None of tradition, the skewed economies, the im-
al's, themselves. In short, there prevailed a sense of
principal grounds of rights and duties them-
be, the citizens of the state
knew that it was theirs, or at least that they
the schools. better pay for teachers. who
pa-
with its claims and counterclaims to na-
tional Lebensraum still weighs heavily; and
when we add to that memory the frustrated
history of the United (sic) Nations, such
nationalist careerism as the U.S. misad-
venture in Vietnam, and the present pos-
sibility of a general holocaust because some
nuclear power's sensibilities have been
sufficiently offended, little more is needed to
understand why the ideas, let alone the ide-
als, of nationalism and patriotism should
be addressed with suspicion.

On the other hand, the apparent disarray
of our culture—the sudden flashes of com-
munal and individual temper, the rapid loss
of tradition, the skewed economies, the im-
probabilities of mass education—all this
might well evoke nostalgia for what appears
in memory as a tidier and more settled past,
in which love of country was an important
culture-the sudden flashes of com-
try, to ethnicity, to religion?

To propose for a mass, technological, and
fragmented society like the United States
that civic commitment be revived by a ver-
sion of “consciousness-raising” reflects a
view of historical causality that might be
understandable for someone writing in the
eighteenth century but in contemporary
terms leads nowhere. As if the economic,
social, and technological forces that have
produced the present tensions and incom-
patibilities could simply be talked away. Professor Janowitz might try spending a day
teaching civics in an inner-city school to
see the improbability of his recommenda-
tions.

Neither nationalism nor its near-relation pa-
triotism has had a good press recently in the
literary or academic or even in the po-

tical culture of the United States and West-
ern Europe. The reasons for this are only
too obvious. The memory of World War II
with its claims and counterclaims to na-
tional Lebensraum still weighs heavily; and
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When the nation-state may have done that it
shouldn’t have, the citizens of the state still
knew that it was theirs, or at least that they
were its. They knew what the state could
require of them, and they accepted their
duties as a condition of the rights that came
with them. They recognized, therefore, the
principal grounds of rights and duties them-
selves. In short, there prevailed a sense of
collective interest and purpose that gave
the nation-state, the skewed economies, the im-
probabilities of mass education—all this
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Benedict Anderson addresses the issues
raised by nationalism and patriotism much
more seriously than does Janowitz, at-
ttempting to view them as features of culture
that have first a history and then a structure
which emerges from that history. The his-
torical role of nationalism is tied closely to
the rise of the nation-state, which Anderson
considers from its origin in the sixteenth
century and down to the current day.

It is clear that modern nationalism in-
corporates features that were affecting com-
munal life before and independently of the
rise of the nation, and Anderson attempts
to identify these. It is in examining this
latter point that he finds his title: Once the
size of a community makes personal ac-
quaintance among its members impossible,
his suggests, the community must then in
some degree be “imagined.” In the case of

an argument for patriotism on the example
of the militias in the American Revolution
and then on the subsequent history of con-
scription in the United States would not be
overly persuasive, even if the militias had
been effective both in military terms and as
indications of a general civic conscious-
ness. Janowitz himself admits doubts about
the militias. They were less important in
fighting the Revolution than was the army,
and anyone with recent experience of the
National Guard would almost certainly ar-
gue that things must be worse now.

Professor Janowitz is no doubt sincere in
his belief that patriotism is an important,
perhaps the primary, civic virtue and closely
tied to whatever else occurs in a society.
Some of his recommendations—for ex-
ample, the importance of replacing the vol-
unteer army—are compelling in their own
right. But his discussion is so emotional
that the most important theoretical and even
the practical issues surrounding the phe-
omenon of patriotism are never even for-
mulated systematically. What, for instance,
is the relation of patriotism to other social
forms of identity, to ethnicity, to religion?
To propose for a mass, technological, and
fragmented society like the United States
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Berel Lang
the nation (like Janowitz, Anderson says little about what specifically distinguishes the nation from other forms of political organization) what is imagined is a form of organization that is "limited," "sovereign," and a "community," i.e., a focus of "comradeship" and "fraternity." Since these are the elements of a commitment to national life, patriotism, for Anderson, is to be understood psychologically and historically before any significant claim can be made for its value. What has produced the powerful varieties of national consciousness, and what causes have sustained them—these are the questions he poses. His response sets out from the premise that nationalism is less an ideology than a form of cultural expression—closer to the phenomena of kinship and religion than to such political doctrines as liberalism or fascism. This is an important distinction; it moves to "naturalize" nationalism, suggesting, against most accounts, that nationalism has both an inside and an outside and that we need to take account of it in the imagination as well as in its external causes.

The line of explanation that Anderson follows is at once eccentric and enlightening. In a number of places, to be sure, he acknowledges the standard explanations of nationalism as related to changes in the patterns of commerce and economic development. His own emphasis, however, is on language, literacy, and the wide-ranging effects of the printing press. These features of social history may seem altogether remote from questions of political organization, but it is precisely those whose abstract views of historical change assume the irrelevance of these factors that Anderson means to dispute. He thus argues persuasively, it seems to me, for the causal relation, singly and then together, of the failing dominance of Latin, the development of vernacular languages to replace it, and—most important—the spread of "print capitalism" as agents in the "imagining" that led people eventually to identify themselves and others in terms of national affiliation. The evidence he cites for this complex thesis is itself complex, moving beyond the standard examples of modern European history to the nationalist movements toward independence that accompanied the colonization of South and North America and then to recent developments in Southeast Asia, the area of his own special interest. It would be unlikely that any single hypothesis could fully cover such a diversity of cultures and periods. And indeed there are loose ends to Anderson's analysis—for example, the need to account for divergent nationalisms within such single-language areas as well as in its extemal causes.

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groups as English. But the central thread of his argument and the varieties of evidence he provides are consistently suggestive. The spread of the vernacular print-languages of the sixteenth century, he argues, had three consequences: (1) They "created unified fields of exchange...below Latin and above the spoken vernaculars." (2) They gave a new "fixity" to language by slowing the rate of linguistic change. (3) They established individual "languages of power." Together these provided a strong common field and a strong exclusionary principle. Citing such diverse examples as the strange, almost artificial career of Magyar nationalism, Ataturk's romanization of Turkish, and the demythologizing of the "sacred languages" by the nineteenth-century inventors of philology (who, in turn, it needs to be added, nourished a new, racist mythology), Anderson plots the parallel courses of nationalism and language. He thus adds to other recent work, like that by Elisabeth Eisenstein and Robert Darnton, which trace to the growing print-culture of the sixteenth century consequences that extend far beyond the specific content of the texts printed. The medium, it turns out, is more than the message.

To be sure, lurking beyond much of Anderson's analysis is a general conception of language as a decisive element in the imagined life of communities and individuals, one by which they establish their identities. This thesis in its theoretical form—for example, in its presupposition of an intrinsic relation between language and thought—Anderson hardly touches. But if one grants only the minimal premise that language is a central element in social life, then the parallels that Anderson points out between the changing forms of language and their organization, on the one hand, and social structure in its other forms, on the other, have important implications. Certainly they serve as a useful counterweight to the accounts of nationalism that take class structure and economic development as the single fulcrum around which everything else in political life generally, and the rise of nationalism particularly, revolves. As both the idealist and Marxist historians have learned to their cost (Anderson neatly points out that the persistence of nationalism remains an enigma for the Marxists), historical effects can also become causes—and however one identifies the causes that produced the vernacular languages of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries or that led to Gutenberg's discovery, the consequences of these events quite evidently took on a life and causality of their own.

Anderson does not exaggerate his claims, however; and it is evident that trade and economics, population shifts, and New World exploration, which have figured in more conventional accounts of nationalism, are not excluded by his account, though it is not clear from what he says exactly how they would be related. Given a historical phenomenon as massive as nationalism, the very distinction between causes and effects becomes problematic. Yet none of these qualifications alters the fact that both in joining the analysis of material conditions to historical change as it is lived and in treating language and its representations as agents of social change, Anderson has written an illuminating and provocative book—a good read as well as an occasion for further reflection. Janowitz is concerned, but his argument is merely special pleading. Anderson, on the other hand, makes nationalism and patriotism more historically intelligible, even more plausible as principle commitment. [WV]

THE HOUSE OF SI ABD ALLAH: THE ORAL HISTORY OF A MOROCCAN FAMILY
recorded, translated, and edited by Henry Munson, Jr. (Yale University Press; xxiii + 280 pp.; $19.95)

Sterett Pope

Al-Hajj Muhammad, one of the two narrators of Henry Munson's remarkable House of Si Abd Allah, is a peddler who makes his living selling the "garbage of the Christians" in the flea markets of Tangier. The Hajj has married nine times, and divorced eight, without children. Unstable and chronically broke, he is the family bard and buffoon but also a man of deep piety. Although al-Hajj Muhammad obtained a passport to Belgium, where he worked for seven years, he has never been able to save money, except for the large sum he spent on the pilgrimage he made to Mecca at the age of forty-seven (for which he bears the Arabic honorific "al-Hajj"). The grandson of Si Abd Allah, a prosperous peasant from the Jbalan highlands outside Tangier, the Hajj mirrors the experience of the hordes of Arab cultivators who have been forced off the land and now sell their labor in the teeming cities of the southern Mediterranean. And as Henry Munson notes in his introduction, the Hajj's worldview is of great interest to Western readers because it graphically demonstrates how "Muslim fundamentalists define their socioeconomic and nationalistic grievances in religious terms and generally fuse them with grievances of an irreducibly religious character."

For al-Hajj Muhammad, the paramount fact of political life in Morocco is foreign domination. "The Christians control this world. They send men to the moon. They build great buildings, great bridges, great ships, and great bombs. But when it comes to the world of God, they are ignorant savages." Although poor and childless, the Hajj is a man of pious dignity who bears his title of "pilgrim" with pride. And although he views politics as the province of infidels, he sees his faith as ultimate salvation—not only in the hereafter, but also in the struggle of this world against the tyranny of the Christians. "Why did God allow the Christians to rule over the house of Islam?" he asks. "Why did God allow the Jews to take Palestine and holy Jerusalem? Why does God allow the Christians to live like sultans in our land, while we are like slaves in their land? This is God's punishment. And this is God's test. Muslims have left the path." Here he refers to the Westernized Moroccan elite, who spurn the injunctions of Islam and share the spoils of the Christian domination of their country.

The notion that foreign domination and social injustice in Muslim lands is the result of religious apostasy should not surprise the Western reader. It is another example of what Arnold Toynbee called "Zealotism"—a kind of "archaism evoked by foreign pressure," whose hallmark is the perceived link between political dependence and religious dereliction—a theme that has exercised a great influence in all three of the Semitic, monotheistic religions. This tendency is shared by the Maccabees and the original Zealots of Jewish history, and also by some Christian fundamentalists in the United States today. To "Zealotism" Toynbee opposed what he called "Herodianism," a form of mimetic cosmopolitanism that seeks to assimilate the methods and culture of hegemonic foreigners. While Herodianism may seem to us a more sensible and effective response to political crisis, Toynbee recognized its shortcomings: Essentially derivative, Herodianism is rarely creative or emotionally satisfying; and more important, it can only promise salvation to a small segment of the imperiled society. While colonialism and modernization have brought many members of ruling Arab elites to skepticism concerning the revealed truths of Islam, the conversion of these few cosmopolitans has only reinforced the faith of the masses, who see their own poverty and the dependence of their countries as the work of infidels and of fellow Muslims in