This paper starts from and keeps constantly in touch with the arguments advanced and points of view expressed in Richard Peters' profound and fascinating article 'The Justification of Education'. Its intentions are to examine one or two of his central ideas in some detail, to indicate that his account is incomplete in certain respects, and to draw attention to what seems to be an ambivalence in his attitude to the academic disciplines and their educational value. Although the method I shall adopt will be critical, I hope that this paper will have some value as an exegesis of his, which is a work of considerable difficulty. I shall be concerned only with Peters' 'non-instrumental' justification of education. This includes a 'hedonistic' and a 'non-hedonistic' justification. A brief summary of the non-hedonistic justification follows immediately below.

Peters argues that the demand for justification is essential to human life. The educational pursuit of truth in disciplines such as science, philosophy, literature, and history is in certain fundamental respects the same as the pursuit of truth in everyday life or any other non-educational context, since in any context the pursuit of truth involves virtues such as truthfulness, clarity, non-arbitrariness, impartiality, a sense of relevance, consistency, respect for evidence, etc. Hence, in a context of learning, persons who are pursuing truth in the disciplines are acquiring rational virtues which are essential for a reflective justification of their beliefs, actions and feelings. Peters connects justification with Socratic 'examination of life', and since he takes education to be the implementation of the values and procedures implicit in justification, he is able to represent it as an attempt to actualize the Socratic ideal expressed in the remark that the unexamined life is not worth living. As such it is both preparatory to and a beginning of the good life. Because there is a close logical connection between education and the 'end'—the good life—to which it is conducive, it is claimed that the argument constitutes a non-instrumental justification of education.
The non-hedonistic justification is indeed non-instrumental. All features which are essential to justification must be present whenever justification is accomplished. There is therefore an essential identity between justification practised within an educational context and justification practised outside education. The non-instrumental justification will be *adequate* if and only if the values and procedures implicit in justification can be seen as the entire valuable content transmitted by education. Peters writes: 'It is being claimed that what is valuable (in devotion to the pursuit of knowledge) is the demand that what is done, thought or felt should be rationally assessed.' The non-hedonistic justification is therefore adequate, since from the non-hedonistic standpoint awareness and acceptance of the formal demands of reason, obedience to which is essential for justification, and the knowledge how to fulfil these demands, constitute the entire content of education as such. The educational study of the disciplines and their objects is justified on the ground that through it the learner acquires the rational virtues which are essential for reflective thought on matters of a different kind, chiefly what the individual is to do or has done, what he believes and how he feels about the various matters with which he is existentially concerned, what style of life he is to adopt, and whether the style of life he has adopted is a good one. Peters has succeeded in showing that the study of academic subjects at school and university is relevant to the life of those who do not continue to study these subjects afterwards, and in what an important way it is relevant. There would be cause for concern only if the non-hedonistic justification were the only non-instrumental justification provided, or the only effective non-instrumental justification, for in that case the entire educational value of the study of the disciplines and their objects would be instrumental to the demand for justification. Then an apt analogy to the educational study of the disciplines would be associating with prostitutes in order to acquire the arts of love.

The justification which Peters provides of the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake is his 'hedonistic' justification, but his presentation of it lacks conviction, and it fails to accomplish its purpose. That it has failed becomes obvious in his remarks concerning the value of continuing
with demanding intellectual activity for its own sake after education is complete. It is hard to understand why Peters is so concerned because so many people, after they have become educated, show no desire to continue with demanding theoretical study or other demanding intellectual activity for its own sake. One would suppose that once the rational virtues essential to justification have been achieved there would be no further need for an educated person to continue the demanding pursuit of knowledge, unless perhaps he were required to make some decision which called for more mathematical knowledge, for example, than his education had provided. Peters recognises that further study might be needed for such a purpose, but what he is concerned about is that after becoming educated people no longer go on studying for the sake of pleasure that the demanding pursuit of truth affords. Instead they take their pleasure in golf and other such activities.

Peters argues that an interest in some demanding study will minimize boredom and likelihood of boredom in a person’s life. This may well be true, but study is not the only preventative of boredom. What does it matter if an educated person occupies his leisure-time in golf, if it gives him pleasure and keeps boredom away, rather than in studying some academic subject for the same reasons? His education has equipped him to realize the Socratic idea of self-examination which, in Peters’ view, is the one thing that is essential to the good life. Or, if pleasure is necessary as well, he is getting it from golf—and health besides. In the last section of his paper Peters seems to attribute a high worth to a person’s continuing the demanding pursuit of truth for its own sake after education has been completed, and seems to want to regard it as a criterion of educational success, but nothing he has said in the body of his paper justifies him in this.

In his hedonistic justification Peters conceives the pursuit of truth in an Aristotelian manner, as the unimpeded actualization of powers of discrimination and judgement which has pleasure as its crown or consummation. In his non-hedonistic justification he conceives it in a more Kantian manner as obedience to the demands of reason for their own sake, an obedience which may be tedious and painful but which is as valued when it fails to attain truth
as when it succeeds. But these descriptions do not cover the whole range of non-instrumental values of the pursuit of truth. The values of that pursuit of truth which is not motivated solely by concern for truth, but by some idea of benefit inherent in the pursuit of truth, are very badly served by the Aristotelian type of description of 'enjoyment' which Peters provides. If that description is taken as adequate to explain the 'fascination' of the pursuit of knowledge, there is no real alternative but to base any serious non-instrumental justification of the demanding pursuit of truth on the values implicit in the concern for truth, and this is in effect what Peters does. A more adequate phenomenology of enquiry would strengthen the so-called 'hedonistic' justification, and provide better grounds for regarding continuing the demanding pursuit of truth for its own sake, after education is complete, as a condition of educational success.

I do not know many philosophers who philosophize seriously in the easy spontaneous way in which Pele plays football, but Aristotle and Leibniz and others may have done so, and it would perhaps be correct to regard a person who accomplishes a demanding enquiry in an effortless style as having enjoyed the doing of it, and to suppose his enjoyment to have been of a straightforward hedonic kind. Similarly, persons who are not much concerned about the matters into which they are enquiring often enjoy pursuing the truth of them, when through their exercise of skill and ingenuity the truth rapidly discloses itself. Such brilliant pleasures are only infrequently experienced by many of those who seek for truth in the disciplines. They exercise judgement and discrimination, of course, but are not aware of these acts as pleasure. A long and difficult enquiry has the character of a venture which comprehensively engages the self of the enquirer. Anxiety is frequently the prevailing mood, and confusion, dead-ends, disappointments, lack of inspiration, and lack of energy combine to generate wretchedness. On the other hand, insights occur unexpectedly, ways open up where there had seemed to be no way, things which had seemed disparate fall together, and so on. Disagreeable experiences probably occupy more of the total time of the enquiry than agreeable experiences, and, on reflection, it is often hard to believe that their intensity was less.
The enquirer may nevertheless be able to regard the joys of the venture as worth more than the pains. If he does, he may be prepared to say that he 'enjoyed' the experience of enquiry, but he may be reluctant to do so. He may feel it more appropriate to say that he found the experience 'rewarding', or that he 'got a lot out of it'. The use of these expressions substitutes a virtually empty notion of benefit for the hedonic notion.

Whether an enquiry is assessed favourably in this way is likely to depend, to some extent, on the depth of the enquirer's desire for knowledge, the importance he attaches to the enquiry, the respect in which he holds the discipline, and the degree of success which he achieves. When desire for knowledge is strong, the enquiry felt to be important, and the discipline respected, insights tend to be more exciting and success more gratefully received. When an enquiry involves exceptional pain, its joys tend to be correspondingly intense. Consequently, Peters' distinction between enquiry which is enjoyable and that which is endured for the sake of truth is difficult to apply to very many instances of enquiry in the disciplines. If they are found rewarding it is partly because concern for truth makes it possible to see the joys as worth more than the pains, but it may be that finding an experience of enquiry rewarding does not depend even on this. In many cases it looks as if what is valued is not the joys despite the pains, but the whole complex of pains and joys together, that is to say the venture as such, so long as it is prosecuted with sufficient vigour and attains a certain measure of success.

If a person regards the experience of an enquiry as painful on the whole rather than pleasant yet still judges the experience to have been rewarding, this may be because in the pursuit of it he felt himself to be living powerfully as a thinking being. Enquiry seems worthwhile to him as a form of life in which he invests his energy, and he sees an enquiry, as it develops, as an expression of his vitality. He necessarily understands enquiry as having truth as its end, but he does not value enquiry solely out of concern for truth and perhaps not primarily so. Truth may be pursued in the disciplines in response to a vital demand, and it may be that many people have this motive without clearly knowing it. They cannot honestly say that
they 'enjoy' enquiry or 'take delight' in it, and although they have a concern for truth they are aware, or half-aware, that this does not explain the strength of their desire to engage in enquiry. Enquiry is valued for its own sake as a vital activity or form of life. What does it matter if it is painful? So is long-distance running.

Kant defines might as the power to overcome hindrances, and for the most part tasks which offer no hindrances provide little vital satisfaction. Even thinkers of the highest ability, who could achieve considerable success without painful effort, tend to undertake tasks which are, as we say, 'at the limits of their powers', or which 'stretch their powers to the uttermost', and sometimes suffer shipwreck as a result. They choose to live the life of the intellect as powerfully as they can. This cannot be explained simply by reference to concern for truth, though truth is what they are aiming at, as artists aim at producing something beautiful, and runners aim at coming in first.

Putting forth one's powers against great hindrances is not normally pleasant, but the opposite. Consequently, a person who chooses to live as vigorously as he can as a thinking being chooses abundant pain and hardship, both to a high degree, but these are not evils when they are necessary elements in a freely chosen mode of life.

Vital values are as fundamental as pleasure or the values of reason and do not have to be justified by reference to these other values. Except in special circumstances, no justification is needed for a person's choosing to go on living rather than to die. He does not have to convince himself that the future holds out the prospect of a favourable balance of pleasure over pain, nor does he have to justify his choice to live by reference to any demand of reason. Obedience to the demands of reason, and even their existence, presuppose concurrence with vital demands, for what are the demands of reason to a person who is unable to bring himself to go on living, or to use his mind? The vital value with which we are especially concerned is intellectual vitality/vitaly rewarding intellectual activity (especially enquiry). It is both the capacity to respond to, and activity as response to, the demand felt by human being for as full and vigorous an exercise of its powers as possible. In general, the vital demand is to live at the top
of one's bent, not only to live keenly and powerfully in the life of the intellect, but also in the life of the senses, the life of physical activity, and the life of practical concern.

So far, little reference has been made to the objects about which truth is sought in enquiry undertaken for its own sake. This deficiency needs to be made good if the values of the non-instrumental pursuit of demanding enquiry are to be clearly seen. In some forms of knowledge, literary criticism for example, the enquirers attach a high value to objects of the kinds they study. It is because he loves poetry that a critic seeks the truth of poems rather than of other things; if he valued poems simply as occasions for actualising his general love of knowledge he would not be a lover of poetry at all. If the object of history is the life of past man, then although it would be odd to say that this object is valued, acquaintance with it and imaginative participation in it is valued. It is not studied only for knowing the truth about it, or for the opportunities it provides for vitally rewarding endeavour. To many scientists the principles and laws discovered by science in its various domains are conceived as foundations of reality, and as such provoke a kind of metaphysical wonder. All these kinds of objects are suited to generate interest in a human being, but to call this relation to objects of study 'being interested in such and such' and to ascribe them all to 'curiosity' puts these objects on the same level as any others in which a person might be interested, and their study on the same level as curiosity about the private lives of actors and actresses. It is a matter of some significance that the disciplines are concerned with the various worlds or regions of worlds which are essential to man's being, or on which his being depends, or which may shed light on the nature of his being, or which express his being with such force and comprehensiveness that they are essential for his self-understanding; and which reveal, also, that which is other than man but with which man is necessarily concerned, or upon which his well-being depends, or which is relevant to his well-being as a valued or threatening part of his environment, or which is worthy of his care and attention for its own sake, or which claims his attention as having a being superior to his own. Aristotle does not justify theoria simply by reference to the satisfaction it
affords, but on account of the dignity of its objects. Socrates and Plato, similarly, thought of the love of wisdom as concern with objects of the highest importance. Most people cannot put their heart into arduous enquiry for its own sake when they believe that the matter they are enquiring into is of little or no importance, and there is something tragi-comic about a person who expends his spirit enquiring into a matter of whose triviality he is unaware. An entirely satisfactory justification of education would take close account of all the factors which make participation in the pursuit of truth for its own sake worthwhile, its vital value and the importance attributed to the objects of which knowledge is sought, as well as its hedonic aspect and the rational values implicit in the concern for truth.

While it is not wrong to say that continuing the demanding pursuit of truth after education has been completed is valuable because it mitigates boredom, this justification trivialises what it justifies by reducing it to a pastime. A person may dabble in history or philosophy or literature, setting a very strict limit on the amount of pain he is prepared to endure. For him the pursuit of truth is a pastime, but it is unlikely to prove an effective safeguard against boredom. I suggest that what Peters really believes is that it is good for a human being to live keenly in the attribute of thought, and that no activity is so far removed from boredom as demanding intellectual activity, especially the demanding pursuit of truth. As an example of sheer concern for truth without regard for pleasure, Peters cites Socrates' willingness to teach young men—an activity which he believes Socrates may at times have found rather boring. But surely Socrates found teaching enjoyable on the whole. What makes the example significant is that teaching would not have stretched Socrates' mind; so perhaps Peters' real argument is that no matter how much pleasure Socrates was getting from teaching, his state must have been one of boredom to some degree, since when he was teaching rather than philosophizing he was not putting forth his intellectual powers to the full, and therefore was not so fully alive as a thinking being. Being bored is living at a low ebb, the opposite of living vigorously. If Peters believes that education should liberate and stimulate intel-
lectual vitality, and that by the time education has been accomplished this vitality should be able to maintain itself without tutorial support, it is easy to see why he feels that perhaps the continuing practice of enquiry or other demanding intellectual pursuit for its own sake is a condition of educational success. His point of view does not communicate itself clearly because he assimilates the vital to the hedonic.

According to the view Peters expresses in his article, the chief value of participation in enquiry during education is to be found in the values and procedures implicit in the concern for truth, to which great emphasis is given. This concern for truth is not the same as the concern for discovering the truth of the objects or matters enquired into. It is not what we ordinarily mean by 'love of knowledge', but more like love of intellectual probity. Peters attaches no value to it except in so far as it is active in accomplishing justification. Since by the time education is complete the learner has acquired intellectual probity, there is no further need for him to undertake demanding enquiry for its own sake for the sake of acquiring it. Consequently, the only possible justification of pursuing demanding enquiry for its own sake after education is the pleasure one gets from it, or rather, the relief from pain (boredom). Thus enquiry in an educational context is justified chiefly in one way, and enquiry carried on for its own sake outside education entirely in another. But certain major values of demanding enquiry performed for its own sake are the same whether enquiry is carried on in school or after leaving school; in particular, love of knowledge concerning matters of importance, and the vitally rewarding character of the quest for knowledge. Peters' virtual ignoring of these values accounts for a feeling of the absence of any dynamic element in his account of the pursuit of truth. It is as if an account of the rules which are logically necessary for any enquiry were presented as an account of the values of the experience of enquiry. Even the account of the hedonic aspect of enquiry represents it as little more than successful activity in accordance with these rules. An inadequate phenomenology affects even the most rigorous arguments, if they have phenomenological presuppositions.
Peters argues that the demand for justification is immanent in human life. Justification is defined as rational assessment which a person makes of his own beliefs, actions and feelings—hence a life of obedience to the demand for justification approximates to the Socratic ideal of self-examination. The practice of certain forms of knowledge and understanding is necessarily relevant to the assessment of beliefs etc., and some of the things known and understood are relevant to particular assessments. According to Peters this justifies the development of knowledge and understanding in education.

In ordinary contexts, justifying something is exhibiting sufficient grounds of its truth, rightness or appropriateness. People very often have an interest in justifying something, and no interest at all in discovering that it is false, wrong or inappropriate. Peters does not use 'justification' in this common way. In his view, justification is, among other things, rational assessment by an individual of his own beliefs, and since it is rational it is not partisan. Now, in the case of belief, what is assessed by the individual may be either the state of believing the proposition believed, relative to the grounds or other warrant which he has for believing it, or it may be the proposition believed, relative to the grounds which there are for its truth. Justification in the first, or weak, sense is more limited in scope than justification in the second, or strong, sense. Suppose I consider my belief that the angles of a triangle are together equal to two right-angles, and discover that I have no ground for believing the proposition, or ground which is inadequate. I assess my belief as not justified by the grounds I possess; either the proposition is true or it is not, I don't know which. The demand for justification in the weak sense is now satisfied. I am aware of my ignorance about the quantity of the sum of the angles of a triangle, and have adjusted my cognitive attitude to the proposition accordingly. What I previously believed I am now doubtful about. I could justify all my beliefs, in this weak sense, abandoning any whose supposed grounds in fact prove the truth of their contradictories, and frankly admitting to myself that in many cases I do not have sufficient grounds for believing the propositions believed or for disbelieving them. I change my cognitive attitude to these propositions
from belief to doubt. But I do not go on to try to discover what is true. For me to go on to enquire into the truth of the matters I am ignorant or uncertain about, something more is required than the weak demand for justification, which is only the demand that relative to any proposition towards which I have a cognitive attitude, I should have the cognitive attitude (belief, doubt or disbelief) which is appropriate to that proposition, relative to the grounds or other warrant (or lack of such) which I have for regarding it as true. On its own, the demand for justification in the weak sense is clearly insufficient to justify the educational development of knowledge and understanding.

If reason makes any stronger demand for justification it can hardly be less than an unlimited demand for the discovery of truth. What I have called 'justification in the strong sense' above, cannot be a demand of reason. Suppose I reflect on a belief and become aware that my grounds for it are insufficient. If I wish, I can go on to ask what further grounds there are for believing it, grounds which I do not yet possess. Suppose I discover that the proposition is false, though without thereby discovering what the truth of the matter is. The demand for justification in the strong sense would then be satisfied. But it would be strange for reason to demand that for each of my beliefs I should enquire into the proposition believed until I am properly satisfied whether it is true or false, yet neither permit me to break off the enquiry when I find my belief to be doubtful and have no interest in pursuing the matter further, nor demand that if I find the proposition to be false, without thereby discovering the truth of the matter concerned, I should go on to discover what the truth of the matter is. Surely reason cannot make such an arbitrary demand? If I do proceed further with the enquiry, I shall no longer be assessing my original belief, or even trying to settle my doubt about it. I shall be trying to discover the truth about the particular matter, and to do that I may have to employ reason not merely critically but productively, by forming hypotheses, finding analogies, etc. Fresh occasions for assessment will arise, though in many cases not of beliefs, and in some cases not of my own beliefs but those of other persons which I entertain as possible solutions or steps towards the solution of the
problem. The notion of justification, as Peters understands it, will have been left far behind. If reason makes a stronger demand for justification than the demand that a person's cognitive attitude to any proposition should be appropriate to the grounds he possesses, it can hardly be less than an unlimited demand for knowledge, for it would be arbitrary for reason to demand that I should remedy my ignorance on every matter concerning which I have held a mistaken or ill-grounded belief, but not my ignorance on matters about which I have held no belief at all.

The demand for unlimited knowledge, were it a demand of reason, would be sufficient to justify not only the development of knowledge and understanding to the level required for a person to be educated, but also continuing in the demanding pursuit of truth after education is complete. But it cannot be represented as a demand of reason in the way that the demand for justification in the weak sense can. A demand to seek truth without limit is not written into human life: human life is intelligible without reference to it, and we do not expect everyone to seek truth without limit or consider him in the least irrational if he does not. Nor is the unlimited pursuit of truth what Socrates meant by self-examination. Socrates' pedagogic effort was directed at getting people to see that they believed certain things about the good on insufficient grounds, and to change their cognitive attitude to one of consciousness of their ignorance on this matter—an attainment of self-knowledge which if Socrates thought of it as the beginning of philosophy he did so because he believed that all men necessarily desire the good. He presupposed that his interlocutor had an interest in discovering the truth about a particular matter concerning which he had had a belief which he had justified in the weak sense (i.e. assessed as inappropriate). A presupposition that human beings have an interest in discovering the truth about all matters about which they have opinions would be mistaken; a presupposition that they have an unlimited interest in discovering the truth even more so. It seems that the most that reason could demand of the individual is that he should not believe anything unless he has grounds or other warrant for doing so, since belief is the attitude of mind appropriate to truth. This is only the weak demand
for justification. It may be that there are certain things about which a human being cannot remain in a state of agnosticism but must have beliefs about, and that the demand to justify just these beliefs is sufficient to justify the development of knowledge and understanding to the degree necessary for a person to be an educated man. But this has not been shown. As it stands, Peters' non-instrumental justification is therefore incomplete.

Possibly, it is also incomplete in another respect. Peters' argument that justification cannot itself be seriously questioned may well be correct, since it denies the possibility of a general justification of justification, but this does not show that it would be pointless to ask for a justification of justification in particular cases, where, for example, justification would involve enquiries of a complex kind which would be prodigal of time and effort, or where justification might well have harmful consequences. We tend to presuppose that truth is compatible with welfare, but this is the case only if truth is always a condition of welfare, and that is the case only if we choose to think it so. If belief is the attitude which is appropriate to truth, it is also the attitude which is appropriate to that towards which it is beneficial to adopt the attitude appropriate to truth. Though it is epistemologically inappropriate to believe something without having grounds or other warrant for its being the case, it is pragmatically appropriate to believe it if doing so would be beneficial. Admittedly, if in a particular case objection were made to the justification of a belief on the ground that it would be inadvisable to justify it, a justification would have been provided for not justifying in that case, so it could still be said that the demand for justification is inescapable. But satisfying 'the demand for justification', when it concerns a belief, does not entail justifying the belief rather than merely the holding of the belief, and it should not be assumed that people who have been educated do not very often justify holding beliefs without justifying the beliefs themselves. Nor should it be assumed that in so far as they do this they are behaving irrationally, for they need not be.

A person might choose not to be very scrupulous concerning the truth of beliefs when he judges that holding them is beneficial or, perhaps more often, when he believes
that not holding them would put him to considerable inconvenience or cause him trouble of some other sort. Furthermore, he might ask how far the activity of self-reflection is justified, and justify calling a halt to it when he judges it would be disadvantageous to him to take it any further. If it were said of him that he had not reflected adequately on the nature of the beneficial itself, he could answer that he knew sufficiently what he wanted from life, and that in his judgement it would be unwise for him to seek to know it any further. He might not be convinced that Socrates and others achieved anything worthwhile from taking reflection about the good to the extremes that they did.

This attitude is a common one, indeed one might call it the attitude of the average educated man. It does not involve a denial of the demand for justification. A philosophical account of education which connects education internally and very directly to the good life by means of the notion of justification, limited in the manner in which Peters limits it and left unlimited in the way that he leaves it unlimited, gets this average educated man as the outcome of education, and his life, which only very remotely approximates to the Socratic ideal, becomes for it the good life. The average educated man will have knowledge and understanding in various forms of knowledge, but as he is not committed to acquiring universal knowledge in the hope that it will be useful to him in his justifying, the amount of knowledge he possesses, and the degree of understanding, need be nothing out of the ordinary. Little more can be asked of him if he is not to lose his chief value, which is that of providing a standard which nearly all learners could attain. If they do attain it, their lives will be relatively free from subjection to sheer immediate passion and blind prejudice; they will be reasonable, and reflective—to a degree. The notion of the average educated man is a dispiriting, even though a realistic and essentially humane, aspect of Peters’ account of education.

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His account presents a very different aspect if we see an unlimited demand for truth as central to it, rather than merely the demand for justification. There are elements
in his article which encourage this interpretation, especially his description of education as an attempt to realize the Socratic ideal. But if demand for truth is taken as unlimited, then since truthfulness and sincerity are demands of reason, the good life will be too much like the life of Kierkegaard, who in writings like *Works of Love* demonstrated the extreme depth and complexity of the introspectible soul, and the correspondingly immense difficulty of achieving self-understanding, and therefore truthfulness and sincerity. The good life would also be too much like the life of the Platonic Socrates for, as well as truthfulness and sincerity, love of truth would involve an examination of the standards by which actions, beliefs, feelings and pattern of life were assessed, and a re-examination of the notion of truth itself—collectively an enterprise of enormous difficulty, since the demand is not merely to assess one's opinions on these matters, but to discover the very truth of them.

The good life would be dangerous as well as onerous. Peters says that to ask for the justification of the pattern of one's life is to ask for features internal to it which constitute reasons for pursuing it. But it is possible that no such reason would appear, because the reflection which bestows the freedom of detachment on the thinker will deprive what he reflects upon of value. He may then feel that whatever value a pattern of life has is not intrinsic to it, but is bestowed upon it by the person who lives it, and this belief may induce despair. According to the author of the pseudo-Platonic dialogue *Cleitophon*, the circularity of the account Socrates provided of the good drove his disciples to despair and caused them to abandon his teaching for hedonism. Peters' account of justification may have a somewhat similar power, for showing that no valid reason can be provided either for or against justification is not the same as justifying it. Salvation is not to be found in the thought that the values of reason are necessary features of human life, for that does nothing to demonstrate that the examined life is worth living, any more than the unexamined one.

I do not think it would be absurd to conceive education as education into despair, since, as Kierkegaard has stressed, despair is not necessarily a permanent or wholly unpromis-
ing state. The educated person who continues in the Socratic quest for truth and falls into despair may succeed in overcoming nihilism. Indeed, it is as if Peters' writings were based on just such an achievement: like Kant's practical philosophy, his philosophy of education will accept an existentialist interpretation. It even seems to demand such an interpretation, in so far as it conceives education as the beginning of the good life, and conceives the good life as involving commitment to an ideal.

However, unlimited concern for truth would not be confined to a Socratic quest for self-understanding which leads the individual on to philosophical enquiry into the nature of the good, but would take all categories of being as its objects. In the face of such an impossible demand, selection would be necessary and inevitable, and not every lover of truth would choose to live in the Socratic manner, making reflection on his own life and on the nature of the good life his chief concern. Nor is there any compelling reason why he should. The weakness of the Socratic position lies in its presupposition that the good life is a life spent in trying to find out what the good life is. This circularity could be remedied by acknowledging that this self-reflective life may not be the good life, or not the only good life, and this would leave it open for us to conceive the good life in a more catholic, Aristotelian, fashion as one in which the thinking being directs his vitality to the pursuit of truth concerning sufficiently important matters. Now, since there are other matters of importance besides the nature of the good life, and since because of human finitude it is impossible to seek the truth concerning all matters of importance, the individual is free to make, say, the pursuit of truth concerning the physical world his most serious concern. Through his energetically pursuing this project, affectivity and imagination would become caught up in it and suffuse it with values which the domain of enquiry is capable of receiving and sustaining, so making it a main element in the good life for him. It is not suggested that he would not need to reflect on his pattern of life at all, but that in so far as this reflection concerned his adoption of scientific enquiry as a major part of his life, reflection might not need to be prolonged. He would be under no obligation to consider possible alternative
patterns of life which might suit him even better, if this one was suiting him very well. In some matters he would have to live like the average educated man, but in those matters which fall within the scope of his most serious concern he would exhibit a concern for truth which far surpassed averageness. Problems would not be allowed to fall out of mind through the knowledge or fear that facing them would be embarrassing or distressing, feelings of disquiet would not be let sink away without elucidation of their cognitive import, factors having a bearing on a matter would not be ignored in obedience to merely conventional rules of relevance, and truth would not be reduced simply to conformity to what others were prepared to accept, neither grossly nor through a number of compliances which cumulatively had that effect.

From this more catholic conception of the good life, we can find our way back to the conception of education as primarily development of knowledge and understanding of matters of importance, including development through engaging in the vitally rewarding pursuit of truth for its own sake. Such an education might well begin and lead on to such a life. It remains the case, however, that the choice of love of truth as a superior or supreme value is only an existentialism. It cannot be justified in a way which would render it acceptable to every reasonable person, neither by reference to the meaning of 'education' as the word is currently used, nor in any other way.

The choice could be supported, nevertheless. It is hardly conceivable that a person would choose truth as such a superior value unless he already had at least an implicit conception of man as able to relate himself consciously to the world as it is, and to things as they are, and so have to do with the world and things as a being awake rather than as a being in a dream. If he feels that he must live in the truth, no matter how cheerless, rather than in a comfortable illusion, is this not the sense of an imperative or appeal, and if this imperative or appeal is not to be explained entirely in psychological terms, or as a demand which originates partly from his empirical nature and partly from initiation into forms of life by his elders, might it not have its source both in his own being and in the being of the world of which he is both a part and a limit? To put
it rather differently, is man not subject to a call both from his own being and the being of what-is to bring them out of darkness into the light of the intelligible? In some such way the metaphysical significance of the feeling of a demand, or something like a demand, to discover the truth of things might be elucidated, and could then be seen as the foundation of the choice of love of truth as a superior value. In the absence of an account of such a kind, the choice to love the truth must appear as ultimately wilful, since it will lack subjective grounds which can be recognized, by those prepared to put themselves imaginatively in the place of the lover of truth, as having a kind of hypothetical universal validity: if anyone sees human existence and the world as he does, it would be fitting for that person to choose love of truth as a basis of his life. Without a metaphysical account of the basis of love of truth the choice of it will not even be represented faithfully, since it is neither the choice to carry through a task to which a human being as such is already irrevocably committed, nor a psychological compulsion or a necessity of some other kind, nor a preference at the level of taste. What it is can only be communicated by extraordinary means, involving the use of imagination. But if the communication is not attempted, the lover of truth will find himself in the peculiar position of having, in the end, to condemn his own choice as arbitrary, yet at the same time of feeling that the choice rests on some ground which he cannot fathom and that his self-condemnation may therefore be unjust.

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If education is described as primarily development of knowledge and understanding of matters of importance, including development through engagement in the vitally rewarding pursuit of truth, it would appear that the educators had a special commitment to the life of the intellect, and it would be very strange if continuing engagement in the demanding pursuit of truth were not regarded, *prima facie*, as a condition of educational success. Important matters would not cease to be important just because the learner had completed his education, vitally rewarding activity would not cease to be vitally rewarding just at that time, and there would still be plenty of scope for
development of knowledge and understanding. Continuing in the demanding pursuit of truth for its own sake would not be a condition of a person's being an educated man, however, for calling him an educated man indicates only that he has reached a certain level of attainment. If a person becomes an educated man, education will have been successful to a degree; it will not be entirely successful unless, in the absence of anything that prevents him, he continues with demanding intellectual activity for its own sake outside tutelage.

But the form of education described above is a relatively narrow one, and it could not be tied as closely to the notion of the good life as Peters would wish education to be. Educators who promote certain values above others which have an equal claim upon human beings cannot justly maintain that a successful education is the most appropriate preparation for the good life for any and every individual. It could be argued that participation in demanding intellectual activity can be vitally rewarding for all learners, so that their experience of educational activities need not be judged unfavourably by them. Many teachers take it as a regulative principle that a learner will find the study of a discipline rewarding, provided he has a certain commitment to it, even if only a naive willingness to work; and provided that he does not, or does not too often, undertake tasks which are so far beyond his present capacity that he cannot hope to achieve a fair degree of success in them. They presuppose that, in the absence of any countervailing factor, vital fulfilment through intellectual activity is possible for everyone. The principle, though a priori, has a good deal of empirical support: good teachers are constantly working wonders with learners who seem at first to lack aptitude for disciplined study. Nevertheless, for persons of certain temperaments engagement in demanding intellectual activity for its own sake is not an element, or not an important element, in the sort of life which is most vitally rewarding for them. The educators would have to recognize that what they were justifying was not education itself, but a type of education which, so far as the good life is concerned, is more appropriate for some individuals than for others.

The function of the form of education described need
not be conceived in the way I have conceived it, however. Its function could be thought to be that of producing persons who are practically wise, and this, on the most obvious and straightforward interpretation of his article, is what Peters takes the function of education to be. On this view, continuing with demanding intellectual activity for its own sake is not a condition of educational success, since it is not a condition of being practically wise.

Although the overt conception of a practically wise life as the main function of education is a new development in Peters' philosophy of education, the form of education he envisages is substantially the same as that described in his earlier writings. For the learner to become educated, development of knowledge and understanding is still required in breadth and depth. Any item of knowledge or degree of understanding might prove relevant to some justification, and the amount of knowledge and the degree of understanding thought necessary to equip a learner for the life of justification, if they are any different from those required for a person to be an educated man, are left unspecified. 'The Justification of Education' accomplishes a sort of compromise between education for the theoretical life and for the practical life. But the compromise is achieved chiefly by the ascription of a practical function to education, while the form of education remains such that education is likely to have outcomes such as love of knowledge, scholarship, etc., as by-products. It could be objected either that the form of education envisaged is not the most appropriate for the function ascribed to it, or that Peters denies full justice to the academic function which that form of education can also serve. It seems to me that because of the limitations of his concept of enquiry, and perhaps because of his conception of the duration of education, he has not been able both to show the great practical value of the development of concern for truth during the educational period, and to save the values of the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, despite a desire, evident in his paper, to do both of these things. As his justification stands, the first has been accomplished, but at the expense of the second.

In calling attention to what I originally described as an ambivalence in Peters' attitude to the academic disciplines,
I have, in effect, been contrasting his earlier conception of education with a different conception which seems to be in process of developing from it. It is to be hoped that what was perhaps the most important element in his earlier conception will not be excluded or lost from the new conception, or its importance diminished, and that an account of the metaphysical basis of truth as a superior or supreme value will in due course be provided. Also welcome would be a recognition of the vital as well as the hedonic values of the pursuit of truth, an adjustment of the present tendency to stress the rational character of enquiry while neglecting to stress the significance of the objects enquired into by the disciplines, and a closer consideration of the nature of the connection between education and the good life.

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REFERENCE