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ISSN 0022-5053 (print)
E-ISSN 1538-4586 (electronic)

Last updated: August 2016

© Journal of the History of Philosophy, Inc.


Tables of Contents

The full texts of articles, discussions, and book reviews from volume 1 (1963) to the current issue are available here (via Project Muse).

Also available here are the contents and abstracts of forthcoming issues.

Forthcoming issue
January 2017 (vol. 55.1)


ARTICLES

Hobbes on Mind: Practical Deliberation, Reasoning, and Language
Arash Abizadeh

Readers of Hobbes usually take his account of practical deliberation to be a passive process that does not respond to agents’ judgments about what normative reasons they have. This is ostensibly because deliberation is purely conative and/or excludes reasoning, or because Hobbesian reasoning is itself a process in which reasoners merely experience a succession of mental states. I argue that, for Hobbes, deliberation (the basis for voluntary action) is not purely conative and among humans it involves reasoning. Furthermore, while non-linguistic reasoning is passive, specifically linguistic reasoning is an active process in which reasoners affirm propositions from which they reason. The historical significance of Hobbes’s account of agency lies in his attempt, by appealing to linguistic tools, to weld a materialist determinism to a cognitive account of practical deliberation that can involve reasoning and be reason-responsive.

The Trouble with Feelings, or Spinoza on the Identity of Power and Essence 
Karolina Hübner

Spinoza claims both that a thing’s essence is identical to power, and that emotions are fundamentally variations in this power. The conjunction of these two theses creates difficulties for his metaphysics and ethics alike. The three main worries concern the coherence of Spinoza’s accounts of essence, diachronic identity, and emotional “bondage,” and put in question his ability to derive ethical and psychological doctrines from his metaphysical claims. In response to these difficulties, this paper offers a new interpretation of Spinoza’s account of affects and his doctrine of the identity of power and essence. It shows that what is fundamental to his ontology of affects is the relation of modification or determination, a relation central to his ontology more generally. The paper argues that we cannot simply identify power and essence but should instead take affects to modify or determine essences as particular exercises of power (particular desires, appetites, and volitions). That is, Spinozistic essences should be viewed as intrinsically determinable, with affects supplying the determinations, and as consisting not in rigid sets of determinate properties, but in ranges of variable properties.


Circling to Scientia: Reading Descartes in Light of the Debate Between Stoic Dogmatists and Academic Skeptics
Joshua Stuchlik

I argue that situating Descartes’s epistemology in relation to the debate between Stoic dogmatists and Academic skeptics sheds light on his theological argument for the reliability of clear and distinct perception in the Meditations. In particular, it allows us to understand how the argument might lead to a sort of certainty in its conclusion that is properly epistemic and not merely psychological, and it enables us to see how reasoning though the argument is supposed to make scientia possible. 


SYMPOSIUM

Kant’s Account of Cognition 
Eric Watkins and Marcus Willaschek

In this paper, we offer an overview of the basic structure of Kant’s account of cognition, of the conditions on the notion of cognition most central to the first Critique, and how they are satisfied in the case of human beings. Our primary aim in this regard is to provide a comprehensive (albeit not exhaustive) framework for understanding Kant’s account of (theoretical) cognition. In the course of doing so, we argue for various interpretative claims, which, taken together, amount to a novel understanding of Kant’s account of cognition. First, we argue that cognition is a mental state that determines a given object by attributing general features to it. Second, we explain what it means for Kant for an object to be given; givenness in the relevant sense involves an immediate relation to an existing object. These first two claims imply that cognition (Erkenntnis) is distinct from knowledge (Wissen), both in Kant’s sense and in our modern sense. Third, we note some fundamental ambiguities about what sensibility and understanding are, and point out that purely causal interpretations of these faculties are problematic. Fourth, we distinguish between an intuition and an intuitive representation (analogous to the distinction between a concept and a discursive representation) in such a way that an intuition is one specific kind of intuitive representation. Fifth, we describe two different accounts of concepts (‘logical’ and ‘psychological’) and explain how they complement each other (despite their distinctness). Sixth, we diagnose several confusions regarding whether Kant is or is not a non-conceptualist about intuitions (though without attempting a definitive resolution to that debate). Finally, we show how our analysis of cognition clarifies what the most promising lines of argument are for Kant’s claim that we cannot have cognition of the objects of traditional metaphysics (while still allowing for limited kinds of knowledge of things in themselves).


Givenness, Objective Reality, and A Priori Intuitions
Stefanie Grüne

According to Eric Watkins and Marcus Willaschek, cognition (in the narrow sense), that is, a conscious representation of a given object and of its general features, has to fulfill two conditions for finite beings: the ‘givenness’ and ‘thought’ conditions. Additionally, they argue that the givenness of an object implies that the object exists. In this paper, I will focus exclusively on their conception of the givenness condition. For Watkins and Willaschek, the reason why cognition in the narrow sense has to fulfill the givenness condition is that it has to latch onto the world. I will try to show that Kant’s account of cognition, in the narrow sense, only requires a relation to really possible objects; that is, a relation to objects whose existence is really possible. It does not require a relation to actually existing objects.
    In the first section, I will argue that the reason why cognition in the narrow sense requires the givenness of objects in intuition is not that cognition has to “latch onto the world” in the sense of referring to existing particulars. In the second section, I will try to show that, at least in the case of a priori intuitions, givenness does not imply existence. Given this result, a priori intuitions do not latch onto the world in the sense of referring to existing particulars. In the third section, I will argue that a priori cognitions furthermore do not latch onto the world in a weaker sense.


Kant on Cognition, Givenness, and Ignorance

Andrew Chignell

My goal in this paper is to examine two central aspects of Kant’s theory of cognition (Erkenntnis) in the context of the account offered by Eric Watkins and Marcus Willaschek. I first focus on what it is for an object to be “given” to the mind and how such “givenness” (allegedly) underwrites both mental representation and reference. I then consider Watkins and Willaschek’s interpretation of Kant’s claim that we cannot cognize things-in-themselves, and conclude by sketching an alternative (and less empiricistic) account of that claim.


Kant’s Account of Cognition
Eric Watkins and Marcus Willaschek

We are grateful to Stefanie Grüne and Andrew Chignell for their thoughtful commentaries on our paper. Both focus their remarks on the issue of ‘givenness,’ which could seem like a relatively narrow topic within the much broader subject matter of cognition that we have attempted to describe in our paper. However, we think that givenness, properly understood, plays an important role in Kant’s account of cognition, since it is central to both of the conditions that Kant places on cognition (which we call the ‘givenness condition’ and the ‘thought condition’). In particular, we maintain that givenness is an independent condition on cognition, one that has a meaning and function distinct from what it contributes to the thought condition. Full consideration of the givenness condition allows one to see more clearly how it gives expression to one of Kant’s most fundamental concerns in the first Critique. For, in our view, the primary role of givenness is to help to explain how it is that representations can refer, or fail to refer, to objects in a specific, cognitively significant way, an achievement that Kant is marking with the term ‘cognition.’ To make good on these claims and to substantiate this picture of the broader significance of givenness within Kant’s account of cognition, we address Grüne’s paper first, then Chignell’s.



2016 - volume 54
January 2016 (vol. 54.1)
April 2016 (vol. 54.2)
July 2016 (vol. 54.3)
October 2016 (vol. 54.4)


2015 - volume 53
January 2015 (vol. 53.1)
April 2015 (vol. 53.2)
July 2015 (vol. 53.3)
October 2015 (vol. 53.4)


2014 - volume 52
January 2014 (vol. 52.1)
April 2014 (vol. 52.2)
July 2014 (vol. 52.3)
October 2014 (vol. 52.4)


2013 - volume 51
January 2013 (vol. 51.1)
April 2013 (vol. 51.2)
July 2013 (vol. 51.3)

October 2013 (vol. 51.4)


2012 - volume 50
January 2012 (vol. 50.1)
April 2012 (vol. 50.2)
July 2012 (vol. 50.3)
October 2012 (vol. 50.4)


2011 - volume 49
January 2011 (vol. 49.1)
April 2011 (vol. 49.2)
July 2011 (vol. 49.3)
October 2011 (vol. 49.4)

2010 - volume 48
January 2010 (vol. 48.1)
April 2010 (vol. 48.2)
July 2010 (vol. 48.3)
October 2010 (vol. 48.4)


2009 - volume 47
October 2009 (vol. 47.4)
July 2009 (vol. 47.3)
April 2009 (vol. 47.2)
January 2009 (vol. 47.1)
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2008 - volume 46
October 2008 (vol. 46.4)
July 2008 (vol. 46.3)
April 2008 (vol. 46.2)
January 2008 (vol. 46.1)
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2007 - volume 45
October 2007 (vol. 45.4)
July 2007 (vol. 45.3)
April 2007 (vol. 45.2)
January 2007 (vol. 45.1)
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2006 - volume 44
October 2006 (vol. 44.4)
July 2006 (vol. 44.3)
April 2006 (vol. 44.2)
January 2006 (vol. 44.1)
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2005 - volume 43
October 2005 (vol. 43.4)
July 2005 (vol. 43.3)
April 2005 (vol. 43.2)
January 2005 (vol. 43.1)
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2004 - volume 42
October 2004 (vol. 42.4)
July 2004 (vol. 42.3)
April 2004 (vol. 42.2)
January 2004 (vol. 42.1)
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2003 - volume 41
October 2003 (vol. 41.4)
July 2003 (vol. 41.3)
April 2003 (vol. 41.2)
January 2003 (vol. 41.1)
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2002 - volume 40
October 2002 (vol. 40.4)
July 2002 (vol. 40.3)
April 2002 (vol. 40.2)
January 2002 (vol. 40.1)
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2001 - volume 39
October 2001 (vol. 39.4)
July 2001 (vol. 39.3)
April 2001 (vol. 39.2)
January (vol. 39.1)
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2000 - volume 38
October 2000 (vol. 38.4)
July 2000 (vol. 38.3)
April 2000 (vol. 38.2)
January 2000 (vol. 38.1)
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1999 - volume 37
October 1999 (vol. 37.4)
July 1999 (vol. 37.3)
April 1999 (vol. 37.2)
January 1999 (vol. 37.1)
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1998 - volume 36
October 1998 (vol. 36.4)
July 1998 (vol. 36.3)
April 1998 (vol. 36.2)
January 1998 (vol. 36.1)
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1997 - volume 35
October 1997 (vol. 35.4)
July 1997 (vol. 35.3)
April 1997 (vol. 35.2)
January 1997 (vol. 35.1)
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1996 - volume 34
October 1996 (vol. 34.4)
July 1996 (vol. 34.3)
April 1996 (vol. 34.2)
January 1996 (vol. 34.1)
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1995 - volume 33
October 1995 (vol. 33.4)
July 1995 (vol. 33.3)
April 1995 (vol. 33.2)
January 1995 (vol. 33.1)
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1994 - volume 32
October 1994 (vol. 32.4)
July 1994 (vol. 32.3)
April 1994 (vol. 32.2)
January 1994 (vol. 32.1)
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1993 - volume 31
October 1993 (vol. 31.4)
July 1993 (vol. 31.3)
April 1993 (vol. 31.2)
January 1993 (vol. 31.1)
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1992 - volume 30
October 1992 (vol. 30.4)
July 1992 (vol. 30.3)
April 1992 (vol. 30.2)
January 1992 (vol. 30.1)
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1991 - volume 29
October 1991 (vol. 29.4)
July 1991 (vol. 29.3)
April 1991 (vol. 29.2)
January 1991 (vol. 29.1)
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1990 - volume 28
October 1990 (vol. 28.4)
July 1990 (vol. 28.3)
April 1990 (vol. 28.2)
January 1990 (vol. 28.1)
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1989 - volume 27
October 1989 (vol. 27.4)
July 1989 (vol. 27.3)
April 1989 (vol. 27.2)
January 1989 (vol. 27.1)
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1988 - volume 26
October 1988 (vol. 26.4)
July 1988 (vol. 26.3)
April 1988 (vol. 26.2)
January 1988 (vol. 26.1)
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1987 - volume 25
October 1987 (vol. 25.4)
July 1987 (vol. 25.3)
April 1987 (vol. 25.2)
January 1987 (vol. 25.1)
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1986 - volume 24
October 1986 (vol. 24.4)
July 1986 (vol. 24.3)
April 1986 (vol. 24.2)
January 1986 (vol. 24.1)
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1985 - volume 23
October 1985 (vol. 23.4)
July 1985 (vol. 23.3)
April 1985 (vol. 23.2)
January 1985 (vol. 23.1)
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1984 - volume 22
October 1984 (vol. 22.4)
July 1984 (vol. 22.3)
April 1984 (vol. 22.2)
January 1984 (vol. 22.1)
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1983 - volume 21
October 1983 (vol. 21.4)
July 1983 (vol. 21.3)
April 1983 (vol. 21.2)
January 1983 (vol. 21.1)
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1982 - volume 20
October 1982 (vol. 20.4)
July 1982 (vol. 20.3)
April 1982 (vol. 20.2)
January 1982 (vol. 20.1)
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1981 - volume 19
October 1981 (vol. 19.4)
July 1981 (vol. 19.3)
April 1981 (vol. 19.2)
January 1981 (vol. 19.1)
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1980 - volume 18
October 1980 (vol. 18.4)
July 1980 (vol. 18.3)
April 1980 (vol. 18.2)
January 1980 (vol. 18.1)
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1979 - volume 17
October 1979 (vol. 17.4)
July 1979 (vol. 17.3)
April 1979 (vol. 17.2)
January 1979 (vol. 17.1)
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1978 - volume 16
October 1978 (vol. 16.4)
July 1978 (vol. 16.3)
April 1978 (vol. 16.2)
January 1978 (vol. 16.1)
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1977 - volume 15
October 1977 (vol. 15.4)
July 1977 (vol. 15.3)
April 1977 (vol. 15.2)
January 1977 (vol. 15.1)
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1976 - volume 14
October 1976 (vol. 14.4)
July 1976 (vol. 14.3)
April 1976 (vol. 14.2)
January 1976 (vol. 14.1)
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1975 - volume 13
October 1975 (vol. 13.4)
July 1975 (vol. 13.3)
April 1975 (vol. 13.2)
January 1975 (vol. 13.1)
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1974 - volume 12
October 1974 (vol. 12.4)
July 1974 (vol. 12.3)
April 1974 (vol. 12.2)
January 1974 (vol. 12.1)
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1973 - volume 11
October 1973 (vol. 11.4)
July 1973 (vol. 11.3)
April 1973 (vol. 11.2)
January 1973 (vol. 11.1)
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1972 - volume 10
October 1972 (vol. 10.4)
July 1972 (vol. 10.3)
April 1972 (vol. 10.2)
January 1972 (vol. 10.1)
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1971 - volume 9
October 1971 (vol. 9.4)
July 1971 (vol. 9.3)
April 1971 (vol. 9.2)
January 1971 (vol. 9.1)
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1970 - volume 8
October 1970 (vol. 8.4)
July 1970 vol. 8.3)
April 1970 (vol. 8.2)
January 1970 (vol. 8.1)
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1969 - volume 7
October 1969 (vol. 7.4)
July 1969 (vol. 7.3)
April 1969 (vol. 7.2)
January 1969 (vol. 7.1)
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1968 - volume 6
October 1968 (vol. 6.4)
July 1968 (vol. 6.3)
April 1968 (vol. 6.2)
January 1968 (vol. 6.1)
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1967 - volume 5
October 1967 (vol. 5.4)
July 1967 (vol. 5.3)
April 1967 (vol. 5.2)
January 1967 (vol. 5.1)
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1966 - volume 4
October 1966 (vol. 4.4)
July 1966 (vol. 4.3)
April 1966 (vol. 4.2)
January 1966 (vol. 4.1)
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1965 - volume 3
October 1965 (vol. 3.2)
April 1965 (vol. 3.1)
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1964 - volume 2
October 1964 (vol. 2.2)
April 1964 (vol. 2.1)
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1963 - volume 1
December 1963 (vol. 1.2)
October 1963 (vol. 1.1)
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Volume by Year
2016 - volume 54
2015 - volume 53

2014 - volume 52
2013 - volume 51
2012 - volume 50
2011 - volume 49
2010 - volume 48

2009 - volume 47
2008 - volume 46
2007 - volume 45
2006 - volume 44
2005 - volume 43
2004 - volume 42
2003 - volume 41
2002 - volume 40
2001 - volume 39
2000 - volume 38

1999 - volume 37
1998 - volume 36
1997 - volume 35
1996 - volume 34
1995 - volume 33
1994 - volume 32
1993 - volume 31
1992 - volume 30
1991 - volume 29
1990 - volume 28

1989 - volume 27
1988 - volume 26
1987 - volume 25
1986 - volume 24
1985 - volume 23
1984 - volume 22
1983 - volume 21
1982 - volume 20
1981 - volume 19
1980 - volume 18

1979 - volume 17
1978 - volume 16
1977 - volume 15
1976 - volume 14
1975 - volume 13
1974 - volume 12
1973 - volume 11
1972 - volume 10
1971 - volume 9
1970 - volume 8

1969 - volume 7
1968 - volume 6
1967 - volume 5
1966 - volume 4
1965 - volume 3
1964 - volume 2
1963 - volume 1