I am pointing to]$’ example. But once we have succeeded in picking out an object, that description is inert in evaluating assertions about that demonstrated object. A true description, in contrast to a demonstrative, generally gives us a condition which is to be applied in each circumstance of evaluation so to determine a referent in those circumstances.

The contrast between demonstratives and descriptions is vivid in modal contexts. For example, suppose that I point to Barack Obama. Then my utterance of ‘$dthat[the guy I am pointing to]$ might not have been the forty-fourth President’ is true but ‘The forty-fourth President might not have been the forty-fourth President’ is, under one disambiguation, false. The contrast between demonstrations and descriptions however is not a modal distinction. Both singular demonstratives and rigidified descriptions such as ‘the actual forty-fourth President’ pick out an object which is the relevant object for all
circumstances of evaluation in which that object exists. ‘The actual forty-fourth President might not have been the forty-fourth President’ is unambiguously true. But demonstrations and rigidified descriptions still differ in semantic role: a rigidifying description uses that description in any circumstance of evaluation; the completing demonstration, once it picks out an object in a context, is by contrast idle in evaluations. A rigidified description such as such as ‘the actual forty-fourth President’ is a rigid designator (since it picks out the same object in every world where that object exists) but is not a directly referential expression (since the description is a part of content of the expression). As Kaplan (1989b, 579) recognizes, this difference between direct reference and rigid designation is obscured in his original presentation of the logic of demonstratives.

The interpretative suggestion is that Aristotle’s contrast between tode ti and toinde is a distinction between two modes of reference. One may point out an object as a demonstratum. Or one may get onto an object as whatever satisfies a given description.

It is an intriguing observation to note certain parallels between the contrast between direct reference and rigid designation and Aristotle’s views on essence, propria and accidents. Aristotle distinguishes an essence from both accidents or contingent properties, and propria, necessary but inessential properties. It is tempting to think of accidents as affiliated with descriptions and propria as affiliated with rigid descriptions. A traditional proprium for a human is risibility. ‘Callias is risible’ is true in every circumstance of evaluation in which Callias exists; and the semantic content of ‘risible’—the contribution the expression makes to the truth conditions of the proposition expressed by ‘Callias is risible’—is a descriptive condition which, as it turns out, is satisfied by Callias in all
worlds inhabited by him. A statement identifying Callias’ individual substance, essence or form, by contrast, is arguably directly referential, and does not pick out an object by mediation through a descriptive condition. To take this view is not to claim that Callias’ individual essence is unstructured, and Callias may be essentially a rational animal, without a term picking out that essence thereby having a descriptive condition as its content.

Defending this line of interpretation would take us far from the local aims of this paper. But let me note that some of the textual evidence considered in §2 at least gels with the suggestions of the previous paragraph. For example, the interpretation is consonant with the association of tode ti with what a thing is (ti esti) in T2 and with essence (to ti en einai) in T6. And the interpretation is consonant with the contrast between what is tode ti and what is poion ti or toionde in T7 and T8, respectively; for these latter two expressions seem to indicate descriptive conditions. Compare the contrast in T12 between what is a this and what holds in virtue of a concomitant attribute. Or the contrast in T3 between what indicates a this and what is just what it is in virtue of being something different. Of course, these observations fall short of proving the interpretation and I must leave the proposal as something of a conjecture.

Let me address a potential misunderstanding. The interpretation of tode ti I am putting forward might suggest to the reader that I take the expression to refer to haecceities. There are certainly similarities. But I do not ascribe to Aristotle an interest in the technical problems of transworld identity in modal semantics. And the distinction between tode ti and toindev on this reading bears similarities to the classic distinction between de re and de dicto scope disambiguations. Again there are similarities. But I do
not ascribe to Aristotle an interest here in scope distinctions. The distinction underlying issues of both transworld identity and scope disambiguation is an intuitive and pre-theoretical contrast between what objects may satisfy a given description and what descriptions may hold of a given object. The interpretation I am putting forward draws on this intuitive contrast. Aristotle of course does not provide a detailed account of the tode ti terminology, and this might suggest that it is his intention to appeal to a pre-theoretical notion and not to a technical concept heavily invested in Aristotelian machinery or caught up in topics in linguistics, modal logic or the philosophy of language.

Before addressing objections, let me note that this interpretation is arguably consistent with Plato’s usage. Plato also distinguishes between the demonstrable and the descriptive at Timaeus 49d-50a:

T15 what we invariably observe becoming different at different times—fire for example—to characterize that, i.e., fire, not as “this,” but each time as “what is such,” and speak of water not as “this,” but always as “what is such.” And never to speak of anything else as “this,” as though it has some stability, of all the things at which we point and use the expressions “that” and “this” and so think we are designating something. For it gets away without abiding the charge of “that” and “this,” or any other expression that indicts them of being stable. It is in fact safest not to refer to it by any of these expressions. Rather, “what is such”—coming around like what it was, again and again—that’s the thing to call it in each and every case. So fire—and generally everything that has becoming—it is safest to call “what is altogether such.” But that in which they each appear to keep coming into being and from which they subsequently pass out of being, that’s the only thing to refer to by means of the expressions “that” and “this.” A thing that is some “such” or other, however,—hot or white, say, or any one of the opposites, and all things constituted by these—should be called none of these things [i.e., “this” or ‘that”] [Zeyl (2000) translation]

ἀεὶ ὃ καθορῶμεν ἄλλοτε ἄλλη γιγνόμενον, ὡς πῦρ, μὴ τούτο ἄλλα τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐκάστοτε προσαγορεύειν πῦρ, μηδὲ ὑδωρ τούτο ἄλλα τὸ τοιούτον ἄει, μηδὲ ἄλλο ποτὲ μηδὲν ὡς τινα ἔχον βεβαιότητα, ὡς δεικνύντες τῷ ρήματι τῷ τόδε καὶ τούτῳ προσαχρόμενοι ὁμοίωθα τε: φεύγει γὰρ οὕχ ύπομένον τὴν τοῦ τόδε καὶ τούτο καὶ τῆς τοῦτο καὶ πᾶσαν ὅση μόνιμα ὡς ὅντα αὐτὰ ἐνδείκνυται φάσις, ἄλλα ταῦτα μὲν ἐκαστα μὴ λέγειν, τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον ἄει περιφερόμενον ὅμοιον ἐκάστου πέρι καὶ συμπάντων οὕτω
καλεῖν, καὶ ὅτι καὶ πῦρ τὸ δὶὰ παντὸς τοιοῦτον, καὶ ἂπαν δὸςονπερ ἢν ἔχη γένεσιν: ἐν οἷ δὲ ἐγγιγνόμενα ἂεὶ ἐκαστὰ αὐτῶν φαντάζεται καὶ πάλιν ἐκεῖθεν ἤπόλλυται, μόνον ἐκείνο αὐτὸ προσαγορεύειν τῷ τῇ τούτῳ καὶ τῷ τόδε προσχρωμένους ὀνόματι, τὸ δὲ ὀποιονδήποτε λέγον ἢ καὶ ὀτιοῦν τῶν ἐναντίων, καὶ πάνθ᾽ ὢσα ἐκ τουτων, μηδὲν ἐκείνο αὐτοῦ τούτων καλείν.

**T15** occurs within an argument for the existence of receptacles. Plato asserts here that what is changing is indemonstrable. Plato’s argument for the thesis that particulars are indemonstrable stems from the premise that stability is a necessary condition for demonstrability (and of course the Platonic view that particulars are unstable). As Fine (1993, 56) and others point out, change in Plato often concerns not merely variation over times, but also the “compresence of opposites,” variation in different contexts or in relation to different relata. Plato holds that particulars lack a state, unvarying across times, contexts or relations, that may be picked out by demonstration. Particulars merely satisfy or fail to satisfy a description at some time, in some context or in relation to some relatum. Plato makes a similar point at *Theaetetus* 157b; speaking of Heracliteanism, he writes

**T16** The verb ‘to be’ must be totally abolished—though indeed we have been led by habit and ignorance into using it ourselves more than once, even in what we have just been saying. That is wrong, these wise men tell us, nor should we allow the use of such words as ‘something’, ‘of something’, or ‘mine’ ‘this’ or ‘that’, or any other name that makes things stand still. We ought, rather, to speak according to nature and refer to things as ‘becoming’. [Levett translation in Burnyeat (1990).]

τὸ δ’ εἶναι πανταχόθεν ἐξαιρετέον, οὕτω στὶ ἡμεῖς πολλὰ καὶ ἄρτι ἴναγκάσμεθα ὑπὸ συνθείας καὶ ἁνεπιστημοσύνης χρῆσθαι αὐτῶ. τὸ δ᾽ οὐ δεῖ, ὡς ὁ τῶν σοφῶν λόγος, οὕτε τι συγχωρεῖν οὕτε τοῦ οὔτε ἐμὸδιο οὔτε τόδε οὔτ᾽ ἐκεῖνο οὔτε ᾠλο οὐδὲν ὅνομα ὃτι ἂν ἰστη, ᾲλλὰ κατὰ φύσιν φθέγγεσθαι γιγνόμενα

In **T16** Plato does not contrast the demonstrable and the ‘suchlike’, as in **T15**. But he does arguably emphasize that directly referential terms such as demonstratives fix a
Aristotle and Plato arguably agree that what is demonstrable is some realized object, form or state, invariant over circumstances of evaluation. They differ of course on the extension of *tode ti*, and Aristotle opposes Plato in holding that at least some particulars are demonstrable.

I gave an argument in the previous section that the sum of textual evidence suggests that *tode ti* picks out individual substances, forms and essences. A result of this suggestion is that Aristotle views individual substances, forms and essences as demonstrable, and such items as universals and matter, as merely describable. One might object that we can clearly demonstrate universals and material, and so the interpretation saddles Aristotle with obviously false views. Can I not, in pointing to Fido, demonstrate not the particular dog but the species?

One way to handle this objection is to distinguish between direct and indirect demonstration. Consider the case of demonstrating a species. I directly demonstrate, typically through an act of pointing, an individual member of the species. But I can do so with the intention of getting my interlocutor onto some other object. Let’s say that I indirectly demonstrate the species. Notice that I succeed in indirectly demonstrating an intended referent only by successfully directly demonstrating an appropriate individual. And similar comments might be made for other cases of indirect demonstration. This distinction between direct and indirect demonstration may be illustrated in the contrast between Kaplan’s (1989a) and (1989b) discussions of demonstration. Kaplan (1989a, 490) characterizes a demonstration as “typically, though not invariably, a (visual)
presentation of a local object discriminated by a pointing.” Kaplan (1989b, 582), on the other hand, views a demonstration as “typically directed by the speaker’s intention to point at a perceived individual on whom he has focused.” Kaplan’s views received considerable critical attention, but this literature need not detain us. The suggestion is that Aristotle reserves tode ti for items that can be directly demonstrated.

In this section and the next, I address the question whether matter or individuals in categories other than substance are directly demonstrable. First: does Aristotle hold that we can directly demonstrate material items? The textual evidence canvassed in §2 gives a somewhat mixed picture. Recall that Aristotle appears to deny that matter is demonstrable in passages such as T10. But he appears to view matter as at least qualifiedly demonstrable in passages such as T13 and T14.

Moreover, as Robin Smith points out to me in conversation, one can form in Greek complex demonstrative expressions with mass terms. In Greek, one can prefix an article with demonstrative force to a mass term. The Greek to hudōr would in this usage be translated as ‘this water’. The use of the article as a demonstrative is rare except with particles, such as in ho men ... ho de, which might be translated as ‘this … that’: see Smyth (1920, §§1106-7). But Smith is surely right that, if Aristotle rejects the demonstrability of matter, it is not due to limitations in the expressive power of Greek.

How can we accommodate this mixed evidence? Here’s a suggestion. Let’s distinguish between the material substance and the matter of a hylomorphic compound.
Callias’ flesh, as the matter of the compound substance, is a potentiality relative to Callias’ form. Flesh, so described, is a capacity for realizing a certain state or ability to perform actions characteristic of humans. But the flesh is of course an entity that can be characterized independently of its role in a hylomorphic compound: Callias’ flesh is a portion of elemental matter such as earth, with specific features that distinguish it from other materials. It may be that Aristotle denies substantiality to matter, the material viewed in relation to a hylomorphic compound, while taking the material, viewed as an entity characterized independently from that compound, as a substance.

Positing an ambiguity is just one way of handling apparent textual inconsistency. But there are independent reasons for making something like this distinction. Aristotle frequently speaks as though matter such as flesh is itself a hylomorphic compound with elements such as earth as its matter. As we have seen, he canvasses the substantiality of the elements in passages such as T5. And the distinction I am drawing bears some similarities to other distinctions in the secondary literature. For example, Gill (1989, 128) and Whiting (1992) make a distinction between the proximate matter, which is essentially compounded with a given form, and the distal matter, which is merely accidentally so compounded.

This distinction between material substance and matter corresponds well to the distinction between two ways of picking out an object, demonstration and description. Callias’ flesh, viewed as matter, is identified as whatever satisfies a certain description, cashed out in terms of the potential to realize certain states and dispositions towards action. Callias’ flesh, viewed as a material substance, is identifiable without reference to Callias, the hylomorphic compound, the form, or the first or second actualities associated
with Callias’ life activities. My suggestion is that the material substance is something which can be identified through demonstration. And to return to Robin Smith’s observation, although I am unaware of the article used demonstratively, concatenated with a mass term, in Aristotle, the usage is available to him to pick out material substances.

Notice that the descriptive requirement restricts what material substance can realize the role of matter for a given compound. Jello makes for a poor knife. Do the requirements for realizing complex functions—such as those associated with human abilities—allow for a variety of materials to do the job? Perhaps. But perhaps not, and nothing I am saying here hinges on whether Aristotelian forms are multiply realizable. The point here is akin to the point made above about rigidified descriptions: satisfaction is a mode of identification different from ostension, even if there is no possibility of a different object satisfying the description. I discuss related issues in Corkum (2013).

There are alternative responses that could be made. For example, Quine (1960, 101) suggests that a mass term within a complex demonstrative is elliptical for an appropriate count noun. So, for example, ‘this water’ is equivalent to ‘this body of water’. This approach would allow one to retain the requirement that a demonstratum has determinate individuation conditions. But the approach would have the disadvantage that an element is strictly speaking indemonstrable: the expression ‘this water’ is meaningful, but does not pick out the element so much as a determinate portion of the element. I doubt that the textual evidence is happily read in this way.
Here’s an objection to the claim that there are material substances, which I’ve heard in conversation. Aristotle holds that substances cannot have substances as proper parts:

**T17** It is impossible for a substance to be composed of substances present in it in actuality. For what is in actuality two things cannot also be in actuality one thing, though a thing may be one and at the same time potentially two. *(Metaph. 7.13 1039a3-6)*

έτι δὲ καὶ ὁδὲ δήλω, ἀδύνατον γὰρ οὐσίαν ἐξ οὐσιῶν εἶναι ἐνυπαρχοντός ὡς ἐντελεχείᾳ: τὰ γὰρ δύο οὕτως ἐντελεχείᾳ οὐδέποτε ἐν ἐντελεχείᾳ, ἀλλ᾽ ἐὰν δυνάμει δύο ἡ, ἐσται ἐν

So, the objection continues, body parts and the elements out of which they are composed cannot be themselves substances.

In response, even if one takes the prohibition against substantial parts as excluding material substances as being parts of compound substances, one might nonetheless hold that the corresponding matter, which is not a substance, is a part. On this reading, compound substances are not mereologically composed by material substances, which are ostensively and independently identified entities, but by matter, which are whatever satisfies the salient description referencing the dispositions and activities of the compound substance. The former are actual substances; the latter, mere potentialities.

And **T17** merely excludes actual substances from being parts of substances. This interpretative line would also make sense of passages where Aristotle appears to endorse the possibility that a substance could have substantial parts. For example Aristotle characterizes nonsubstantial items as present in a subject (in **T20**, discussed below). He then addresses a worry raised by this characterization in the following passage.

**T18** We need not be disturbed by any fear that we may be forced to say that the parts of a substance, being in a subject (the whole substance), are not
substances. For when we spoke of things in a subject we did not mean things belonging in something as parts. (Cat. 5 3\textsuperscript{a}29-31)

Here too we might read Aristotle as canvassing the thesis that there can be substantial parts of substances. But Aristotle may be allowing for the parts of a substance being identified as material substances. The interpretative move I am sketching, drawing on the distinction between material substances and matter, is thus consistent with the thesis that no substance has actual substantial parts.

Here’s a second objection. As noted in §2, Aristotle canvasses the substantiality of elements and body parts in T\textsuperscript{5} and elsewhere. But he goes on to reject that elements and body parts are substances:

T\textsuperscript{19} It is clear that even of the things that are commonly thought to be substances the majority are potentialities. This applies both to the parts of animals, since none of them exist when separated (and when they are separated then too they are all as matter), and to earth and fire and air. For none of these is a unity, but as it were a heap, until they are concocted and some unity is formed from them. (Metaph. 7.16 1040\textsuperscript{b}5-10)

Aristotle’s reason for rejecting the substantiality of elements and body parts is that these are both mere potentialities: the latter lack genuine separability, and the former are mere aggregates. Compare the characterization of matter as potentially a this in T\textsuperscript{14}. I read T\textsuperscript{19} as rejecting that elements and body parts are substances when considered as matter, not when considered as material substances. But others take Aristotle to be denying substantiality altogether to elements and body parts. Sokolonski (1970), for example,
holds that Aristotle rejects that these are substances since, although they exhibit one kind of unity—namely, continuous extension—they lack the kind of unity required by substances—namely, that they be separate and thises. As mentioned above, Sokolonski (1970, 282) takes the tode ti locution to identify an entity which can be picked out from its environment as a discrete entity. Although I have an available response—Aristotle denies demonstrability only of matter, not material substances—Sokolonski raises an issue that might be formulated as an objection to this move.

We might view as a requirement for direct demonstration that the referent have determinate individuation conditions. For the act of demonstration requires that we pick an object out from its environment. As stuff, elements lack individuation conditions and so cannot be narrowly demonstrated. Since Aristotle occasionally characterizes material as tode ti, the objection might continue, the expression cannot concern demonstration.

Here’s a response. There are several criteria for substancehood, and elements may exhibit demonstrability while failing to meet other criteria. Although Aristotle arguably questions whether material substances are full fledged substances, he occasionally characterizes elements as demonstrable and asserts that they lack individuation conditions. Notice that T19 does not deny that an element is a tode ti. The weight of the evidence suggests that Aristotle would deny that demonstration generally requires individuation conditions. And indeed, I doubt that demonstration generally requires individuation conditions. I can demonstrate the element water by pointing to an indeterminate portion of it. Demonstration merely requires identity conditions.  

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4 Thanks to Chris Frey for pressing me on this point.
Let me sum up this section. I have mooted a distinction between material substances and matter, so to handle the mixed textual evidence for whether Aristotle holds that material is demonstrable. I cannot develop a full defense of the distinction here, but I hope to have offered some initial support for the distinction and its application.

I turn to the second of our two interpretative issues. Aristotle is sometimes taken to be endorsing the view that an individual is *tode ti*, whether an individual substance or a nonsubstantial individual. I have offered something of an argument against the view that nonsubstantial individuals are demonstrable: Aristotle views individuals as demonstrable but denies demonstrability of nonsubstances; taken together, the evidence suggests that only individual substances can be demonstrated. Of course, this conclusion can be resisted, if one views the denial of demonstrability of nonsubstances to exclude only nonsubstantial universals. I see no reason to read the relevant passages in this restricted way. But let’s look more closely at nonsubstantial individuals, to see if there is any positive evidence for taking them to be demonstrable.

As a rough and ready formulation, call a property *recurrent* if it can be possessed by more than one object, and *nonrecurrent* if it can be possessed by at most one object. Scholarly debate over whether nonsubstantial individuals are recurrent or nonrecurrent has focused on the interpretation of Aristotle’s characterization in the following passage of nonsubstantial individuals as being *present in* a subject.

**T20** Of things there are… some are in a subject but are not said of any subject. (By ‘in a subject’ I mean what is in something, not as a part and cannot
exist separately from what it is in.) For example, the individual knowledge-of-grammar is in a subject, the soul, but is not said of any subject; and the individual white is in a subject, the body (for all colour is in a body), but is not said of any subject. (Cat. 2 1\textsuperscript{a}20-24).

Τῶν ὄντων … τὰ δὲ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ μὲν ἐστι, καθ’ ὑποκειμένου δὲ οὐδενὸς λέγεται, —ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ λέγω ὃ ἐν τινὶ μὴ ὡς μέρος ὑπάρχων ἀδύνατον χωρίς εἶναι τοῦ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ, — οἶον ἢ τὶς γραμματικὴ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ μὲν ἐστὶ τῇ ψυχῇ, καθ’ ὑποκειμένου δὲ οὐδενὸς λέγεται, καὶ τὸ τί λευκὸν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ μὲν ἐστὶ τῷ σώματι, —ὁποῖος γὰρ χρῶμα ἐν σώματι,— καθ’ ὑποκειμένου δὲ οὐδενὸς λέγεται.

This is the passage mentioned in connection with T18 in the previous section. I have argued in Corkum (2009) that T20 is neutral on the question of recurrence.

Devereaux (1993) makes the innovative move of drawing on T1 to support the view that nonsubstantial individuals are nonrecurrent. Devereux holds that T1 establishes that being indivisible and numerically one is a sufficient condition for being tode ti. The characterization of nonsubstantial individuals as ‘indivisible and numerically one’ (ta atoma kai hen arithmōi) first occurs in the following passage:

T21 Things that are indivisible and numerically one are, without exception, not said of any subject, but there is nothing to prevent some of them from being in a subject—the individual knowledge-of-grammar is one of the things in a subject. (Cat. 2 1\textsuperscript{b}6-9)

ἀπλῶς δὲ τὰ ἄτομα καὶ ἐν ἀριθμῷ κατ’ οὐδενὸς ὑποκειμένου λέγεται, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ ἔνα οὐδενὸς κωλύει εἶναι• ἢ γὰρ τὶς γραμματικὴ τῶν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστίν.

So Devereux holds that nonsubstantial individuals are thises. As thises, T1 establishes that such items are not said of more than one subject. And so nonsubstantial individuals are nonrecurrent.

However, this reading of T1 is controversial. Sharma (1992: 311) offers an alternative reading according to which, to confirm that a primary substance is a this, Aristotle only mentions that it is indivisible and numerically one because he takes it as
agreed that no substance is present in a subject. If this were a tacit assumption in the passage, then the status of primary substances as ultimate subjects of predication can be established solely by contrasting them secondary substances, which of course are not numerically one. So from the context \textbf{T1}, Aristotle’s claim is merely that indivisible and numerically one \textit{substances} are demonstrable. It may be that being indivisible, numerically one and substantial are jointly sufficient and separately each necessary to be demonstrable. If so, then passages such as \textbf{T1} are consistent with the ascription to Aristotle of the views that individual substances are demonstrable but universal substances, nonsubstantial universals and nonsubstantial individuals are indemonstrable.

Let me close this section with a speculative comment. I have contrasted demonstration and description as two ways of picking out an object—two ways of picking out the same object. I am attracted to the view that nonsubstantial individuals \textit{just are} individual substances, insofar as they satisfy a description. Callias’ individual paleness is Callias as the satisfier of the description corresponding to the predication ‘… is pale’. Notice that on this interpretation, nonsubstantial individuals are indeed nonrecurrent. But they are not for this reason \textit{tropes}. Trope theorists tend to view concrete particulars as composed of tropes, and Aristotle explicitly denies this in \textbf{T20}—or at least, he denies that individual substances are \textit{mereologically} composed of nonsubstantial individuals. But moreover, tropes are particular properties distinct from individual substances, and on this line of interpretation, nonsubstantial individuals are not entities over and above individual substances. If this line of interpretation is correct, then the ontology of the \textit{Categories} is generated from the stock of individual substances and two intuitive ways of picking them out—through demonstration or through description.
As a result, the Aristotelian ontology is considerably less inflationary than it may appear to be.

Let me sum up. In §1, I have followed the standard reading of *tode ti* as entailing the demonstrability of its referents. In §2, I gave a preliminary argument that *tode ti* picks out individual substances, essences or forms: the reading makes the best sense of the textual evidence.

The second argument of the paper draws on our best understanding of demonstratives to contrast reference through ostension and reference through the satisfaction of a description. In §3 I sketch this distinction and its application to both Aristotle and Plato. I have neither offered nor ascribed to Aristotle a fleshed out theory of demonstration, but the pre-theoretic distinction between demonstration and description is reasonably clear. To handle the objection that items other than individual substances, essences or forms ought to be taken as demonstrable, I drew a distinction between direct and indirect demonstration. These two kinds of demonstration have distinct success conditions. The former relies solely on an act of ostension; the latter involves speaker intention to pick out an item other than that directly demonstrated.

To resolve the mixed picture Aristotle presents on the demonstrability of matter, in §4 I distinguish material substances from matter. Material substances can be identified through ostension. But matter is whatever satisfies a certain description drawn in terms of
the dispositions and activities of the compound substance. And in §5 I made a few brief remarks defending the indemonstrability of nonsubstantial individuals.

In what is perhaps the most controversial move of the paper, I view the distinctions between being *tode ti*, on the one hand, and being *toinde or poion ti*, on the other; between essence, on the one hand, and *propra* and accident, on the other; between being an individual substance, on the one hand, and being a universal, a nonsubstance or matter, on the other—as all partly constituted by a distinction among ways of identifying an entity, and not by a distinction among *kinds* of entities. The move makes the Aristotelian ontology parsimonious. There is both material substances and matter, but these are not distinct classes of object: matter just is a material substance identified descriptively. So too nonsubstantial individuals are not distinct objects over and above individual substances, but alternative ways of identifying these substances. These suggestions would be controversial, and I will have to leave detailed discussion for another occasion.

**Works Cited**


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