Aristotle on Ontological Dependence

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Abstract
Aristotle holds that individual substances are ontologically independent from non-substances and universal substances but that non-substances and universal substances are ontologically dependent on substances. There is then an asymmetry between individual substances and other kinds of beings with respect to ontological dependence. Under what could plausibly be called the standard interpretation, the ontological independence ascribed to individual substances and denied of non-substances and universal substances is a capacity for independent existence. There is, however, a tension between this interpretation and the asymmetry between individual substances and the other kinds of entities with respect to ontological independence. I will propose an alternative interpretation: to weaken the relevant notion of ontological independence from a capacity for independent existence to the independent possession of a certain ontological status.

Keywords
Aristotle, substance, property, universal

In the Categories, Aristotle classifies beings into four kinds: individual substances such as you and me, universal substances such as humanity, and also individuals and universals in the various categories other than substance, such as quality and quantity, which I will lump together under the label ‘non-substances’. Aristotle holds that individual substances are ontologically independent from non-substances and universal substances but that non-substances and universal substances are ontologically dependent on substances. There is then an asymmetry between individual substances and other kinds of beings with respect to ontological dependence. Such asymmetry is widely and rightly thought to be a lynchpin of Aristotelian metaphysics. What is really real for Aristotle are such ordinary mid-sized
objects as you and me. Our properties – my paleness, your generosity, our humanity – inhabit Aristotle’s ontology, in some sense, only in so far as they are ours. This much we can all agree on; and I will only briefly rehearse one of the reasons for ascribing this picture to Aristotle below. For I agree with the orthodoxy that individual substances enjoy a certain kind of ontological independence from non-substances and universal substances – an independence which non-substances and universal substances lack with respect to substances. But I disagree with a commonly held view as to what kind of ontological independence individual substances have and both universal substances and non-substances lack. Under what could plausibly be called the standard interpretation, the ontological independence ascribed to individual substances and denied of non-substances and universal substances is a capacity for independent existence. The pervasiveness of this interpretation will emerge in what follows. Among other issues, the view gives a misleading but commonly held impression of Aristotle’s criticism of Platonism, underlies a misguided but hotly contested debate on the nature of non-substantial individuals, and lends support to a mistaken but often held view of the active intellect. Despite the orthodoxy of the interpretation, however, I believe that it cannot be correct. For there is, I will argue, a tension between this interpretation and the asymmetry between individual substances and the other kinds of entities with respect to ontological independence.

This tension has not gone completely unrecognized in the secondary literature and responses to it include weakening the ascription of ontological independence to substances (to the claim that substances are ontologically independent only from some non-substances) and positing two notions of ontological independence (so that the ontological independence ascribed to substances is not that denied of non-substances). I will argue against both responses and propose an alternative: to weaken the relevant notion of ontological independence from a capacity for independent existence to the independent possession of a certain ontological status.

Closely related to the issue of ontological independence is the interpretation of separation terminology in Aristotle. Aristotle often uses separation terminology – the Greek χωρίς and its cognates – to refer to ontological independence; I will rehearse an argument in support of this below. And claims arguably involving this kind of separation crop up in several areas of Aristotle’s metaphysics and philosophy of mind. I have alluded to three examples already: Aristotle’s claim that non-substances are inseparable
from that in which they inhere; his claim that the active intellect is separate; and his criticism that the Platonist wrongly separates the Forms. Brief consideration of these topics will serve several purposes. It will help to spell out the significance of the topic of ontological independence. It will bring out the pervasiveness of what I have called the standard interpretation of ontological independence. And it will underline the difference between this standard interpretation and my proposal. Finally, these topics provide excellent test cases for any interpretation of ontological independence: the success of an interpretation of ontological independence and separation terminology will be judged in part by its fruitfulness in shedding light on these cases.

**Asymmetry Thesis**

In this section, I will defend the claim that there is an asymmetry between individual substances, on the one hand, and non-substances and universal substances, on the other hand, with respect to ontological dependence. That is to say, I will defend the claim that individual substances are ontologically independent from both non-substances and universal substances but that neither non-substances nor universal substances are ontologically independent from individual substances. I will begin by showing that some of Aristotle’s separation terminology refers to some notion of ontological independence. This largely rehearses arguments from Gail Fine’s (1984, 1985) seminal work on the subject. Although Fine, I will later argue, misinterprets the relevant notion of ontological independence as a capacity for independent existence, I am persuaded by Fine that some of Aristotle’s separation terminology refers to some notion or other of ontological independence. I will then argue that there is an asymmetry between individual substances and other kinds of entities with respect to separation: substances are separate from both non-substances and universal substances but neither non-substances nor universal substances are inseparable from substances. Taken together, these claims show that substances are ontologically independent from non-substances but non-substances are ontologically dependent on substances.

Aristotle employs a variety of notions of separation, all referred to by the Greek χωρίς and its cognates. The separation which, we will see in a moment, Aristotle ascribes to individual substances needs to be distinguished from various other kinds of separation; these are typically marked
by a dative of respect and include local separation, defined at Phys. 226b21-3, temporal separation, mentioned for example at Meta. 1016b2, and definitional separation, distinguished from simple separation at Meta. 1042a28-31. As a working hypothesis, I will assume that unqualified separation terminology refers to the separation which Aristotle ascribes to individual substances unless there is contextual reason to doubt this; in what follows, my use of 'separate' and its cognates refer to this notion.

Aristotle nowhere defines separation. The argument concluding that separation refers to some notion of ontological independence draws a connection between separation and the notion of natural priority, which Aristotle does explicitly define. There is evidence that, for Aristotle, the claims that A is separate from B and B is not separate from A are jointly sufficient for the claim that A is naturally prior to B. One passage which Fine (1984: 34) offers in support of this relation is EE 1.8 (1217b10-15):

[The Platonists claim that the Idea of the good] is the original good, for the destruction of that which is participated in involves also the destruction of that which participates in the Idea, and is named from its participation in it. But this is the relation of the first to the later, so that the Idea of good is the good per se; for this is also (they say) separable from what participates in it, like all other Ideas.

This passage draws a relation between separation and priority (expressed here by the ordinals). There is room for confusion here. Aristotle might be taken to be ascribing to the Platonists the following argument: the Idea of the good is separate from what participates in it; if it is separate from something, then it is naturally prior to that thing; so the Idea of the good is naturally prior to what participates in it. Were this the correct reading of this passage, it would support the claim that separation is a sufficient condition for priority. But this is not the correct reading. Rather, the passage is ascribing to the Platonists the following argument: if a thing is separate from what participates in it, then it is naturally prior to them – given that what participates cannot be without that in which it participates. That is to say, there is an additional premise: what participates cannot be without that in which it participates. The passage, correctly read, shows that separation and this additional premise are jointly sufficient for priority.  

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1) Other evidence of the relation holding between separation and priority include Meta. 1028a31-b2, 1038b29 and 1218a1-9.
The relevant notion of priority is substantial or natural priority, which is defined at 1019a1-4: “Some things then are called prior and posterior… in respect of nature and substance, i.e. those which can be without (ἐν οἷς ἐννοεῖται ὑπερήφανον) other things, while the others cannot be without them.”\(^2\) I have flagged the Greek expression being translated as 'can be without' and I will return to the question whether this is the only possible translation. The definition of natural priority thus has two components:

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\text{A is naturally prior to B just in case both of the following conditions hold: (i) A can be without B and (ii) B cannot be without A.}
\]

Natural priority thus concerns some kind of ontological dependence and independence. Let us put these points together. A is prior to B just in case A can be without B but B cannot be without A. This suggests (although it does not force\(^3\)) the view that A is separate from B just in case A can be without B.\(^4\)

Aristotle holds that substances, alone of the categories, are separate.\(^5\) Moreover, Aristotle holds that substances are prior to non-substances.

\(^2\) This notion of natural priority needs to be distinguished from various other senses of priority, such as temporal priority, local priority, definitional priority, priority with respect to motion, priority with respect to power, priority in order and so on. Aristotle discusses these at \textit{Categories} 12 and \textit{Metaphysics} 5. 11. For a discussion of these various senses of priority, see Cleary 1988.

\(^3\) Since the fact that the two conditions that A is separate from B and B is inseparable from A are jointly sufficient for A being prior to B fails to entail that either condition is necessary for A to be prior to B. Indeed, Fine only explicitly claims that separation is a necessary condition for priority; but her cited passages do not establish this (but only the weaker claim that certain separation and inseparability facts are jointly sufficient for priority). This is perhaps the source of some confusion in the literature concerning Fine's argument: see Morrison 1985a: 187 and G. Fine's (1985; 160 n. 6) response.

\(^4\) De Strycker (1955: 125) and G. Fine (1984, 1985) have argued for this interpretation; for other exponents see Morrison (1985a: 130 n. 11). Reeve (2000: 4-5 nb. 9) notes that Phys. 7.7 (260b17-19) appears to distinguish ontological independence from substantial priority: "A thing is said to be prior to other things where if it does not exist, the others will not exist, whereas it can exist without the others; there is also [priority] in time, and with respect to substance." Reeve pins the source of the equivocation on Plato, but I doubt that there is a conflict between this passage and the passages discussed in the body of the paper. It would be reasonable to read 260b17-19 as claiming that there is also temporal priority in addition to the substantial priority \textit{just described} in the passage.

\(^5\) See 185a31-2, 1029a27-8.
Consider 1069a20: “substance is first, and is succeeded by quality, and then by quantity.” See also 1071b5: “substances are the first of existing things.” This, along with the relation holding between separation and priority, suggests (although it does not compel) the claim that non-substances are inseparable from substances, independently of the interpretation of separation terminology as expressing ontological independence. But when combined with the evidence canvassed above for thinking that separation terminology refers to ontological independence, these passages give us good reason to ascribe to Aristotle that view that non-substances are ontologically dependent on substances and that substances are ontologically independent from non-substances.6

Moreover, Aristotle clearly holds in the Categories that individual substances are prior to, and so separate from, universal substances. He explicitly calls individual substances primary with respect to universal substances and universal substances secondary with respect to individual substances. See, for example, 2a11-19:

A substance – that which is called a substance most strictly, primarily, and most of all – is that which is neither said of a subject nor in a subject, e.g. the individual man or the individual horse. The species in which the things primarily called substances are, are called secondary substances, as also are the genera of these species. For example, the individual man belongs in a species, man, and animal is a genus of the species; so these – both man and animal – are called secondary substances.7

Finally, Aristotle claims at 2a34-b7 that if primary substances did not exist, then nothing else would either:

All the other things are either said of the primary [i.e., individual] substances as subjects or in them as subjects. . . . Colour is in body and therefore also in an individual body; for were it not in some individual body it would not be in body at all. . . . So if the primary substances did not exist it would be impossible for any of the other things to exist (οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλων τι εἶναι).

6 Admittedly, these considerations fail to give conclusive reasons for the ascription. But the view that separation terminology refers to some notion of ontological independence is a standard view and one which, as we will see, underlies certain debates in the secondary literature such as the debate whether non-substantial individuals are recurrent. Moreover, the asymmetry between substances and non-substances is well recognized. My concern in the body of the paper is, if we accept these standard views, what is the correct interpretation of the ontological independence.

7 Cf. 2b4, 3a17, 3b11, 8a15.
So, putting these claims together, Aristotle holds that both non-substances and universal substances are ontologically dependent on individual substances and that individual substances are ontologically independent from both non-substances and universal substances.

I will cash out this asymmetry in this way:

(Assumption) For any substance S and any non-substance or universal substance S’ such that N ontologically depends on S.

We might ascribe a weaker claim to Aristotle by allowing that either some individual substance depends ontologically on a non-substance (or universal substance) or some non-substance or universal substance is ontologically independent from any individual substance. But anything weaker than the Asymmetry Thesis would considerably water down the picture drawn in the opening paragraph of this paper. For then properties would not generally inhabit Aristotle’s ontology in so far as they are ours. Moreover, a claim weaker than the Asymmetry Thesis would come into conflict with the apparent generality of the conclusion of 2a34-b7 – the claim, quoted above, that if primary substances did not exist, then nothing else would either. So we have these prima facie reasons for holding on to the Asymmetry Thesis.

Now, how ought we to interpret the notion of ontological independence operating in Aristotle’s notion of separation? Let us, modifying terminology introduced by Fine, make the following first stab:

(IE) A is ontologically independent from B just in case
A can exist without B.

This thesis takes the Greek ἐίναι in such passages as 1019a1-4 existentially; hence the acronym for existential independence. More interestingly for my purposes, IE takes the ἐνδέξεσθαι in this passage modally. As a result, ontological independence is taken to be a capacity of a certain kind – namely, a capacity for independent existence. This is, for us, a natural reading. Indeed, IE gels with some contemporary theories of ontological dependence. Peter Simons (1991), for example, holds that something is “ontologically dependent on something else when the first cannot exist unless the second exists.” However, although this is a natural enough reading for modern ears, this is not the only possible reading, and there are reasons to
look for a better reading. For, as I will argue in the next section, there’s a
tension between IE and the asymmetry holding between substances and
non-substances with respect to ontological independence.

**Against IE**

Here is the dialectic of this section: I will draw out an ambiguity in IE,
propose two disambiguations and argue that neither disambiguation meets
the demands imposed on the interpretation of ontological independence
by our condition of adequacy, the Asymmetry Thesis.

The claim that A can exist without Bs is ambiguous between two claims.
Under one disambiguation, the claim is that, for any given member of the
class of B things, A can exist without *that* B. This claim is consistent with
holding that A cannot exist without some B or other. Under the other
disambiguation, the claim is that, for the class of B’s, A can exist without
any member of that class whatsoever. Let us use the following acronyms:

(IE₁) For any given B, A can exist without *that* B.

(IE₂) A can exist without any B whatsoever.

I will say that IE₁ or IE₂ is exhibited by As with respect to Bs. Now, do either
of IE₁ or IE₂ meet the demands imposed by our condition of adequacy, the
Asymmetry Thesis? That is to say, are either of IE₁ or IE₂ exhibited by sub-
stances with respect to non-substances and not exhibited by non-sub-
stances with respect to substances?

Individual substances exhibit the kind of independence expressed by IE₁
with respect to some non-substances: Callias need not be generous. So the
individual substance Callias can exist without the non-substance quality
generosity. But there are problems for viewing the relevant notion of
ontological independence as IE₁. First, individual substances do not pos-
sess this capacity with respect to all kinds of non-substances. Consider
propría, necessary but inessential properties. An individual substance can-
not exist without its *propria*. A traditional example – not Aristotle’s – of a
*proprium* for humans is risibility. If risibility is indeed a *proprium* for
humans, then Callias cannot exist without risibility. Consider also non-
substantial universals such as color. It seems entirely plausible that sub-
stances cannot exist apart such general properties: Callias cannot exist
colorless. There is thus a need to restrict that from which substances are ontologically independent, if we are to view ontological independence as $IE_1$. Under this view, individual substances are not ontologically independent from non-substances generally, but only from accidents. Were ontological independence $IE_1$, then we would need to weaken the Asymmetry Thesis to the claim that substances are ontologically independent from some non-substances.

One might be willing to accept this consequence. But there are worse problems for viewing ontological independence as $IE_1$. Although individual substances exhibit $IE_1$ with respect to some non-substances, non-substances also exhibit $IE'$ with respect to some substances. In particular, non-substantial universals also uncontroversially possess this kind of independence from individual substances: although Callias can exist without being generous, generosity can exist without Callias. (Allow me for now this way of putting the point. What is uncontroversial is that generosity does not depend ontologically on Callias. To say that generosity can exist without Callias is how one would express this ontological independence, were something like $IE'$ the right interpretation. But it is not how I would prefer to put the point, as will become clearer below.) So $IE'$ is inadequate to the Asymmetry Thesis. A capacity to exist independently of some specific thing is shared by both individual substances and universal non-substances, but ontological independence is something attributed to individual substances and not attributed to universal non-substances. This cannot then be the relevant notion of ontological independence.

I will turn to $IE_2$, under which the claim that $A$ can exist without $B$ is the claim that $A$ can exist without any $B$ whatsoever. One might hold that non-substantial universals lack this kind of independence from individual substances. For non-substantial universals cannot exist without any individual substance whatsoever: if no one were generous, generosity (as Aristotle might put it, on this reading) would not exist. However, individual substances also lack this kind of independence from non-substances. An individual substance such as Callias cannot exist denuded of all attributes whatsoever. If this is what is meant by ontological independence, then it is simply false that substances are ontologically independent. So $IE_2$ is also inadequate to the Asymmetry Thesis. This then cannot be the relevant notion of ontological independence either.

This asymmetry problem has long been recognized. Burnyeat et al. (1979: 4–5) propose two possible solutions. The first proposal is to restrict
the class of things from which substances are ontologically independent to
non-substantial individuals. That is, the proposal accepts that there are
certain universal non-substances apart from which substances cannot exist.
To repeat an example I have mentioned above, Callias cannot exist color-
less. When Aristotle claims that substances are ontologically independent,
he means (on this proposal) merely that they are ontologically independ-
ent from non-substantial individuals. For if these are found in at most
one subject, then it is true that individual substances can exist apart from
them but any one of them cannot exist apart from the individual substance
which is the only subject in which it is found. So Callias need not be gen-
erous, but Callias’ generosity, on this view, cannot exist apart from Callias.
This response rests on a controversial view of non-substantial individuals;
I will discuss this controversy in a little more detail below. But moreover,
it requires that we weaken the Asymmetry Thesis: for the proposal denies
that individual substances are ontologically independent from all non-
substantial universals.

A second proposal from Burnyeat et al. (1979) is to allow that “a kind
of substance, e.g. animals, can exist without exhibiting a given quality,
e.g. baldness; but baldness cannot exist without some animal having it.”
As Burnyeat et al. recognize, this works for determinate qualities but
not for all determinable qualities. Bodies, for example, can exist without
being pink but not without being colored. So the proposal runs into the
same problem as before: it also requires that we weaken the Asymmetry
Thesis.

Let us sum up. I have argued that the claim that As can exist without Bs
is ambiguous between two claims. Neither reading distinguishes substances
from non-substances. That is to say, neither reading is adequate to the
Asymmetry Thesis, the claim that ontological independence is something
substances possess and non-substances lack. The initial plausibility of IE, I
suspect, rests on an equivocation: substances possess IE₁ with respect to
accidents; non-substantial universals lack IE₂ with respect to individual
substances. That is to say, substances can exist apart from any given acci-
dent; non-substances need some substance or other. There is a way out for
those who would continue to hold IE. One might respond that the ascrip-
tion of ontological independence to substances alone of the categories is
indeed equivocal. But this response is unattractive. For, under this view, the
ontological independence ascribed to substances is no longer the ontologi-
cal independence denied of non-substances. If we can provide a unitary
account of ontological independence, without recourse to posited equivocations, then surely the unitary account is preferable.

Before concluding my argument against IE, let me add one further piece of textual evidence. At Categories 12 Aristotle catalogues senses in which one thing is called prior to another. One sense is the situation where the prior thing

does not reciprocate as to implication of existence. For example, one is prior to two because if there are two it follows at once that there is one whereas if there is one there are not necessarily two, so that the implication of the other’s existence does not hold reciprocally from one; and that from which the implication of existence does not hold reciprocally is thought to be prior (14a30-35).

Here Aristotle is explicating one case of ontological dependence, spelt out in modal terms. So although, as we have seen, Aristotle’s notion of ontological dependence is not generally modal, he holds that ontological dependence can in some cases be manifest in ways where a modal characterization is not inappropriate. But Aristotle goes on to describe another case:

There would seem, however, to be another manner of priority besides those mentioned. For of things which reciprocate as to implication of existence, that which is in some way the cause of the other’s existence might reasonably be called prior by nature. And that there are some such cases is clear. For there being a man reciprocates as to implication of existence with the true statement about it: if there is a man, the statement whereby we say that there is a man is true, and reciprocally – since if the statement whereby we say that there is a man is true, there is a man. And whereas the true statement is in no way the cause of the actual thing’s existence, the actual thing does seem in some way the cause of the statement’s being true; it is because the actual thing exists or does not that the statement is called true or false (14b10-22).

Here Aristotle canvasses a case where ontological dependence is spelt out in causal or explanatory terms. The notion of priority is explicitly described as natural priority, so we ought to take it to be the notion of priority which is relevant to ontological dependence. In this situation, however, Aristotle clearly believes that what is prior cannot exist without what is posterior. So here we have further evidence against the adequacy of IE as a general account of ontological dependence. I will return to these interesting cases below.

In this section, I have provided evidence that ontological independence cannot be a capacity for independent existence. Although I have not shown
that there is no sense of IE adequate to the Asymmetry Thesis, I hope I
have shown that the burden of proof has shifted to those who would believe
that ontological independence is a capacity for separate existence. Prima
facie, it seems that no account of IE can reflect the asymmetry between
substances and non-substances which ontological independence requires.
Although the problem has been well recognized, few have concluded that
IE is mistaken. The reason for this reluctance, I suspect, is the difficulty of
seeing an alternative.\(^8\)

An Alternative

Aristotle is generally less concerned with the question of what things exist
than we might expect. His ontological concerns are typically with such
questions as, given the things which we call beings, in virtue of what does
each such thing have claim to this ontological status? For example, this is
Aristotle’s concern with respect to mathematical objects: the philosophical
question is not whether such things exist but how they do: see Meta.
1076a36–37. And this is also Aristotle’s methodology in the Categories. He
begins with a taxonomy of beings classified according to two criteria:
whether the thing is said of a subject and whether the thing is present in a
subject. Individual or primary substances such as Callias are neither said
of, nor present in, a subject; universal substances such as human are said
of, but not present in, a subject; non-substantial universals such as color
are both said of, and present in, a subject; non-substantial individuals are
present in, but not said of, a subject. Both said-of and present-in ties
express ontological dependencies: what is either said of or present in a
subject has claim to the status of a being in virtue of standing in at least
one of these ties to a subject. Standing in one of these ties to a subject is
sufficient for the thing to be classified as a kind of being. And it is in virtue

\(^8\) I will discuss a few alternative proposals for the interpretation of Aristotle’s view of ontological dependence below. In the contemporary discussion of the issue, there has been some recent recognition of the failure of accounts of ontological dependence spelt out in terms of existential claims embedded within modal operators. See E. J. Lowe (2005) for an overview. Interestingly, Kit Fine (1995) argues against an account of ontological independence spelt out in terms of capacities for independent existence with an appeal to propria: necessarily, if Socrates exists then so does the singleton which contains Socrates as its sole mem-
ber, but Socrates does not depend on his singleton.
of standing in one of these ties that non-substances and universal substances are in fact classified as beings. Individual substances, which are neither said of nor present in a subject, but which are nonetheless beings, have claim to the status of a being independently of standing in one of these ties to a subject.  

I believe that this description of the methodology of the Categories gives us the best point of departure to develop an interpretation of Aristotle’s notions of ontological dependence and independence. As we have seen, IE fails for the reason that no disambiguation of IE meets the demands placed on any account of ontological dependence by the Asymmetry Thesis. My proposal is to follow the guidelines provided by the above description of the methodology of the Categories so as to weaken our account of ontological dependence. So let us make a first stab as follows:

(OI) A is ontologically independent from B just in case A admits of the ontological status of a being independently of standing in some tie to B.  

And if A is ontologically dependent on B, then A has the ontological status of a being in virtue of standing in some tie to B. I will discuss some of the differences between IE and OI in a moment. But I will first consider the question whether there is a reading of OI which meets our condition of adequacy for any interpretation of ontological independence, the Asymmetry Thesis. The claim that A is a being independently of Bs is ambiguous in just the way that the claim that A exists without Bs is ambiguous. That is to say, the claim is ambiguous between these two theses:

9) In comments to an oral ancestor to this paper, Dimitrios Dentsoras objects to this description of the methodology of the Categories as conferring ontological status to entities on the basis of the said of and present in ties. He proposes an alternative picture which I might characterize in this way: Aristotle accepts the various categories on the basis of what are commonly called beings and uses the said of and present in ties merely to classify them according to their ties to a subject. I agree with Dentsoras that Aristotle accepts the various categories on the basis of what are commonly called beings. But I see the present in and said of ties as providing a rationale for this taxonomy of things commonly said to be, and not merely a classification.

10) In what follows, I will refer to such notions as inherence and ontological dependence, and also to the two-place expressions themselves referring to these notions, as ties and not relations so to avoid confusion between these syncategorematic notions and expressions and the Aristotelian category of relation. For the usage and its motivation, see Strawson (1959: 167).
(O1) For any given B, A admits of the ontological status of a being independently of standing in some tie to that B.

(O2) A admits of the ontological status of a being independently of standing in some tie to any B whatsoever.

O1 is consistent with the claim that A must stand in a tie to some B or other; O1 is inconsistent with this claim. Now: are either of O1, or O1, plausible candidates for an account of ontological independence? Do either meet the demands imposed by our condition of adequacy, the Asymmetry Thesis? Individual substances exhibit O1; Callias would have his ontological status as a being even were he not generous. However, a non-substantial universal does not generally depend on any individual substance for its status as a being. Generosity would be, for Aristotle, a being no less than Callias even if he were not generous. Non-substantial universals exhibit O1, and so the thesis fails to meet the demands imposed by the Asymmetry Thesis.

What then of O2? Substances do not depend on non-substances for their ontological status as beings. Individual substances are classified as beings independently of standing in any tie to anything else – independently, that is to say, of being present in or said of any other beings. Universal substances, on the other hand, have their ontological status as beings in virtue of standing in ties to other things – but only in virtue of being said of individual substances; they do not depend for their ontological status on non-substances but they do depend on individual substances. Moreover, a substance does not depend even on properties from which it cannot exist apart. Consider again propria. Although these properties are necessary, a substance is not a being in virtue of standing in some tie to its propria. So although, for example, Callias cannot exist without risibility, Callias’ claim to having the ontological status of a being does not depend on his being risible.11 Similar comments could be made for such general properties as being colored. So individual substances exhibit O1.

Now what of non-substances and universal substances? Non-substantial universals fail to exhibit O1; although generosity, for example, does not

11 Dimitrios Dentsoras objects that there is a sense in which Callias depends on his risibility to be human, for his being human necessarily entails his being risible. This is a weaker notion of dependence than the paper targets. For Callias is risible in virtue of being human, not human in virtue of being risible.
depend on Callias, the property would not have the ontological status it enjoys were there no generous people whatsoever. Similar comments could be made for universal substances. And non-substantial individuals also fail to exhibit $O_1$. Recall, I have mentioned that it is controversial whether these are found in at most one subject. Let us call non-substantial individuals recurrent if they are found in more than one subject, and non-recurrent otherwise. If they are non-recurrent, then they do depend on the specific individual substance in which they uniquely inhere. But this, of course, is consistent with a failure to exhibit $O_1$. For Callias’ generosity, if non-recurrent, admits of its ontological status in virtue of standing in a tie to some substance or other – namely, Callias. And if non-substantial individuals are recurrent, found in more than one subject, then they admit of their ontological status in virtue of standing in a tie to some substance or other – namely, those subjects which share the non-substantial individual. So, to sum up, substances exhibit $O_1$ with respect to non-substances and non-substances fail to exhibit $O_1$ with respect to substances. $O_1$ conforms to the Asymmetry Thesis. This gives us good reason to hold that $O_1$ is the relevant notion of ontological independence in Aristotle’s *Categories*.

The interpretation I am putting forward has several virtues. First, as I have just argued, there are philosophical reasons for preferring $O_1$ to IE. IE fails for no disambiguation of IE meets the demands placed on any account of ontological dependence by the Asymmetry Thesis; $O_1$ meets these demands. Second, there are textual reasons for preferring $O_1$ to IE. As I have noted, $O_1$ is sensitive to the methodology of the *Categories*. The interpretation of ontological independence as a capacity for separate existence, by contrast, ignores the way in which this work actually proceeds – that is to say, as providing a principled taxonomy of beings. Moreover, $O_1$ arguably accounts for both cases we have looked at from *Categories* 12. Recall, one case, where one is prior to two, employs a sense of priority where what is prior does not reciprocate as to the implication of being of what is posterior. The other case, where a man is prior to a true existence claim, employs a sense where there is mutual reciprocation as to implication of being. IE is adequate only for the first case. But both cases could plausibly be described as situations where the one entity depends on the other for its ontological status.

Third, $O_1$ is more in keeping with some of Aristotle’s other views in metaphysics than IE. The account of ontological independence as a capacity for independent existence cashes out the notions of ontological dependence
and independence in terms of possibilities. In contrast with IE, OI eschews a modal characterization of ontological dependence. As such, my proposal provides an approach to ontological independence without recourse to counterfactual situations and impossible situations. That is to say, we need not consider the counterfactual situation of Callias, who is actually generous, being presently deprived of his generosity. And we need not consider the impossibility of Callias being presently deprived of his risibility or color. The reliance of such imaginary situations in an account of ontological independence are required by those who would hold that ontological independence is a capacity for independent existence. But such imaginary situations are hardly consistent with Aristotle’s approach to modality. For us, there are present nonactual possibilities: Callias might not be now generous. But what is presently nonactual is, for Aristotle, not possible.¹²

Moreover, this non-modal aspect of OI is a plausible reading of the relevant Greek. The Greek phrase we have hitherto translated as ‘can exist without’ is εἶναι ἐνδέχεται οὖν. Although the verb ἐνδέχεσθαι can express contingency, it need not have a modal force; it may just mean to admit or allow. Indeed, the modal version of ἐνδέχεσθαι tends to be the impersonal use of the third person, and the third person ἐνδέχεται in the phrase is not an impersonal; its subject is the independent entity. Of course, little weight can be put on this observation. But it does provide some linguistic evidence in favour of OI over IE. More importantly, these observations show that OI is a possible reading of the relevant Greek.¹³

A full defense of the account of ontological dependence and independence I have proposed would need to go well beyond the aims of this paper. It would need to flesh out an account of what it is for a thing to

¹² This is not the place for a detailed discussion of Aristotle’s views on modality. For evidence arguably supporting the necessity of the present, see De Interpretatione 18a28-34. A good beginning point in the secondary literature is Hintikka (1973: 164).

¹³ Let me comment parenthetically on Aristotle’s use of separation terminology. A term Aristotle frequently uses to express the notion of separation is the verbal adjective χωρίστως. Adjectives in –τος may express states or capacities and so χωρίστος may be translated as ‘separate’ or ‘separable’. Morrison (1984c) argues that χωρίστον in Aristotle typically means separate and not separable. Fine (1984: 36 nb. 19) rightly notes that this evidence does not disprove her interpretation of separation as a capacity for independent existence, since an actually possessed capacity might be described as a state. Nonetheless, to my ears at least, it sounds like an odd choice of terminology to describe a capacity for independent existence as the state of being separate and not as separability. For what it is worth, the interpretation I support in the body of the paper avoids this oddity.
depend on something else for its ontological status, if such dependence is not an incapacity for separate existence. Since two of the ways in which such dependence is expressed in the Categories is to be either present in or said of a subject, a full defense would need to explicate these ties. Furthermore, a full defense of my proposed interpretation of Aristotle’s account of ontological dependence would need to distinguish the relevant senses of separation and priority terminology from other, irrelevant senses; and a full defense would need to take on board the variety of relevant senses of this terminology. For example, we have seen that Aristotle holds that there are some cases of ontological dependence where a modal characterization is not inappropriate and that there are other cases where a causal or explanatory characterization is appropriate. A full defense of my proposal would need to explicate the differences between these cases. Such a defense would be another paper, although I make a start on this project elsewhere.\footnote{14}

It may well seem then that OI\textsubscript{2} is objectionably thin as an account of ontological independence.\footnote{15} And indeed, OI\textsubscript{2} is not an account of ontological independence at all. For the claim suggested by OI\textsubscript{2}, that one thing is ontologically independent from another just in case the first admits of the ontological status of a being independently of standing in some tie to the second, does not explicate the notions of having an ontological status or of independence. OI\textsubscript{2} is rather a formulation of ontological independence – the weakest formulation of ontological independence which meets our condition of adequacy for any account of ontological independence, the Asymmetry Thesis, the requirement that ontological independence is something substances possess with respect to non-substances and universal substances and which these other kinds of entities lack with respect to substances.

But, for my present purposes, the thinness of OI\textsubscript{1} is an advantage, and this in several ways. First, as I have just noted, the account’s thinness is a guard against the importation of anachronism, such as a modern view of modality. Indeed, as we have seen, any account of ontological independence spelt out in terms of capacities will likely run afoul of the Asymmetry Thesis. So my endorsement of OI\textsubscript{1} could be seen as, in part, the negative claim that ontological dependence in Aristotle is not a modal notion.

\footnote{14} See my “Aristotle on Non-substantial Individuals,” ms.
\footnote{15} Thanks to Richard Mohr and Martin Tweedale for pressing me to be clearer on this point.
Second, there may not be more to ontological independence which is common to the various ways in which one entity is ontologically dependent on, or independent from, another. Being present in a subject gives us one reason for ascribing a certain ontological status to a thing; being said of a subject gives us a different reason for ascribing a certain ontological status to a thing; but there may well be nothing else in common to these two cases other than the fact that both conform to OI. The fleshing out of the account of ontological dependence, then, will depend on the explication of the present in and said of ties. So my endorsement of OI could be seen as, in part, the positive claim that Aristotle has an irreducibly pluralist account of ontological dependence.

Finally, although thin, OI is thick enough to do work in the interpretation of a variety of issues in Aristotle. I will illustrate by showing that several points of significance for my interpretation of ontological independence can be spelled out even with this general and programmatic formulation of ontological independence. And it will be useful to develop this point, since it helps to show what hinges on an interpretation of ontological independence. Moreover, it will help to show what is gained by rejecting the orthodox view of ontological independence as a capacity for independent existence. But before turning to some consequences of my proposal, I will comment on some rival interpretations.

My proposal bears some similarities to a few other proposed accounts of ontological dependence in the recent secondary literature. I will briefly discuss three. First, Donald Morrison (1985a and 1985b) takes one thing to be separate from another if the first is outside the “ontological boundaries” of the second. However, Morrison holds that being outside the ontological boundaries of a thing is equivalent to being numerically distinct from it. Morrison thus views the separation ascribed to substances as a symmetrical relation. If substances are separate from non-substances, and separation is numerical distinctness, then non-substances must be separate from substances. So the view is committed to denying either that substances alone of the categories are separate or that it is not non-substances from which substances are separate, but only other substances. Morrison takes the second option. As we have seen, there is explicit textual evidence against the first option. The burden on this view is to explain the apparent relation between separation and priority drawn in such passages as 1217b10-15, discussed above.

Second, Lynne Spellman (1995: 86) proposes that ontological independence in Aristotle is neither a capacity for independent existence nor
numerical distinctness but is rather “independence in being.” However, Spellman views the relevant notion of separation as the ontological correlate of definitional separation:

\[\text{to be separate in definition, so Aristotle tells us, is to be such that in a definition of A no reference is made to B – that is, in saying what A in itself is we do not need to say that it is (a) B. Likewise, what it means for A to be separate from B, if separation is the ontological correlate to separation in definition, is that A would be such that B is not at any time (part of) what A in itself is.}\]

Spellman’s proposal works well for the separation of substances from certain non-substances and the inseparability of certain non-substances from substances. As she (1995: 85) notes,

\[\text{Secretariat and a specimen of the kind horse are separate in this sense from Secretariat's accidental properties. Secretariat may be brown, but in saying what Secretariat is, brownness is not part of what he is, nor, of course, is it part of what it is to be a horse. Conversely, non-substances such as colors have independent being only in a derivative way. That is to say, brownness has an essence, but the definition of any property will make it clear that properties are properties of substances (or other objects).}\]

However, Spellman’s proposal has the result that an individual substance is inseparable from what it is and, in particular, from a universal substance. So, for example, Callias is inseparable from the universal substance rationality, since part of what Callias is, as a human, is being rational. Spellman would not be troubled by these results, since she holds that individual substances are individual forms – specimens of natural kinds which are not identical with the ordinary mid-sized objects which I have taken to be paradigmatic individual substances. She moreover denies the relation between priority and separation which I, following Fine, have endorsed. So, like Morrison’s proposal, there is a burden on this view to explain the appearance of the relation between separation and priority drawn in such passages as 1217b10-15, discussed above.

Finally, Mary Louise Gill (1989: 213) holds that separation terminology, in the cases with which we have been concerned, refers to a notion of “autonomy, or separation from an external mover. Autonomous entities rely on themselves both for the realization of their capacities and for their persistence.” An alleged result is that only living things are primary substances. I am not unsympathetic to this view. More would have to be said on the subject of natural causes to allow for autonomous agents who nonetheless
require certain conditions to obtain, such as there being sufficient sunlight for a plant to grow. Regardless, although it may be Aristotle’s view that the only separate things are in fact living things, this is the result of his substantive claims regarding natural causation, and not an immediate consequence of his notion of separation.

The Significance of Separation

Aristotle continues to hold the Asymmetry Thesis outside of the Categories. Although Aristotle does not generally employ the terminology of being present in a subject or being said of a subject outside of the Categories, he continues to maintain that non-substances are beings in virtue of standing in a tie to something else while substances are beings independently of standing in any such tie. Moreover, Aristotle continues to use separation and priority terminology to refer to this notion of ontological independence. For example, he criticizes Platonists for separating the Platonic Forms. He holds that inherent properties are inseparable from what they are in. And he claims that the active intellect is separate. In these final sections, I will briefly indicate a few of these points of significance for my interpretation of ontological independence.

Criticism of Plato

Aristotle criticizes the Platonists – for example, at Peri Ideon 84.23-4, Metaphysics 1086b30 and De Anima 432a14 – for separating Platonic Forms from sensible particulars. In this brief section, I will spell out the difference an interpretation of ontological dependence makes for our reading of this criticism. Under the interpretation of separation as a capacity for independent existence, Aristotle is attacking the position that Platonic Forms are capable of existing independently from the enformed particulars. That is to say, under this interpretation of separation, Aristotle ascribes

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16 One example is the well-discussed focal connection between substances and non-substances. Aristotle writes, for example, at 1003b5-10 that “there are many senses in which a thing is said to be, but all refer to one starting-point: some things are said to be because they are substances, others because they are affections of substance, others because they are a process towards substance, [and so on].”
to the Platonists the view that it is possible that there exist uninstantiated universals and Aristotle's position is that uninstantiated universals are impossible.  

Under the interpretation of separation argued for in this paper, by contrast, both the Platonist position and Aristotle's criticism are subtly different and of more interest. The question is: have universals like humanity and generosity their ontological status in virtue of standing in a tie to sensible particulars or have sensible particulars their ontological status in virtue of standing in a tie to such abstractions? The position Aristotle ascribes to the Platonists is not that it is possible for universals to exist uninstantiated but that it is actually the case that universals do not depend on particulars for their ontological status. It may well be the case that universals cannot exist uninstantiated but that they nonetheless do not depend ontologically on individual substances. This would be similar to the case of *propría* we discussed before. I cannot exist, recall, without such *propría* for humans as risibility but this is not to say that my ontological status as a being depends on my being risible. So too one might hold that a universal such as humanity cannot exist apart from instances of particular humans yet nonetheless hold that humanity does not depend on particular beings for its ontological status as a being. I believe that it is this position which Aristotle is ascribing to the Platonists. If this is right, then Aristotle's disagreement with Platonism is not over the issue of instantiation but over the more interesting issue of ontological dependence and independence.

The point holds promise for our understanding of the details of Aristotle's criticism of Platonism. Aristotle arguably ascribes to the Platonists the view that the separation of the Forms from sensible particulars follows from the explanatory priority of Forms over sensible particulars. For example, some hold that the Third Man argument involves an explanatory regress. An explanation of why the many sensible particular F things, say, are F must appeal to the Form of F-ness, for Forms are explanatorily prior to sensible particulars. Since, according to the Platonists, the Form of F-ness is itself F and cannot itself provide an explanation of it being F, we require a second Form, and so on. Aristotle believes that the separation of

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17 For this interpretation, see, for example, Fine (1993: 61).
18 For the Third Man argument, see *Peri Ideon* 83.34-85.3. For an early formulation of the argument, see Vlastos (1955) and, for the view that the Third Man argument involves an explanatory regress, see Cohen (1971) and Penner (1987).
the Forms plays some role in the regress. Yet, under the standard view of separation terminology, the separation of the Forms is a capacity for uninstantiated existence and it is difficult to see how a capacity for uninstantiated existence follows from the premises of the regress argument. For example, one suggestion is that the separation of the Forms follows from the explanatory priority of Forms over sensible particulars. But it is difficult to see how the explanatory priority of Forms over sensible particulars would entail that Forms are capable of uninstantiated existence. And indeed, some have viewed the separation of the Forms as a distinct premise in the argument. The interpretation of separation I have proposed holds promise for making the claim that the separation of the Forms follows from their explanatory priority plausible. Aristotle is arguably ascribing to the Platonists the view that the explanation of the ontological status of the many sensible particulars, as beings of a certain kind, requires appeal to the relevant Form, while holding further that the explanation of the ontological status of a Form, as a being of a certain kind, does not require appeal to some sensible particular or other. These views would not entail that Forms can exist uninstantiated. But they do resemble the claim that Forms are separate from sensible particulars, under the interpretation of separation I have proposed. Of course, much more would need to be said to defend the claim that claim that the separation of the Forms follows from their explanatory priority. But this sketch of the issue indicates one point of significance for the interpretation of ontological dependence in Aristotle.

Non-substantial Individuals

What sort of things are non-substantial individuals? Aristotle’s examples, given at Categories 1a25–28, are a “certain item of grammatical knowledge” (ἡ τῆς γραμματικῆς) present in a soul and a “certain paleness” (τὸ τι λευκὸν) present in a body. But the exact nature of non-substantial individuals is not clear from these examples. Recall, I’ve been calling a property recurrent if it can be found in more than one subject, and non-recurrent otherwise. What is not clear from these examples is whether non-substantial individuals are recurrent or non-recurrent. Can your soul and mine share the same certain item of grammatical knowledge? Can your body and mine

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19 See, for example, Code (1985).
share the same paleness? I have skirted this issue at times above. I will not here enter far into the details of the debate between those who hold that non-substantial individuals are non-recurrent properties and those who hold that such entities are recurrent properties.\textsuperscript{20} Rather, I will merely point out that much of the debate has rested on the assumption that ontological independence is in Aristotle a capacity for separate existence. Under the view of ontological independence I have advocated in this paper, however, some of the evidence appealed to in the debate is neutral on the question.

Non-substantial individuals are \textit{inherent} or present in a subject, and much of the debate on this issue has centered on the apparent definition of this notion at \textit{Categories} 1a24-5. I will quote Ackrill’s (1963: 4) translation:

\begin{quote}
By ‘in a subject’ I mean what is in something (\textit{τινι}), not as a part, and cannot exist separately (\textit{ἀδύνατον χειρὶς εἶναι}) from what it is in (\textit{τοῦ ἐν ὧν ἐστίν}).
\end{quote}

A commonly held assumption is that a non-substantial individual is non-recurrent if it is inseparable from an individual substance. This assumption rests on an interpretation of separation as a capacity for independent existence, an interpretation at work in the above translation. If a given non-substantial individual is incapable of existing independently from an individual substance, then it seems that the non-substantial individual must be non-recurrent. The assumption that a property is non-recurrent if it is inseparable from an individual subject thus drives much of the dialectic of the debated reading of 1a24-5. Those who hold that non-substantial individuals are non-recurrent properties read 1a24-5 as claiming that any non-substantial individual is inseparable from its subject, an individual substance. For this reason, they take \textit{τινι} and \textit{τοῦ ἐν ὧν ἐστίν} to co-refer to the individual substance in which the non-substantial individual inheres.

Those who hold that non-substantial individuals are recurrent, on the other hand, read 1a24-5 as only committed to the claim that non-substantial individuals are inseparable from some of the subjects in which they are found, but not from the individual substances in which they are found.

For this reason, they take τοῦ ἐν ὑπάρξει to refer, not to the individual substance in which the non-substantial individual inheres, but to some other entity in which the non-substantial individual may be said to be. For example, those who hold that non-substantial individuals are recurrent might take an individual colour to be a fine-grained shade of colour. Moreover, they might take the entity from which an individual colour cannot exist separately to be the universal body. No fine-grained shade of colour can exist apart from bodies, but that is not to say that a fine-grained shade of colour may not be shared by more than one body.

I have argued that separation terminology, when it refers to a notion of ontological independence, does not refer to a capacity for independent existence. If I am right that ontological independence in Aristotle is rather the admission of the ontological status of a being independently of that being standing in a tie to anything else, then the assumption that a non-substantial individual is non-recurrent, if it is inseparable from an individual substance, is false. For OI, has the result that the claim that an item is inseparable from a subject entails only that it has its ontological status dependently on things of the same kind as the subject. Such a view is consistent with either the view that non-substantial individuals are recurrent or the view that they are non-recurrent. Furthermore, establishing that τινὶ and τοῦ ἐν ὑπάρξει co-refer to the individual substance in which the non-substantial individual inheres would not decide the issue. For then a non-substantial individual is present in, and inseparable from, an individual substance; and so each depends on its status as a being in virtue of standing in a relation to some individual substance or other. But this may be true of either recurrent or non-recurrent items.

The inseparability possessed by individual properties entails neither that such properties are recurrent nor that they are non-recurrent. This offers a deflationary position on the relevance of 1a24-5 to the question of non-recurrent properties. If we wish to answer the question whether non-substantial individuals are non-recurrent, we will have to look elsewhere.21

The Separation of the Active Intellect

Aristotle claims at De Anima 3.5 that the active intellect is separate. Referring to the active intellect, he writes:

21 I discuss non-substantial individuals in more detail in Corkum ms.
And this intellect is separate ( phíλοσφοικός), unaffected, and unmixed, being in essence activity. For that which acts is always superior to that which is affected, and the first principle to the matter. Actual knowledge is identical with its object; but potential knowledge is prior in time in the individual but not prior even in time in general; and it is not the case that it sometimes thinks and at other times not. In separation ( phíλοσφοικός) it is just what it is, and this alone is immortal and eternal. (430a17-23)

This passage has been controversial practically since it was written and I can only indicate here how an interpretation of separation terminology affects our interpretation of this passage.

It is not clear even what it is from which the active intellect is separate. I will assume that the claim being made in the above quoted passage is that the active intellect is separate from the body and, moreover, that the implicit claim is that the passive intellect is inseparable from the body. Furthermore, I will assume that this is in virtue of the active intellect being active as opposed to the passivity of the passive intellect. In support of this assumption, I will note that Aristotle explicitly raises the question whether there is a kind of soul which is separable from the body at 403a3-12, in the first chapter of De Anima, where he surveys a variety of questions to be addressed in the work.22 It is plausible that he is returning to this very question in the passage quoted.

Under the interpretation of separation as a capacity for independent existence, the claim that the active intellect is separate from the body is the claim that the active intellect, as opposed to the passive intellect, is capable of existing independently from the body. This interpretation could lend support to the view that the active intellect will survive death; alternatively, the interpretation could lend support to those who hold that, where the passive intellect is a human intellect, the active intellect is God’s intellect.23 However, those who hold these views of the active intellect are hard pressed

22) “A further problem presented by the affections of soul is this: are they all affections of the complex of body and soul, or is there any one among them peculiar to the soul by itself? To determine this is indispensable but difficult. If we consider the majority of them, there seems to be no case in which the soul can act or be acted upon without involving the body; e.g. anger, courage, appetite, and sensation generally. Thinking seems the most probable exception; but if this too proves to be a form of imagination or to be impossible without imagination, it too requires a body as a condition of its existence. If there is any way of acting or being acted upon proper to soul, soul will be capable of separate existence; if there is none, its separate existence is impossible.”

23) For a recent advocacy of this latter view, see Caston (1999).
to explain why the separation of the active intellect follows from its activity, where the inseparability of the passive intellect follows from its passivity.

Under the interpretation of separation terminology I have argued for in this paper, the claim that the active intellect is separable from the body is not the claim that the active intellect can exist apart from the body. It is instead the claim that the active intellect does not depend on the body for its status as a distinct kind of thing with a distinctive characteristic activity. Here is one way of cashing out this independence. The passive intellect depends on the bodily sense organs so as to receive the perceptual information which leads to concept acquisition. The active intellect, by contrast, operates independently of the bodily sense organs. Once one has acquired a given concept, she can actually think it. Although concept acquisition requires a body, the further actualization of a concept, the characteristic activity of the active intellect, does not. Such an interpretation would explain why the separation of the active intellect follows from its activity, where the inseparability of the passive intellect follows from its passivity.\textsuperscript{24}

Of course, defending this interpretation would require a careful study of the \textit{De Anima}, but I will leave this for another time.\textsuperscript{25}

\textbf{Works Cited}


\textsuperscript{24} An apparent problem for this view is that, if the claim that the active intellect is separable from the body is not the claim that the active intellect can exist apart from the body, then why is the active intellect described as immortal and eternal? Although this description gives credence to the suggestion that the active intellect can exist apart from the body after death, I do not find the description to give irrefutable evidence for this view. The claim that the human active intellect is immortal and eternal may only be the claim that, of the various components of the human soul, it is the most like the divine intellect. I discuss the interpretation of the active intellect in more detail in my 2005.

\textsuperscript{25} Thanks to Dimitrios Dentsoras, Neil van Leeuwen, Richard Mohr, Martin Tweedale and an anonymous reviewer for \textit{Phronesis}. Ancestral papers were delivered, under the title, “Ontological Independence in Aristotle’s Categories,” to the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy at the American Philosophical Association Eastern Division Meeting, Washington, D.C., December 2003, and at Princeton and Stanford in the Spring of 2004.
—— ms. “Aristotle on Non-substantial Individuals.”