CHAPTER

2

Deictic Shift Theory and the Poetics of Involvement in Narrative

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SUBJECTIVITY IN NARRATIVE

> What about the role of subjectivity in the language-act? Phenomenology links language not only to the objective referent in the world, but also to the subjectivity which is speaking. The phenomenologist Serge Doubrovsky explains it most succinctly: "Whenever something is said, someone must be saying it." Or if we use Ricoeur's formulation, "the display of a world and the positioning of an ego are symmetrical and reciprocal." Though Ricoeur, pressured by the opposition of the structuralists, has a more complex definition of the self–world relation than did the generation of phenomenologists preceding him, the basic formula of Merleau-Ponty still applies: for the phenomenologist, meaning (in and through language) arises from the action, or more precisely the interaction, between self and world. Meaning is densest and richest in literary discourse. This is so because literary language can best "embody" (a favorite metaphor of Merleau-Ponty) non-conceptual as well as conceptual intentionality. Intentionality is by its very nature unique to the *Lebenswelt* of the individual speaker, since each person's self–world relations are unique. It is through the intentionality unique to any given author, and present in the language of that author, that he is present in his literary work. In fact, language does not only embody intentionality—language is an extension of the author's intentional field. Language becomes a vital theater of exchange through which the author interacts with world. (Magliola, 1973, pp. 238–239)

Recent approaches to fiction in the humanities and social sciences have made problematic the twin issues of referentiality and subjectivity in narrative. There has

been an overall recoil from the naivete of literary analysis built on simplistic equations between the subjectivity of the author and the intentionality found in his or her work, or between literary and historical worlds. New Criticism demanded that the analysis of literature be grounded in "the work itself," whereas structuralism simply bracketed questions of subjectivity and referentiality as irrelevant.

Poststructuralist theory has been more actively hostile to traditional notions of subjectivity and reference. It calls into question the whole notion of a real world and a transcendent subject, finding instead that referentiality and subjectivity are effects of language. As Carroll (1982) states, "the subject remains only as a skeleton of its former self, as a function of language" (p. 15), and, "this . . . anti-subject . . . consists of *the rules of the game,* the laws which govern the 'generation' of a text" (p. 17).

Two theoretical approaches that work for a critical but positive and subtle rendition of the role of subjectivity in narrative are hermeneutics and the phenomenology of reading. These concentrate on the subjectivity or intersubjectivity of the author/reader or reader/text relationship.

Finally, narrative theorists have argued about the status of fictional subjectivity and its relationship to narrative techniques. Most of them assume an a priori model of fictional subjectivity that sets a narrator as mediating subject between the reader and the characters.

In what follows, I approach the issue of subjectivity in narrative using a linguistically based tradition largely rejected or ignored by narrative theorists. I combine this tradition with that of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of language in the manner called for by Ricoeur (1974), to create a poetics of involvement, that is, a poetics that profits from structuralist (and poststructuralist) insights while nevertheless asserting that the primary purpose of reading novels continues to be entering into and living the experience of the self–worlds of fictional beings.

Deixis

The key to this intersection between the linguistics of subjectivity and the phenomenology of language is the term *deixis.*

When philosophers, linguists, and narrative theorists attempt to understand the role of subjectivity in language and conversely, the role of language in subjectivity, they invariably notice a certain aspect of language which seems to depend on extralinguistic, subjective, occasion-specific considerations. Theorists have variously named this aspect of language *egocentric particulars* (Russell), *shifters* (Jespersen, Jakobson), *indexicals* (Peirce), *token-reflexives* (Reichenbach), *occasional terms* (Husserl), or *deictics* (Bühler). By these terms, they designate those words and aspects of language that can only be understood with reference to a NOW, a HERE, and an I. For some, the irreducible deictic word is THIS, which can refer to anything at all, depending on the particulars of the speech situation. "This time" is NOW, "this place" is HERE, and "this person" is I.

Deixis (adjectival form, *deictic*) is a psycholinguistic term for those aspects of meaning associated with self–world orientation. Deixis is a language universal (Hockett, 1963) that orients the use of language with respect to a particular time, place, and person. Karl Bühler, the Austrian psychologist and semiotician, was the first person to employ the term in its modern sense. He distinguished the deictic field (*Zeigfeld*) of language from its symbolic field, and named the orientational axes of the deictic field the *Origo of Here/Now/I*:

> Two intersecting perpendicular strokes on the page can serve as a coordinate system for us with O as the origo, the point of origin for the coordinates:
>
> 
>
> I maintain that three deictic words must be put at the place of O, if this scheme is to represent the deictic field of human language, namely the deictic words *here, now,* and *I.* These lexical items, so simple in their sound structure, might induce the language theorist into philosophical abysses or to respectful silence, when challenged to determine their function. Rather, he should simply acknowledge that it is certainly very peculiar, but nevertheless precisely statable, how they function in a concrete utterance. . . . In the sound form, in the phonetic pattern of the words *now, here, I,* there is nothing conspicuous; it is only peculiar that they ask, each in turn: look at me as a sound phenomenon, take me as a moment marker, as a place marker, as a sender marker (sender characteristic).
>
> And this the naive speech partner has learned, and does take them in this way. . . . Only the logician is baffled. . . . But it is hoped that we can ease his deliberations via our coordinate concept; because the "setting up" of a coordinate system always has a specific function, as the logician knows. In our case, it is just the coordinate system of "subjective orientation," to which all parties in verbal exchange are and remain attached. (Jarvella & Klein, 1982, pp. 13–14)

Deixis is not limited to a few selected words such as *I, you,* and *this.* It is also, as defined by Peirce (Buchler, 1955) in his description of the same phenomenon, the function that connects all language use to situations.

> [A] symbol, in itself, is a mere dream; it does not show what it is talking about. It needs to be connected with its object. For that purpose, an index is indispensable. No other kind of sign will answer the purpose. That a word cannot in strictness of speech be an index is evident from this, that a word is general—it occurs often, and every time it occurs, it is the same word, and if it has any meaning *as a word,* it has the same meaning every time it occurs; while an index is essentially an affair of here and now, its office being to bring the thought to a particular experience, or series of experiences connected by dynamical relations. (p. 56)

Deixis has long been associated with the gestural dimension of language. Peirce's definition of the index as anything that focuses the attention or anything that startles us applies both to the spatial gesture of pointing and to the phonic gesture of shouting (Buchler, 1955). Revzin (1974), in an essay on the possible origins of language, called deixis "the primordial function of gesture" (p. 18) and found in deictic signals "the concepts conveyed in modern language by words of the type 'here,' 'there,' 'near,' 'distant,' and by different grammatical categories" (p. 18). Atkinson (1979), in a study of children's first utterances, asserted that "if we interpret 'basicness' as having implications for ontogenesis, one particular nonpropositional function is more fundamental [than the propositional function] to the development of language" (p. 230). This most fundamental function is the deictic function of calling attention to a situated particular. This function, which can be performed gesturally by pointing and shouting, can also be performed verbally by a "single deictic particle [whose] function is to draw attention to some feature of the situation, . . . normally accompanied by some paralinguistic movement of the head or hands. . . . We may think of the deictic as meaning 'look!' or 'there!' " (Lyons, 1975, p. 645).

The deictic function is not only a phylogenetic or ontogenetic stage in the development of language, but the continuing prerequisite for all reference (Lyons, 1975). All language use depends on some felt relevance to situation, on the attention of participants, and their ability to lift out the topic. Gale (1967) pointed out that the efforts of some analytic philosophers to produce a language devoid of deixis are in vain, because without it, "we could not know, for example, that some event is now happening, simultaneous with this token [instance of speech]" (p. 152). If such cues were removed from verbal articulation, they would have to be supplied by inference or other contextual cues. Like zero in mathematics and the dark space in the theater, deixis orients us within a situation without calling attention to itself.

The concerns of Merleau-Ponty with language are largely with its deictic functioning. Again and again, Merleau-Ponty (1962) makes the point that language has a bodily, oriented dimension which gives it life: "[Language] presents or rather is the subject's taking up of a position in the world of his meanings" (p. 193), and, "I reach back for the word as my hand reaches towards the part of my body which is being pricked; the word has a certain location in my linguistic world, and is part of my equipment" (p. 180).

Deixis and Subjectivity

Deixis governs such grammatical and epistemological categories as topicalization (Buchler, 1955), orientational mapping (Buchler, 1955), unique reference (Gale, 1967), narrativity (Bruder, Duchan, Rapaport, Segal, Shapiro, & Zubin, 1986), and induction (Apel, 1980). In the present work, the most important aspect of deixis is its relationship to subjectivity: "expressions which we group as 'deictic' introduce an explicitly subjective orientation into linguistic classification" (Wales, 1986, p. 401). Ricoeur's (1974) comments on indicators are addressed to this issue:

> These signs do not connote a class of objects but designate the present occurrence of discourse; they do not name but indicate the *I*, the *here*, the *now*, the *this*, in short, the relation of a speaking subject to an audience and a situation. What is admirable is that "language is organized in such a way that it allows each speaker to appropriate the entire language by designating himself as the '*I*.' " (Benveniste, 1971, p. 226 [internal quote]; Ricoeur, 1974, p. 255)

Benveniste (1971) found in the word "I" the source of our ability to adopt language as our own, and therefore the source of subjectivity, rather than vice versa. Ricoeur (1974) used Benveniste's arguments but dissented from his conclusion, arguing with Merleau-Ponty that language is necessarily and originally embodied and that, although subjectivity is performed through language, subjectivity originates in our bodily interactions with the world:

> Speech is itself the reanimation of a certain linguistic knowledge which comes from the previous words of other men, words which are deposited, "sedimented," "instituted," so as to become this available *credit* by which I can now endow with verbal flesh this oriented void in me (which is signifying intention) when I want to speak. (p. 249)

Ricoeur's phrase, this oriented void, recalls Merleau-Ponty's (1962) position that:

> The word "here" applied to my body does not refer to a determinate position in relation to other positions or to external co-ordinates, but the laying down of the first co-ordinates, the anchoring of the active body in an object, the situation of the body in face of its tasks. (p. 100)

The Deictic Field and Its Functioning in Narrative

The first theorist to consider the role of deixis in narrative was Karl Bühler, the Austrian psychologist. He noticed that what he called the *Zeigfeld,* the deictic field, operates in three different modes. The first, which he called *ad oculos,* operates in the here-and-now of the speaker's sensible environment. Thus, when the speaker points at an object and says "this," those who share his or her sensible environment perceive what he or she is indicating. The second, which he called

anaphora, operates on the context of discourse itself considered as a structured environment. When a speaker or writer uses the word "this" to refer to something in his or her own discourse, those who are following the speaker's words can easily understand what is being referred to. The third mode in which the deictic field can operate is that of imagination and long-term memory, which Bühler called *deixis at phantasma*:

> If someone wants to show something to someone else, then both of them, the one who is doing the leading and the one who is being led, must have a sufficient degree of harmonious orientation. . . . [But] [h]e who is led by phantasma cannot follow the arrow of the speaker's outstretched arm and pointed finger with his gaze to find the something out *there*; he cannot use the spatial origin quality of the voice's sound, to find the place of a speaker who says *here*; the voice character of an absent speaker saying I also does not belong to written language. And still, a rich variety of these and other deictic words are offered to one in vivid accounts of absent objects and by absent narrators. A look at any travel report or novel will essentially confirm this on the first page. (Bühler in Jarvella & Klein, 1982, pp. 22–23)

Bühler attempted to describe the psychological and physical process whereby the live deictic field of our own bodily orientation and experience can be transposed into an imaginative construction. In his model, the body–feeling representation, or *Korpertastbild* (what psychologists would probably now call the body schema), becomes loosened from its involvement with the HERE/NOW/I deictic coordinates of waking life in our immediate environment, and becomes available to translation into an environment we construct both conceptually and orientationally. (Bühler used the word "loosened" to indicate that in this process, the normal subject never really forgets where he or she is in the physical world, but rather backgrounds this knowledge to allow for imaginative travel.) The deictic coordinate system, which Bühler called the *Origo of HERE/NOW/I* (Jarvella & Klein, 1982), is then used in the constructed environment to orient ourselves within "the somewhere-realm of pure imagination and the there-and-there in memory" (p. 23). This is what Merleau-Ponty (1962) called "summoning," the body's freedom from immediacy:

> In order to enjoy the use of [my body] as the mood takes me, in order to describe in the air a movement formulated only verbally or in terms of moral requirements, I must reverse the natural relationship in which the body stands to its environment, and a human productive power must reveal itself through the density of being. (p. 112)

Though he mentioned the "rich variety of . . . deictic words" (p. 23) in narration, Bühler did not go into the specifics of how deictic words are used in literature. This job was taken up by Käte Hamburger, a German narrative theorist, in her major work, *Die Logik der Dichtung* (1957, translated and revised in English as *The Logic of Literature*, 1973). Hamburger argued that there are two realms of language act: reality statement and fiction. What distinguishes these two realms is the different logic they call into play. Reality statement derives its logic from the fact that it calls into play a speaker and a world which is independent of the speaker: reality statements are by someone (Hamburger called this the statement–subject or I–Origo, after Bühler) and about something (the statement–object). This corresponds to Doubrovsky's statement, "whenever something is said, someone must be saying it" (quoted in Magliola, 1973, pp. 238–239). Acts of fictional narration, on the other hand, transfer their referentiality from the actuality of the historical world to the entertained reality of the fictive world, and transfer the subjectivity of the speaker to the subjectivity of story world characters. Thus the fictional Origo is not the "speaker" of the text but the experiencing character within the story world. Hamburger made much of two facts which demonstrate this transfer: that deictic adverbs which indicate "presentness," such as "here," "today," and "now," are often found in past-tense narration; and that psychological verbs such as "think" or "feel" are used with third-person subjects in fictional narration. For example, the sentence "She felt sad now" is not anomalous in a novel, although it would be deictically contradictory in conversation or even in historical narration. This is because conversation and historical narration, both of which fall into Hamburger's category of reality statement, take their deictic anchorage from the act of communication, which provides the basis for verb tenses, deictic adverbs, and other markers that derive their meaning from the position of the SPEAKER and ADDRESSEE. In addition, historical statements are constrained by common-sense epistemological assumptions, such as that only the speaker can state the reality of "feeling sad." In fictional narration, the tense of verbs is not keyed to the author's act of writing or the reader's act of reading (although it may be keyed to a fictive act of narrating, such as is the case with explicit first-person narrative). Moreover, the subject of lived experience, the person who constitutes the Origo of the deictic field in fiction, is not the SPEAKER "I" (real I–Origo, author, narrator) but, paradigmatically, a third-person character. In short, the notions of HERE, NOW, and SELF are constituted in fiction on the plane of the story rather than in the act of narrating. Hamburger summed up her argument as follows:

> We have both specified and endeavored to account for those phenomena—or better those symptoms—which in themselves reveal that fictional narration is of a categorically different nature and structure from [reality] statement . . . : the use of verbs of inner action with reference to the third-person, . . . the disappearance of the narrative preterite's significance of designating past-ness [with respect to the time of narration], and the possibility (not the necessity) created by this of its combination with deictic temporal, particularly future, adverbs. These are not symptoms which as such are isolated; they mutually condition one another. They alone are elements which make fictional narration recognizable as a special verbal–gram-

> matical phenomenon . . . [T]he symptoms pointed out thus far are linked with the transferral of the real spatio-temporal system onto the fictive persons or I–Origines, which at the same time implies the disappearance of a real I–Origo, i.e., of a statement–subject. (1973, p. 134)

This "dislocation of the 'I–origin' from speaking self to silent other," as Cohn (1989, p. 8) summarized Hamburger's thesis, is the basis of the Deictic Shift model of fictional narration that this chapter develops and presents.

Any theory that seeks to distinguish fictional narration from other uses of language must find distinctions on two axes: the narrational and the fictional. There are nonfictional uses of narration and there are ways of presenting stories other than through literary representation. It seems to me that Hamburger elegantly distinguished fictional narration from both of these cousins in her analysis of the I–Origo. In nonfictional narration, one may find evidence of a transfer of spatio-temporal deixis (e.g., use of the "historical present," deictic adverbs such as "here" and "now" keyed to narrated time), but one will not find third-person verbs of inner action. If one does, one will begin to take the narrative as partially fictionalized, as in Truman Capote's (1965) *In Cold Blood.* Similarly, in fictional forms that are not narrated, third-person consciousness cannot be directly presented, but must be conveyed symptomatically through observable behavior such as gesture, dialogue, monologue, or expressive enactment. We have no more access to another person's consciousness in a play or a history book than we do in ordinary life. Only in fictional narration is the lived, unexternalized experience of a person directly representable. Hamburger summed up the uniqueness of fictional narration with the statement that *"Epic* [i.e. narrative] fiction *is the sole epistemological instance where the I–originarity or (subjectivity) of a third-person* qua *third-person can be portrayed"* (1973, p. 83, emphasis in original).

In Hamburger's theory of fiction, first-person narrative has a different status from that of third-person fictional narrative, because the former linguistically observes the epistemological constraints of the statement system of language: tying the deictic field to the act of "utterance," and denying access to third-person subjectivity. Hamburger called first-person narrative *feigned reality statement.*

In 1973, the linguist S.-Y. Kuroda took the next step in the development of a linguistically informed theory of subjectivity in narrative in his ground-breaking article, "Where Epistemology, Style, and Grammar Meet: A Case Study from Japanese." Like Hamburger, Kuroda based his argument on the relationship of epistemology to linguistic markers, including deictics. Also like Hamburger, he based his argument on examples from natural narratives, but he supplemented this with the generative grammar method of inventing and comparing "minimal pair"-type acceptable and unacceptable sentences. The oddity that struck Kuroda is the distinction, in Japanese, between ways of attributing sensation depending on epistemological perspective.

Different markers are used in Japanese to indicate the source of knowledge of a sensation. If a sensation is known through being experienced or lived, it is marked as an adjective, whereas if the sensation is inferred from observed behavior, it is marked as a verb. Kuroda noticed that in Japanese fictional narratives of a particular type, the adjectival form was used with third-person subjects, contrary to conversational usage. The type of narrative which used this form was the type commonly called "omniscient narration," that is, narration in which there is no overt first-person narrator, and in which information about third-person characters' thoughts and feelings is given without any epistemological qualification—"he was sad," rather than "he seemed to be sad" or "he appeared sad."

Kuroda outlined two ways of structurally conceiving this fictional presentation: the traditional conception and his own alternative conception (which closely parallels Hamburger's). In the traditional conception, omniscient narration is set up as the allseeing mind of an omnipresent narrator, speaking to us as readers about the truths of the story world. This conception is predicated on the theory of language use that says there must always be a speaker and an addressee for every artifact of language. This truism assumes that all language use adheres to the communicative paradigm, which Hamburger called the *statement function* of language: to say something to someone about something. Kuroda's alternate conception is that there are two modes of language use in narrative: reportive and nonreportive. Reportive language use is referable to and thereby framed by a narrator's epistemology, and nonreportive language use is the direct narration of a character's subjectivity. In place of the omniscient narration theory, Kuroda proposed the *multiconsciousness theory,* in which characters' consciousness can be directly represented by the text without need of an intermediary narrator. He argued that this latter theory is more empirically adequate to the different grammars evinced by reportive versus nonreportive narration, as exemplified by the use of sensation adjectives and reflexives in Japanese.

Meanwhile, literary theorist and linguist Ann Banfield was writing articles about represented speech and thought that would later be consummated in *Unspeakable Sentences: Narration and Representation in the Language of Fiction,* published in 1982. The theory of narration contained in this book both corroborates and extends the work of Hamburger and Kuroda. Banfield asserted in her introduction that "[Kuroda's] distinction between the reportive and nonreportive styles does exist in the grammar of English. . . . It manifests itself . . . in the grammar of reported speech" (p. 12). Banfield went on to show that the syntax of the literary style known variously as free indirect discourse, *erlebte Rede* (lived speech), or *represented speech and thought* (Banfield's term) is disallowed in nonnarrative contexts. For example, a typical specimen of represented thought might be:

How happy she felt!

where the SELF whose emotion is expressed by the exclamation is that of "she" rather than that of a reporting "I." Banfield found a number of linguistic elements

that cannot be expressed by someone other than their experiencer. That is, they cannot be contained in indirect discourse, in which a subject reports on something someone else said. The previous example cannot be embedded in indirect discourse:

* He said that how happy she felt!

Similarly, questions, incomplete sentences, and direct address cannot appear in indirect discourse. Because such expressive elements are referable only to their experiencers, they cannot be subordinated to another SELF's discourse. The presence of these elements in narration is evidence that the deictic field of narration is anchored not in the SELF of an omniscient SPEAKER who can report on the experiences of others, but in the SELF of characters whose experience can be directly represented by the text.

Banfield argued that Benveniste's (1971) distinction between *histoire* and *discours* was misinterpreted by later narrative theorists, who included fictional narrative in the category of *discours* (see especially Genette, 1980). Benveniste asserted that there are two distinct uses of language: *discours*, which is grounded in the act of utterance, and *histoire*, which excludes references to the act of utterance and hence presents itself as without a speaker. In French, the distinction between these two language uses is exemplified by the presence of two past-tense systems, the aorist and the imperfect. The aorist is barred from use in sentences containing first and second-person pronouns (though Banfield found a limited exception to the bar on first-person pronouns), or deictic adverbs such as "yesterday" or "now." Benveniste was not clear how or even whether fictional narrative fits into the category of *histoire*; he explicitly included it in some of his generalizations, but the bulk of his argument was based on historical narrative.

In contrast to *histoire*, *discours* is anchored in the I/YOU of communication, and its references to the past or future are in relation to the act of speaking/hearing or writing/reading. Thus, the aorist is barred from *discours*.

Banfield noted that Benveniste never took up the problem addressed by Hamburger, that of the use of deictics in narrative that are anchored not in an act of communication between author and reader, but in the experience–field of characters on the plane of the story. But she believed that Benveniste's identification of the sentence of *histoire* also carries great significance for a theory of fictional narration. Fictional narrative in French often contains mixtures of aorist and imperfect. Banfield found that the imperfect is used in sentences that express or represent the SELF or subjectivity of characters in the story world, whereas the aorist is used for *pure narration*, in which story world reality is directly represented without any mediating SELF/subjectivity, either of a character or a narrator.

With Hamburger, then, Banfield believed that one of the distinguishing marks of fictional narrative is its representation of third-person consciousness (though unlike Hamburger, she included certain first-person narratives in this definition), but Banfield considered the essence of narration to be the sentence of pure narration, in which there is no deixis because there is no SELF. This is, in fact, quite consistent with Hamburger's view that the sentence of narration does not belong to the statement system of language, in which assertions are made by a statement–subject about statement–objects, but to the logic of narrative fiction, in which what is narrated is thereby created. In both subjective and objective sentences of fictional narration, the I/YOU of communication is excluded. Thus, narrative does not belong to *discours* using Benveniste's schema.

Banfield did not adopt Hamburger's or Benveniste's terms for her own theory of narration, although she used their terms and arguments to build her own case. Instead, she preferred to talk in terms of communicative and narrative uses of language.

Kuroda's (1973) article was written with only a cursory knowledge of Hamburger's book and without knowledge of the work of Banfield. In 1976, Kuroda wrote a more general theoretical article, "Reflections on the Foundations of Narrative Theory from a Linguistic Point of View," in which he joined forces with Hamburger and Banfield in their refutation of the so-called "communication model" of narrative.

Because the view that all language is communicative seems virtually tautological, the questioning of this view needs explanation. Like Hamburger, Kuroda insisted there are two fields of language use, one the "statement system" or "field of communication," and the other, the narrational system, in which language is not structured as a communication, but as a creation. I try to illustrate this difference by way of an analogy from *case grammar* (Fillmore, 1968).

The sentence, "Van Gogh painted a house" may have three different meanings, according to the case relation perceived between "painted" and "house." In the first instance, Van Gogh is perceived to have used a bucket of paint to apply paint to an already existing house. This is what Fillmore (1968) called the *object relation* between predicate and noun. In the second instance, Van Gogh paints a representational picture of a particular house. This second sense is analogous to Hamburger's notion of *statement*, insofar as the painting is a statement about a particular, real house. In the third instance, which Fillmore called *factive*, Van Gogh paints a picture of a house which thereby exists as a particular house only through his painting of it. This relation is analogous to Hamburger and Kuroda's notion of the creative function of narration:

> Epic fiction, the product of narration, is not an object with respect to the narrative act. Its fictivity, that is, its non-reality, signifies that it does not exist independently of the act of narration, but rather that it only *is* by virtue of its being narrated, i.e., by virtue of its being a product of the narrative act. One may also say that the act of narration is a function, through which the narrated persons, things, events, etc. are created: the narrative function, which the narrative poet manipulates as, for example, the painter wields his colors and brushes. That is, the narrative poet is

> not a statement–subject. He does not narrate about persons and things, but rather he narrates these persons and things; the persons in a novel are narrated persons, just as the figures of a painting are painted figures. *Between the narrating and the narrated there exists not a subject–object relation, ie., a statement structure, but rather a functional correspondence.* This is the logical structure of epic fiction, which categorically distinguishes it from that of the reality statement. (Hamburger, 1973, p. 136; emphasis in original)

Kuroda pointed out that first-person as much as third-person fiction is created through a narrative act. For Kuroda, the linguistic oddities of third-person fiction call attention to an epistemology peculiar to all fiction, and it is the epistemology, rather than the linguistics, that creates the essence of fictionality. In first-person as in third-person narration, the sentences of narration create the reality of the story world. Thus, he claimed that even if there were no linguistic evidence of the epistemological divide between the communicative or statement function and narrative acts, this divide nevertheless exists. Kuroda's argument was phenomenological: he took his cues from linguistic evidence, but was not bound by linguistics. Kuroda's standpoint is the one most closely related to the standpoint assumed here.

Because all narrative meaning is only realized by being read, one may object that, by definition, all narrative is communicative, but Hamburger and Kuroda (as well as Banfield) mean by communication or statement system the Jakobsonian model, in which all language use is structured by an "addressor > message > addressee" paradigm (Jakobson, 1960, p. 353). The consequences of this model are that every sentence of language must be implicitly framed as follows: "I [the addressor or narrator] do assert to you [the addressee or reader] that. . . ." Kuroda (1976) commented on the way this model has been extended to models of fictional language:

> Taken seriously, or literally, then, a theory of narration based on the notion of narrator (the narrator theory of narration) must claim that each sentence of a story—for the time being let us exclude direct quotations—is a message communicated by the narrator; each sentence is the product of an act of judging in the narrator's consciousness. (p. 206)

Hamburger, Kuroda, and Banfield all argued in their own ways that in the canonical language of written fictional narrative, there is no addressor and no addressee—no I/YOU—and that paradigmatically, language in narrative is structured either by the model "subject of consciousness > representation of consciousness," or "objective narration > representation of the story world." The former of these models gives us the shift of the deictic field from the spoken or written I/YOU/HERE/NOW of communication to the moment of a character's consciousness within a story world, where the character is experiencing modes of consciousness that may or may not have communicative intent, but that certainly do not "intend" toward the reader (except, fictionally, in some of the deliberate transgressions of postmodern fiction). And, as Kuroda (1976) pointed out, even narrative that is structured as a communicative act is premised on the same epistemological shift:

> Thanks to the faculty of imagination, one can imagine a communicational setting and materialize a sentence which is imagined to be materialized in that imaginary communicational setting. The sentence then represents the content of a mental act in some imaginary consciousness, that of the narrator. (p. 223)

But the conclusive empirical evidence for this shift comes from the language of nonnarrated stories, that differs in particular ways from communicative language in German, Japanese, English, and French, as Hamburger, Kuroda, and Banfield pointed out. This model does not deny the pragmatic reality of the author and the reader, but it asserts that the language of fictional narration is not deictically grounded in this reality, as it is in the language of I/YOU communication.

Hamburger, Kuroda, and Banfield's challenge to the Jakobsonian model is not deconstructive in the sense of challenging the notion of subjectivity, or in the sense of claiming that subjectivity is an artifact of language. Instead, they each saw language as capable of being used in two radically different ways for subjects. Assumed by their theories is a phenomenological subject who takes language in different ways. Language taken as historical statement has one kind of intentional logic; language taken as fictional narration has another. The conventions of language instruct us to take particular texts one way or the other, but we can also choose to contextualize sentences as historical statement or as fictional narration for purposes of play, perversity, or philosophical thought experiment. For example, I can read the following sentence as if it were part of a spy novel or a scientific observation: "The door opened slowly." Note, however, that if I recontextualize a sentence that is linguistically marked as historical (e.g., "I saw the man walk in") as fictional, I must treat it as a feigned reality statement, and if I recontextualize a sentence that is marked as fictional ("How stupid she had been!") as historical, I must construct a SPEAKER to whom to attribute the expressiveness instead of referring it to the SELF of "she."

The notion of two different modes of narration is, of course, not new. Beginning with Aristotle and Plato, there have been theories of the difference between speaking in one's own person and fictional narrating. But Hamburger, Kuroda, and Banfield pinpointed specific epistemological and syntactic differences between I/YOU communication and narration that set their ideas apart from those of other narrative theorists: third-person subjectivity, the transfer of the deictic field, the exclusion of the second person, the possibility of objective contexts (that is, contexts without a SPEAKER or even a SELF). Each of these three theorists found a link between the language of narrative and its logical status. Unlike other theorists, they claimed that there are not only pragmatic differences

between fictional and nonfictional sentences, but linguistic–syntactic differences, as well.

In light of the arguments of Hamburger, Kuroda and Banfield, the Magliola epigraph that heads this chapter takes on new meaning. The two quotations Magliola cites as roughly equivalent (Doubrovsky's "whenever something is said, someone must be saying it" [1966, p. 36], and Ricoeur's "the display of a world and the positioning of an ego are symmetrical and reciprocal" [1969, p. 85]) can be seen, in fiction, to be quite different assertions. In fiction, many things are said without anyone (fictionally) saying them, and the display of a world may reveal an ego that is not a sayer's. From inside the fiction, worlds may also be displayed without positioning an ego—in objective contexts. None of this contradicts Magliola's own assertion that "It is through the intentionality unique to any given author, and present in the language of that author, that he is present in his literary work" (p. 239). The rich perceptions of being-in-the-world that we form and inhabit from an author's language owe their life to the freedom of fictional epistemology, that offers the author and reader new ways of representing and conceiving self–world relations.

The Deictic Shift Model

The term *Deictic Shift model* is used here to refer to the Hamburger–Banfield–Kuroda thesis that the deictic field is constituted on a different basis in fictional narrative than it is in conversation and other language situations, as this thesis is being used and developed by an interdisciplinary group of researchers at the State University of New York at Buffalo, including the contributors to this volume. The Deictic Shift model has implications for the study of narrative comprehension in the disciplines of linguistics, communicative disorders, psychology, and artificial intelligence, as well as literary theory. The notion that the deictic field in narrative is constituted at the level of the story world rather than in the act of utterance, or moment of communication between author and reader, opens up many research questions. What is the linguistic and psychological evidence for this assertion, and what are the consequences of this thesis for theories of language use and narrative understanding? For example, some of the consequences of accepting the Deictic Shift model are:

1. Real readers conceive of canonical fictional language (that is, narrative without a narrator) as self-constituting rather than emanating from a fictional teller.
2. The Gricean Cooperative Principle functions in a different way in narrative than it does in conversation (for example, a novel may begin *in media res* without apology).
3. Narrative acts qua fictional acts do not belong to the category of speech acts.

4. Such linguistic indicators as definite and indefinite reference, verb tense and aspect, sentence modality and logical connectives must, in subjective context, be understood with respect to the epistemology of the subjective character rather than with respect to author/reader communication.

A number of projects being pursued by the group in Buffalo are discussed in other chapters of this book. These projects reflect a variety of philosophies and methodologies, but they share a rejection of the communication model and subscription to the notions of subjective and objective contexts.

Other Models of Fictional Language Relevant to the Deictic Shift Model—the "No Linguistic Difference" View and the "Dual Voice" View

The "No Linguistic Difference" View. It is often claimed that there is no language specific to fiction, but that fiction uses all languages. For example, Searle (1975b) suggested that the difference between fictional and "serious" discourse is that fiction pretends to execute speech acts, whereas serious discourse actually executes these speech acts. But the examples he gave of fictional and nonfictional language are obviously different with regard to those elements foregrounded by the Deictic Shift model. His example of a serious speech act is taken from *The New York Times* of December 15, 1972:

> Washington, Dec. 14—A group of federal, state, and local government officials rejected today President Nixon's idea that the federal government provide the financial aid that would permit local governments to reduce property taxes. (quoted in 1975b, p. 321)

His example of a fictional speech act is taken from Murdoch's *The Red and the Green*:

> Ten more glorious days without horses! So thought Second Lieutenant Andrew Chase-White recently commissioned in the distinguished regiment of King Edwards Horse, as he pottered contentedly in a garden on the outskirts of Dublin on a sunny Sunday afternoon in April nineteen-sixteen. (quoted in 1975b, p. 322)

The latter example has the following distinguishing elements of narrative fiction, as defined by Banfield, Kuroda, and Hamburger: exclamation without quotation referable to a third-person character, parenthetical noncommunicative psychological verb, reversed verb–object word order ("so thought"), and, less conclusively, a situational verb (Hamburger's term for verbs which designate mundane physical acts such as eating or sitting—in this case, "pottered") paired with a full calendar date. The example of fiction which Searle used to demonstrate his own theory of fiction as pretended speech act is precisely the kind of narrative

act for which there is no speech act counterpart: the narration of third-person consciousness. Dorrit Cohn remarked that narrative theorists who take their model of fiction from its resemblance to speech acts

> disregard the moments in third-person fiction that cannot be accommodated in their model: notably those moments—in some instances extended over the entire length of a long novel—that narrate life as experienced in the privacy of a character's consciousness. Clearly there is a crying need for a different model, one that is better suited to account for our pervasive mindreading experience in third-person novels, that awakens our sense of wonder at this singular experience and raises our theoretical consciousness of its uniqueness. (1989, p. 7)

Cohn went on to endorse Hamburger's work as such a model (she did not see Banfield as a successor to Hamburger).

Another philosopher, Hector Castañeda, not only ignored syntactic differences between fictional and nonfictional texts in his discussion of fictional versus nonfictional objects (Castañeda, 1989), but concocted the two examples by which he showed how similar the two kinds of reference can be. His example of nonfictional text, which is presented tongue-in-cheek as a "startling case" of similarity with a fictional text, is supposedly taken from the *Martinsville News*:

> Pamela, now 45 years old, had rented again the old bungalow at 123 Oak Street. She had it decorated and furnished exactly as she had done 20 years before. Her bed had the same pale blue sheets and pillowcases it had that afternoon when she strangled her companion Randolph Reilly. She still loved and hated him both with equal passion. (pp. 176–177)

This "example" of "nonfictional" language use, which is almost identical to Castañeda's equally concocted example of fictional language use, has at least four of the features of fictionality mentioned by Hamburger, Kuroda, and Banfield. When I read the example that purported to be nonfictional, I immediately felt that it read like fiction. That a respected philosopher would consider it harmless fun to invent his examples of fictional versus nonfictional text (and to do so in such unconvincing fashion) in a serious article on the nature of fictional reference shows that the linguistics of fictional narrative is an invisible issue even for some scholars studying the nature of fictionality.

Certainly narrative can be written that deliberately blurs the boundaries between the fictional and nonfictional epistemology. Journalism which uses fictional devices has become known as new journalism in the past few decades, and biographies have always borrowed fictional devices to flesh in their subjects. Conversely, fictional narrative has been masquerading as historical statement for centuries, in the form of epistolary novels, first-person narratives, and other documentary forms of fiction. Hamburger called this type of narrative feigned reality statement, because such narratives, unlike third-person fiction, have to argue

for the validity of their propositions by linking their evidence to the experience-field of the narrator (I was there, I saw it, these letters have been preserved). The linguistic differences between text in the two modes of narrative is not merely stylistic, then, but reflects adherence to an epistemological divide. In nonfictional epistemology, the SELF must always be I, the NOW must always be the present moment, and HERE must always be the place where I am now. In fictional epistemology, the SELF can be anyone (including a fictional first person), the NOW can be any time, and the HERE can be anywhere. The designations "fictional" and "nonfictional" refer to sets of linguistic and referential differences.

Depending on how linguistic structure aligns with referential differences, there are four possible results: (a) fictional linguistic structure with fictional referentiality (third-person fiction), (b) nonfictional linguistic structure with fictional referentiality (first-person fiction), (c) nonfictional linguistic structure with nonfictional referentiality (reality statement), or (d) fictional linguistic structure with differing degrees of nonfictional referentiality (novelized history or journalism). Of these, (b) and (d) are complicated by their mix of epistemological cues. The feigned reality statement is text that follows nonfictional epistemological constraints in its language, but lacks a real, independent referent for both its SPEAKER and its propositions. The new journalism or historical novel style is text that follows fictional epistemological rules in its language, but whose unqualified attributions of third-person subjectivity, central facts, and events are more or less supported by real, independent evidence such as interviews, observations, and historical records. The difference between these two hybrid forms is that, whereas feigned reality statement is just as fictional as third-person fiction, the representation of third-person consciousness in historical text necessarily indicates a shift to fictional epistemology, because this is not possible nonfictionally (with one exception—text which shifts the author's SELF to the third person, such as Norman Mailer's *Armies of the Night*).

The Dual-Voice Position. On the other side of the spectrum from those who consider literary style irrelevant to the issue of fictional epistemology are literary theorists who find Banfield's theory in particular lacking literary adequacy. The most pointed criticism of Banfield's theory came from poetician Brian McHale (1983), who found her approach doctrinaire and empirically unsound. McHale faulted Banfield on three major grounds: (a) her use of sentences as the units of narration, (b) her insistence that each expression (which normally corresponds to a sentence) is limited to one SELF, and (c) her "horizontal" model of meaning (that is, she sees sentences as having a single syntactically correct frame of reference within which they either express the subjectivity of a particular SELF or designate narrative reality).

Each of these objections raises important issues for a narrative theory that seeks to be more than formally coherent. Banfield answered these objections in her own way (see especially chapter 5 of Banfield, 1982, pp. 183–223), but

because the Deictic Shift model being advanced in this chapter has a somewhat different analysis of these issues, I propose answers that incorporate a good deal of Banfield's own arguments with some modification and difference in emphasis.

The Issue of the Basic Unit of Narrative Analysis. Banfield (1982) used sentences as her basic unit of meaning, limiting herself to the syntactic unit used in transformational grammar. But she used sentences in a way that does not contradict a discourse-based theory. Like Fillmore, Banfield looked at sentences for their contextualizability within some situation. Janyce Wiebe and William Rapaport (1988) expanded Banfield's notion of subjective and objective sentences into subjective and objective contexts and found that this expanded notion is easily built upon Banfield's basic schema. In fact, Banfield's theory of discrete subjective and objective units works better at the discourse level because it explains how sentences that, when isolated, look like objective sentences or psychonarration (a category that mixes subjective content with objective propositional form, and thus is subjective but not expressive), can actually be subjective and/or expressive when they are part of a subjective context that pulls them in. An example provided by Banfield: "She felt the man standing, watching them go with dislike. He disliked women and despised them. He was merely stupid" (Lawrence, 1978, p. 26; quoted by Banfield, 1982, p. 263). The second sentence of this excerpt, which by itself looks like a psychological report of his (Parkin's) subjectivity, must be read in context as a representation of her (Constance Chatterley's) subjectivity, and thus fallible. Wiebe and Rapaport (1988) revised Banfield as follows:

> Subjective sentences that are not marked as such, or that do not indicate who the subjective character is, usually appear in the midst of other subjective sentences attributed to the same subjective character. That is, once a clearly marked subjective sentence appears for which the subjective character can be determined, unmarked subjective sentences attributed to the same subjective character often follow. Thus, to recognize subjective sentences in general, we need to consider subjectivity at the level of the discourse. For this reason, we extend the notions of subjective and objective sentences to the notions of subjective and objective *contexts*, which consist of one or more subjective sentences attributed to the same subjective character, or one or more objective sentences, respectively. (p. 131)

The Problem of SPEAKER, SELF, and Voice. McHale asserted that the point of view expressed in individual sentences can be read at several levels, and that Banfield's rule of "1 Expression/1 SELF" ignores the complexity of levels found in many narratives. The examples given by McHale (1983) to refute Banfield's "1 Expression/1 SELF" rule fall into four categories:

1. One character parodies another character's expression (numbers before literary examples are McHale's):

> Banfield writes: "In 'Yes, she could hear his poor child crying now,' the *yes* cannot be the expression of 'her' point of view and *poor* of 'his' " (94). But as a matter of fact it is relatively easy to construct a context for this sentence which would encourage the reader to interpret *yes* and *poor* as expressing different points of view:
>
> (16) She was about fed up with both of them, father and daughter. Above all, she was sick and tired of hearing him moan about his poor child. His poor child this, his poor child that: enough already! Yes, she could hear his poor child crying now.
>
> The contextualizing sentences prepare the way for a dual-voice reading of the sentences in question by compelling the reader to reconstruct a hierarchy of voices. The dominant voice is "hers," and "she" in turn quotes "his" voice with ironic intention. "He," we understand, habitually uses the phrase "my poor child," which "she" here recontextualizes within "her" own speech. Thus, we read *yes* in the final sentence of (16) as expressing "her" point of view alone, but *poor* as expressing two superimposed points of view—"his" being travestied by "her." (1983, pp. 35–36)

2. Gradual shift from one character SELF to another character SELF with unclear boundary between, as in the "Nausicaa" section of *Ulysses*:

> (15) He was leaning back against the rock behind. Leopold Bloom (for it is he) stands silent, with bowed head before those young guileless eyes. What a brute he had been! At it again? A fair unsullied soul had called to him and, wretch that he was, how had he answered? An utter cad he had been. He of all men! But there was an infinite store of mercy in those eyes, for him too a word of pardon even though he had erred and sinned and wandered. Should a girl tell? No, a thousand times no. (Joyce, 1973, p. 367; quoted by McHale, 1983, p. 33)

3. One character's "voice" is used to represent another character's SELF (diverging of "voice" and "perspective," also found in "Nausicaa" example, [15] above).

4. A character SELF is described using a "voice" alien to the character SELF's own mental or linguistic process, conjuring up "someone 'behind' or 'above' him—a narrator, in fact" (McHale, 1983, p. 37), as in McHale's "Eumaeus" example from *Ulysses*:

> Preparatory to anything else Mr. Bloom brushed off the greater bulk of the shavings and handed Stephen the hat and ashplant and bucked him up generally in orthodox Samaritan fashion, which he very badly needed. His (Stephen's) mind was not exactly what you would call wandering but a bit unsteady and on his expressed desire for some beverage to drink Mr. Bloom, in view of the hour it was and there being no pumps of Vartry water available for their ablutions, let alone drinking purposes, hit upon an expedient by suggesting, off the reel, the propriety of the cabman's shelter, as it was called, hardly a stones-throw away near Butt Bridge, where they might hit upon some drinkables in the shape of a milk and soda or a

mineral. But how to get there was the rub. For the nonce he was rather nonplussed. . . . (Joyce, 1973, p. 533; quoted by McHale, 1983, p. 37)

Before going further to analyze McHale's point, I dwell at some length on the terms germane to this discussion. Of particular importance are SELF, "voice," SPEAKER, and "point of view." SELF is Banfield's epistemological and deictic term for the subjectivity whose experience is being lived in the NOW of a particular sentence. This is commonly summarized in narrative theory by the question, "Who sees?", the verb "see" standing for all perceptual and other experience. "Voice" is a widely and casually used term for those stylistic attributes of a linguistic expression which conjure up attributes of a speaker. This aspect of a text is often summarized as, "Who speaks?," but for a reason I give shortly, I think this catch phrase is an inappropriate synonym for "voice." Banfield rejected the term "voice" for the language of narration, reserving it for representations of oral performance. Similarly, she rejected the term "speech" for the language of narration, which she found to be a separate kind of performance, writing, with its own characteristics. SPEAKER is Banfield's deictic term for the subject of discourse in the sense of the "I" who speaks, in other words, Hamburger's statement–subject. There is no SPEAKER or statement–subject in canonical narration as defined by Banfield and Hamburger. The word "speaker" as used by most other narrative theorists includes a priori the narrator presumed to be "speaking" all the words of every narrative text. Finally, the term "point of view" is used to refer to a multitude of different aspects of a text, including SELF, voice, speaker, opinion or ideology, and spatio-temporal perspective. (For attempts at sorting through these, see Uspensky, 1973; also Chatman, 1986.) In Banfield's statement quoted by McHale, and in McHale's own usage in the previous passage, point of view was used in two different ways. For Banfield, point of view meant SELF (i.e., the subjectivity whose experience is being lived in the NOW of a particular sentence). In McHale's reading of Banfield, point of view meant the source of the words being used, or the "voice" conjured by the words. Since the words "poor child" in his made-up example were originally used by the fictional "him" (let's call him George), they retain George's "voice" even when he is not using them. Thus, Banfield would find one SELF in the expression, even as contextualized by McHale, whereas McHale found two voices. This kind of confusion is rife in all discussion using these basic terms, and I try to cut down on some of this confusion by defining and being consistent in my own usage. The capitalized and deictic terms SELF and SPEAKER as used here always connote Banfield's usage, and "voice," enclosed in quotes where I have a reluctant relationship to the term as used, will be given its common usage from mainstream narrative theory. Likewise, "speaker" (without capitalization) denotes the source of a "voice," without arguing that the speaker is the SELF of a particular passage. I avoid the confusing term "point of view."

As can be gathered from the "poor child" example given earlier, the definition of terms is especially important to the argument between the dual voice theory

and Banfield's "1 Expression/1 SELF" rule. Some clarity can be brought to both sides by borrowing some further terms from phenomenology. The phenomenologist and psychologist Wilhelm Dilthey introduced the term *Erlebnis* to denote the lived quality of experience as opposed to its behavioral aspects. In Dilthey's scheme, *Erlebnis* or lived experience gives rise to *Ausdruck*, expression, that both objectifies experience and creates further lived experience for the subject. Because expressions are both objective and subjective, they are available for interpretation by others even as they are lived by oneself (Dilthey, 1977). SELF is Banfield's term for the subject of *Erlebnis*, and SPEAKER is her term for the subject of Aus*druck* in the NOW of speaking. The generic terms "voice" and "speaker" do not discriminate between the objective and subjective aspects of expression, nor do they limit their meaning to THIS act of speaking—the act of speaking that is taking place in the NOW of the narrative. It is possible for a single expression to reverberate with many voices and to conjure up many speakers, as in the "heteroglossic" texts pointed out by Bakhtin. But the questions "Who sees?" and "Who speaks?," commonly used as synonymous with the terms "point of view" and "voice" or "speaker," *do* limit their force to THIS act of experiencing (e.g., seeing) and THIS act of speaking, or, in Banfield's term, this consciousness-in-the-NOW. The answer to "Who thinks?" in McHale's example must be the person who thinks in the NOW of that particular sentence, namely "her." This is not the same as asking whose voices reverberate in the sentence. Thus McHale's interpretation of "1 Expression/1 SELF" as "1 sentence/1 voice" was not sensitive to Banfield's own arguments, based as they were on the principle of a deictic field and an ORIGO at the level of the story world.

The first three kinds of "dual voice" pointed out by McHale all involve the mixing aspects of two characters in a single expression. In the first, one character mimics another; in the second, SELF shifts without a clear signal; in the third, textual elements of a single expression are associated with two different characters.

Mimicry certainly involves two voices—one to be mimicked, and one to do the mimicking. Unlike straight quoting, mimicking expresses an attitude toward the words (and thus the person) quoted. When a character mimics another's speech, he or she "takes over" the language of that other to make a point of her own. But this is not the same as two different SELVES expressing themselves through the same expression. In example (16), the passage is clearly a subjective context attributable to "her," not to "him." His habitual expression is used, but it is used here by her. His attitude is alluded to, but his subjectivity is not the epistemological source of the passage. Speech is a behavior that others may observe and reproduce (or distort) for their own purposes. Thus, even if one were to grant that there are two voices in this passage, there is only one SELF.

The second kind of example occurs often in the writings of Virginia Woolf. Before recognizing from overt cues that a shift in perspective is occurring, the reader will recognize from the "mind-style" of a passage that there has been a disjuncture with the mind-style of a preceding passage:

> For he was gone, she thought—gone, as he threatened, to kill himself—to throw himself under a cart! But no; there he was; still sitting alone on the seat, in his shabby overcoat, his legs crossed, staring, talking aloud.
>
> Men must not cut down trees. There is a God. (He noted such revelations on the backs of envelopes.) Change the world. No one kills from hatred. Make it known (he wrote it down). He waited. He listened. A sparrow perched on the railing opposite chirped Septimus, Septimus, four or five times over and went on, drawing its notes out, to sing freshly and piercingly in Greek words how there is no crime and, joined by another sparrow, they sang in voices prolonged and peircing in Greek words, from trees in the meadow of life beyond a river where the dead walk, how there is no death. (Woolf, 1963, p. 28)

In this passage, the subjective processes of Rezia and Septimus Smith are represented. It is clear to the reader who is following the novel that the beginning of the passage ("she thought") is Rezia's subjective context and that the end is Septimus', but the boundary between one SELF and the other is hard to identify. The paragraph break represents a potential change (cf. Wiebe, 1990b, 1994) from Rezia to either another character or to an objective context. But the ending of the earlier paragraph—"there he was; . . . talking aloud"—primes the reader to think that what follows may be a representation of what Rezia heard Septimus saying when he was talking aloud, and so a continuation of Rezia's subjective context. What follows could be either a representation of Septimus' own subjectivity or Rezia's observation and representation of his behavior. The verbs "waited" and "listened" are more strongly suggestive that this must be Septimus' subjectivity, because both verbs denote his intentionality in addition to his behavior. But both are conceivably an inference by Rezia. Finally, the sentence beginning "A sparrow perched on the railing" conclusively puts us into Septimus' SELF since it describes Septimus' perception of the bird as chirping Septimus' name and singing in Greek. We know from earlier context that Septimus lives in a world in which everything he notices has ultimate significance directed at him personally. The "sparrow" sentence is conclusively Septimus' because it describes without amazement happenings that to Rezia are utterly impossible (a bird calling someone's name and singing in Greek); once we decide that the perception expressed in the sentence is that of Septimus', we must attribute the SELF of the sentence to him, because Rezia does not have access what he hears, as she does to what he says or writes.

If my reconstruction of my first reading of this passage is accurate, I had to double back several times to figure out whose consciousness was being represented. This doubling back, which occurred many times in my reading of *Mrs. Dalloway,* had its own stylistic effect, and the fuzziness of the boundaries between subjective contexts inevitably saturated the feel of the novel as a world. Any reading of the novel that only considered the correct attribution of SELF in each subjective context would be inadequate. The epistemology of Woolf's novel as life-world is enacted in this stylistic effect: People living in the same place and

the same time are steeped in each other's subjectivity, but paradoxically, know almost nothing about each other. The boundaries are there, but they are not.

At the same time, I do not think the fuzziness of boundaries between characters' subjective contexts constitutes a case of dual voice, let alone double SELF. In each case, the reader makes an effort to find the right SELF to whom to attribute a subjective context. Even in the "Nausicaa" example used by Banfield and McHale, which combines boundary fuzziness with a divergence between voice and SELF, McHale cites "the point . . . where the perspective shifts from Gertie to Bloom" (1983, p. 36). The reader's realization that there is or has been a shift of SELF must take place at some moment in time, even though different readers may make this shift at different moments in the text depending on a number of factors, both psychological and linguistic, such as familiarity with the text, involvement in the text, and the strength of the cues. Prolonged confusion about whose consciousness is being followed does not constitute proof that more than one consciousness is being followed at the same time. Rather, at these moments of ambiguity, a SELF exists but is not identifiable.

The third case, divergence of "voice" and "perspective" (SELF) between two characters, is rather rare, I believe. In the example used by McHale, the linguistic style associated with Gertie McDowell was used to represent Leopold Bloom's consciousness. Since Gertie cannot know at this moment what is going on in Bloom's consciousness, there is something impossible about this passage if "her style" is construed as "her subjective context." Narration of one character's private states by another character is a violation of epistemological realism, which does not allow characters on the same ontological level to "live" each other's subjectivity unless such telepathy is asserted as possible in a particular story world, as in some science fiction or magical realism. But her style need not be construed as her subjective context, unless there are specific markers that indicate this is the case. It may be a kind of metonymy between her presence and the style of the text, rather like the theme of Peter in "Peter and the Wolf." Still, the passage is an expressive one in the style of represented thought ("At it again?"), so it must be someone's subjective context. And the epistemological content of the text, according to McHale, points inexorably to Bloom.

What is one to make of this? McHale naturalized this passage as the "divergence of voice and perspective" (p. 37), but surely he cannot mean that the consciousness-in-the-NOW represented here is Bloom's, but the style of the consciousness is the narrator's. Either we must attribute the expressive force of a thought such as "At it again?" to a narrator, or we must attribute it to Bloom (or Gertie). If it is attributable to a narrator, what is the passage then saying about Bloom's own consciousness at this moment in the story? That he is thinking something like this but in his own style that isn't represented here? Such a reading requires epistemological gymnastics that I cannot summon. The most likely epistemology I can offer for this passage, as a nonexpert, is that Bloom may be projecting what Gertie would think if she knew what he knows. This, of course,

does not constitute Bloom having access to her consciousness, but Bloom being able to guess what she might think and the style in which she would think it. That is, all the knowledge in this reading would originate with his consciousness.

Another possible reading is that Joyce is here being more the trickster than the epistemologist, flaunting the logic of possible worlds. I do not claim that all narrative must make epistemological sense; only that unless we can make some sort of epistemological sense out of a narrative, we cannot enter into it as a world. In short, I call this case an undecidable stylistic effect and ask for more examples.

Finally, we come to the heart of the controversy over the speaker: the ever-present narrator controversy. Many narrative theorists have argued that the necessary difference between a character's subjectivity (SELF) and the words used to contextualize and articulate this subjectivity ("voice") constitutes irrefutable evidence for a narrator whose consciousness has merged with or diverged from the character's consciousness, thus creating, in Pascal's term (1977), a *dual voice*. As Pascal argued, "the narrator must provide a language for matters that, for the character, resist verbal formulation" (p. 112).

These theorists argue that such necessary aspects of narrative as the arrangement of episodes, descriptive passages, and even such additions as "he said" are signs of a narrator's presence. Typical statements of this position: "there is always a teller in the tale, at least in the sense that any utterance or record of an utterance presupposes someone who has uttered it" (Rimmon-Kenan, 1983, p. 88); "we might conceive of narrative discourse most minimally and most generally as verbal acts consisting of *someone telling someone else that something happened*" (Herrnstein-Smith, 1980, p. 231). Other theorists, such as Chatman, Cohn, and Tamir, are not committed to a particular stand or are inconsistent on the existence of narrators for all narrative texts, and use the concept when it seems useful.

This controversy is important for the discussion of the Deictic Shift model of narration as it is being described here, because the dual voice theory is an affirmation of the communication model of narration that the Deictic Shift model explicitly rejects. If there is always, as a cognitive necessity, an a priori SPEAKER (in the case of fiction, a narrator) structured into our understanding of every instance of language, then the deictic field of a narrative must be structured in relation to this SPEAKER, and the language of every narrative text must be understood as being an utterance on the same model as conversation, with an attending discourse structure, whether or not it actually exhibits such a structure.

I believe a great deal of the misunderstanding and confusion about these two views of narration has to do with the difference between our experience of narrative as fiction and our experience of narrative as a multilevel construction that includes both fictional and nonfictional meaning. Pragmatically speaking, a work of fiction is always the work of someone—the author—who arranges the words, articulates the subjectivities of characters, and expresses attitudes through the language of the narrative. I venture to say—indeed, I hope—all readers of fiction form dynamic concepts of the author as they read. These concepts may

include a psychological profile and beliefs about what the author intends and what moral stance he or she takes within the fictional world and toward the real political world in which he or she writes.

In addition, the ontologies represented by the existence of a novel are at least two: the historical world of the author and the fictional world of the characters. Attitudes expressed by the text that we may at first take to sincerely represent the author's own ideology may be at any time preempted by a superior level of knowledge that scoffs at these attitudes and places them figuratively or literally in quotation marks, distancing them from the author's own subjectivity. Bakhtin (1981) referred to this aspect of narrative as the degree of refraction of the author's intentionality. But this refraction is not dependent on the existence of a narrator; the languages used to capture characters' experience commonly reflect a hierarchy of evaluation, but this evaluation may be objective (i.e., absolutely true within the fiction) or it may represent the attitudes of social groups or characters at the story level.

In the "necessary narrator" theory of narrative, the reader must always construct a fictional narrator who is the source of the "telling" of the narrative. That is, this theory posits that there must be a fictional level between the character and the author, a level with a fictional SPEAKER. When this SPEAKER is not linguistically identifiable, this theory calls the narrator a "third-person narrator," an "omniscient narrator," the overall "voice" of the narrative. Thus we are back to Searle's "fiction as pretended speech act" model of language use in fiction. If there is always a fictional narrator "speaking" the story, then it is this narrator who is producing all the speech acts of the text and to whose epistemology we refer for justification of assertions. And what epistemological justification can there be for a narrator's knowledge of third-person consciousness? Omniscience.

As Cohn (1978) pointed out, early novelists felt constrained to either avoid representing characters' subjectivity, or to externalize it through such devices as thinking aloud, so that the author could justify his or her knowledge of another's thoughts. This pressure to make the epistemology of fictional exposition conform to the epistemology of real-world experience reminds me of a dreamer clinging to a wall in a dream, not realizing that in a dream one can fly at will. Because in reality we do not have direct access to another person's thoughts, many early novelists either avoided representing a character's experience or resorted to the dramatic technique of having characters declaim their thoughts in monologue. But such epistemological timidity soon fell away as readers and writers learned to accept the representation of subjectivity as just as plausibly mimetic as representations of landscapes. Modern novels that give epistemological justification for their representations of characters' consciousness do so either playfully or in the interest of specific stylistic effects.

Although writers and readers have moved on to explore the freedom of representation allowed by fiction, critics have been slow to drop the model in which there must always be some naturalistic justification of knowledge represented in

a text. When there is no overt sign of a narrator, they speak of narrators who "merge" with characters in order to express what is going on in their minds, or of narrators who merely report the story. Of course, merging with other subjectivities is not possible in real-world epistemology, but evidently this is more plausible than simply dropping the core epistemological assumption—that there must be a narrator who is the source of knowledge and language in the text. The thought of dispensing with the narrator is considered "counter-intuitive" (McHale, 1983, p. 21) and even "dizzying" (Toolan, 1988, p. 130).

In the work of sensitive critics who do not distinguish clearly between authors and narrators, the distinction between works with and without fictional narrators comes through in their choice of terms in particular instances: for example, each time Booth (1961/1983) made a point about stories that seem to be unmediated by a narrator, he called the narrator who "must" be there the author. Booth confused the fictional epistemology of the novel with the real situation of the novel's creation. The author is not a fictional part of the novel; he or she is its creator. There is no need to justify how the propositions in a novel came to be known, because they are fictional propositions, and therefore, as Hamburger argued, simply the case by virtue of being narrated. We do not have to ask ourselves, as we read the fictional sentence "John felt bad," how the SPEAKER or WRITER of this sentence came by this knowledge, any more than we have to ask the same question of the fictional sentence "John walked down the street." We do not have to picture an author divining into the character's mind because the character's mind is a creation of the author's mind, and the author's mind belongs to a whole different realm from the fiction. Instead, we enter into the fiction and take its propositions as the reality that simply exists in this story world, without any need of a mediating SPEAKER. Questions about the author's knowledge, motives or intentions are not out of bounds, but they are outside of the fiction qua fiction. Here Genette (1988) agreed: "In pure fiction [the term omniscience] is, literally, absurd (the author has nothing to 'know,' since he invents everything) . . ." (p. 74). But elsewhere, he dismissed the distinction between fictional and nonfictional as unworthy of separate categories of narrator:

> There is an enunciating instance—the narrating—with its narrator and its narratee, *fictive or not, represented or not,* silent or chatty, but always present in what is indeed for me, I fear, an act of communication. (1988, p. 101)

Genette's sarcasm was directed at Banfield, but since the substance of his argument is against those who insist on banishing the author from a work of fiction, I fear his sarcasm is misdirected. Banfield did not deny the reality of authors, only of fictional SPEAKERS in the absence of positive signs of their existence. Like Booth, Genette referred to authors and narrators without having a model that distinguishes the fictional from the nonfictional act of narrating. When he argued that "Narrative without a narrator, the utterance without an uttering, seem

to me pure illusion and, as such, 'unfalsifiable' " (1988, p. 101), he missed the key point of Banfield's argument: Fiction is just such an illusion. And he compounded the confusion by continuing that if he were to meet a narrative without a narrator:

> I would flee as quickly as my legs could carry me: when I open a book, whether it is a narrative or not, I do so to have the author *speak to me.* And since I am not yet either deaf or dumb, sometimes I even happen to answer him. (1988, pp. 101–102)

The refreshing humanist attitude expressed here, which I gladly second, has nothing to do with the presence or absence of fictional narrators.

Booth said of *Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* (Joyce, 1976), that "We accept, by convention, the claim that what is reported as going on in Stephen's mind really goes on there, or in other words, that Joyce knows how Stephen's mind works" (1961/1983, p. 163). The first clause of this quotation from Booth uses the model of fiction espoused in this chapter: the model in which fiction is accepted as the manifestation of a world, without need of epistemological recourse to a narrator unless one is specifically posited, or to an author unless we change realms to ask historical questions. The second clause makes the error being argued against here, of thinking that a realistic epistemological justification such as a SPEAKER, author, narrator, or teller is required to back up the fictional propositions found in a narrative. Joyce doesn't know how Stephen's mind works in the manner of a subject knowing an object; he lives Stephen's mind as its creator. We as readers don't know how Stephen's mind works in the manner of a subject knowing an object; we live his mind as we construct it and inhabit it for ourselves as we read. The "mistake" Booth attributes to the "inexperienced reader" who thinks that "the story comes to him unmediated" (p. 152) is precisely the essential fictional effect created by that story: the mistake we happily collude in when we enter into a fictional world. This is not to say that there are not countless "disguised helps" (Booth, 1983, p. 163) from the author, but that these helps remain successfully disguised for the immersed reader, and need only be called attention to when we "pull out" to see how a particular effect was made possible.

For several years, mention of the author has been somewhat taboo in narrative theory. Banfield pointed out that the concept of the omnipresent narrator has filled the empty place of the author in mainstream narrative theory as the epistemological source of the text. Whereas nonstructuralist, independent narrative theorists such as Lubbock, Bakhtin, Cohn, and Booth (and, as illustrated previously, the "structuralist" but incorrigible Genette) used the term "author" freely and almost interchangeably with the term "narrator," most current narrative theorists are careful to speak only of a narrator even as they attribute powers to the narrator that were formerly considered to be those of the flesh-and-blood author alone, such as "organizer and guarantor of meaningfulness" (McHale, 1978, p.

281), "subject of this enunciation which a book represents" (Todorov, 1966, p. 146; quoted in Banfield, 1982, p. 184), and even the agent who inserts chapter breaks, chapter numbers, and headings (Toolan, 1988)! The theory of narrative espoused by Hamburger, Kuroda, and Banfield does not deny the existence of narrators, but it does require specific linguistic evidence of one.

The Deictic Shift model of fiction, then, bases its notion of the presence or lack of a SPEAKER or narrator on specific deictic indicators in a text, rather than on an a priori argument based on an analogy with ordinary human experience.

Verticality and the Deictic Shift Model. Returning, then, to the issue of verticality raised by McHale, what does the Deictic Shift model of narration have to say about the different levels of reading that are admittedly necessary to a competent reading of literary language?

According to the Deictic Shift model, fictional narration requires the reader to imagine deictic fields in which HERE, NOW, and SELF coordinates are transposed from their usual anchorage in the "I" into an anchorage in the narrative text. This fictional deictic field is constructed (and lived) according to the linguistic specifications of the text, as a world-to-word *direction of fit* (Searle, 1983). These specifications include verb tense and aspect (Rapaport et al., 1989), deictic pronouns, verbs and adverbs (Fillmore, 1974), expressive elements (Banfield, 1982), experiential verbs, modals, argument structure (Wiebe, 1990b), and presentative structure. All fictional narratives contain a multitude of such clues. By following them, the reader is able to move with the fictional situation as it emerges with each new sentence.

The hypothesis of the Deictic Shift model is that a deictic field is created by a fictional narrative through these particular clues as they are instantiated in particular texts and "picked up" by particular readers. There is no story world deictic field until it is established by the text and by the reader following the text. Similarly, there is no deictic field at the level of narration unless one is specifically called for by the text. Without a story world deictic field, there can be no story, but there can be narration without a fictional narration-level deictic field. Unless a fictional SPEAKER or WRITER who exists on a deictic plane separate from that of the characters is specifically signalled by the text, the reader need not constitute a separate fictional deictic field at the level of narration. Of course, the reader has an idea of a real author who wrote the text at some real historical time and place. The very existence of the text is pragmatic testament to the reality of the author or authors. But narrators as fictional beings must be created by the text. They do not spring automatically to life as part of the reader's fixed cognitive model of fictional structure.

Perhaps many narrative theorists would grant this as true in the abstract, but would claim that fiction cannot be written without providing clues to a narrator's existence. The difference of opinion seems to be centered on the question of what constitutes a clue to a fictional narrator's existence. The only constellation

of clues that is uncontroversial is the presence of a first person who uses the present tense in a narrative whose basic story world deictic field is designated by the past tense. According to arguments by Hamburger and Banfield, the use of the past tense for story world time does not by itself imply a narrational NOW in the present tense. In fact, as noted previously, Hamburger defined fiction by its use of the "epic preterite" tense combined with a deictic NOW anchored in this tense rather than in the present (Hamburger, 1973, p. 66). Use of the first person for an experiencing SELF in a narrative does not by itself imply a first person SPEAKER who views the story world from a different vantage point (Banfield, 1982). Other clues often used to argue for the existence of a narrator—descriptive passages that are not in a character's experience (Rimmon-Kenan, 1983), reports that articulate a character's experience in ways superior or alien to a character's own verbal ability and style, and reports of a character's behavior or private states such as "he got up" or "he thought" (Rimmon-Kenan, 1983)—are all representations of story-level reality, whether subjective or objective, and thus do not require the construction of a second fictional deictic plane.

This is not to say that fiction is not typically multilevelled and hierarchically ordered. This truism is recognized in all narrative theories. A story (or a reader) can always potentially change frames in one of two directions. One may emerge from one deictic plane to a higher or more basic-ontological-level deictic plane, as in awakening from a dream or looking up from reading. Borrowing a computer science term, I call this process *POPping*. Conversely, one may submerge from a basic level to a less available deictic plane, such as episodic memory (known as "flashback" in fiction), fictional story world (this may be a fiction within the fiction), or fantasy. I call this submersion a *PUSH*, the term paired with POP in computer science. There is theoretically no limit to the number of POPs and PUSHes possible in a fictional narrative. The most common PUSHes are probably flashbacks and dream sequences, and the most common POPs (other than coming back from flashbacks and dreams) are irony and narrator commentary.

There is a basic level of story epistemology and ontology to which one normally expects to return from these POPs and PUSHes; that is, if a character dreams, we expect him or her to awaken, or if a narrator makes a remark that reveals that he or she knows how a story will turn out, we expect him or her to go back to story time rather than just revealing what he or she knows and spoiling the story. This basic story level is usually activated throughout the narrative and becomes part of the reader's construction of the narrative as a whole, even when it is put on hold, so to speak, for a textually cued POP or PUSH. Other levels which are not as basic will, I hypothesize, gradually decay as reader constructions, and will eventually be dropped if they are not activated by use in the text. I think this is what happens with vestigial narrators who are used briefly at the beginning of a story to introduce a situation and who then disappear for the remainder of the narrative. Hamburger mentions this pattern as typical of a stage in the history

of the novel when consistency of perspective was not as scrupulously observed as it came to be later. An author would begin with a narrator who is the fictional source of the knowledge in a story, and then "forget" about the narrator as the story became more and more "fictionalized," that is, as its pretense of being the statement of a historical subject was dropped in favor of third-person fiction.

Thus, even the creation of an overt narrator does not necessarily mean that this narrator exists for the reader behind those parts of the narrative that do not evoke this presence. If the narrator is not continually activated by signs in the text, and if his or her presence is not of importance to the overall meaning of the work, then it is hypothesized here that his or her telling of the story will decay and eventually drop from the reader's construction.

The opposite case is also possible, but very rare, I believe. A text that has shown no sign of a narrator may suddenly acquire one, and this appearance may require the reader to change, in retrospect, the meaning of all that has gone before. Genette mentioned an example of a surprise POP at the end of a narrative, *Portnoy's Complaint* (Roth, 1969), that retrospectively frames the whole narrative as being a monologue addressed to a psychoanalyst. But this occurs in a first-person narrative; it is the other person's voice, not the narrator's, that is the surprise. Genette's claim that "every narrative is, explicitly or not, 'in the first person' since at any moment its narrator may use that pronoun to designate himself" (1988, p. 96) is a claim that readers always have a mental construction of a fictional "I" who may appear at any time. But as I mentioned, any number of fictional POPs or PUSHes may be signalled by a narrative, and readers are able to construct each new level on the spot, as called for by the text. This does not mean that readers must keep in mind a permanent schema of all possible levels and bring this schema to all texts, whether or not these levels are activated by a particular narrative. I submit that in a novel such as *To the Lighthouse* (Woolf, 1955), a POP to a narrator would be not only a surprise, but a felt violation.

What McHale meant by the term "verticality," I believe, is our ability as readers to understand the language of narrative on many different levels. Each level adds richness of meaning to our understanding of literature. On this point, there is no quarrel. For example, when Jane refers to Mrs. Reed as the "mama" of the three Reed children at the beginning of *Jane Eyre* (Brontë, 1973), this reference resonates from its most direct meaning as evoking the relationship between the children and Mrs. Reed, to Jane's own lack of someone to call Mama, to her jealousy of the Reed children for their favored place, to her superior distance from their dependence on a mama. Thus, a single reference resonates with Jane's projective identification with the other children, her own neediness, and her defense against this neediness—her lofty distance. Jane's feelings as evoked cannot be neatly divided between Jane the young child and Jane the first-person adult narrator. One may go further to bring in the author's relation to the word Mama or one's own feelings about Mamas. This is not to say one should or shouldn't bring in these levels; this is to say that one often does. All

of these associations may be brought to a single word. But as with the concept "voice," the levels of resonation here do not alter the attribution of SELF in the particular NOW of the sentence in which it appears.

Banfield mentioned that irony is a way of reading rather than a linguistic (read syntactic) phenomenon. There is nothing syntactic in a sentence such as "torture is fun" to tell the reader that the sentence is to be taken ironically. Rather, a reader accumulates a sense of the values that underlie a literary work, and if some story statement contradicts these values, the reader will either attribute the values expressed to a currently foregrounded character whose values match those of the statement, or he or she will POP out of the story world to search for other motivation for this contradiction. Although dual-voice theorists argue that there is always a narrator, I argue that there is always an author, whose attitudes and subjectivity saturate the text, albeit from another realm. The reader may always POP to consider how to take a given passage by comparing its values with a mental representation of the author's intentions. This kind of consideration is a necessary part of the task of reading.

To summarize: At any moment of reading a narrative, a reader may attentionally occupy one of several deictic fields—for example, a character's subjectivity within the story world, or the author's wry commentary on some historical phenomenon. The same sentence read from different levels has different self–world significance and, hence, a different meaning. There are textual, logical, psychological, and accidental factors that influence our choice of level at any moment of reading.

The Fictional Status of the Language of Narration, and the Attribution of Style. In a fictional narrative without a narrator, the language of narration is not itself part of the fiction, except where it represents the verbal expressions of characters or other story-level language, such as words painted on a wall. Rather, the language of narration is the mode of being of the fiction. Fictional people, events, experiences and verbal expressions are all represented and come to life through the language of the text, and the style of the language makes each fiction a different kind of experience, a different texture, a different self–world relation. Style that is not fictionally attributed to a narrator's or character's verbal expression in a NOW is not itself fictional. There need not be anyone in a fictional world responsible for the words of narration.

In terms of different techniques for representing subjectivity, the language of narration plays a different role according to the linguisticality of the subjectivity being represented. In first-person "feigned reality statement" narration, all the language of narration exists fictionally, because the "I" is purported to be writing or telling the narrative. In narration without a narrator, the representation of subjectivity may be more or less fictionally linguistic as its referent is more or less linguistic. For example, in the directly quoted speech of characters, the referring expression and the referent are both made of the "same stuff": language.

Similarly, Cohn (1978) has pointed out that stream-of-consciousness monologues, by purporting to convey not only the content of a character's thoughts but the verbal style in which it is thought, implies a highly verbal consciousness on the part of characters. The language of narration in such a style is part of the fictional world because the language of the text represents the language of the character's thought processes. As one moves away from mimesis of linguistic forms of subjectivity, there is more controversy about the status of the language of narration. What about language that represents perception, or unconscious desires, or the simple experiencing of a character? In the usual context of a sentence such as "She felt sad," what is the relationship of the language of narration to the subjectivity of the character? Borrowing the terminology of Gendlin (1980), I say that the language of narration *explicates* the character's subjectivity, but without the language being expressive of such, because the words are not part of the character's experience. The language explicates the character's SELF without itself being part of that fictional SELF. Thus, the language is objective: it is not part of a fictional being's consciousness in the NOW. At the same time, the language captures the subjectivity of a character's consciousness in the NOW. The language is objective, but it captures a SELF.

The most pointed style question is raised about situations in which the experiencing of a verbally limited character is explicated and captured using a distinctive and sophisticated style. The consciousness being represented and the sophistication of its representation may seem too far apart to call the latter simply "explication." One may feel it necessary in such cases to conjure a fictional mediating being who speaks for the character. My own attitude in such a case is that style belongs to the author, not to a fictional being, unless fictionally ascribed to one. When Cohn (1978) commented on what may be the paradigmatic case of this splitting, *What Maisie Knew,* she referred the sophistication of the style to James, not to a fictional narrator speaking for Maisie:

> Occasionally James will make a half-hearted attempt to color his psycho-narration with child-language, as when he mentions Maisie's "tucked-in and kissed-for-good-night feeling" for Miss Wix (p. 36). But these phrases always stand in sentences of typically complex Jamesian syntax. (p. 278)

When a reader is immersed in the story world, style constitutes the feel of the story world without itself becoming the fictional object of judgment. (Of course, readers often POP to consider the role of style, and particularly with "difficult" authors, style may be so dense as to retard the reader's attempt at total immersion.) But it is also often the case that the language of a text is called into question by the text itself and becomes an object for the reader's judgment. McHale argued that in *Ulysses* (Joyce, 1973), a separation is created between style and central consciousness by such passages as the "Nausicaa" example and the "Oxen of the Sun" chapter:

> I am thinking especially of the notorious "Oxen of the Sun" chapter, whose language successively parodies some thirty historical styles of English writing. The central consciousness of "Oxen of the Sun" is presumably Bloom, although this is far from clear, and Stephen, too, is on the scene. Neither Bloom nor Stephen, however, seems a plausible source for the parodic styles. Ultimately, of course, it is the author who is responsible for "Oxen of the Sun"—for the selection of styles to be parodied, for the arrangement of the parodies, for the parodic intention and means. But each style gives rise, in turn to a distinct image of a speaker, a "particular personality" in Banfield's phrase—a Latinate speaker, an Anglo-Saxon speaker, an Elizabethan, Miltonic, Pepsyian, Swiftian, Dickensian, or Carlylean speaker, and so on. A narrator, in short, who is separable on the one hand from the author ("organizer and guarantor of meaningfulness") and on the other hand from the characters. (1983, p. 38)

McHale raises the interesting case of the unattributed use of various literary and social languages, or *heteroglossia*, as it is termed by Bakhtin. Briefly, I point to McHale's own seeming preference to attribute a point of view to an existing character rather than to a narrator whose existence has not been established. In the section of *Ulysses* he referred to here, he found it implausible to attribute the epistemological source of the many distinctive styles to the characters on the scene, and because the author's own parodying of the styles points up his own distance from them, he feels forced to conjure a narrator to whom to attribute each of these styles. This may be the case—that when a reader cannot plausibly attribute an idiosyncratic language in the text to a character, he or she constructs a narrator to whom this language may be attributed. But Bakhtin, whose own use of the term narrator is ambiguous with "author," does not interpret heteroglossia as the discourse of a narrator in the following passage:

> Incorporated into the novel are a multiplicity of "language" and verbal-ideological belief systems—generic, professional, class-and-interest-group (the language of the nobleman, the farmer, the merchant, the peasant); tendentious, everyday (the languages of rumour, of society chatter, servants' language) and so forth, but these languages are, it is true, kept primarily within the limits of the literary written and conversational language; at the same time these languages are not, in most cases, consolidated into fixed persons (heroes, storytellers) but rather are incorporated in an impersonal form "from the author," alternating (while ignoring precise formal boundaries) with direct authorial discourse. (1981, p. 311)

POPping Out of the Fiction. So far, I have mentioned only intrafictional levels. But a fictional narrative necessarily has a relation to extrafictional worlds as well. A reader not only constructs and inhabits the fictional story world; he or she also constructs an idea of the actual author and the relations between the author and the story world, and the relations between the story world and the historical world. These, too, are a part of the meaning of a novel. One measure of the quality of a work of fiction is the degree to which it challenges a reader

to modify or expand his or her conception of reality. I do not dwell on this very difficult question, but make the point that irony, which many theorists argue is proof of a dual voice in narrative, is primarily a phenomenon of the perceived relations between the created fictional world and the author's real intentionality. For example, there is a presence behind Huck Finn's (Twain, 1981) narration. The ironic commentary provided by this presence is derived not from any single linguistic element that one could point to, nor any epistemological source within the fiction, but from the implications we draw from certain contradictions in the text between what people profess and how they behave. These contradictions are called attention to by strategic juxtaposition, hyperbole, and other rhetorical devices. This use of rhetoric, and the values it implies, will be referred by the reader (according to the Deictic Shift model) to the real author, not to a fictional narrator who is behind the fictional narrator Huck.

Objective Contexts and Contexts of Nonreflective Consciousness. According to the Deictic Shift model, objective context is text with no SELF, that is, text whose fictional epistemology does not originate in a consciousness. This contradicts common sense normal epistemology, but then, this is the essence of fiction: Its "reality" is established by fiat, not by consensus and corroboration. Again, I emphasize that the lack of a SELF is a fictional phenomenon. The subjectivity of the author at the time of writing is not doubted by this model, nor is it found to be irrelevant or uninteresting—it is just a topic that awaits development within the context of this model.

The characterization of a passage as objective is never absolute in real-time immersed reading. There are absolute linguistic cues, such as exclamations and curses, that a context is not objective, but a sentence that has none of these cues may nevertheless turn out, in retrospect, to be part of a subjective context if a later sentence recontextualizes the objective context within the consciousness of a SELF:

> The ship sailed at midnight. And for two hours her husband stayed with her, while the child was put to bed, and the passengers came on board. It was a black night, the Hudson swayed with heavy blackness, shaken over with spilled dribbles of light. She leaned on the rail, and looking down thought: This is the sea; it is deeper than one imagines, and fuller of memories. (Lawrence, 1976, p. 528)

In this example, the first sentence does not have any indications of subjectivity. But the following sentences establish that the first sentence, rather than being an objective statement of something that happened, is actually a prospective thought of the woman: The ship is to sail at midnight, and the actions and thoughts of the following sentences take place before midnight, as the woman prepares to leave. The entire passage is a subjective context within the woman's consciousness.

In an objective context, story settings, events, and characters are narrated directly, without mediation by a consciousness. To the questions "who sees?" and "who speaks?" the answer is, "no one." As with most written stage directions

in a script or most camera shots in film, fictional reality in objective contexts is designated without being spoken or seen by a fictional subject. There may be a spatio-temporal orientation in an objective context, but there is no fictional subject occupying this orientation.

The fictional status of the text in an objective context is that of total referentiality. What it says, is, and its saying disappears. The story world is constructed to fit the words of the text. This does not mean that style is unimportant; the text's referentiality lies not only in what it describes, but in its syntax, its sociolinguistic register, its case grammar, and all the other concomitants of style. These produce the texture and felt reality of the story world.

This aspect of objective context is also true of contexts of nonreflective consciousness, a kind of objective "capture" of nonreflective subjective states. The sentence of nonreflective consciousness faithfully captures the lived experience of a character without implying that the character knows, understands, or would agree with the language used to capture this experience. The narration of childhood subjectivity must use a vocabulary far beyond that of a child in order to capture the child's perception and lived experience. The same is also true of other beings who are conscious without being linguistically adept. In the following short text, for example, a cat's lived experience is captured:

> With glad meows he sprang from the couch. As soon as the door opened, Socks was outside, his forepaws against Mrs. Bricker's thigh, stretching to be petted. A light breeze ruffled his fur, and spring sunshine drew the fragrance from the lemon blossoms. Life was good again. (Cleary, 1973, p. 41)

In this passage, the first two sentences can be read as either objective or subjective, whereas the third sentence is probably subjective, and the fourth, "Life was good again," is definitely subjective. (In its full context, the entire passage—the entire book—is solidly established as Socks' subjective context.) It is certain within the logic of the book's story world that Socks the cat does not know the names of common objects such as "door" or "couch," nor does he know Mrs. Bricker's name. The words of this passage explicate the relationship between directly felt referents in Socks' lived experience, not his linguistic or cognitive representations of them.

Objective contexts and sentences capturing lived experience share this in common: They are the direct representation of the "raw material" of fictional reality, in one case the *noumena*, or things-in-themselves, and in the other, the phenomenal experience of a subject. In neither case does the linguisticality of the text imply that the reality described is itself linguistic.

In Bakhtin's (1984) typology of discourse in Dostoevsky, objective context is one kind of "direct unmediated discourse directed exclusively toward its referential object, as an expression of the speaker's ultimate semantic authority" (p. 199) (Bakhtin's "speaker" is the author). According to Bakhtin, this kind of discourse is "not possible in every epoch . . . —for [it] presupposes the presence

of authoritative perspectives and authoritative, stabilized ideological value judgments" (p. 192). In other words, objective context is warranted by social consensus and certainty about the nature of reality. But by using the argument that the authority to designate reality comes from conventionalized norms, Bakhtin missed the creative power of objective contexts to command new ways of portraying existence. Fictional objective contexts need not buckle under the strain of their difference from historical normality, nor apologize for the strangeness of the worlds they portray. Indeed, they may establish existents (as in science fiction) or ways of presenting reality (as in the Nouveau Roman) at great odds with normal orthodoxy without arguing for the right to do so.

Conclusion

The Deictic Shift model of narrative subscribes to Banfield's dictum 1 EXPERIENCER/1 SELF. One may not be able to determine, from isolated narrative sentences or expressions, the epistemological source of the knowledge or experience represented therein. But there will always be only one fictional SELF as the Origo of any fictional expression. As to "voice," I argue that "voice" is a poor synonym for SELF, because a voice is a public behavior that may be referred to the SELF or Origo of a HEARER as easily as to a SPEAKER. A mimic's use of another's voice is based, not on his or her merging with the other's subjectivity, but on his or her ability to hear and reproduce. A double voice does not equal a double SELF. I also argue that the so-called merging of a narrator with a character can be more adequately described as the absence of a narrator. Finally, the difference between the characters' own use of language and the language of the narrative does not ipso facto conjure a fictional narrator, because the language of fiction (the "narrating") may be simply fiction-creating, rather than being an object of fiction itself.

The Deictic Shift model also subscribes to Banfield's division of narrative into subjective and objective sentences, with Wiebe's additional notions of subjective and objective contexts and with some elaboration on the status of psychological reports.

Some issues of paramount importance to Banfield are not battle lines for me here. One such issue, which is proclaimed in the name of her book (1982), is that sentences of pure narration and represented subjectivity are not speakable. Although I find her arguments on this score historically and intuitively plausible, I do not see any principled reason why oral narrative should exclude these types of sentences. Just as the author is not part of the story world, so an oral storyteller can efface his or her own discourse and allow the shift of deictic plane to take place.

Mark Clarke stated that conversational narratives may represent an "altered state of consciousness" compared to ordinary conversational interaction: "to the extent that the storyteller becomes absorbed in the narration, this [story]world

becomes separated from the conversation" (1986, p. 324). Where such a story is nonfictional, the deictic field may separate from the speaker's SELF-in-the-NOW and become centered in a past SELF whose experience is relived. Where the story is fictional, the speaker may live the experience of the story world as an imaginatively constructed deictic field, just as a reader or listener does. The reality of the speaker does not necessitate a fictional SPEAKER whose consciousness anchors the deictic field.

On a similar issue, I do not object to the idea that signs of pronunciation can appear in represented speech. McHale pointed to many examples of signs of pronunciation both in represented speech and in sentences of the syntactic form of indirect speech. Apparently, Dos Passos and other "proletarian novelists" made a point of mixing direct and indirect forms, perhaps as a way of drawing attention to and breaking through the concealed authority and pretension of objectivity that unmarkedness allows in the indirect forms. The shock value of the result decreases as one reads more of this type of sentence: "She shook her head but when he mentioned a thousand she began to brighten up and to admit that que voulez vous it was la vie" (Dos Passos, 1937, in *Nineteen Nineteen*, p. 382; quoted by McHale, 1978, p. 255 and Banfield, 1982, p. 115). Banfield argued strongly that signs of pronunciation are signs of communication, but I do not see a necessary connection between the voice and communication. I do not subscribe to Banfield's statement that "the oral . . . cannot free itself from the I–you relation" (1982, p. 242). In some psychotherapies, for example, one may have the freedom to express oneself without addressing anyone. Fictional narrative and therapeutic self-expression have this in common: They are a form of revelation, bringing something out into the open before (potential) witnesses, without being bound by norms of politeness and decorum that permeate and constrain language in direct address. Clarke pointed out that the talk of the mentally ill is paradigmatically not organized with regard to an addressee, and that the narratives of young children are often found "faulty" in this regard. He contended that there is often a double bind tension in the role of storyteller, in that the teller may be more interested in living an experience than in the communicative needs of his or her listeners (1986, p. 333).

I also find that SELF and voice are separable issues, and that although a voice comes from a person, this person is not necessarily the SELF. I even find that, on occasion, there are passages with many voices but no SELF.

In the first case, where the voice in a passage does not belong to the SELF, the SELF is a HEARER rather than a SPEAKER. A positive sign that this is the case is that there are ellipses in direct speech, indicating that the SELF is impaired and cannot hear all that is said. A HEARER may also be the epistemological source of represented speech. Further, a first-person SELF who has heard another character's speech may later represent that speech in the form of represented speech. In this case also, represented speech is referred to the epistemology of the HEARER, the first person. Neumann (1988) gives several cases

of this type from the eighteenth-century epistolary novel *Sir Charles Grandison* (Austen, 1980). In the following example, each paragraph break signals a change in speaker in a first-person report of a conversation:

> We can't be all of one mind, replied I. I shall be wiser in time.
> Where was poor Lord G. gone?
> *Poor* Lord G. is gone to seek his fortune, I believe.
> What did I mean?
> I told them the airs he had given himself; and that he was gone without leave, or notice of return.
> He had served me right, *ab-* solutely right, Lord L. said.

Neumann believed that represented speech and thought (she used the term *free indirect discourse*, or *FID*, and defined this more loosely than Banfield's term) may have originated in everyday speech, noting that characters in eighteenth-century novels often use untagged, shifted reports of another's speech that retain the original speaker's evaluative elements, suggesting that this is a mimesis of everyday conversational usage. But the examples she used are from fictional letters, that feign written rather than oral usage. Still, the usage is nonfictional, suggesting that FID as a style (at least in English) may have originated as an entertaining way of recounting conversations in letters.

Once again, the epistemological divide between speech and thought is important. Speech is just as much an experience for the hearer as for the speaker, so represented speech may be referred to a SELF other than the speaker, namely a HEARER. Thought, perception, and other forms of private experience, on the other hand, can only be referred to the subject of consciousness who experienced them.

My second point, that a text may contain voices without SELF, diverges from Banfield in that it asserts that expressive elements may be found in an objective context. This is my contention about unattributed heteroglossia, in which bits and pieces of voices are used to create a milieu, but these voices are not speaking in a NOW. Instead, these voices are used to conjure up a typified social context:

> In the towns, on the edges of the towns, in fields, in vacant lots, the used-car yards, the wreckers' yards, the garages with blazoned signs—Used Cars, Good Used Cars. Cheap transportation, three trailers. '27 Ford, clean. Checked cars, guaranteed cars. Free radio. Car with 100 gallons of gas free. Come in and look. Used Cars. No overhead.
>
> A lot and a house large enough for a desk and chair and a blue book. Sheaf of contracts, dog-eared, held with paper clips, and a neat pile of unused contracts. Pen—keep it full, keep it working. A sale's been lost 'cause a pen didn't work.
>
> Those sons-of-bitches over there ain't buying. Every yard gets 'em. They're lookers. Spend all their time looking. Don't want to buy no cars; take up your time. Don't give a damn for your time. Over there, them two people—no, with the kids. Get 'em in a car. Start 'em at two hundred and work down. They look good for one and a quarter. Get time.
>
> Owners with rolled-up sleeves. Salesmen, neat, deadly, small intent eyes watching for weaknesses.
>
> Watch the woman's face. If the woman likes it we can screw the old man. (Steinbeck, 1966, p. 53)

This passage is part of an entire chapter that evokes a number of voices in order to establish a milieu. The voices do not belong to people speaking in the NOW of a narrative; rather, they paint a picture of what a place is like without enacting any narrative story-line. The voices illustrate a general atmosphere rather than a particular event. Thus they are an example of the *they say . . . relation* between language and world.

Finally, I believe with Kuroda that it is to phenomenology and epistemology rather than to linguistics that the final appeal must be made for the Deictic Shift model, although it is linguistic structures that call our attention to the need for this model. Although I admire Banfield's (1982) linguistic argumentation, and I find her rigor of great use to my own understanding of what happens in fiction, I think that her own perceptiveness goes considerably beyond the linguistic devices she finds. In her other work, such as "The Empty Centre: Describing the Unobserved" (1987), she demonstrates her own knowledge of and reliance on phenomenological and epistemological categories, even as she continues to try to find falsifiable ways of making her claims.

Many of the assertions made here on behalf of the Deictic Shift model are subject to testing. As of now, I subscribe to the truth of these assertions because they seem more faithful to my own experience of reading than the alternative. It may be that those who have been trained to believe that there is always a narrator really do construct this extra mediating level as they read, regardless of whether one is called for by the text. Similarly, now that I am used to the no-narrator-unless-marked notion, I may have dropped a mediating level that I had before. If so, I believe I have thereby gained new narrative effects that are not possible using the old model, effects that some authors are specifically striving to achieve. Consider the following quotations, for example, from Sartre (1965):

> Since we were *situated,* the only novels we could dream of were novels of *situation,* without internal narrators or all-knowing witnesses. In short if we wished to give an account of our age, we had to make the technique of the novel shift from Newtonian mechanics to generalized relativity; we had to people our books with minds that were half lucid and half overcast, some of which we might consider with more sympathy than others, but none of which would have a privileged point of view either upon the event or upon himself. (p. 224)

> Thus, our technical problem is to find an orchestration of consciousnesses which may permit us to render the multidimensionality of the event. Moreover, in giving up the fiction of the omniscient narrator, we have assumed the obligation of suppressing the intermediaries between the reader and the subjectivities—the viewpoints of our characters. It is a matter of having him enter into their minds

> as into a windmill. He must even coincide successively with each one of them. We have learned from Joyce to look for a second kind of realism, the raw realism of subjectivity without mediation or distance. (p. 228)

> [Our predecessors] thought that they were justifying, at least apparently, the foolish business of storytelling by ceaselessly bringing to the reader's attention, explicitly or by allusion, the existence of an author. We hope that our books remain in the air all by themselves and that their words, instead of pointing backwards toward the one who has designed them, will be toboggans, forgotten, unnoticed, and solitary, which will hurl the reader into the midst of a universe where there are no witnesses; in short, that our books may exist in the manner of things, of plants, of events, and not at first like products of man. (p. 229)

> From this viewpoint, absolute objectivity, that is, the story in the third person which presents characters solely by their conduct and words without explanation or incursion into their inner life, while preserving strict chronological order, is rigorously equivalent to absolute subjectivity. Logically, to be sure, it might be claimed that there is at least a witnessing consciousness, that of the reader. But the fact is that the reader forgets to see himself while he looks and the story retains for him the innocence of a virgin forest whose trees grow far from sight. (p. 229)

If there is always a fictional SPEAKER whose voice is heard by the reader as he or she reads, then a particular kind of aloneness can never be represented in a narrative. Virginia Woolf, in particular, wrote often about an aloneness for which there is no one to speak, and I think this effect is much more strongly conveyed when the text is not conceptualized as being relayed by a fictional SPEAKER. Consider, for example, the following passage from the "Time Passes" section of *To the Lighthouse* (Woolf, 1955):

> So with the house empty and the doors locked and the mattresses rolled round, those stray airs, advance guards of great armies, blustered in, brushed bare boards, nibbled and fanned, met nothing in bedroom or drawing-room that wholly resisted them but only hangings that flapped, wood that creaked, the bare legs of tables, saucepans and china already furred, tarnished, cracked. (p. 194)

In this passage, I think it is important that there is not only no one who sees what is depicted here, but also that no one speaks. The fictional subjectivity of the passage belongs only to the airs.

Finally, I comment on the relationship (or lack of one) between the Deictic Shift model and structuralist and deconstructive views of subjectivity. A great deal of the passion that greeted Banfield's theory of unspeakable sentences came from a perception that she was trying to destroy the last human presence in literary analysis, the narrator. Because we were deprived of the author by the New Critics and the structuralists, the narrator was a last bastion of human attribution for the beauties and complexities of the novel. The deconstructionists and the Lacanians argued that subjectivity was an illusion structured by language, and that all of this concern about personhood was nostalgia. From another angle, linguists were claiming that all literary meaning could be scientifically explained, which sounded a lot like "drained." Humanist literary study was besieged on all sides.

But my own reading of Banfield, Hamburger, and Kuroda is that they are restoring the real author (in partnership with the real reader) as the creator of the text, and are asking us to look at the different ways subjectivity can be represented fictionally. They are not denying the reality of subjectivity; they are celebrating its complexity and the unique ways it can be represented in fiction.