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Universals of Narrative and Their Cognitivist Fortunes (I)

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> Now this poor fellow, continued Dr. Slop, pointing to the corporal, has had the misfortune to have heard some superficial empiric discourse upon this nice point.
> Laurence Sterne, *Tristram Shandy*

1. Isolation with or against Interdisciplinarity? Narrative as Paradigm Case

> —And pray who was *Tickletoby*'s mare?—'tis just as discreditable and unscholarlike a question, Sir, as to have asked what year (*ab. urb. con.*) the second Punic war broke out.—Who was *Tickletoby*'s mare?—Read, read, read, read, my unlearned reader!
> Laurence Sterne, *Tristram Shandy*

In a cross-disciplinary review of narrative theory, "Telling in Time," I diagnosed isolationism as a cardinal evil:

> Unhappily, the narrative field is parcelled up among several disciplines, which tend to work in casual or even studied disregard for one another's very subject matter as well as methods and findings. Thus the inquiries into so-called

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> artistic/literary, historical, and everyday narrative all too often go each its own institutional way: a division of labor with little interdisciplinary feedback and synthesis. (Sternberg 1990b: 991 and *passim*)

In this regard, only with the substantive implications foregrounded, the present argument complements that "Telling in Time" series. Here, as there, vested group interests come second to my interest in narrative at large. Of the groups involved to date, I will show, the cognitivist latecomer has most flagrantly and self-defeatingly reversed this hierarchy, especially in its contact, or lack thereof, with the poetic tradition. It exhibits too much self-sealing, too little achievement by common standards, and less impact on the mainstream treated, or most often ignored, as outgroup. The self-styled Cognitive Revolution has therefore failed either to rival or to reorient the practice of narratology—let alone interests other than theoretical—not even at a time when the major Structuralist paradigm eventually began to crumble there. As before, the reorientations discernible there since, in and against the mentalist line, not excepting the occasional tie-up with cognitivism proper, have mainly issued from lights and changes and pressures, alternatives and shifts of balance, within the established discipline.

Moreover, though the group's apartness widely typifies its approach to text at large, these minuses vis-à-vis narrative and narratology have a special claim to attention. Nowhere else has the renovated mind science invested so heavily since the 1970s, in a discourse kind so central and congenial as well as so researched within the humanities. Next to it by such criteria, the work done on figurative language under the new banner, since Ortony (1979) and Lakoff and Johnson (1980), has relatively more to show, and more will to show it, with a fairer chance of being heard without—in special issues of *Poetics Today* (13:4, 14:1, 20:3), for example. Accordingly, perhaps, its amnesia and separatism have also drawn more fire.[1]

As a longtime student of how narrative is constructed in the mind, I for one find the poor start made by a kindred area of study anything but exhilarating. That the so-called cognitive turn has on the whole turned out such a disappointment regarding the genre most attractive to it and most amenable to comparative assessment, however, yet leaves the future open. The unhealthy balance sheet to date only brings home the general lesson of isolationism and argues for a sea change in this particular new arrival, from self-conception downward, without either belittling the spirit of its enterprise or overidealizing the established poetic tradition with which it

1. E.g., Jackson 2002: 163–64, 171–74; Adler and Gross 2002: esp. 203–5; Goodblatt and Glicksohn 2003; or, in anthrobiological terms, van Oort 2003, to mention some recent critiques in the same journal.

might, and still may, form an interdiscipline other and better, if not larger or greater, than the sum of its parts. Other certainly, like any whole; also better, if only owing, and proportionally, to the forgeable composite equipment; though not larger or perforce greater, in that it would be focused on the mind/narrative junction, hence bent on selectively interrelating, not swallowing and supplanting wholesale, the disciplines that encompass the respective parts.[2]

In effect, such contact amounts to a must for this latecoming group. Where else would the body of narrative knowledge indispensable to all practitioners in the field come from? The developments, the accidents, if you will, of intellectual history over the millennia have thus far assembled in the study of literature a collective repository without parallel, though not without its problems, either. Joint heritage apart, I carry no overall brief for the narratology practiced by literary scholars, usually on literary texts—and least of all for what partisans or outsiders often identify as such, that is, the Structuralist orthodoxy dominant in the 1970s and 1980s, now fortunately moribund. Nor, as attested (inter alia) by my own unorthodoxy then or persistent bent for discipline crossing, does such a wide departmental label as "literary" rule out divergence, beginning with the very premises. It mostly indicates a shared range of corpora, issues, values, horizons, analytic traditions, things to do with texts, narrative and otherwise, which mark the choices from or against which one proceeds. So typical commonalities of interest among literary narratologists (in, e.g., novelistic fiction, point of view, originality, thickness, verbal art, subtext and intertext, close reading) double as battlegrounds, or less often, even as a background to some new departure. A crisscross of family resemblances ensues, nothing like a disciplinary approach or paradigm.[3]

2. Compare Richardson and Steen 2002: 2 on "the advantages of rethinking the history of literature and culture from a cognitive standpoint" as supplementary rather than oppositional to "current approaches and methodologies." For introducers of "Literature and the Cognitive Revolution" to possibly suspicious fellow humanists, this combines reasonableness with reassurance. As in the case of narrative, though, the latent advantages would surely grow both firmer and mutual—still more appealing, too—if the rethinking of current practice also went the other way. And if the other disciplinary party cannot or will not do their own rethinking, their crossing into the literary/cultural field in practice yet enables and demands scrutiny. Such is the need for doubling the viewpoint on the interdiscipline—its traffic, promise, conditions as well as the actual respective performances—that I will largely reverse that taken by literary cognitivists.

3. Against the impression of, say, Jackson 2000: esp. 333–34 that poststructuralism reigns in narrative study—so much so that narrative itself is a "poststructuralist concept"—and that the field therefore stands opposed to cognitivism, along with the mainstream of literary inquiry. On bedrock issues, such as epistemology, a great many narratologists, of otherwise different stripes, rather occupy positions nearer to cognitivism, whatever their view of (or familiarity with) its practices. I certainly do, if only because of poststructuralism's psychologi-

But then, competing disciplinary paradigms is one thing, common disciplinary property and standards of professionalism another. Largely owing to its ramification since antiquity, this family has accumulated a vast fortune, vaster than known to some members, let alone to outsiders, least of all when they would rather not know. Their amnesia is facilitated by the neglect of literary scholarship to bring together its wisdom(s) into comprehensive as well as updated states of the art: an endemic failure that I recently discussed apropos inference theory. There, the enormous collective knowledge found in the library, or in the learned scholar's mind, remains otherwise uncollected:

> No textbook makes the fruits of studying myriad texts available to the literary student—or to adjacent disciplines so badly, if unknowingly, in need of them as correctives and correlatives, eye-openers and labor-savers and reminders of questions already broached. . . . Collective knowledge on view does not even match individual . . . practice and competence, far less those of the best readers over the ages. (Sternberg 2001b: 131, 150)

Unlike inference, mappings and manuals of narrative scholarship are at least available in various forms, consulted with profit as far as they go, and a witness of sorts to the unusual extent and branching of the research done. Yet even the bids for synthesis found in textbooks exhibit holes, imbalances, if not partisan choices. They tend to underrepresent premodern, a fortiori, prenovelistic traditions of writing and inquiry, for example, or media other than verbal, or what lies outside the trends and parameters in vogue, or the knowledge derivable from the work on countless particular narratives, where criticism has invested most of its energy and repertoire. Their occasional glances at Erich Auerbach's panorama of *Mimesis* (1973 [1946]) or at Lessing's interart semiotics in *Laocoon* (1963 [1766]) or at Edwin Muir's (1960 [1928]) plot typology or at Bakhtin on Dostoevsky (1984 [1963]), respectively, suggest what further wealth might otherwise have accrued to the current body of theory.

Nonetheless, the common property lies ready to the scholar's hand, enabling each approach to define, enlarge, ally, inspect, correct, revitalize, and if necessary reorient itself on a wide home ground, given the basic commonalities of interest and expertise. To put the matter at its lowest, the variety of narratological styles cum resources insures against narrowness

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cal and communicational unreality, most glaring vis-à-vis the dynamics of narrative: hardline relativism cannot tolerate, or survive, generic universals. My substantive objections to cognitivism are less profound, more bridgeable: even its chronic fear of ambiguity doesn't in principle attach to the mind's workings on text—least of all narrative—as distinct from the practitioners' common bias. Accordingly, getting the state of the field(s) right affects the estimate and prospects, indeed the very idea, of the interdisciplinarity in question here.

and inbreeding without denying exchange, far less mutual intelligibility, to those who seek it. What has transpired in reality falls short of "dialogic" utopia; yet the enlistable collective knowledge about story land remains in a class of its own here, as does the qualified practitioner's know-how, and it is time to be outspoken about both their uniqueness and their indispensability in story research.

Among the disciplines involved, therefore, literary narratology (or the poetics of narrative) can relatively stand alone best, even hope and work for progress within its own embattled arena. Due to the same unrivaled advantages, it offers insiders the high road to competence and specialization in the genre that aspirants to mastery elsewhere would do well to take. The habit of self-disparagement in literary circles (whether born of amnesia, or of some apparent impasse, or of taking one's assets for granted, or of wishful alignment with harder-looking or just greener sciences, logical, linguistic, pragmatic, psychoanalytic, now also cognitivist) has helped foster illusions to the contrary in outside quarters that might exactly benefit from an honest reckoning. To judge by my experience with another interdiscipline, where poetics meets biblical narrative (Sternberg 1985, 1998, especially the opening chapters), articulating the terms of alliance, however unpalatable at first, serves to promote it in the long run.

When it comes to such a reckoning vis-à-vis cognitivism, our key genre offers a better vantage point than do issues less visited or more abstract or speculative or cross-discoursive, like some of those (literariness itself included) now under debate in this journal. The respective balance sheets to date may themselves vary accordingly—as may the specific conditions and prospects of joint endeavor—yet would always repay comparison. Their very drawing up and comparability, at the same time, may benefit from the problems, standards, measures that the exemplar highlights.

Thus, narrative in the broad sense, as event-representing discourse, has always been at the center of the literary system, hence of literary criticism, with shifting emphases (from, say, tragedy and comedy and epic to the novel) and steady extension (e.g., from long to shorter forms, from writing to orality, from classical to modern practice, from the canon outward). While central within this institution, further, the genre has seldom and, even so, belatedly received official scholarly notice without it. Until the second part of the twentieth century, when narratology itself gained this trade name and an unprecedented momentum, the literary study of narrative in effect equaled narrative study *tout court*. It has accordingly studied the field longest, hardest, in the most diverse aspects and lights, since Aristotle's *Poetics* got it off to a historic start as a theoretical enterprise: one that in the originator's view covers all represented actions (epic, dramatic, imaginary,

traditional, fact-based), the entire and ever-widening gamut of "mimesis." Its theories also have the most elaborate and versatile arts of interpretation to draw upon or test themselves against—as vice versa—along with an immense empirical range of closely analyzed texts of all kinds, periods, cultures. Again, it is relatively the least shut-in regarding either matter or method: witness its occasional aspirations to inclusiveness of coverage beyond literature proper, to extrapolating unity from diversity, narrativity from the narratives on record, via semiotics, for example. Hence the wide, at times radical impact on domains concerned with extraliterary, extraverbal, or syncretic branches of the genre, such as historiography, visual art, film.

Why, with all these advantages, literary narratology (especially the modern poetics of narrative) hasn't done better yet, and what such betterment demands, is rather the question I focused in that programmatic "Telling in Time" overview. Examined in the light of practices old and new, the question revealed the need for moving toward a large functional theory, grounded in the universal effects of narrative. Interdisciplinarity does not therefore provide the only, or even the main, answer.

Inversely with the small and recent yet proliferating body of work that goes under the name "cognitive study of narrative." It has been led, and most of it done, by specialists in psychology and artificial intelligence (with a scattered following in linguistic, literary, cinematic circles). However, the training provided by either branch of cognition encompasses, or would encompass at its ideal best, just one-half of such study, the mental aspect. Obviously, nothing in their mother disciplines qualifies cognitivists for analyzing discourse, narrative or otherwise. The strange thing (stranger yet for aspirants to science, strangest for experimentalists alive to the chasm among intuitive, articulated, and organized knowledge) is that practitioners would not generally appear to have repaired the omission, either, or even to have recognized it as such in the first place. The record shows little evidence of their having acquired, or recruited, the narratological skills and scholarship demanded by this interdisciplinary enterprise.

Dispensing with the indispensable specialized knowledge betrays, in turn, the failure to recognize *their* enterprise as necessarily interdisciplinary, beyond comparison with any venture geared to its disciplinary narrative corpus or subgenre. This illustrates the difference between two kinds of interdisciplinarity. In one, the contact with some related field(s) is optional: however promising, stimulating, innovating, sometimes even revitalizing—always given the twofold expertise—it yet remains, strictly, dispensable to the field's practice. In the other kind, it is mandatory, because constitutive. The difference turns on whether the would-be discipline crosser might stay

at home or needs to venture abroad for some common household. A single interdiscipline can therefore be, as here, optional to one party, necessary to the other.

Various disciplines anchored in narrative subject matter exemplify the first possibility: literary study, above all, notorious for its assorted affairs with other domains, both humanistic and harder-seeming, in quest of anything from revaluation to expert help to prestigious methodology to sheer change. It may nevertheless stand alone and, as explained, stand alone best, thus also best illustrating the rule of its kind. Nor, to say the least, do the rate and order of success covary with the option taken. Think of an earlier and for better or worse indubitable revolution, the Linguistic Turn. Armed with traditional resources, as well as individual talent, critics have produced accounts of literature's verbal art that few great linguists or linguistic poeticians have matched and some have acclaimed. Among the successes, compare Ian Watt's (1960) brilliant analysis of the first paragraph of *The Ambassadors* with Michael Halliday (1971) on *The Inheritors*; or William Empson's (1955 [1930]) independently revolutionary study of poetry with Roman Jakobson's "Linguistics and Poetics" (1960) or with the more psychology-driven theory and practice of his own teacher, I. A. Richards. Which goes to disconfirm Jakobson's imperialistic assimilation of poetics (qua "verbal art") to linguistics, as if the object's medium entailed and exhausted the analyst's method, rather than enabling the import and adjustment of another method to the available tool kit. The fallacy of mistaking the optional for the constitutive springs to the eye at the other extreme: the weakness of automatic applications (Saussurean, Chomskyan, Jakobsonian, Derridean) betrays the inadequacy of the linguistic model itself to discourse, a fortiori to literature, of which the verbal code is only a part.

So is the subject matter of every other exterior or intersecting field. Indeed, the very affairs of literary students with rhetoric, linguistics, semiotics, pragmatics, or psychology since Freud presuppose an educated interest in the respective coordinates of the discipline's own object (power, language, encoding, context, mental life and effect) that fellow students have instead chosen to approach from within. Concerning the fruit of the interest as externally developed, or co-developed, each affair also envisages its ultimate reception and assimilation at home. Or the other way round, the target audience indicates the ongoing disciplinary anchorage. So even practices of narratology openly associated with this or that cognitivism (e.g., Bordwell 1985, Ryan 1991, Fludernik 1996, Jahn 1997, Herman 1997) yet reveal a far stronger group likeness to both their otherwise crossing and their stay-at-home mates than to the outside association that they co-opted: stronger, perhaps, than appears from the various changes in nomenclature,

declared intent, or reference list, which may overlie the common inside knowledge. In their case, the likeness becomes most evident, and strongest, where such inside knowledge itself foregrounds, rather than ignores or disallows, the mind's (reader's, experiencer's) processing of narrative: some of the above narratological cognitivists are thus as openly associated with my own research in this mentalist line, born and done within a framework other than any existing cognitivism. (Inversely, where cognitivists proper build on the same research, they maintain, we will find, their own disciplinary allegiance, so that the imported narrative theory is liable to get ill-integrated in transfer.) Here, within, also lies the background to novelty, the prospect of currency, the measure of success in bridge building.[4] Family-like, again, the infighting may grow, or sound, violent to suit. All in the day's work, really.

The rule carries over to analogous domains of narrative study. As poeticians operate on their own home ground—arguably too special (novel-centered or just "literary") for universality—so historians who attempt to interpret or generalize history telling at least know their historiography, film theorists their filmographies, anthropologists their mythology or folklore, ethnomethodologists their data bases of ordinary talk, complete with the profession's analytic instruments.

Outside the mind, on the other hand, cognitivism as such is homeless. Once venturing out, therefore, its choice lies between demanding partnership with the native research community and happy-go-lucky unprofessionalism. That the disciplinary object of study intersects with everything in human experience, narrative included, only means that its students can bring to every resulting interdiscipline part of the equipment. Among the founders of one such interdiscipline, George Miller and Philip Johnson-Laird have thus interwoven their own high cognitivist expertise with the best available knowledge about the other component to produce the groundbreaking *Language and Perception* (1976). They would no more reinvent

4. Particularly since the bridge doesn't quite lead both ways, or not yet. Narratologists apart, that is, the envisaged reference group then at most extends to cognitivist story analysts but not to the rest of the cognitivist field, not even where its study of "real" mental life intersects with discourse topics (e.g., how events are perceived, sequenced, understood). The latter extension, if not the former, would require of the "humanists" both an equal competence in psychology and a higher self-image vis-à-vis it (see also note 41 below), or else there's little hope for a new sense of community to arise. That the question of reference (out)group, with its complex of academic paradigms and priorities and politics, has yet to be faced is another measure of the interdiscipline's unarticulated, embryonic state. It also brings out a division, or self-division, within the isolationist camp. They should apparently see no problem of target readership, but wider influence and missionary work (especially converting, at least impressing the old professionals) have a certain allure with some. Even the belligerent Graesser et al. (1997), on whom more soon, protest too much.

linguistics than it would nowadays occur to physicists to improvise their biology in constituting biophysics. For some reason, however, what goes without saying in the interstudy of the mind and the language system turns apparently gratuitous apropos full-fledged language use. Here, the mental part tends to get confused among partisans with the whole, as though the mind's juncture with discourse entailed the joint analytic competences to match: indeed, as though our approaches to the world and to the story world were one, involving "mental representations" of the same order.

Why, of all outside trainings, should the psychologist's and the computer scientist's lend them ipso facto expertise in any branch of discourse? One might as well ask, with the narrator of *Defending Billy Ryan*, "why a perfectly intelligent but untrained civilian, one who would never try to do a kidney transplant or a cardiac bypass, or even change the oil in the family car, will get it into his fool head to argue with a lawyer" (Higgins 1992: 92). Except that this analogue brings out a startling difference. The question about the intelligent but untrained civilians laying down the laws of (narrative) discourse would sound as rhetorical, were it not for the field's broad presumption to the contrary and its assured ill-performance accordingly.

Presumed to be self-generated or a matter of native wit, the body of outside expertise is as a rule silently ignored. But the neglect may run to the limit of pointedness, by way of exclusion, for example. Thus, van den Broek et al. 1997 assembles a set of articles on "event comprehension and representation" with a view to an "integrative project." As the editors declare, "this book is about building bridges, all sorts of bridges." They most emphasize the one designed to promote "exchange of ideas" among "researchers who share interests, yet may not be ordinarily aware of each other's work," thus differing in the "methodologies . . . vocabularies . . . orientations" brought to "the common problems. Definitions of what constitutes an event vary and routinely are left implicit." To integrate the field, the volume therefore undertakes to collocate work from the relevant groups and perspectives: across the text/textoid divide, for example, even across narrative media (ibid.: ix–xi). But the fifteen essays commissioned for the purpose do not include a single reference to, let alone contribution from, narratology.

The presumption of bi-competence at times grows vocal. In a celebratory survey of "discourse psychology," Arthur Graesser, Shane Swamer, and Xiangen Hu (1997) associate it with a "unique object of inquiry," namely, "the cognitive representations, procedures, and processes that transpire in the human mind when discourse is comprehended and produced." It outreaches psycholinguistics, limited to "sentences and single utterances." Further,

> discourse psychologists also stretch their interdisciplinary tentacles beyond linguistics into the rhelms [*sic*] of rhetoric, sociology, communication, anthropology, education, philosophy of mind, literature, computer science, and cognitive science. Although discourse psychologists appreciate the wisdom that has been accumulated by the various sister fields, they remain committed to the principles of the scientific method as it is practiced in the field of psychology. (Ibid.: 229–30)

Tentacles would appear the right word for such expansionist, all-devouring interdisciplinarity, stretchable to everything possibly associated with cognitive representations, yet accountable to nothing beyond its own psychological methodology. Appreciating "the wisdom . . . accumulated by the various sister fields" sounds like a hollow tribute, given the forthright denial of any commitment to its cumulative weight, and the pregnant silence on its role thereafter. Nor does the thin reference, if any, to those fields during the survey bespeak much appreciation or inspire confidence. Can "the scientific method"—as implemented by a particular field at that—make sundry bricks without hay, generate science unlimited in the absence of the relevant (linguistic, etc.) knowledge and know-how? The foreign domains having been annexed, must their traditions, however wise, bend to a new unitary, positivistic rule?[5]

But then, the extrapsychological component of the nuclear interdiscipline "*discourse* psychology," anterior to the tentacles, does not receive so much as the lip service of "wisdom." It is even denied the lesser dignity of having its various major arenas (e.g., speech act theory, inference making, conversation analysis, utterance typology, stylistics, as well as narratology or poetics) enumerated. Again, from the actual survey of "reading time" or "inference generation," you could never tell that these issues have been studied by professionals for a century at least. With the whole thing reinvented in effect, the discourse psychological surveyors' claim of having moved the field "one giant step further" looks both unduly modest and, to an expert judging by results, wildly overstated, if not reversible. Concerning infer-

5. All this reverses what has been described by Spolsky (1993: 41) as "the common mistake of interdisciplinary studies": the assumption that the ideas drawn from the field in which one is "an amateur are (somehow) more reliable than the more familiar, but embattled assertions" in one's own. On the literary critical side, precisely where the interdisciplinary is optional, that mistake of "amateur" overrating does at times betray itself, all the way to what may be called the nominal fallacy. The appeal not just to cognitivist research or method but even (as Jackson 2000: 328, 334–38, 342–44, 2002: 164, 171–72 observes) to the term *cognitive* then supposedly invests the analysis with novelty, value, and authority. What with the shared nominal fallacy, the two mistakes thus compound to reinforce the one party's isolationism and the other's incentive for import.

ence, the approaches to it via formal semantics are even incomparably more rigorous.[6]

Salient in itself, this omission of outgroup discourse study entails, or radicalizes, a fatal contradiction between cognitivist theory and practice, to which I already adverted and will often return. The trouble springs from dividing the indivisible, misunderstanding what one's own theory encompasses and necessitates. Cognitivism is unprecedented for its emphasis on the knowledge of reality (actions, existents, places, schemas at large) we bring to the text; and computer simulations of the mind at story understanding dramatize the principle that not even the humblest epistemic forms (e.g., Schank and Abelson's "script") come naturally. From the lowest to the highest, from top-down to bottom-up exercise, they need learning and grade readings. So they do, but never alone. If our world knowledge plays such a key role in discourse cognition, then so must our knowledge of discourse and discourse world—only more specialized, contingent, artificial, protean, like culture itself. How else would our mental operations (on the world as transmitted, inter alia) vary beween, say, news report and novel, realism and grotesque, irony and plain speech, overt and implicit meaning, verbal and graphic and cinematic encoding? To practice cognitive discourse study, by the same token, the analyst must additionally acquire the second-order, systematic knowledge needed to handle any question concerning the knowledge (masterly, good enough, partial, naive) internalized by readers (one's own experimental subjects among them) on all these fronts and levels. Working toward such an adequate metalanguage is exactly the business common to the various discourse theories left out of account in the psychology-bred interdiscipline that most wants them.

Regarding the oblivion to competence in discourse, discourse world(s), discourse theory, as if they were our birthright, such frequent inconsistency with the epistemic premises grows even worse in view of the communication model behind this and other cognitivisms. The field's definitional concern with "information processing" is misleading, in that the term may well suggest to the outsider a paradigmatic focus on the receiving end: on a one-sided activity, an understanding or interpretation of the text lib-

6. For some useful pragmaticist surveys, focusing on entailment, presupposition, and implicature, see Gazdar 1979, Levinson 1983, van der Sandt 1988. A reanalysis of these types within an explicit cognitivist pragmatics was attempted in Sperber and Wilson 1986, foreseeably unmentioned here, either. Among literary theorists, on the other hand, such research lines have gained some currency. In Sternberg 2001b, I weigh these lines—including the formalist paradigm behind them—against a comprehensive probabilistic approach to inference as a mind/discourse encounter, one that coheres and often joins forces with that built into narrative. This likeness in the operations and process of sense-making will newly reveal itself below.

erated (poststructuralist style) from the authorial transmitter's meaning, design, control. Actually, the disciplinary paradigm is bifocal, interactive or communicative rather than freely interpretive. The very equivocal nomenclature resolves itself when traced back to its origins in the 1940s: Claude Shannon then founded the "theory of information" on the model of an electronic communications system, with a transmitter encoding a signal at one end, a receiver decoding it into a message at the other.[7]

The desired signal/message correspondence thus finds a variant in that of input to output sought in computer understanding and, metaphorically, elsewhere among cognitivists. Open references to author or implied author, to authorial purpose or transfer as a normative parameter of meaning representation, to the author/understander communicative circuit, and the like, accordingly abound there (e.g., Schank and Lebowitz 1980: 252; Bruce 1980; Brewer and Lichtenstein 1982; Abelson 1987: 46; Schank and Kass 1988: 182–83; Bruner 1990: 61–65, 76–77; Gerrig 1993: 1–2; or the model developed in van den Broek et al. 1994: 239–43 or Segal 1995: 5ff.). Hence, inter alia, experimenters and programmers assume that their authorship of test material qualifies them to judge the performance of subjects or simulators. By appeal to the authorial norm, readers are also increasingly subgrouped into high and low level in terms of their knowledge, memory, or skill (as throughout Kintsch 2000, with overviews). However unwelcome news to certain declared literary adherents to cognitivism, and however they may reconcile its communicative with their interpretive (e.g., reader response, deconstructionist) basis, all this is standard practice in the field.[8]

For Graesser et al. (1997: 236, 258), predictably, "the communicative interchange between author and readers" guides inference making, as "the attitudes of the writer" figure among its objects; and the fiat of relevance to

7. For a short history of "information processing" as interactivity, see Harker 1989; some additional useful references would be Cherry 1966 and MacKay 1972. See also note 8 below.
8. To be sure, as already hinted in notes 3 and 7 above, many others will instead find a common ground here, particularly narratologists. On how the information/communication antithesis enters into narrative sense-making, especially the (re)construction of point of view and/as reported discourse, see, e.g., Sternberg 1978 [1971]: 246–305, 1982a, 1983b: 172–86, 1985: 58ff., 1991, 2001b: 151ff.; and, apropos (un)reliable narration, Yacobi 1981, 1987, 2000, 2001. Thus, Yacobi's approach to unreliable narrating as a purposive dissonance between information and communication, inset and frame—or in terms of readerly strategy, as a hypothesis for interpreting textual incongruities by attributing them to a narrator opposed to the author—never mentions cognitivism. In effect, the theory is nevertheless cognitive down to the premises, and so is its application in, say, Cohn 2000 [1983]. On the other hand, this theory's echo in Nünning 1999, self-described as "cognitive" but rejecting the idea of an implicitly communicating author, goes against the mainstream cognitivist premise no less than against the echoed original. (The notorious anticommunicative stance of Banfield 1982 has at least the virtue of consistency with its formalist model.)

the "goals of the communication" postulates an encoded authorial intentionality latent and variable, yet decodable and normative. Needless to say, this renders discourse knowledge of all kinds indispensable—from communicational workings at large, through the middle ground of a text type or a period, to author-specific ways—and forgetting or assuming it, inconsistent. The same applies, a fortiori, to the analyst. Ironically, the knowledgeable disciplines ignored are often likewise oriented to communication, intentionality and all, as with pragmatics, much of narratology, and most classical literary scholarship.

The self-contradiction, prevalent in the field, worsens yet further in the ensuing short shrift given to criticisms from anonymous "discourse researchers outside of psychology." The tendentious and aggressive answer betrays the extent to which Graesser et al. take competence in discourse research to be as unproblematic (or nonscientific) as the activity of discoursing itself at either end. Here native wit apparently does duty for the local "wisdom" accumulated, and likewise bent to "method," in "realms" elsewhere.

> The skeptics have worried about three sins that are frequently committed by discourse psychologists:
> 1. Using unnatural discourse materials in psychology experiments,
> 2. Forcing research participants to complete bizarre tasks, and
> 3. Examining discourse in vague pragmatic contexts. (Ibid.: 230)

Observe that all three putative sins, as picked and cited by the defense, challenge the how's of the research performed, never the home-grown performers' qualifications in the first instance. Whether the real pragmaticist, narratologist, talk analyst (any more than the psycholinguist) would so obligingly waive their hard-won expertise in discourse, let alone agree that its fruits amount to "qualitative impressions and simple-minded claims" unless quantified by the psychologist's experimental science (ibid.: 258), is another matter, of course. In turn, beyond the skepticism attributed to them, they might ask what exactly the psychologist, even having first acquired (and a fortiori, if unconversant with) their knowledge of discourse, will contribute to it as such. Contribute where, how, how much, to whose benefit, in what degree of novelty or, given the holes and quarrels big and small within cognitivism, of firmness? Again, in terms of reference group, who will count as arbiter, peer, sharer, neighbor, receiver, subject, total outsider? All open questions, these, which I have not seen addressed in any detail, let alone coordinated into a workable research agenda, by promoters of the interdiscipline from either side. The last thing they want, surely, is to proceed tourist fashion, shopping around for ideas and other bargains,

or looking for import and export opportunities, each in a different part of the respective foreign land. It's early days yet for systematics, perhaps, but high time to face the realities as against the exigencies of contact, with a view to their best possible alignment, as to the least possible rhetoric.

Instead, the very "how"-sins put on the list are treated by Graesser et al. as excesses both venial and avoidable. Yes, seeking to control variables, experimenters have often fabricated their own "incoherent, pointless, and uninspiring 'textoids'." Yes, some tasks and procedures, like interrupted reading, will appear mysterious, even counterproductive, to the subjects, among other outsiders. And yes, deviant contexts recur, beginning with the reading for a laboratory test. Nevertheless, they maintain, what hostile critics would judge "unnatural acts on bizarre texts in degenerate pragmatic environments" are defensible in terms of scientific rigor. (Funnily enough, the defenders would appear unaware that the sins have been paralleled, and lately attacked, on the putative accusers' own side of the fence, including context-bound pragmatics itself.) What's more, and allegedly unknown to the critics, the newer trend requires no defense whatever. All such unnaturalness has vanished, as it were, in the research on "naturalistic text processing" done by Graesser and his associates (ibid.: 230–31, 258–59). But, known or unknown, would this change in cognitivist practice silence criticism? Thus, with the shift from "textoids" to "bona fide literary stories," the question marks about the would-be practitioner's metaknowledge, as well as the reader's/subject's knowledge, only ascend from discourse in general to the specifics of narratological and the finesses of literary competence. What either opines in variable epistemic innocence about such stories (their meaning, reading, nature, typicality) accordingly counts for even less, and least of all by reference to the artful communication models implied there. In terms of "scientific methodology" proper, again, the higher the naturalism of the "acts . . . texts . . . environments," the lower the experimenter's control—over the opposite number's "qualitative impressions and simple-minded claims," inter alia. Old problems with this self-generating interdisciplinarity redouble, fresh ones arise: the tale of the short blanket, in a nutshell, except that it remains untold here. So Graesser et al. (ibid.) can "hereby dismiss the misconceptions of the skeptics about discourse psychology," to their own satisfaction at least.

The hubris, with the vested disciplinary interest, is, if not always so flagrant, representative enough to count as virtually paradigmatic. Nor, against expectation, has it been questioned and kept in view by qualified followers, in their own best (or long-term) interest as opposite numbers. Rather, among literary critical cognitivists, it has all too often found encouragement—at times more than silent—not least where their own handling

of parallel issues and texts shows the difference made by expertise in poetics, narrative specifically included. The common silence on this self-made interdisciplinarity is odd enough. Laissez-faire carried to excess? Tell it not in Gath, lest the Philistines rejoice? (One can imagine the outcry in the other camp, though, if the presumption of mastery were reversed and the literati conducted their own experiments by native wit or on the strength of a flying visit in psychology.) Odder yet are forms of actively encouraging isolationism, whether declaring poetics subsumed under cognitive study, or invidiously comparing the respective methodologies, or exaggerating the project's novelty and evolution and accomplishment, or even limiting criticism to matters of detail. Either way, going by expediency alone, this double standard threatens to give the entire interdiscipline a bad name coupled with a bad start. The rest of scholarship is unlikely, nor particularly anxious, to draw such fine distinctions as between the optional and the constitutive, the literary critical or narratological cognitivist and the cognitivist analyst of literature or narrative.

Even the occasional calls on either side for "real" crossdisciplinary endeavor, dialogue, marriage, symbiosis, and the like tend to blur the key question of the neophyte's discourse knowledge in its various aspects—readerly, scholarly, semiotic, artistic, generic, historical, culture-bound at large—on top of other formative and operational vaguenesses. (E.g., with direct reference to narrative, Haberlandt 1980: 99–100; van Dijk 1980; Brewer and Lichtenstein 1981, 1982; Spiro 1982: 84–85; Bruner 1986, 1990; Gerrig and Allbritton 1990: 380–81; Gerrig 1993: 1–2; Zwaan 1993: 4–7 and *passim*; Talmy 1995: 423, n.7; Brewer 1998; Kintsch 2000: 209–13; van Peer and Chatman 2001: 1–17 and *passim*.) The popular scenario of the marriage as a two-phase division of labor, whereby the scientist will import humanistic theory for testing, still begs the question. Inevitably so, for reasons already apparent in the limit case of Graesser et al. 1997. Unless the experimenter has internalized the imported wisdom and tests it on subjects to match, the divide will persist in the guise of continuity—as it does when the humanistic theorist invokes experimental findings about discourse at face value. How can the one take over ideas for application and the other data for generalization (or vice versa) without an insider's understanding of them to start with, let alone the ability to evaluate and adjust and challenge them, if necessary, on their own terms?

Moreover, the issue of proper equipment, the subject's, a fortiori the analyst's, gains extra sharpness from the communicative model widely assumed in the field and at times breaks surface in half-admissions of what it implies. Here is one made about "a domain problem" by the author of the story-generator TALE-SPIN:

> We are trying to reason about a form of writing, without having much expertise in the art of writing, and I expect no more success than I would from someone with no medical knowledge who tried to build a diagnosis system. . . . I suggest that we [story cognitivists at large] pay more attention to what the writers say about their work, not so much the literary criticism and the structuralism literature as the simpler 'how-to' advice that writers have passed on. (Meehan 1982: 459)

A domain problem, in AI jargon, concerns knowledge—here specifically of narrative discourse—and the open self-criticism targets psychologists as well as programmers. They ("we") could all do with "'how-to' advice," given the shared interest in both formulas or schemas or models and the writing of storied textoids. On the other hand, the self-questioning and certainly the envisaged betterment of the field's qualifications limit themselves to the authorial, transmitting side of narrative. Meehan dispenses wholesale with "the literary criticism and the structuralism literature"—theory, history, interpretation, method, fact—in the belief that cognitivists do as well, or better, on their own at the receiving end. The presumption of natural self-sufficiency at this end, however, clashes with the avowed domain problem at the other. Given "the art of writing," there must be an art of reading to suit, just as building a "diagnosis system" necessitates, among other "medical knowledge," expertise in performing and theorizing the diagnostic style of reading. Failing this symmetry between the parties, or roles, the artificer loses insight into the output of his own TALE-SPIN, as will emerge.

Elsewhere, the giveaway subdivisions of communicative competence fall within the domain of reading itself. Think back, for example, to the scaling of readers into high versus low level, good versus poor, expert versus novice, literary versus ordinary, as practiced and extensively surveyed by Kintsch 2000, minus the necessary principled implication for the status of the respective findings, never mind the finder. And the hierarchy may again run along discourse lines, subgeneric or cultural, for instance. As the next section will elaborate, this explains the drastic confinement of the research, especially by founding cognitivists, to "story" as against longer or higher forms of narrative. Even so, not all "stories" are always considered eligible for experiment and analysis, because the readership they imply may distinguish among actual readers, to the verge of in/out polarity. And again, when it does come, the painful admission does not go all the way.

Speaking of encounters with foreign literature, as when a Westerner reads American Indian folktales or vice versa, Johnson and Mandler (1980: 80) thus envisage plain misreading for want of the relevant narrative schemata. "Motivations for action that are apparent to one cultural group may not be apparent to another. While this means that an 'out' group may indeed

perceive a story as ill-formed, it does not mean that causal connections did not exist in the story as understood within the original culture." But once the original communicative framework has been posited as immutably normative, the rule perforce extends to *intra*cultural differences among texts, understanders, and their (mis)match. The analysts should therefore have recognized that one may well belong to an outgroup within one's own discourse "culture," as they and their subjects do in relation to all those narratives (e.g., epic, novelistic, literary, art-cinematic) for which they do not qualify as implied audience and which they would indeed often judge "ill-formed" by the exterior, in effect heterocultural schemata available to them. For that matter, the epistemic, let alone analytic proof to the contrary falls on them, by the same token—even apropos the Russian folktale, complete with its Proppian morphology, automatically subsumed under "European" culture. Another genuine insight, with another vain attempt to divide the competence that is indivisible on the premises.

Unsurprisingly, the offense against the ABC of professionalism, as well as against disciplinary self-consistency, incurs strategic losses across the board. The mind's very encounter with discourse ranks high among the losses incurred, because the question already features in poetics since classical literary theory, under assorted guises,[9] as well as in the early and modern study of visual art. It repeatedly features there, moreover, with an eye to the difference, even in reality effect, between art and the life it "imitates." If less oblivious, cognitivist newcomers to the encounter in question might thus be spared the fallacy of lumping together world and discourse world, what we mentally image ("represent") as observers and as processors of another's text-mediated image: an error in ontology whose massive chain reaction will emerge in force throughout. If less oblivious, again, they would know better than to set cognition against (at least above) emotion, or to premise the well-formedness of discourse, or to flatten story to its actional structure, or to mistake notorious variables for laws, culture for nature. Inversely with the self-deprival of established positive rudiments, also to be soon exemplified and later demonstrated. In face of avoidable errors and regressions at such basic levels, it makes nonsense for the perpetrators (with their zealous adherents) to relegate the wisdom that has already outgrown them to non- or at best pre-cognitive frameworks. The buzzword of paradigm shift visibly boomerangs, as does the axiom that the latecomer must be superior.

That all those losses pay for the offense against scholarly norm offers cold comfort, or justice, to one who, like myself, believes that the (re)turn toward

9. For example, the eighteenth-century German thinkers invoked in Adler and Gross 2002: 203–7; or Lessing in Sternberg 1999. Earlier and further traditions, more directly related to our paradigm case, will ensue.

discoursive mental operations is long overdue in general and, in particular, the key to the specificity of the narrative genre, hence to the reconception of its study. The high interdisciplinary promise is unlikely to actualize itself, in this quarter at least, if the (re)turn toward the mind remains cognitivism's entire stock and store, as it disciplinarily is. Compare Daniel Dennett (1986 [1978]: 126) on the need for AI workers to study philosophy "unless they are content to reinvent the wheel every few days. When AI reinvents a wheel, it is typically square, or at best hexagonal, and can only make a few hundred revolutions before it stops." With the difference that AI workers rarely set themselves up as philosophers or write programs for philosophical understanding.

All the more reason, therefore, why cognitivist inquiry should not waste further time and effort on rediscovering the hard trial-and-error way, if ever, such narratological wisdom as lies ready to hand, whether competences or ideas or tools or findings, positives or negatives. Nor indeed has this gratuitous effort made since the 1970s nearly caught up yet with the actual state of the art after two millennia, not even on the basic theoretical level. There, if anything, the new regresses to the old, scientism to neoclassicism, as apropos closure, linkage, well-structuredness, escape from indeterminacy, oversight of nonreferential aspects and patterns and dynamisms, bracketing form or matter with effect in eternal union, all of them issues on which we will elaborate. Unwitting cognitivist echoes of the tradition (e.g., throwbacks to Aristotle's *Poetics*) give a sense of déjà vu, often aggravated by intervening changes in the practice of narrative or advances in narrative poetics: those who ignore the past are condemned to repeat it, false starts, bitter lessons, outdatings, and all.

On the whole, therefore, self-generating cognitivist practice to date looks here like an exemplar and victim of isolationism: an enclave in spirit as well as in size, inbred, cliquish, militant, working on a narrow (theoretical, interpretive, empirical, methodological) front, almost out of touch with surrounding established disciplines, and so liable to be shrugged off wholesale among professional narratologists in return, unless freshly oriented toward the common pursuit of narrative knowledge. Surprisingly for an enclave, moreover, the cognitivist one does not even boast anything like the solidarity of a unified, continuous research program, beyond a general interest in the "mind."[10] Nor, though even its body of work on narrative is relatively

10. Jerome Bruner (1990), voicing his own disappointment with the Cognitive Revolution he helped to bring about, questions the commonality and genuineness of this interest itself within a field that has aberrantly turned against humanism. So, from another viewpoint, does the philosopher of mind John Searle (1980) in his notorious attack on computer programs

small, will the interested reader or student find any comprehensive overview of it. Nor does its short nominal history exhibit much improvement in these regards. The opposite is closer to the truth.

At the outset, the cognitivist practitioners of 1975–85 at least did start, or restart, with issues basic and methods adapted to the genre. They tried to capture the essentials of narrative via story grammars or schemas, inspired or provoked by the then new linguistics and often associated with contemporary (e.g., Proppian) Structuralist projects. Within the enclave, cross-references also abound at the time, including comparisons, variants, debates, amendments, fresh proposals, stock takings.[11] Hence, at least, the sense of a familial and developing enterprise, across the lines that might otherwise divide psychologist from computer expert, say, or grammarian from pure schema builder. Hence, again, the real, if few, accomplishments owing to the effort concentrated on a narrow front. (Matters of detail apart, as well as reinvented insights, I would single out two: adding memory to the complex of narrative parameters and getting to grips with action logic. Though both issues were broached as early as chapter 7 of the *Poetics*, their study here marks an advance [with a revival that narratology would do well to emulate, in the first case], not a throwback. The two notably coincide anew in Schank and Abelson's [1977] discovery of the "script" pattern, the conventional event sequence—e.g., riding a car—that hitherto escaped notice because too low-level, automatic, trivial-seeming. The less routinized and small-scale patterns explored in the field will appear more familiar to the outside specialist.)

Such virtues fall short of narratological competence; nor did they make good the pretensions to science grounded in the experimental (or the computational) testing, among other reputed advances; nor did they lead to a breakthrough or, with story grammars, even to longevity. Yet, however modest, they are all too often conspicuously absent in later cognitivist work on the genre. Such is evidently the case with the survey of "discourse psychology" by Graesser et al. (1997), but it proves representative even beyond its circle and scope. I will now cite books only—the format designed for

for story understanding. To Bruner's idea of a saving interdisciplinarity and how it translates into practice, we will soon return.

11. Friendly or hostile, much of this cross-reference had to do with the form, nature, and viability of story grammars. Thus, for example, the special issues in *Poetics* (1980, 9:1) and *Journal of Pragmatics* (1982, 6:5/6); Black and Wilensky 1979; Brewer 1983, 1985; Brewer and Lichtenstein 1981, 1982; Denhière and Baudet 1989; Garnham 1983; Johnson-Laird 1983: 361–70; Lehnert 1981; Mandler and Johnson 1980; Mandler 1982a, 1984; Rummelhart 1980; Stein and Glenn 1979; Shen 1989; Wilensky 1982b, 1983, all with further references suggestively overlapping as well. For Structuralist equivalents, see Prince 1973, Pavel 1985; for excellent critical introductions, Stewart 1987, Ryan 1991: 201–32.

integrating knowledge and significantly rare here—books, moreover, whose corpus or very stated intent promises due reference to the mainstream as well. Let us glance, then, at Jerome Bruner's *Actual Minds, Possible Worlds* (1986), followed by his *Acts of Meaning* (1990), Richard Gerrig's *Experiencing Narrative Worlds* (1993), and Mark Turner's *The Literary Mind* (1996).

Whatever the individual merits that recommend them to the narratologist, these books converge on the titular mental object without sharing any particular goal, focus, theory, tool kit. Bruner would oppose "story" to "argument" as "two modes of cognitive functioning, two modes of thought, each providing distinctive ways of ordering experience, of constructing reality" (1986: 11); and later, in the hope of bringing the cognitive revolution back into the human sciences, he advocates "cultural meaning-making" as against the overtechnicalized, algorithmic "information-processing" that has taken over the field (Bruner 1990: 1–32). Gerrig, likewise a psychologist but equipped with more standard tools of the trade, concentrates on readerly "transport" and "performance" as metaphors for experiencing narrative worlds (1993: 2). In Turner, disciplinary allegiance shifts to cognitive linguistics and neuro(bio)logy, while the center of interest does to basic "principles of mind we mistakenly classify as 'literary'—*story*, *projection*, and *parable*" (1996: v). Not even the recurrent mention of literature—alone shared and a welcome change from the older story analysis—produces a theoretical common ground.

Small wonder they hardly build on each other, any more than they do on Roger Schank's contemporary *Tell Me a Story* (1990), geared to the everyday oral variety, or than his monograph, dispensing with all apparatus, builds on its own ostensible line.[12] Yet at junctures where the arguments happen to cross, the silence maintained by the revisitor is nevertheless puzzling. Turner, for example, seems unaware that his equation of the literary with the ordinary mind apropos "parable" recalls Gerrig's apropos "transport," or that the ubiquity of "story" has been argued in Schank 1990, or that his thesis on the narrative origin of language (Turner 1996: 140ff.) echoes Bruner on ontogenesis (Bruner 1990: 77–80, 138, with explicit phylogenetic implications[13]). Indeed, Bruner's (1990: ix) lament that the science of mind "has become fragmented as never before in its history" would appear to

12. "Earlier, often more cautious attempts at the same issues are often ignored, both when they are congruent and, more importantly, when they might lead to modifications": thus Rubin 1995: 154 on the overlapping Schank and Abelson 1995a, despite the references that have been added.

13. Also with earlier references that duly go as far back as Fillmore 1968 on the "arguments of action" prior to case grammar. If a "Copernican revolution," as it seems to Herman (1999: 23) in default of backreference, then the narrative-first idea has already gone some way toward establishing itself across disciplines.

have a double bearing: the research projects grow more atomistic—most visibly in the usual article-length format—the parishes more self-sealed. By comparison, today's narratology proper, though practiced and specialized on quite another scale, looks like a community of sorts. It is an odd revolution, and an odder revolutionary science, whose agents and factions do not acknowledge each other, like the proverbial ships in the night.

Again, in a wider interdisciplinary light, these books reveal among them the typical isolationist shortcomings, with the inevitable penalties, some in a more extreme or compound form than others. Thus, none of them builds on stable generic foundations, any more than on each other, let alone on each other's or on some earlier, better-defined concept of narrative. Instead, the genre's first principles are either cavalierly handled or, in line with the recent vogue, skipped. Both short ways with what's-what present a contrast—regressive, maybe reactionary—to the beginnings and thus to the vaunted scientific method.

Even by informal standards, therefore, Bruner's object of analysis remains elusive. Concerning "what a story must 'be' to be a story," he expressly opts for a "loose fitting" generality, whereby "narrative deals with the vicissitudes of human intentions" (Bruner 1986: 16–17). But the looseness soon proves to tighten here, relax further there, change bearings elsewhere, as if to mime the defining vicissitudes. This largely springs from the none too orderly movement among three questions, two of them deemed "literary" at that, "what makes a story" and "what makes it great," and a third, "cognitive": "what makes great stories reverberate with such liveliness in our ordinarily mundane minds" (ibid.: 4). As a result, it is often hard to tell which question dominates when, hence where the generic feature at issue stands between constraint and license for the purpose, or between poetics and psychology. Does the "must" of rendering "two landscapes" at once, of intentional "action" and of the agent's "consciousness" (ibid.: 14), pertain to story or to good story alone? Fiat or forte? On the other hand, the opposition whereby "arguments convince one of their truth, stories of their lifelikeness" (ibid.: 11) allegedly governs the respective superior instances, a matter of judgment by appeal to extra psychological value or "liveliness." Only, that value is in fact as common to lifelike, "lively" descriptions and paintings as to stories: "argument" opposes all realism here, with or without "vicissitudes," to the loss of any generic cutting edge. What, then, sets apart those "two modes of cognitive functioning, two modes of thought"? And so forth.

Gerrig's object in turn runs out of control, theoretical or operational, though he begins with a set of more neutral-looking generic entities. He would locate "a common core at the heart of the various experiences of

narrative," so as "to understand the repertory of narrative processes that give substance to this variety of worlds" (Gerrig 1993: 1). But all the generic terms in question—*narrative*, *narrative world*, *experience of narrative*—remain hopelessly open-ended, to the verge of emptiness and indefinite scope.

Among the existing definitions of narrative, he ignores both the narratological and the home-grown offerings in favor of William Labov's (1972: 359–60) idiosyncratic match of clause sequence with event sequence—only to brush it aside as overformal. "No a priori limits can be put on the language structures that might prompt the construction of narrative worlds" (Gerrig 1993: 3–4). This shift of ground from narrative to narrative world, even so, might bespeak one from a formal, "linguistic" to an experiential, "cognitive" approach to the genre. However, the experience now alleged to define the narrative world by its mental construction—that of the experiencer "being transported" from the here and now—proves utterly lacking in definitional force. It is, Gerrig (ibid.: 5) admits, not necessary but "optional," since "a text cannot force a reader to experience a narrative world," the transporting or any other way.[14] Nor, unadmittedly but equally obviously, is the effect (comparable to "liveliness" in Bruner) sufficient for delimiting the genre or its world, the genre by its world experience. Gerrig's own mentions and examples thus reveal that the experience of transport brackets temporal with spatial world-making. Ironically, in the very first illustration of this response, the experiencing hero invokes visual art as paradigmatic: "It was like looking at a brilliant picture and losing myself in it" (ibid.: 2–3, also 9–10, 29–30, 135). An old stereotype, actually, if you know your (inter)art history.

Neither mandatory nor sufficient, then, the allegedly definitional effect ("transporting" impact on the mind) ranges from time to space arrangement, from the linguistic to the cinematic to the pictorial, from the narrative to the descriptive, encompassing all represented worlds and indeed all reference in all semiotic codes. More precisely, the effect wavers among and along all these axes: from the given indiscriminate application, how can one tell which experience (aspect, mechanism) of transport is ubiquitous, which specific where, if anywhere, which built-in, which contingent, and why? The wavering inevitably proceeds to destabilize, of course, the experimental results. On top of it all, "the experience of the real world" (e.g.,

14. We will see how it can, and inevitably does, provided the way narrows to the range of distinct generic features and effects. Likewise with Turner's parabolic projection. Regarding "experientiality" itself, contrast Fludernik's (1996) attempt to delimit it within the land of narrative, as well as from other genres and approaches, including my own (ibid.: esp. 321–28). Whatever the ultimate viability of her idea, the difference in treatment vis-à-vis Gerrig, notably in specifying "cognitive" thrust, remains instructive and makes it arguable among professionals.

ibid.: 27–28, 61) gets subsumed in turn. Incredibly so—given that the psychology must depend on the level of ontology—except for the disciplinary leveling down of all ontologies into an inclusive "mental representation." So what we encounter here is an extreme variant of the cognitivist twinning of first-order with discourse-mediated reality cum response. An extreme variant, though not unparalleled, either. Cognitivism tends to isolate the world discoursed about from the discourse about the world and the world of discourse—particularly the action from the entire (con)text, as if it were real—while here all worlds co-qualify for experientiality: the real among them, along with the imagined and the otherwise imaged and mediated, let alone the nonactional.

Within the universe of "experience," everything beyond mental representation therefore remains open, eligible, dispensable, unsystematized, in need of classifying by form/effect specifics. Whatever the monograph is about, or the bearing of any single claim and experiment, it somehow includes, hence obscures, rather than luminously differentiating the titular genre, the cognition of narrative in its narrativity.

Divergent interest notwithstanding, Turner's coverage overreaches itself in similar regards to similar fuzzy effect. Narrative comes to subsume everything existing, enacted, encountered, expressed in the world; and what subsumes everything, truly or falsely, distinguishes nothing by its own logic. The diverse examples, clever formulations, local insights, and pressuring rhetoric of science, in which the book abounds, overlie yet another miscellany.

According to Turner's reiterated paradox, "the literary mind," generally deemed separate or optional, is instead "the fundamental mind" and the locus of "the central issues of cognitive science," in that the mind works by "*story*, *projection*, and *parable*." Parable allegedly expands the mental range of any story (not just those classified in literature as parabolic) by projecting it onto another story (1996: v). At their most comprehensive, these basic principles equally govern living and discoursing: "thinking, searching, planning, deciding, watching the clock" and telling or reading a novel about characters engaged in such activities (ibid.). At a further remove, the same carries over to intrafictional life and discourse. In the opening example from *A Thousand and One Nights*, the name of storyhood co-applies to "the daily royal wedding tale" occurring within the imagined world and to the proper "story" that Scheherazade tells the daily royal groom about another, to us higher-level, imagined world (ibid.: 4). So interchangeably so that the former's "twisted finish" (the wife's daily execution) is replaceable by "the more common and traditional ending" (happy union) that the latter indicates.

The disciplinary category mistake (between the first- and the second-order, here also between either and the third-order) recurs to the limit: as though the presence or absence of intermediate encoding, choice, arrangement, functionality, communication, in short, made no principled difference. And what difference it makes, from bedrock workings upward, Turner's own discussion gives away throughout. Literature's admitted finesses are not a surface variant of lived cognizing but a reflex and result of its inbuilt distance from this private, monologic, self-directed affair as a life image on show, a virtuality ("mimesis") transmitted for a purpose. With "story, projection, and parable," as with "transport," evidently, if the literary relates to the everyday mind, it bears a far closer relation to the discoursive mind, everyday or artful. Or the other way round, the literary (along with the otherwise artistic, e.g., cinematic) must bear a weaker relation to the textless mind, which faces the immediate outside world and fashions it ad lib. At the very least, our mental work (principles, processes, products) necessarily subdivides by what I called the order of data worked upon, between the mediate and the immediate.[15]

Even so, with the mind recast as a family tree instead of another catch-all, à la Turner, does mental amount, at any of the above nodes, to storied, projective, and parabolic? No, since the tree would as inevitably branch out further, now along generic lines. Regarding our direct encounter with "everyday" reality, Turner himself (ibid.: v) concedes that the story principle organizes not all but "most of our experience, our knowledge, and our thinking," as already did, unmentioned by him, Schank (1990) in driving a parallel claim. (See also the debate kindled in Wyer 1995 by Schank and Abelson's lead essay.) Why a storied majority, what falls outside it, how its workings compare with those of the putative unstoried rest, Turner omits to expound. But, like the overstatements, the reticences indicate the speculativeness of any generalization on the alleged mechanisms at work here and the place of narrativity among them.

When it comes to discourse, literary or everyday, the mind/story equation, or near equation, visibly goes from bad to worse. Here, the object is at least found in observable and subdivisible shape, with clear negative implications for any unitary reductive psycho-logic of its mental processing. In both the literary and the everyday generic repertoire, of course, not all discourse is storied, nor is even the whole makeup of any storied discourse, regardless of how one defines storyhood.

That Turner never defines this generic term, except in passing and ad

15. This cuts across the question of whether there is a real world "out there": even if not, the difference in (im)mediacy between life and text life still operates, at one remove.

hoc, opens the way to slippage, however, and its freely alternating linkage, disjuncture, interchange with the subgeneric-looking "parable" and the cross-generic "projection" make the name of "story" applicable at will. The liberties taken with the genre's name push to another extreme the current movement away from definitional rudiments. (Elsewhere, in cognitivist work on action logic, for example, such avoidance is less troublesome. The discourses cited may then often reasonably bear the name at least, albeit for reasons unspecified, and also tend to serve particular analytic ends, rather than being generalized into fundamental universality.) The boundless and unstable nomination springs to the attentive eye in force, with the usual recoil upon the argument as a whole. You keep wondering where, how, why "story" exactly applies. Often it doesn't at all, or not with any visible operational difference from language use, other projectibles, mere states, anything else in the world and the discourse world.

Given that "stories take place in time" (Turner 1996: 48), does this umbrella term reasonably cover, say, visual space images like "charts, diagrams, coins, and maps" (ibid.: 97) or literally interchange at will with that of "space"? Again, does it stretch wholesale to the running paradigm case of metaphor, live or dead, including all those idiomatic examples that frozenly image and/or conventionally target (mean, project) a world at rest? Granting such projectibility—as of the locative figure "He is *in* retirement" onto a state(ment) of retired existence (ibid.: 39) or "She is a lioness" onto an ascription of bravery to her—how does it belong to narrative, or narrative's, at either end?[16] Or take proverbs like "'When the cat's away, the mice will play,' 'Once burned, twice shy'" (ibid.: 5–6, 87; cf. again Schank 1990: 38–39, 103–6). A proverb offers not "a condensed, implicit story to be interpreted through projection" but a deconcretized, recurrent, or habitual state of affairs: it may be parabolic, or projective, but is by definition descriptive (rather than "storied," narrative). So it always remains in its given proverbial form and often in the meaning projected onto the relevant speech-context as well. When we discoursers use the second of the above proverbs, "Once burned, twice shy," to generalize cautious behavior in or into familiar existential terms, accordingly, the reference to the discourse act as "projecting the source story onto a covert target story" (Turner 1996: 6) incurs a double generic misnomer. Here the drama of reading alone "takes place in time," its mental events the only carriers of eventhood (and even those often

16. The trouble originates in the Lakoff and Johnson (1980) approach to metaphor, which already freely dispenses ("projects") the attributes of action. By a few turns of the screw, Turner so tightens the link that metaphor becomes an exemplar of story and story, as in age-old allegoresis, a form of metaphor. Outside this shotgun wedding, revealingly, the two primary thrusts of cognitivist discourse analysis, the figurative and the narrative, seldom meet.

include some operating below the threshold of communicative relevance, as distinct from neurobiology).

Elsewhere in the book, the term does or could fit the thing referred to, the putative storied marker or operation does apply, but indiscriminately from other things to which it co-applies. Among "mental patterns," for example, if "narrative imagining is prediction" and "evaluation" and "planning" and "explanation" (ibid.: 9, 20), then so is metrical or thematic or argumentative imagining along their appropriate sequences: how will this sound design turn out, how well, to what end, and via what route, we ask ourselves in reading poetry. If so, inversely, "narrative imagining" isn't "our fundamental cognitive instrument" for performing any of those activities, either, whether predictive, evaluative, teleologic, or explanatory. That fundamental principle, whatever it might be, must necessarily underlie (inter alia) both story and sound cognition, which somehow ramify from it thereafter by whatever divides them across unity. As it is, neither "whatever" defines itself here. (In what follows, my dynamics of suspense, curiosity, and surprise will indeed, I hope, prove equal to the twofold challenge of marking off such kinds under, or against, a joint universal.) Likewise with the rest of the "mental patterns" invoked pell-mell (ibid.: 9–11 and *passim*), some obviously overlapping: projection, metonymy, emblem, image schema, blending, language. What difference, then, does narrativity make to the workings of this shared repertoire? Which in turn depends on what work of cognition makes narrative sui generis in the first place.[17]

No family tree of mental experience ramifying into storyhood; no branching out at the communicational any more than at (or, higher up, as against) the first-order lived node, on the way to the privileged kind. What subsumes everything, falsely (as with the timeless proverb) or truly enough (as with these all-discourse properties), again confuses everything. The approaches to be examined in the next section at least aim for genre specificity: they even tend toward the other extreme, that of overdiscriminateness, in attempting to delimit "story" from the broad narrative class.

Finally, reinventing square narrative wheels has its counterparts in, as well as its repercussions on, lower levels of generality. The more perceptibly so, given the appeal to texts that are traditional, or canonical, rather than themselves improvised, as often elsewhere. The rediscovery of the "show-

17. Herman 1999 also criticizes Turner's overextension of "story" but with a number of differences, some principled in narratological and/or interdisciplinary terms. The criticism thus not only fails to expose but silently adopts the cognitivist mixture of reality levels; instead of showing the havoc played by leaving narrative undefined, it would force on Turner a certain line of definition, one value-laden and so vulnerable to countercriticism at that; in part as a result, it overlooks the wild "storying" of metaphor, proverb, chart, all possibly valuable but descriptive.

ing/telling" antithesis in Schank (1990: 10–12), out of touch with the canon altogether, is less surprising: you never expect there an awareness of the quarrels over the matter since Plato's *Republic*. The central place occupied by literature in these monographs, however, bears no relation to the treatment of the literary critical heritage on the issues, never mind the works, under analysis.

For example, Gerrig (1993: 2) undertakes to describe "how psychological theories can be used to capture regularities of experience that have often been overlooked within competing traditions." Overlooked? Our imaginative self-projection from the actual to some virtual here and now—the psychology of artistic illusion, above all—has been famously studied, codified, debated for over two millennia. The debate continues, but the available knowledge would spare the newcomer some elementary missteps, like conflating delusion, illusion, and sheer reference, or the text-mediated and the immediate effect—as well as the narrative and the extranarrative—under the vague figure of "transport." He might then even want to reconsider his thesis that fictional and historical world-images generate the same experience. I leave aside the host of nicer distinctions known to poetics and aesthetics, some indeed made or redrawn in contact with neighboring "traditional" branches of psychology itself.[18]

Still less can the allowances for outsidership be made when Turner, himself trained in literary scholarship, forgets narrative poetics, however relevant to the questions at issue. Instead of "an elegant bridge between worlds"—as described by the neuroscientist Antonio Damasio on the book's cover—this would seem more like a bridge that the crosser burned behind him. Nor does cognitivist work on story, insofar as it applies, fare much better. The oblivion and its backlash have already arisen apropos the concept of narrative; the rest would take too long to mention. Even when acknowledging for once that "the body of research in literary theory on focus and viewpoint is large," while these topics "have emerged relatively recently . . . in linguistics," Turner's (1996: 120, 175) actual references *ad loc*. are to cognitive linguists only, and those associated with himself at that. The exception proves the rule of studied ignorance, courting repayment in kind, across the two disciplines.[19]

18. Two wide-ranging collections on the subject are Gregory and Gombrich 1973 and Burwick and Pape 1990; further references and analysis in Sternberg 1999: 304ff., including a proposal of how to unpack the illusionary complex.

19. In a recent multidisciplinary volume of essays on narrative perspective (van Peer and Chatman 2001; reviewed in Herman 2003), this book's section on the topic is ignored by narratologists and psychologists alike. A comparison of the actual scholarly frames of reference, though, shows the latter, in turn, going their own ways, or byways, regardless. See also notes 58, 61 below.

By contrast, on the other side of the fence, Bruner is the most widely read as well as most insistent and eloquent advocate of interdisciplinarity, designed to save the Cognitive Turn from its own aberrations. A voice apart, it seems, and a counterpoint to Graesser et al. In character, Bruner multiplies references to narrative theories of different stripes (1986: esp. 3–43, 172–78, 1990: 141–70 *passim*, including short reading lists for the nonspecialist), only he sometimes misses their point. The key to mutual intelligibility and transfer, command of the opposite number's metalanguage requires more than good intentions.

Here exactly my preliminaries come full circle to adumbrate the rest of the argument: Even given not only the will to joint endeavor but also the way—in the form of a ready-made common ground, a meeting of mind-oriented interests—a shortfall in discerning or understanding the commonality presents a real obstacle to its actualization. A pair of examples will now serve to introduce our major case in point.

For one crucial example, recall how Bruner envisages the psychology of literature as a union to which literary theory will bring formal and aesthetic insights, psychology affective explanation. Much like Gerrig's belief regarding transport, poetics has allegedly concentrated on the makings and greatness of stories, without taking the further step toward discovering what produces their impact on us (ibid.: 4ff.). Yet the very earliest poetician cited, Aristotle, insistently referring givens to affects such as catharsis, lays bare and should have averted the misconception: not a further, not a future, but a foundational step, on any competent reading of his text since the Renaissance.

Similarly with modern developments. An example of obvious cardinal significance would be the *fabula/syuzhet* pairing, whereby the Russian Formalists (and, under assorted labels, others since) distinguish the order of happening in the world from that of unfolding in the text. Imported by the psychologist, alas, the distinction turns into one between "the timeless and the sequenced," the former also doubling as "timeless underlying theme" or "the gist, the plight" (ibid.: 17, 21, 36; echoed in, e.g., Nelson 1996: 188–89, 197–98, 216–18). One book later, moreover, this detemporalized member of the pair veers round into (co)sequentiality together with (co)inclusiveness, only the wrong ones. Narrative elements, we then hear, derive their meaning from "their place in the overall configuration of the sequence as a whole—its plot or *fabula*" (Bruner 1990: 43). But the overall emplotment rather characterizes the *syuzhet*, the finished work told and read, which has indeed been literally Englished as *plot*.[20] Inversely, the

20. Since Lemon and Reis 1965: 66ff., on which see the commentary in Sternberg 1978 [1971]: 10–14.

latter's temporality gets forgotten or defocused in turn: "A narrative, after all, is not just a plot, a *fabula*, but a way of telling, a *sjužet*" in language (ibid.: 123). The "way," in fact, covers the actual sequence as well as the "language," and the sequencing of the language itself, which mark each tale's discourse vis-à-vis its underlying *fabula*. Therefrom also ensues a processuality that should have been right in the cognitivist's line: the *fabula* as a mental (re)construction of the event order implicit and freely twistable along the discourse. An opportunity of bridge building missed, in short, for lack of "bilingualism."[21]

Such garbled extrapolating or import from narratology exhibits another reflex of isolation, even if despite itself. A nodding acquaintance with the main body of scholarship is not yet nearly enough to break out of the enclave toward interdisciplinary work that will meet professional standards, pool the available resources, test them against each other, and advance knowledge to everyone's gain, because yielding more than the sum of its parts.

On a far larger scale, and straight to the mind/discourse crux, my own theory of narrative has long been misunderstood and misapplied in transfer to cognitive psychology. En route, an approach cognitive in all but name—advisedly so, and yet recognized by experts as such—has turned cognitive more in name than in rationale and analytic or experimental practice. A turn indeed, but the wrong way: an academic variant of the translator (here, into formal cognitivism) as traducer (of narrative's functional dealings with the mind, under "the Proteus Principle"). Inversely, the theory's parallel fortunes within narrative study itself, even where unrelated to cognitivism, exhibit and advance on the whole the right turn toward our eventful mental processing of the discourse: action, character, arena, viewpoint, language, teleology, or whatever else unfolds there in sequence. If only considering the wider implications, it would therefore pay to understand what has gone wrong in discipline crossing, why it has gone wrong, and how retrievably. Moreover, as the reductive translation variously falls between the disciplinary stools, the inquiry will also enable us to survey and evaluate more usual practices of cognitivist story analysis, often in comparison with those of narratology. In turn, since cognitivist narratologists generally draw on the former practices, rather than on the underlying psychology or com-

21. For the same reason, the distinction suffers other violence in interdisciplinary transfer elsewhere. According to Zwaan (1993: 163–64), ordinary narrative thus primarily involves the construction of the "story" (*fabula*), restoring "the chronological order," while the reader of literary narrative will instead tend to represent the "plot" in memory, preserving "(some of) the *reported order* of the events." This contradicts the very logic of narrative sense-making or, inversely, if true, would make nonsense of literature's endless investment in the arts of antichronological narration since Homer's epic and the Bible's history telling. See also note 66 below, as well as the ensuing argument in this section and the next.

puter science, the interdiscipline will thereby come into light from the other direction as well. Finally, and perhaps good news to readers impatient with metatheory, all these threads intersect at the heart of narrative itself, converging on the question of what universally defines it across such manifest variability. This question of narrativity ramifies along the argument, so that each section affords a fresh, multiple perspective on some generic crux, as reflected in the subheadings.

I will begin with the theory as originally integrated into my *Expositional Modes and Temporal Ordering in Fiction* of 1978 [1971], which attracted cognitivist notice soon thereafter: presumably due to its orientation to narrative effect and dynamics and processing, clean against the then dominant Structuralism. Foregoing parts and versions, anterior and unknown to cognitivism's engagement with story, need not generally concern us here. Where necessary, however, I will also draw on a few direct sequels, especially the case study *The Poetics of Biblical Narrative: Ideological Literature and the Drama of Reading* (Sternberg 1985) and the programmatic state-of-the-art review "Telling in Time (I): Chronology and Narrative Theory" and "Telling in Time (II): Chronology, Teleology, Narrativity" (Sternberg 1990, 1992).

The barest outline will do for a start. In or out of language, narrative uniquely entails the concurrence of two temporal sequences: that in which events happened and that in which they unfold, the dynamics of action and of its narration, represented and communicative time, in short. Some analysts have overlooked this definitional duality, among them cognitivist story grammarians and schema builders, exclusively focused on the characters' doings as they move in time through their world. Oddly, even narratologists aware of the duality—under assorted labels, the way of modern Structuralism—tend to miss, even to oppose, its implications in defining narrative by reference to a single time axis: as what Aristotle called a mimesis of an action, or as a change of state, or as a represented series of events. To quote a declared cognitivist practitioner, "One of the least controversial claims of contemporary narratology is that a narrative text is the representation of a number of events in a time sequence" (Ryan 1991: 109). But then, I do controvert it, since the action or event line itself hinges for its telling and reading and very narrativizing on communicative time. So much so that the discourse can ostensibly dispense with its representation—no surface verbs, happenings, movements—and yet project a narrative into our mind via latent actional triggers: think, for now, of how paintings tell their stories.

Narrative therefore uniquely lives, I argue, not just in or over time but *between* times, and so do we readers, hearers, viewers, throughout our pro-

cessing of it as such. From this unique in-betweenness, there necessarily arises a set of three master interests that constitute the universals of narrative, each well defined by its strategy and workings amid the generic processual family resemblance. For short, I call them *suspense*, *curiosity*, and *surprise*, and the terms will do as long as it is understood that each encodes a distinct functional operation of the mind within narrative's overall intersequencing: the dynamics of prospection, of retrospection, and of recognition, respectively. In these lie not only the heart of the theory but also the heart of the trouble attending its cognitivist rendition, so that (what with their informal usages) we need to get them right from the outset as terms of art. Here are a few excerpts that offer both complementary viewpoints and a running statement on the three:

> *Suspense* arises from rival scenarios about the future: from the discrepancy between what the telling lets us readers know about the happening (e.g., a conflict) at any moment and what still lies ahead, ambiguous because yet unresolved in the world. Its fellow universals rather involve manipulations of the past, which the tale communicates in a sequence discontinuous with the happening. Perceptibly so, for *curiosity*: knowing that we do not know, we go forward with our mind on the gapped antecedents, trying to infer (bridge, compose) them in retrospect. For *surprise*, however, the narrative first unobtrusively gaps or twists its chronology, then unexpectedly discloses to us our misreading and enforces a corrective rereading in late re-cognition. The three accordingly cover among them the workings that distinguish narrative from everything else, because they exhaust the possibilities of communicating action: of aligning its natural early-to-late development with its openness to untimely, crooked disclosure. (Sternberg 2001a: 117)

> The complex of narrative interests . . . has been progressively disentangled [above] in close reference to various principles of distribution and ambiguation. Our distinction between the two clashing components of suspense, hope and fear, relates to two possible expectations about the future resolution of a conflict; that between curiosity and suspense relates to the chronological direction of the missing and desired information (narrative past versus future); while that between curiosity and surprise relates to the perceptibility of the process of gapping and gap-filling. With "curiosity gaps," the reader is at once alerted to the deformation of antecedents; with "surprise gaps," in contrast, his awareness of the gap's very existence and/or relevance and/or true significance is retrospective, being delayed to the point of closure rather than heightened at the point of opening. (Sternberg 1978 [1971]: 244)

> I have no particular commitment to the labels, except as handy abbreviations that reasonably accord with ordinary usage as well as with experience; but I do insist on the distinctiveness, the inclusiveness, and the universality of the strategies so labelled: recognition, retrospection, prospection. Surprise, whether mild

> or sharp, local or plot-length, actional or cross-level, is an index of false understanding and a belated call for realignment; the rise of curiosity signals that the past has been deformed into alternative formations; suspense throws us forward to the opacity of the future. Although different in thrust, all involve the construction of rival hypotheses with which to fill in the gaps opened up by the sequence about the world's affairs and whatever attaches to them by nature or art, which in narrative means everything. (Sternberg 1992: 531–32)

> I [therefore] define *narrativity* as the play of suspense/curiosity/surprise between represented and communicative time (in whatever combination, whatever medium, whatever manifest or latent form). Along the same functional lines, I define *narrative* as a discourse where such play dominates: narrativity then ascends from a possibly marginal or secondary role (e.g., as a temporal force governed by the space-making, descriptive function that always coexists with it . . .) to the status of regulating principle, first among the priorities of telling/reading. (Ibid.: 529)

The running statement, I hope, speaks for itself. Let me just reemphasize that the three master effects/interests/dynamics cut across all generic variables. The boundaries they traverse include, for example, semiotic codes, subclasses within or without language, surface forms, world items, text lengths, value systems, poetic or aesthetic or quotidian styles, mental faculties between, say, the conceptual and the emotive, or readings that apparently never overlap. Like storytellers, different readers may actually choose or chance to favor different interests as well as, or in line with, other priorities; but the favorite must arise from the generic trio, and impinge on everything else in the reading, given the exigencies of intersequence. You may wish the hero well or ill, depending on your attitude; you may suspect the hero's avowed motivation in advance of its breakdown or swallow it at the time, depending on your skill. The suspense you experience either way en route to resolution, in the one case, and the polarity between curiosity and surprise dynamics, in the other, nevertheless testify to the unbreakable lawlikeness of the narrative process as such.

This bare-bones outline will gain some flesh as we proceed to examine the theory's fortunes, or misfortunes, in cognition land proper since the early 1980s. The main line of transfer goes back to the cognitive psychologists William Brewer and Edward Lichtenstein in "Event Schemas, Story Schemas, and Story Grammars" (1981) and the still better-known "Stories Are to Entertain: A Structural-Affect Theory of Stories" (1982). Follow-ups include work by Brewer himself, on his own (e.g., 1983, 1985, 1995a, 1995b, 1996, 1998) or with new collaborators (e.g., Jose and Brewer 1984, Brewer and Ohtsuka 1988, Ohtsuka and Brewer 1992, Dorfman and Brewer 1994), and an increasing number of mentions, applications, retestings, strictures,

by various cognitivists, some apparently familiar with the original theory at second hand only, in the translated version, as it were.[22]

This invites comparison with another, and generally superior, line, which traces back to David Bordwell's medium-specific transfer of the universals to *Narration in the Fiction Film* (1985): its wide influence on cinema study is visible, inter alia, in harder-line, experimental research (e.g., Magliano et al. 1996 or the moderate Tan 1996). Against the belief in the power of tags, the fact that this book (or Bordwell 1989) refers to itself as cognitivist, while mine wouldn't and didn't, makes little difference to the substantive continuity grounded in the variform, "protean" universals. Thus grounded, it even outreaches the receiver's operations between the respective temporalities to bring out a finer kinship in point of view across the media. There ensues a clear gain to the mind-oriented theory of the genre as a whole, however labeled. Inversely, this continuity sharpens the difference vis-à-vis other narratological cognitivisms and, above all, the assorted "discourse psychologies." Had we but world enough and time, it would be worth pointing the moral that Bordwell is as much at home in narrative as in cinema study and as alive to historical and otherwise contextual as to technical and semiotic variables. Which cannot always be said of *his* followers, some of whom even conflate his thoughtful extension with the Brewer et al. problematic version of my argument about the workings of narrative.

For the sake of that very difference as well as of brevity, though, I will focus on that version and even so pick out a few major issues. By these I mean a set of arbitrary but typically cognitivist limitations imposed on the theory's range, which in effect go a long way toward de-universalizing the narrative universals and de-cognitivizing as well as otherwise vitiating the approach, complete with the added experimental method. Far from a chapter of accidents, those restrictions on the source theory where it most bridges the fields will prove all too consistent: not just unhappily kindred to each other within the translated framework but, on a wider scale, at a still deeper level, also in keeping with the target discipline as usually practiced since the 1970s. Amid ostensible variety, or factional strife or agenda shift, the strings attach to cognitivism's typical idea of narrative, in ways and for reasons to be discussed. So the case marked by its attempt at large interdisciplinary transfer doubles as a paradigm case of isolationism, thus ending in a discordant, neither-here-nor-there mixture, rather than a blend. What with the other comparative viewpoints involved, the lessons are proportionally fundamental.

22. E.g., from Stein 1982 or Wilensky 1983 to the recent Gerrig 1993; Goldman and Kantor 1993; Graesser et al. 1994; van den Broek et al. 1994; Millis 1995; de Wied 1995; Tan 1996; Cupchick 1996; Jose 1998; Steen 1999; Hoeken and van Vliet 2000.

2. Story or Narrative? Generic Typology and Teleology

> The true cause of the confusion in my uncle Toby's discourse, and a fertile source of obscurity it is,—and ever will be,—is the unsteady uses of words, which have perplexed the clearest and most exalted understandings.
> Laurence Sterne, *Tristram Shandy*

> And I begin to ask: Are there stories?
> Bernard in Virginia Woolf, *The Waves*

In the introduction to a well-known and at the time representative "special issue on stories," abounding with disputes among mind-oriented approaches, the editor identifies the problem that stands out all along as that of

> *defining a story*. What are the features that reliably lead to the classification of one text as a "story" and another text as a "non-story"? It seems to me that the view one adopts of stories and storiness has great influence on the questions that one asks and on one's choice of research goals, procedures, and materials. (Coots 1982: 381–82)

The bone of contention reveals itself as a shared quest for the starting point. Brewer and Lichtenstein's (1982: 476–77, 483–84) insistence that their predecessors got the object of study wrong expresses an analogous ranking, only in adversative terms and with some awareness of developments in narratology. (The target extends in Brewer 1995a and 1995b to subsequent inquiry.) Either way, this sensible order of priorities, as I already indicated, is typical of cognitivist work (especially by psychologists) until the mid-1980s, a reason for its ongoing pertinence, and a measure of divergences to come.

Indeed, such earlier views of "stories and storiness" at times underlie, usually in implicit form, more current research that jumps into the middle of some particular question (e.g., causality or agentive goal). Özyürek and Trabasso 1997 on "narrative evaluation" thus draw their "episodic categories" from a story grammar like Stein and Glenn 1979. Here, as in the occasional follow-up or literary critical cross-reference, what's-what leads an afterlife of sort. Most often, amid the same gravitation toward lower-level or atomistic (or, for that matter, overextensive) "research goals, procedures, and materials," the discipline-foundational beginnings with the beginning are neither invoked nor emulated: not even in book-length studies, such as those by Bruner (1986, 1990), Gerrig (1993), and Turner (1996), from which we exemplified this change for the worse. An odd regres-

sion, even apart from demands of scholarly orderliness, never mind the continued pretension to science. After all, one inevitably approaches narrative with some idea of its generic features, reach, distinctiveness, which is best articulated and, if necessary, as it is here, argued. "Unless narrative has been defined in or by its narrativity, we leave the subject matter undelimited and risk missing its generic feature(s): narratologists then become liable to do everything indiscriminately together with, if not anything but, narratology" (Sternberg 2001a: 115; cf. Prince 2001: 230–31). The more so where the emphasis falls on issues (like meaning, transport, projection above, or elsewhere reading, inference, memory, situation model, let alone the still higher-level "processing" umbrella, as against, say, actionality) that ostensibly outreach the genre and would be found wanting in specificity on consideration by the authors.

Odd as it may look, the neglect of definitional groundwork has yet become the rule in the field, with more or less dire consequences, as illustrated. The inversion of priorities—both what comes first and what counts most—sometimes runs to a doctrinal, not to say reactionary, extreme. In "The Big Picture: Is It a Story?" Reid Hastie and Nancy Pennington (1995) thus mock their own title. They attack "the 'methods police' of conventional experimental psychology" in the name "of what cognitive science does best: a freewheeling, but rigorous[?], exploration of genuinely interesting ideas," like that conducted in "Memory and Knowledge: The Real Story," the article by Schank and Abelson (1995a) to which they respond. "The 'methods police' will be after Schank and Abelson for not defining elementary concepts such as 'story'";[23] but "the chapter is worth a dozen or so closely argued essays on the definition of story" and will "encourage future researchers to put the hobgoblins of methodological precision in the peanut gallery where they belong at this stage of the research endeavor." At what stage will dealing with the universals of narrative become fruitful? What's wrong with defining our terms of art as best we can at the moment? For an answer, we receive police work, hobgoblins, and a peanut gallery.

Less impassioned admirers of the chapter elevated to exemplary status, or of the already-mentioned book (Schank 1990) that it adapts, will find

23. A shrewd prediction, for Brewer (1995b: esp. 112–13) acts the old guard "conventional" policeman within the same volume, as does Rubin 1995 on his own beat. The name-calling, in turn, apparently echoes the opposition of "neats" to "scruffies" reported by Wendy Lehnert (1994: 147–50), another former student of Schank at Yale. If so, the insistence of the "neats" on Chomsky-type "formalisms" has little to do, and may even collide, with mine on first things first. Or the other way round, the universals of narrative, like all discourse forces, resist formalizing ("grammaticalization") and should therefore have a particular appeal to its opponents, unless scruffiness equates with muddling through.

its disregard for "methods" visited with the usual penalties—the "genuinely interesting ideas" not excepted. Quite the contrary. The enthusiasts' loaded either/choice between method and matter grows falser than usual where storiness is left in such material disorder. On the one hand, it extends to beliefs or one-word utterances (Schank and Abelson 1995a: 11–14). On the other, its range proves narrow, even exclusionary, and ambiguous, for all its virtual imperialism. Narrow, for example, in keeping out fiction altogether, because "hypothetical people" lack "personal relevance," and in its admitted obliviousness to "oral traditions and other forms of cultural transmission" (ibid.: 76, 230). Beyond the memberships enforced or declared unsuitable wholesale or acknowledged under pressure to have been forgotten, observe the context: a debate, among the fourteen voices collected in Wyer 1995, on whether our entire experience (memory, knowledge, intelligence, learning, understanding, interaction, ego) is storied, hence necessarily on what the keyword encodes, covers, excludes. Otherwise, adhering *or* objecting to the mind's picture as a "collection of stories" (Schank and Abelson 1995a: 9) begs the question. Schank for one begs it in work after interesting work, with the result that he finds it difficult to answer some lower-level questions that do greatly matter to him. A recurrent one, with which he ends here (ibid.: 82), is the obscurity "unfortunately" enveloping what makes particular stories similar. From within the field, and on complementary grounds, another methods policeman responds by way of ironic paradox. He describes the essay in question as itself remarkably consistent with the theory, because it tells a story instead of arguing a thesis (Rubin 1995: 154, 161): a double-edged reflexive twist apropos genre.

Judging by results, though, the contrast drawn thus far (and overdrawn by the infighters against the methods police) goes a long way toward convergence. On this matter, it turns out, earlier and later practitioners of cognitivist narrative analysis differ more in intention than in achievement. The former are generally unable, the latter unconcerned or unwilling, to meet the first imperative of research: an adequately (if possible, unanimously) delimited object. Such a delimitation would require a generic typology; and its absence, or inadequacy, grows most conspicuous with the object's descent in generality from (narrative) type to ("story") subtype, as characteristically happens in the work of Brewer et al.

A quick comparison with the poetic tradition further sharpens the incongruity. Historically, the study of narrative intersected at birth with that of genre. Both originate in the *Poetics*'s focus on the mimesis of characters in action, on the poet as plot maker. Given this emphasis, what binds literature to narrative in the wide sense—marginalizing the descriptive, the lyrical, the purely verbal—is also what generates its crisscross typology. If the class

defines itself by its represented ("mimetic") event sequences, then it subdivides by their particulars. Within Aristotle's typological network, epic and drama vary in the mode of representing ("imitating") action, tragedy and comedy in the stature of agents, complex and simple plot in the presence or absence of unexpected turns—always with variant effects to suit.

Over the millennia since, a host of discourse types other than mimetic (i.e., action-representing), as well as otherwise mimetic subtypes (e.g., romance, novel, film), have come into being. In the eyes of the literati—though never with the reading public—mimesis itself at times lost its centrality to other aspects, as when "plot" gave way to "spatial form" in modernism, "representation" to "writing" in poststructuralism. And genre theory has ramified accordingly. So has narratology, of course, except that there Aristotle's typology remains foundational: the genre continues to be defined by most in terms of the action it represents and to be subgrouped along various representational lines. This even amidst the overprivileging of the novel and related narrative latecomers, a descent in generality otherwise not unlike that from type to subtype under analysis here.[24]

Isolated from both narrative and genre theory, cognitivism yet started by realigning them—if only on an improvised or unarticulated basis—in order to pick out for analysis a certain "storied" kind of tale. The kind indeed receives from Brewer et al. the new, disciplinary status and label, yet with an unusual imported addition, namely, a monopoly on the workings, or teleologies, whereby I characterize the genre as a whole: curiosity, suspense, surprise. This is exactly, you will recall, where my theory parts ways with Aristotle and his (cognitivist or mainstream) lineage: narrativity gravitates from "mimetic" surface to mental interplay, from a given action per se to a threefold complex of time effects whose experiencing necessarily signals and sequences an action represented in, or below, an assortment of discourse forms. Instead of running throughout narrative, as a distinctive generic complex attached to its processing, however, the universals are reserved by Brewer et al. for one narrative variety called "story" and associated with so-called popular literature.

For this comedown of the teleology from generic whole to storied part, look at the following attempt at typology:

> The discourse force of a text is the overall purpose of the text. Thus, within the class of narratives: instructions and newspaper articles are primarily designed

24. For more on this *pars-par-toto* analogy between disciplines, see note 27 below. In its light, the story of "story" doubles as a parable for narrative theory—or, better, the uttermost variation on the generic theme—with some further differences from this exemplary limit case to be noted in passing.

> to *inform*; propaganda and fables are primarily designed to *persuade*; while popular stories and novels are primarily designed to *entertain*. (Brewer and Lichtenstein 1982: 477; also 1981: 365–67; Ohtsuka and Brewer 1992: 331–32; Dorfman and Brewer 1994: 105–8; Brewer 1995a, 1998; echoed in, e.g., Abelson 1987: 41; Hoeken and van Vliet 2000: 278)

As "narrative," the subgroups all have in common a represented action ("a coherent series of temporal events"); they vary according to what the discourse represents it for. The trichotomous subgrouping actually boils down to a dichotomy. Thereby narratives that aim for "comprehension," with a view to "informing" *or* "persuading," contrast with stories, alone geared to "entertainment" (or "enjoyment," "interest," "liking"). Research will allegedly divide labor to suit:

> A theory of narrative comprehension is a theory that attempts to account for the ability of humans to understand narrative discourse. A theory of story schema is a theory that attempts to deal with the individual's knowledge and enjoyment of the subclass of narrative discourses that are stories. (Brewer and Lichtenstein 1982: 473)

The holes in this typology leap to the eye, on either side of the attempted category/force matching. Where, inter alia, are non-"popular," high literary "stories and novels"? Nor do later mentions of this absentee supply an answer. Brewer (1985: 184) discounts "'literary' genres," though actually multiplying references to "novel," "fiction," "oral" types. Brewer and Ohtsuka (1988) do cite and experiment with some literary instances, yet merely as "natural texts," without differentiating them operationally from the nonliterary. Again, Brewer (1995a) adds a fourth, "literary aesthetic" force but leaves it (and with it the subclass involved) vague, even circularly defined in terms of the nameless "experience" or "response" intended by "literary text."[25] Where, on the other hand, are discourse functions like expressivity, reflexivity, self-fashioning, social bonding, memorizing, deautomatizing, pattern (re)making? To correlate the axes, how would one match the named forces with *War and Peace* or *Ulysses*? For the sake of argument, though, let us now examine the classification on its own terms and against its own disciplinary background, especially regarding the narrative/story crux.

The taxonomy's potential improvement over cognitivist alternatives doesn't lie in the bid for delimiting "story"—also precedented in Structural-

25. So its critique in Steen 1999: 114, 116–17 is mainly notable for underwriting the other forces, which perhaps look definite by comparison. These include "entertainment" (with its reflexes in "suspense, surprise, or curiosity") as an allegedly distinctive attribute of "popular" fiction.

ist grammars (e.g., Prince 1973, echoed as late as 2001: 230)—not even by reference to "enjoyment." Rather, the latter vacuous term for once gains (or might gain) a sharp operational edge, and the subcategory an apparent specialty vis-à-vis the rest, in translation into my three universals.

To put some flesh on this comparison. The originating cognitivist researchers outdid their Structuralist forerunners in institutionalizing and privileging "story" among narrative categories. So much so that the bulk of research long went under this trade name alone. Thus already the pivotal Rummelhart (1975), whose "Schema for Stories" (actually a story grammar) claims descent from Propp (1968 [1928]) on the folktale. But the shared name hides, or highlights, assorted disunities in sheer taxonomic criteria and reference as well as, more expectedly, in approach or findings. For a strategic choice of object—by a discipline aspiring to science at that—its grounds and parameters are regrettably loose, miscellaneous, often (self-) contradictory. They waver among methodology, objective design, and the pleasure principle.

With an eye to method, the reason adduced for "story's" preferential treatment is its simplicity, which facilitates analysis, generalizability, manipulation, testing within the grammars/schemas/situation-models proposed (e.g., Stein and Glenn 1979: 59, 67, 98–99; Haberlandt 1980: 99–100; van Dijk 1980: 2, 8, 15, 17; Mandler 1984: 17–18, 26–27; Minsky 1987: 263; Abelson 1987; Magliano and Graesser 1991: 203–4; Zwaan 1993: 6–7, 36–37; Kintsch 2000: 68, 199, 205, 264, 273–74, 276). Looking back on decades of work with "brief artificial texts that truly deserve to be called trivial," Walter Kintsch (2000: 205) explains that "their complexity is all we can handle," theoretically and empirically, in the present state of the art. This has motivated the fabrication of storylike textoids: among psychologists, for analytic and experimental ends, and among computer people, in the gradual development of story understanding *or* generating programs. Under the combined exigencies, the cognitive turn is a turn toward the simple. Novels, even assuming the researcher otherwise equal to them, would practically kill the novel line(s) of research at birth.[26] Simplification willy-nilly becomes

26. E.g., in the quote from Brewer and Lichtenstein 1982: 477 (echoed in Dorfman and Brewer 1994: 107) above, "popular stories and novels" allegedly co-exhibit the "entertain force." Yet the claim about the latter is never put to the test, remaining "empirically" undemonstrated, though sheer length itself makes a cognitive difference, as Aristotle already observed (Sternberg 1990a: 61–65; cf. Friedman 1958, Herman 2003). Even when followers like Hoeken and van Vliet (2000: 280) use a detective novel by P. D. James, the actual test material picked for the subjects shrinks to the first chapter, allegedly readable "as a short story." In computer science, Schank and Abelson (1977) disclaim novelistic coverage and actually tend to the other extreme. Again, in this respect at least, the novel's cinematic equivalent—the feature film—lends itself better to experimental work (e.g., Bolz 1992, Magliano et al. 1996, Tan 1996) owing to its shorter and invariant duration.

the rule (norm, determinant) of practice, hence simplicity that of storiness, in tail-wag-dog fashion.[27]

But what counts as simple and why? Brevity is usually taken for granted, which already restricts most accounts to the lower limit of processing and recall: the lowest, where exclusive of a normal short story.[28] But what else will actualize the feature, meet the constraint? The answers given, or tacit, significantly diverge, so as to complicate the picture of simplicity. Of the analysts just cited, Karl Haberlandt thus goes by "structure," which would open the category to all, and only, those tales that fit some putative minimum description; likewise Kintsch (2000: 68, 276, after Kintsch and Greene 1978) with his "basic exposition—complication—resolution structure" or "setting, problem, and resolution"; while Jean Mandler adds the strings of ubiquity ("appears in cultures all over the world"), ontogenesis ("the stories of our childhood"), invariance ("rigid formats"), and overall transparence (a structure graspable "upon a single hearing"), whereby the folktale would alone qualify for simplicity. Textoids, usable by such approaches, inter alia, complicate the picture further. They get simplified, and their storiness varies, according to the factors that each analysis (or program) would generalize, manipulate, control, test. To some degree, the complication lingers in the choice of material for these ends by adherents of the recent "naturalistic text processing": a choice still constrained and variable but, given the data, especially if literary, more resistant to control, as well as more vulnerable to the problematics of expertise.[29]

27. Contrast narratology's recourse to "minimal narrative" (e.g., Prince 1973: 31; Genette 1980: 30, 1983: 14–15; Sternberg 1992: 464–72) as a heuristic or expository device for pinpointing the essentials of the genre. Contrast also what normally goes there without saying: e.g., the wide agreement on the bedrock specificity of event representation, the anchorage in authentic corpora, as well as the specialized training and the available resources. Inversely, compare the frequent privileging of special cases: from extremes like the intricate, the disorderly, the rule-breaking, or just the voguish, to the canonical, the fictional, the novelistic. These, especially the novel, are to literary theory much as "story" is to cognitivism. So, parallel or subject to the disciplinary advantages, the reification of generic variables and contingencies manifests itself afresh there, if only in reverse. "Local and provincial restrictions," indeed, as Frank Kermode (1983: 52ff.) calls them, except that he still means those imposed on, not by, the art of the novel. The history of this local patriotism has yet to be told, the imbalances redressed, and the slow movement toward a comprehensive narratology advanced against opposition, not least from sheer force of habit. As an opponent of novel-centrism, I find it ironic that "fiction" has stolen into the title of my first book (Sternberg 1978 [1971]), counter to its narrative-wide argument and examples.

28. "Long natural texts are not only difficult to simulate with the means at our disposal, but they provide the subject with too many opportunities for misunderstandings, slips of attention, and a sheer unwillingness to cooperate" (Kintsch 2000: 205).

29. Recall the bid for "discourse psychology" in Graesser et al. 1997; compare also the running plea for such naturalism throughout van Oostendorp and Zwaan 1994. The loss of control incurred is yet frankly acknowledged in Zwaan 1993: 54.

Again, less circularly and as a rule concurrently, "story" is delimited by objective hallmarks. These include its channel (e.g., oral) and/or thematics (e.g., goal-driven) and/or, most often, connectivity (enchained sequence): the last marker does not exactly simplify it vis-à-vis the rest of the narrative genre, the second further confines the actions representable by it, while the first would isolate it from its own written namesakes. Stipulating orality, Mandler (1982b: 437, 1984: 17–18) herself dooms to failure the quest for a culture-wide story grammar: "novels and literary short stories" have broken with the folktale's oral tradition in their ordering, processing, aesthetics. Even so, one asks, would a preliterate Homer conform to a rule system based on the folktale? (By another divide within the unwritten realm itself, Schank and Abelson [1995a] privilege interpersonal storytelling at the expense of the culture's oral traditions, folkloristic or epic.) Nor does Mandler (1984) adhere to her own stipulation in the texts cited or (re)written throughout her monograph, far less when comparing notes with others across the divide in channel. Inversely with stipulators of written or mixed or literary forms (Beaugrande 1982: 407, with numerous equivalents since and further variants like the computer screen and the cinematic medium).

Elsewhere, even in the same breath, the markedness veers toward the reputed magic of "story"—as if catchalls like "interest" or "point" (Wilensky 1982b, 1983) were enough for a cutting edge.[30] Nor will "interest" cohere for the purpose with the earlier story attributes, "methodical" and/or "objective," within or across approaches. What with its being value-laden, it bears a problematic and indeed disputed (co)relation to them all. Like the advocates of naturalistic text processing after him, for example, Robert Wilensky (1982b: 346) argues that nobody in real life would tell or want to hear the pointless stories current in research. Their hard-line fabricators, though, did and still do credit them with interest to be tested, computed, rated, generalized.

Moreover, crosscutting the genuine/fabricated line between discourses is that drawable between the realities discoursed about. Apropos text or textoid, "interest" divergently (positively, negatively, freely) correlates with some determinate mode of existence, axiology (here, the pleasure principle) with ontology. In cognitivist research, it often implies and may openly valorize fiction, as the mode associated with play, escapism, artfulness. But all who (con)fuse lived with told action, world with story world—examples

30. They might at best do for rough indexes to an effect associated with a well-known device or corpus, e.g., the soap operas churned out in Lebowitz 1985. To avoid "the need for detailed analysis of what makes a plot fragment interesting," he reasonably assumes Lovers-Kept-Apart to be such by appeal to "our own experience with melodramatic stories" (ibid.: 496).

have already been given—will evidently allow fictionality no more than a variable status, as a pleasing extra, say. Or will if consistent. Schank and Abelson (1977: 167–68) warn that their theory has yet to accommodate novelistic art, while later Schank and Abelson (1995a: 76) rule out "hypothetical" existence from storiness because it offers no interest to the persons in the immediate living context: the ideal twists round into a disqualifying, negative feature. Elsewhere, literariness adds complications of its own to the picture, and so forth.

The oblivion to the rudiments of genre theory incurs an unstable object of study: its definitions, with all that ensues, therefore multiply, even wobble, not just unavoidably (in a sense, more's the pity, avoidably) and uncontrollably but also unprofitably. If cognitive science employs a "methods police," as a few citizens complain and others in effect boast, then the guardians of law and order assigned to the discourse quarter must have been napping on the job. Except perhaps for their vigilance regarding the mechanics of statistical quantification exercised on ill-gotten data.

Failing either consensus or, often, self-consistency on what's-what within narrative and why, how would analysts model "story" knowledge, well-formedness, understanding, inference, tempo, valuation, recall? The chain reaction, which we already traced in less methodical practice, again overtakes every lower-level aspect and element: how, if at all, do they enter into the fuzzy storiness (and/or/versus the narrative and discourse classes)? Take orality, fictionality, interestingness, causality, problem solving, the Freytag pyramid of exposition-complication-resolution, for example. Are they invariant, variable, necessary, sufficient, conventional, exemplary, (sub)typical? And no matter how or in what company each of them turns out to stand, what becomes of their denial or reversal elsewhere, including their change of status within one theory? The question that goes to the discipline's pride and joy likewise resurges. How to test, improve, compare, let alone synthesize theoretical models?

A severe blow, this, not only to the common pursuit and cumulativeness of science (glorified in Mandler 1982b: 438–40, 1984, for instance) but also to its experimentalism. In a comparative light, by the same token, this is where the trouble exceeds the analogous problematics of narratology at its most novel-centric, fashionable, value-laden, language-based, and otherwise *pars pro toto* or self-divided. The preemption of "empirics" by the laboratory (to exclude the library, in face of whose mountain of data the respective problems might still compare even here) only underlines the difference, recoils upon the preemptor. How to justify the hope and labor and money invested in asking research subjects to categorize (identify, group, rank) nar-

ratives by their storyhood, as if the poor things could dream up answers firmer than the experimenter's questions and somehow intuit elusive labels into universal existence between text and mind? In the absence of so much as established usage, what can rescue this testing for "story knowledge" (diverse lower-level components and corollaries again included) from misunderstanding between the parties all along, with its threat of a vicious circularity where the blind lead the blind?

As with the laboratory, the psychologist's or the programmer's, so with the rest of empirical testing, notably falsifiability by counterexample. "If we find a story that the grammar does not generate, that is empirical evidence against the grammar" (Black and Wilensky 1979: 220); yet how would it count as disqualifying evidence if the grammar (elsewhere the schema or any other theoretical framework) need not admit its storyhood, much less its canonicity or exemplarity?[31] And as with the bar to progressive modeling, so with its subject matter. Assuming, for the sake of argument, both the coverage of the subgenre's knowledge or mental representation and the pertinence of such uneducated, accidental "knowing," how to encompass other varieties than story and, eventually, the entire narrative class? Even on that assumption, the sharper the story's distinctiveness, quantitative or qualitative, the wider, more unbridgeable its discontinuity with the rest: the nonsimple, the nonartificial, the nonproblem-like, the unresolved, the written, the literary, the imaginary, the truth-telling, or whatever counts as story's other in whatever aspect. Would such discontinuity leave any genre to speak of, any common ground to build a family network upon? Inversely with the actual chaotic picture of the favored subclass. Either way, a generic dead-end results where believers would envisage a vista of progressive generality. "The comprehension processes, the basic strategies, the role of knowledge and experience, as well as the memory products generated, are the same for literary texts as for the simple narratives . . . used in our research. . . . The difference is in the 'what,' not the 'how'" (Kintsch 2000: 205). The very correlates of sameness and difference being in question, there is no visible line of advance—never mind on "our" whole disciplinary front—toward a comprehensive theory of narrative as such.

The incongruities only rise with the declared rigor of the project, to the limit of theorizing and judging grammaticality, acceptability, well-structuredness, closure, goodness. In the loss suffered, there is little to choose between such embarrassment of definitional riches and the more

31. This is indeed how Mandler (1984: 57–58) dismisses their counterevidence. See also the quarrel, discussed in Beaugrande 1982: 409–10, over whether a set of instructions on "how to catch a fish" counts as disproof.

recent definitionless or definition-spurning plunges in medias res that I instanced at the outset.

(The less so where the problematic and variant relations of "story" to "narrative," and of either to "text" or "discourse," are forgotten in retrospect, as though the categories were never differentiated along different lines. By such misharmonizing, later references to this body of work often silently interchange the terms, or relocate, even concentrate under the wider "narrative" heading various allegedly "story"-specific methods, elements, patterns, claims, and findings, including those of Brewer et al. The results of this cavalier practice are easier to imagine than its grounds, and above all in scholarship that purportedly builds on the disciplinary tradition. Examples thus abound among the recent appeals made to "problem-solving," "script," "schema," and the like in narratology and film study as well as in discourse psychology. Just consider how the genre changes names between the title of Trabasso and Sperry [1985] and that of Trabasso and van den Broek [1985]; or how an attempt to recommend cognitivism to the literary narratologist declares that "in this essay the terms *narrative* and *story* are coreferential" [Herman 1997: 1057 n.1]. The former is typically silent on its very erasure of the taxonomic boundary drawn in works cited; the latter, on the erasure's untraditionality and justification. In Brewer's particular case, subsequent "narrativizing" mentions [e.g., Gerrig 1993: 80–82, 88–90; Graesser et al. 1994: 16–17; van den Broek et al. 1994: 236–37; Tan 1996: 206–7] improve matters in longer retrospect at least: they happen to reverse back the earlier "storying" of my generic universals.)

For one revealing parallel to Brewer et al., consider the much-cited Black and Bower 1980, which starts with an analogous wider map of "text types and purposes" (drawn from a literary guide to writing). Among them, "Exposition" is designed to "inform," "Argument" to "persuade," "Narration" to "tell . . . events . . . in order." From the last, reminiscently again, there branches out that subclass "called 'stories.' A narrative simply relates a temporal sequence of events; a story relates a causal sequence of events relevant to a protagonist pursuing a goal or resolving some problem" (ibid.: 226). The subclass accordingly boasts an action with tightened sequentiality (from temporal to causal) and determinate subject matter (goal-oriented hero). Like the class, at the same time, it varies from the two other classes in being defined by what it represents (enacts, objectifies) rather than by how or why it communicates (vis-à-vis the addressed subject). On the way from class to subclass, the mimetic, world-in-action differential gets specified, for better or worse, without reference to the mind constructing and as differentially experiencing the kinds of mimesis: a clear, one-track line of

advance, if strangely mind-less (and, stranger yet, paradigmatic) for cognitivism's advertised mental turn.

"Story" emerges here as a tolerably well-delimited variety, in short, but not for long. When going on to explain why it especially repays analysis, Black and Bower appeal not to its twin objective markers but to its allure, unmentioned thus far and out of line with the typology. "Stories are interesting," hence elicit readings of character and event that we can usefully study (ibid.). The pleasure invoked in lieu of problem solving also yields methodological profit; or rather doubles it, on the assumption that such interest carries over to the simple test examples for which the authors otherwise apologize as "*not* 'good literature'" (ibid.: 226–27).

This abrupt shift of emphasis, if not of definition, carries further typical weaknesses. Unlike the goal-driven event chain, "interest" no longer tells apart the subclass from the narrative class,[32] or for that matter Narration from the (informative) Exposition and (persuasive) Argument classes: all discourse is equally liable to arouse or kill interest, given the open range of the term's meanings. And what *does* "interest" mean? How to spot, anchor, trace, verify, measure, explain its occurrence? Where does it come into our understanding and overall experience, specifically into the "story" process? And what if it doesn't (e.g., a goal-driven event chain leaving us cold)? How, in a word, to advance beyond subjective registration, the mere gesture toward a teleology of pleasure?

No answers emerge, as usual, not even an awareness of their absence. Nor have any been meanwhile provided, far less stabilized, by later adherents to or deviators from the trade name, whatever their stance on police work. (To further disciplinary reasons and examples we will return.) The would-be science, complete with the empirics of testability, reveals a soft core; it begins to look more like the old-fashioned impressionism that the poetics of narrative today, whatever *its* forks and faults, has relatively superseded. (Narratological cognitivism should therefore have been the first to disclose this softness, with appropriate consequences for its own modus operandi, including every single borrowing.) The distance between group image and performance recalls that found in another domain, Bible study, where the interdiscipline of biblical poetics has met with opposition in the name of the truths supposedly known to the establishment of history, including archaeology. As the trouble with those historians rather proves to be that they

32. As it happens, the best-known definition of *story* in literary criticism, E. M. Forster's (1962 [1927]), rather distinguishes it by its merely chronological sequence—here become the common property of *narrative*—and yet attributes to it the fundamental generic ("and then?") appeal. So, regardless of label, the two sets of criteria needn't coincide.

are not historical enough (Sternberg 1985 and especially 1998), so with the hardness of scientific inquiry here, even vis-à-vis its imagined rival. A fortiori, when it would itself constitute an interdiscipline but relegate the native outgroup scholarship to an inferior order of "wisdom."

"Qualitative impressions and simple-minded claims": self-made discourse psychologists, or followers blinded with the trappings of method, need to take a harder look at the grist fed into the mill of quantification—preferably in a comparative light—before cheapening the imagined goods of unbelievers. For those trained in empirics, honest scrutiny and comparison of the record, along such lines as those suggested here, can yet hopefully teach after the fact what should have been obvious from the outset. There is no shortcut from will to theory to machinery, no improvising another's knowledge by crossing into oneself, no bridge without stable foundations at either extreme. As to the immediate point, therefore, a discourse/mind interstudy entails a composite object of study: a typology informed and ramified by teleology, with each type and divide specifically mapped onto our experience. Reverting to first discoursive and generic principles, armed this time with the best available equipment, albeit with the same quantifying terminus in view, is then likely to appear both the more professional and the more constructive way to their wanted interdisciplinarity.

Brewer and Lichtenstein's own variation on pleasurable teleology, "entertainment force," is every bit as unspecific to "story" and as unstable in sense and reference. (No wonder the affective term freely interchanges there with "enjoyment" and "liking," as it might further interchange with "charm" or "delight" or "tellability," all empty out of context, all particularized, hence redundant, in context.) Suppose, counterfactually, that the two other, "comprehension"-based forces—the "informative" and the "persuasive"—were self-explanatory, isolable, and also avoidable by the genre in its "story" branch. Even so, "What entertains?" would pose a question unanswerable, almost meaningless in the abstract, because inextricably dependent on a host of extratextual variables, from the culture's scale of interest all the way to personal taste and mood. By this very blank(et) criterion, the highest narrative order of art would qualify, in principle and performance alike, as well as the lowest: just recall the attack made on the former by Plato, unhappy with the seductiveness of Homeric epic, and its endless resumption against both orders since. Though intended to belittle, "the great entertainer" label reflects a truth about Dickens—his writing, generic mixture, accessibility, unprecedented sales—as the volunteered subtitle "An Entertainment" does about the Graham Greene novels that defiantly appear under it. But, tag apart, what else have such truths in common? On a pleasure ("enjoyment,"

"liking") hierarchy, again, some readers demonstrably rank a Kafka "fable" above a "story"-thriller, while others position "newspaper articles" highest, and yet others shuttle the candidates according to state of mind. One heroine loves Italian painting but at night reads "detective stories, earning the contempt of her father who told her that his answer to the question 'Who dunnit?' was invariably 'Who cares?'" (Mortimer 1988: 17): catholic daughter, highbrow father, yet both pleasure-driven. The cultural and historical empirics on record, then, lay bare the umbrella term's hopeless fluidity of sense and reference—alone invariant—as would psychological experiment if duly conducted.[33]

Nor would this blank(et) "force" even mark off "the class of narrative" from the rest of discourse, any more than it does the "story" subclass from the rest of narrative. Less so, actually, than its two mates, which at least entail representational discourse whereby to inform/persuade—hence outreach narrative yet draw the line at nonrepresentational texts and levels and structures. How would they take effect without a reality about which to add knowledge or shape opinion? Entertainment as such, however, runs through communication, across language forms, sign systems, or media, so that it equally belongs to the whole extranarrative spectrum. In this, to recall our definitionless examples from later theorizing, it groups together with "transport" in Gerrig (1993) and "projection" in Turner (1996). It is coproducible not only by description, imaging the world at rest, but also by the play of nonsemantic elements and axes: as in rhyme, music, abstract painting, authorial style, with equivalents in narrative's own extranarrative levels. "The first business of style," Ford Madox Ford (1964: 80) preaches, "is to make work interesting," and so is its second, third, fourth, *n*th business, for style "has no other business." So even if stretched from "story" to narrative at large—the recent cognitivist fashion—the pleasure umbrella indiscriminately covers all discourse besides, along with everything in this generic discourse, and marks nothing but the innocence of the would-be marking.

On top of it all, the "popular" discourse type, associated here with story's (elsewhere with narrative's) "entertain force," independently varies in membership and habitation to compound losses of identity. That the Bible, Dickens, and Agatha Christie head the list of popularity to date makes nonsense of this type; a fortiori, of its correlation with any such hedonistic teleology. One would shrug off the whole attempted match, were it not for its typicality and endurance to this day, as a basis for experimental work, too. Before venturing into comparative analysis of oral and written traditions,

33. Tan (1996) offers some useful evidence and discussion of this point in the context of film.

Brewer (1985: 177) disarmingly acknowledges the danger of "letting a laboratory scientist loose in the complex world of cross-cultural anthropology." Yet, on the usual presumption, there apparently remain worlds into which to cross without danger. That of narratology must look simple indeed, open to all comers equipped with an average reading ability and a Ph.D. in some discipline; or else the assorted tourists would know that they cannot help giving themselves away.

In Brewer et al., the giveaway vacuous usage, born of isolation from relevant theory and history, threatens afresh the cognitivist bid for science. This time, however, hollowness in the very premises is seemingly averted owing to an interdisciplinary juncture with a so-called humanist or literary narratology. Thereby "entertainment" gets translated into mechanisms both differential and well-defined, even amidst their own generic family likeness: suspense, surprise, curiosity. It might, thereafter, do as a harmless umbrella for these shorthands I encoded for the respective (prospective, recognitive, retrospective) mental processes.

Still, the potential change for the better, and the interdisciplinary payoff with it, realizes itself to a very limited extent. In Brewer et al.'s translation, most immediately, the threefold operational correlate of "entertainment" mixes with taxonomic addenda that are alien to its spirit, at cross-purposes with each other, and so even odder than the usual cognitivist jump to "story." Note, above all, the translators' opposing, even incompatible, departures from the original account of the genre's workings: toward under- and over-specification at once, hence toward over- and under-inclusiveness. Beyond its interdisciplinary lesson, examining these departures offers the theoretical gain of retesting and reilluminating the universals peculiar to narrative as a class.

On the one hand, the translation exhibits a slippage between the hodgepodge of "entertainment" and the discriminate mental processes imported for precision: a relapse into impressionism. Too many reputedly enjoyable interests (effects, affects) are now counted as generic, suspense/surprise/curiosity among them, at best at their head. The three get demoted to "such as" rather than keeping their exclusive, because uniquely distinctive, status. So "humor," though a variable and not even a variable of narrative but of discourse generally, co-occurs with them as an experiential and experimental parameter (Brewer and Lichtenstein 1981: 377; Brewer and Ohtsuka 1988: 400ff.) The list of co-occurrents even diversifies into "suspense, surprise, curiosity, humor, sexual arousal, and anger," as "affective states" coproductive of "entertainment" (Brewer 1985: 188). But humor and the like no more carry definitional force here than does, say, "transport" in Gerrig (1993), or else any witticism and cartoon would qualify for narrativity along

with any *trompe l'oeil*. Neither attaches, uniquely or necessarily, to the workings of time, far less to the mind at work between times.[34]

On the other hand, there intervenes the opposite departure, one unduly limiting in reason, theory, and practice alike. The very underspecification just revealed does not lead to wider inclusiveness—against the logic of classes, which genre typology follows. With the generic door opened to features like humor, besides suspense/surprise/curiosity, you would at least expect the class membership associated with the lot to grow in proportion. Instead, it shrinks from "narrative" down to "story"[35]: the cognitivist favorite newly steals the show at a higher price than usual, because compounding the missed opportunity to introduce the real hero in distinctive mental ("cognitive") action. Previous work on story, our authors contend, got its object wrong (Brewer and Lichtenstein 1982: 476–77, 483–84; updated in Brewer 1995a: 109–13, 1995b): however true the charge, still truer than they realize, their own line-drawing hardly escapes it, though it for once might, just by keeping to the narrative rationale.

Even on its own mistranslated ground, the taxonomy breaks down several times over. Apropos the key excerpt from Brewer and Lichtenstein 1982: 477 cited above, observe the radical shift of ground in the movement from the broad "class of narrative" to its subclasses. The generic class is defined there by the action (coherent event-series) it represents, while the subclasses allegedly vary according to the functions or "forces" they serve: understanding (with informative or persuasive thrust) as against entertainment (suspenseful and so forth). The double standard results in taxonomic disarray all over. It leaves the narrative genre representational but functionless, the subgenres variously functional (all too diversely so for members of a single class) but actionless, or certainly without distinctive represented actions to match, and the whole/part and part/part relations at best obscure. No visible generic picture of unity and diversity, tree and branches, hence no typological sense, least of all in correlation with teleological force.

(Contrast, for example, how Aristotle's *Poetics* advances from epic and drama as a mimesis of an action to tragedy as that of a serious action, or from the catharsis generated by the simple tragic plot to its reinforcement through shock effect in complex plotting. *His* favorites at least seem defen-

34. The slippages recur among Brewer's following. In Graesser et al. 1994: 16–17, 24, for example, the generic trio is both replaceable by "some other salient emotion" and interchanged with reading "for enjoyment" or the design "to entertain the reader."

35. Further down, actually, to "a large proportion of popular stories from Western culture" (Brewer 1985: 169) and, ontologically, to "entertainment fiction" (Dorfman and Brewer 1994: 107). As already observed, the "narrativisers" of this "storying" translation (e.g., the article cited in the foregoing note) at least reverse the shrinkage back into generality, with the possible exception of the fictional.

sible on the joint objective/affective premises. Both more inclusive and essentially protean, again, my own approach eschews all a priori favoritism yet encourages a reasoned subgrouping of narrative by the universal[s] favored [foregrounded, dominant] in different varieties: suspense in the Western, curiosity in the mystery, surprise in Fielding or Jane Austen, for example, to leave aside complex hierarchies and interplays of the three generic dynamisms. On either sense of the system, then, typological analysis is the other face of synthesis, difference the mirror image and complement of resemblance, in putting the same hallmark to antipolar use.)

Worse, if possible, "narrative" itself occasionally shifts its meaning in Brewer et al. from generic, action-defined whole to a part thereof and a goal-directed, intelligibility-bound part at that. The class, with "story" for subclass, thus doubles as a subclass on a par with "story," only otherwise operative—indifferent to "entertainment" value—which also presumes some higher, shared class left unmentioned. (An example would be the division of labor quoted above, between the theories of "narrative comprehension" and "story schema.") The taxonomy evidently breaks down under the weight of its cumulative inconsistencies.

Nor is such breakdown either repairable or escapable, in that it necessarily ensues from the paradoxical attempt to localize universals: to have a subgenre monopolize the operative features, and hence the forces, that distinguish the genre as a whole. (Simultaneously, with "humor," etc., thrown in, generic boundaries are erased, so that the monopoly turns into a common discourse property.) This attempt at dividing the indivisible fares here worse than the usual "storying" because of its gratuitous offenses against the theory's rationale and sheer reason alike. Especially, it typologizes now with, now without regard to temporality and/or teleology. In transfer, Brewer et al. even regress (vis-à-vis my own approach, change poles) to the old idea of the narrative genre as impactless represented action: a definition that is untenable, because trained on a single time-line, and unoperational, noncommunicative, in effect anti-cognitive, because it is mimeticist, rather than mentalist.[36]

36. Compare the example from Black and Bower (1980) above, typically focused on event sequence, actional causality, and goal-driven or problem-solving agent, all reality-like attributes. For parallels in narratology, likewise typical of the field and traceable to Aristotle's idea of mimesis, see Sternberg 1992, 2001a; but then, inconsistency with the declared orientation is the least of their problems. On the contrary, they have all too little (or too little systematic) reference to the mind's processing of narrative, and Structuralist approaches have negated it on principle, which is indeed my longtime quarrel with them (as also noted in broad retrospect by, e.g., Pavel 1990: 350–51 on "textual energy and movement" or Jahn 1999: 167 on "the process turn"). An influential example would be Genette 1980 apropos what I universalize as "suspense" and "curiosity." Not only do both effects remain outside his mimetic

Even if cognitivism (psychological, computational, linguistic, literary) generally belies its name in starting from the same old mimeticist premise, this bid for an interdisciplinary restart should have learned better than to toe the party line—as though wanting to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds. After all, the represented action itself entails a process of communication for its very deployment in text and mind. So how could any narrative—albeit the most un-"story"-like, whatever *that* means—help living between the temporal sequences?[37] In turn, how can it live there without generating the suspense/curiosity/surprise that attach to that interplay as devised and experienced from moment to moment? Born of discontinuity between the telling and the told, the generic effects must arise regardless, if only because perfect continuity is unattainable—as well as undesirable—en route from start to finish. In the narrating, the genre thus entails prospection about the narrative future, which is always opaque; also retrospection on the past, always left gapped to an extent, since the world and our wonder concerning it are inexhaustible; also recognition of things unsuspected, ill-judged, missed before, always overtaking us, given that no understanding is final, no action sequence reconstructible or predictable with absolute certainty, or the other way round, given that while there's life and discourse to go through, there's always novelty, somehow, somewhere. For every narrative, or reading, the question is rather how best to actualize (unleash, channel, time, scale, dovetail, manipulate) these inbuilt processual forces within the framework of its operative codes and ends.

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concept of narrative ("a linguistic production undertaking to tell of one or several events"); he goes so far as to replace their apparent equivalents, "anticipation" and "retrospection," with the neologisms "prolepsis" and "analepsis" in order "to avoid the psychological connotations of such terms" (ibid.: 30, 39–40). Given the emphatic antimentalism, even the fact that the replacement ends in reification, instead of "neutrality," disconfirms the theory without necessarily contradicting it from within, as it would and as its parallels do under the banner of mind science. Only Genette's eclectic disciples run into analogous paradigmatic inconsistency to boot.

37. As Brewer and Lichtenstein themselves concede elsewhere in shifting the genre's definition from a single to a properly twofold, actional/presentational sequence: "a theory of narratives must . . . deal with the structural relationships between the event and the discourse levels" (1981: 377). Yet they fail to draw the necessary conclusion: that genre-wide intersequential "relationships" must produce on a generic scale the very effects, or "affects," that they would keep for "story." As though to evade this devastating conclusion, another shift immediately ensues, whereby "relationships" are abandoned in turn—like the event sequence before—and the pole of sheer communicative workings substituted. "Affective response is primarily a function of the discourse structure rather than of the event structure" (ibid.): untrue, inconsistent, and not even capable of preserving the affective monopoly of "story" because applicable to the discourse of narrative at large. In short, wherever the definitional emphasis falls—and it modulates between extremes—the typology collapses once again, now from the side of teleology.

It was precisely to drive home the universality of the trio's workings, across all narrative variations, that the exemplars in my 1978 book already ranged so widely over corpora: the Bible, Homeric epic, Elizabethan revenge tragedy, Fielding, Austen, Balzac, Trollope, Henry James, Faulkner, history writing, diary keeping, the detective tale in classical versus realistic or recanonized mode. (Subsequent work has only extended the range to further codes and corpora and crosscuts, including the law text in Sternberg 1998: esp. 520–638.) So omnipresent is the teleologic as expounded and illustrated there that, but for disciplinary pressure, Brewer et al. would never forget or minimize its scope to empower any single variant, well or ill defined, popular in the market or otherwise.[38]

By an ironic accident, pressures against a grand and, above all, mind-oriented narratology happen to converge. Forcing the theory into line with cognitivist "story" business also means reinforcing a hostile trend on the other side of the fence. There, interests like suspense and enjoyment at large, never mind entertainment, have been recurrently downgraded, often condemned outright, in the name of high art. Such elitism or purism (C. S. Lewis once dubbed it literary Puritanism) is as old as *The Republic*, as ongoing as the malaise still displayed by some narratologists in face of apparently pleasure-centered, affective-looking, or just mind-driven universals, especially under their short names. ("Suspense," however well-defined its mechanism, sounds less respectable as a term of *art*, less eligible for universalizing, than "the dynamics of prospection"; and so forth.) Little wonder Brewer and Lichtenstein's (1982) reductively hedonistic variant, flattening the universals to "entertain force," has been singled out for attack as a "caricature" of narrative effect (Livingston 1992: 109). Of all scope limitations, that favoring "popular story" is therefore the most incongruous, because it unwittingly echoes the very immemorial prejudices of the literati that my argument has striven to uproot (not in vain, to judge by results elsewhere). Across disciplines, rationales, and value frames, the low-brow and the highbrow extremes would meet here at a number of junctures, presumably to their own mutual surprise.

The Brewer-style echoing thus de-universalizes the genre's trio of master effects by relegating them afresh to their traditionally low and local slots, as if they need not or did not co-govern the highest order of literary narrative down the ages, with appropriate changes in artistry. That re-slotting would also play into the hands of the highbrow tradition, from Plato to post-

38. Contrast Bordwell's (1985) retracing of the universals not only across media but also across the distance between classical Hollywood and art cinema. See likewise Yacobi (1995: esp. 610ff., 2000) on ekphrastic narration in transfer from the visual to the verbal code, which involves the plotting of static pictorial images.

modernism, in keeping more "serious" discourse ends (with the narratives geared to them) apart from the "low thrills" of story. (Officially so when Brewer [1995a, 1998] adds a separate "literary aesthetic" experience, for which lovers of mere story affect need "to develop an appreciation.") On the pars-pro-toto front, it would justify, as it were, the valorizing not just of the novel, for example, but of its least-hedonistic branches, from social realism to experimental writing. To top off the irony, where everyday, humdrum, utilitarian narratives are concerned, the disciplinary extremes would reunite, in joint dismissal this time.

In earlier work, I have shown at length that the elitist dogmas collapse on scrutiny, in reason and in fact together. They go against the grain of narrative, whose narrating entails and at will foregrounds gaps in the narrated world to enforce the threefold processing (ahead, backward for closure, backward after disclosure) in our response. Nor do the preconceived ideas accord with the practice of their own exemplars, or with the credo of a high modernist like Henry James, to whom "love of 'a story as a story'" is "the vital flame at the heart of" telling and reading: "the creation of alarm and suspense and surprise and relief" will repay "all the arts" invested by the novelist in playing "on the credulous soul of the candid reader or, immeasurably better, on the seasoned spirit of the cunning reader" (1962: 252–53; framed in Sternberg 1978 [1971]: 284–303, 1984). So let us now extend the principle to the genre's lower limit, where un-"story"-like functionality supposedly disables and replaces our universals. News reports, say, would then be "primarily designed to *inform*," "fables . . . to *persuade*."

Even with literature or literariness ignored, however, such undesirables will not be ruled out of the circle. Take the attempt to justify the consignment of the informative/persuasive subclasses to a narrative "force" and "theory" other than those of storytelling proper.[39] For a reason, the consigners would appeal to the contrast between straight and twisted deployment. "Comprehension and memory are facilitated by having the events in the discourse map the order of events in the event structure" (Brewer and Lichtenstein 1982: 478; also Ohtsuka and Brewer 1992, Brewer 1995a: 92–93). But from this premise, right or wrong or overstated, none of the consequences drawn or implied thereafter follows to rationalize the story/narrative divide.

For example, such chronological mapping does not necessarily indicate a thrust and theory oriented to plain meaning ("comprehension and recall")

39. I leave aside for now the empirical counterevidence to the allegedly high informativity or informational effect of the "nonstory" subclass. E.g., Seely and Long (1994) want to explain the very opposite: why news items diverge from the rest of narrative in their "extremely poor levels of comprehension and recall." See also the final paragraphs of this section.

as against storylike pleasure. The misbelief that it does is just another variant of an old and strong antichronological bias, whose persistence from Aristotle to contemporary narratology I reviewed in the "Telling in Time" series. Exemplifying an almost irresistible tendency to package deal form (here, orderly or disorderly sequencing) with function (e.g., interest absent or present, meaning or feeling), the wide negative consensus has no ground in narrative experience. Some have, indeed, exhibited the contrary bias. Between the forms of telling, the historian Edward Gibbon, as well as the novelist Anthony Trollope, judges the adherence to chronology to be the more pleasurable: "For in every operation of the mind there is much higher delight in descending [straight] from the cause to the effect, than in ascending from the effect to the cause" (quoted, with further discussion and parallels, in Sternberg 1978 [1971]: 41–46; 1992: 934–35). A matter of taste, this *or* the opposite ranking, but we can theorize the opposition by associating either sequential (dis)ordering of events with its own rank order of effects. The iconic, orderly, harmonious-looking chronology is also forward-looking, whereby it generates suspense, just as dechronologizing would generate surprise or curiosity: a shift in, not beyond, "storied" affect, unless you forget the basic order/impact correlations.[40] Inversely, that "actual mystery stories are not organized in this way" (some are, but never mind) would only prove that they have opted for a different, retrospective, curiosity-favoring strategy, with a twisted rather than orderly tale to match. Neither subclass is "poorly organized," because either exhibits the time (dis)organization generating its chosen major time effect among co-generic narrative priorities.

Nor, advancing beyond affectivity, does it follow:

1. that, "if stories are designed to inform, the appropriate discourse organization for stories ought to be this [chronological] one"; or inversely,
2. that, if so designed, then their frequent dechronologizing "seems somewhat paradoxical"; or more broadly,
3. that the choice polarizes between "storytelling" for entertainment, with its ("low") play of surprise/curiosity/suspense, and "narrating" in step with time for other ends ("higher," "serious," e.g., epistemic, memorial, rhetorical); or most generally,
4. that "affectivity" and "cognition" pull different ways. (Brewer and Lichtenstein 1982: esp. 478–79)

40. As Brewer and Lichtenstein do their own translated formula for suspense in Brewer and Lichtenstein 1981: 365–67; 1982: 480–81. So do, among other followers, Ortony et al. (1988: 131) in reinvoking prospective tension to differentiate "genuine stories from storylike narratives that are not in fact considered stories at all."

Reserving the final, discipline-wide antithesis for the next section, let me glance at the rest of the claims. These have in fact been anticipated in my earlier inquiries as a matter of principle: the translation to cognitivism's story land and language once more silently goes against the grain of the original, as against reason and cultural record and psychological reality.

Can you imagine any world image devoid of rhetoric or of information, of all bearing on your outlook or knowledge? The supposed alternatives to entertainment with its playful correlates are in fact inseparable from representation and, in narrative representation, from the play between times unique to the genre. But, even assuming the existence of "persuasive" or "informative" subgenres, this universal interplay might exactly work for their specialized ends as well.

Apropos narrative persuasion, I have demonstrated at length its repertoire of temporal arts in fiction, history, and law writing. On the largest scale, these arts enable various strategies for controlling our movement from first to last impressions—all the way between the progressive deepening and the unexpected collapse or reversal of our initial judgment. At the former extreme, an orderly chronology may best arouse and escalate suspense about (say) a hero under pressure, then allay it by showing him emerge from the ordeal as he always was, only more and more convincingly so. The doubt about the ordeal's outcome, generated via suspension, highlights in resolution the continuity between first and last image, primacy and recency effect. (Governing the sequential, artless-looking march and impact of Trollope's novelistic characters, or of the historian's personages, why shouldn't the strategy co-apply to their equivalents in, for example, the didactic fable?) The latter, reversing extreme, whereby the hero will be eventually disclosed as the opposite of the character he assumed in our eyes, requires a twisted order of telling for surprise. For the truth to be driven home with a vengeance at last—recency to uproot primacy—the narrative must first lure us into the wrong impression. (The collapse of appearances, hence of response, stretches in turn to the last-minute discovery of kindness behind a tough exterior, or vice versa, effected for moralistic purposes.) An in-between model, "the rhetoric of anticipatory caution," will half prepare us for the coming surprise via early disturbing incongruities (i.e., curiosity gaps) in the façade the hero presents, antipathetic (Darcy in *Pride and Prejudice*) or attractive (Wickham). And so forth, with prospection, recognition, retrospection scaled according to the wanted dynamics of impression formation.[41]

41. For the strategies at versatile narrative work, see Sternberg 1978 [1971]: 90ff., further developed in Sternberg 1985: esp. 264–364, 441–515, 1998: 471ff. What with their versatility, they demonstrate, inter alia, a still larger point: how an approach attuned to artistic wealth

As suspense, curiosity, and surprise always play a key role in shaping our attitude toward an event, motive, character, worldview, point of view, so do they in the reception and retention of information generally, complete with their twists and turns. The principle newly holds across all subgeneric boundaries, within and outside "story," for example, however defined. If "comprehension and memory are facilitated" by chronological telling, then divergent, anachronic orders can yet serve the purpose as well or, in certain respects, better. A gap about the past or the future will whet our appetites for even otherwise unexciting (e.g., expositional, summary, descriptive) knowledge, if only by means of delay; nor are we likely to forget what has been discovered by trial and error, much less by a painful exposure of our blissful ignorance thus far.[42] Narrative, then, abounds in formal and func-

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can repair and outreach equivalent studies of "primacy vs. recency effect" in the psychology of perception. As shown there (esp. 1978 [1971]: 93ff.), in order to conduct, analyze, and sort out experiments that test such effects, one needs to have mastered their causes, latent in the protean kinds and ways of discourse (test material included) and richest in poetic discourse. Otherwise, unalerted to the flexible combinations of primacy with recency along the sequence, the experimentalist will tend to set up a binary, either-primacy-or-recency test of strength. Even so, failing a distinction as basic as fiction/nonfiction, conflicting test results may leave one baffled; the oversight still persists in van Oostendorp 2001. (Similarly with the mysteries of illusion, at which note 18 above glanced, or the impact of temporal [dis]ordering on understanding and recall, to which note 42 alludes below.) A healthy two-way traffic then ensues between the disciplines, and on the conceptual level as well as those of knowledge and empirical evidence. A far cry from the automatic casting of the "humanistic" partner in the role of poor relation: testee, borrower, applier, at most elaborator of hard cognitive science. Nor is this unequal role assignment current only within the favored party, who would presume their own competence in discourse without relinquishing monopoly over the mind's workings on discourse or world. From the other side of the fence, we likewise hear that the standard "dialectical relation between theory and practice cannot be the case with cognitive literary studies because the originating theory cannot, even in principle, be recursively affected by the investigation" (Jackson 2002: 177; contrast Goodblatt and Glicksohn 2003). You would expect literary students to have learned better from the field's earlier interdisciplinary affairs; but getting down to cases—such as narrative theory, reading, empirics here—is perhaps the only antidote to taking scientific pretensions and paraphernalia at face value. Some have, indeed, learned better. In self-declared cognitivist narratology, this very set of discourse-sensitive rhetorical models of primacy/recency has already been fruitfully taken up: e.g., see their extension to cinematic narrative in Bordwell 1985: 38 and *passim* and the overview in Jahn 1997: 460–61.

42. More advanced cognitivist research on understanding and memory now bears out these theses, though it has yet to explain the effects in relation to the (inter)play of temporal sequence. See Kintsch 2000: 311–31 for an extensive survey. At the same time, however, Kintsch 2000: 68 reiterates his old view that when "narrative is constructed according to some other cultural schema" than exposition-complication-resolution, "comprehension may be distorted accordingly" (Kintsch and Greene 1978, paralleled in, e.g., Johnson and Mandler 1980: 78ff.; Beaugrande 1982: 391–92; as well as the quotes from Brewer and Lichtenstein 1981 and 1982). How can gaps now promote, now hinder understanding? The apparent inconsistency may reflect the lingering of the problem-solving schema canonized by story analysts, or the need for an integrated theory of sequence in (narrative) discourse, or both. See also note 41 above.

tional variables, or varieties, yet they never break, or even merely collocate, with the genre's universal dynamics but rather invariably pass and operate through it, to unparalleled effect.

3. Affectivity against or with or after Cognition? Enjoyment and/or Understanding? How Mental Stands to Discoursive Geography

> I should have read it ten times better, Sir,
> answered Trim, but that my heart was so
> full.—That was the very reason, Trim, replied
> my father, which has made thee read the
> sermon as well as thou hast done.
> Laurence Sterne, *Tristram Shandy*

This section will proceed to demonstrate a thesis that has been running through the argument since the introductory generalities. I started by arguing that cognitivism, homeless outside the mind, needs to form common households with intersecting domains and can ideally bring to every resultant interdiscipline about half of the equipment. Actually, it can, or at any rate does, bring far less to the juncture with narrative study, less than to psycholinguistics, for example. And whether it will have as much knowledge to contribute to an interstudy of a discourse genre that reflects and engages our entire experience as humans is an open question.

The answer partly hinges, of course, on internal advances: toward a grand architectonics of the mind, notable for its absence (Newell 1990, Anderson 1993, Kintsch 2000), toward a richer idea of cognition, on which more soon, toward less speculative models, toward settlement of the ever-proliferating differences, and so forth. But future contribution also depends on the practitioners' acquiring, in turn, an informed sense of the relevant narratological issues and exigencies: what goods are wanted, applicable, integrable on what front, in plain language. Otherwise, even in-house wisdom existing and to come will not necessarily help to advance the interdiscipline; or it will await spotting and implementation by the mind-oriented narratologist on the lookout for aids to definite problems, the way another researcher, interested in formalism, may draw on logical systems that the logician would not dream of adapting to outside use or would not know how. As it is, regarding the very mental aspect relevant to the mind/discourse encounter—such key questions as the gamut of producible experiences, which arise where, in what particular shape and role—the supposed experts on it still have more to learn from the heritage of poetics and aesthetics than to teach. Unexpected, certainly unflattering, but demonstrable nevertheless.

The current distance from the proper interdisciplinarity shows in the relations between "story" form and force, (discourse) typology and (mental) teleology. These rudiments we have just found to be variously wanting across cognitivist approaches: nonexistent, unspecific, groundless, disintegrated, or even muddled in transfer from a "humanist" narrative theory. As to the disciplinary shibboleth "mental representation," it is a nonstarter here: an empty substitute, or at best a prerequisite or the lowest common denominator, for the assorted type-specific effects producible on the mind in and through representation. By itself, it just translates Aristotelian "mimesis" into explicit interiority but without the original's progressive unpacking. A network of what's/how's/why's will alone make operative differences among represented images to pinpoint, say, the workings of narrativity. A "cognitive approach," in short, is not yet a functional approach to experience, much less to the experience of discourse as such, nor will it become one unless it learns to dovetail representational with (con)textual variables; and if communication-bound, as most exponents are, it also needs to advance from psychological, possibly solipsistic, certainly one-sided, to transactional, purpose-driven reality, from mind to the meeting of the addressor's and the addressee's minds in the discourse arena.

But all this offers only one measure of the distance from workable two-handedness or partnership. Another is the limited concept of the mind itself, as applied to the narrative reader, above all.

This further shrinkage, with a further general problematics, already lurks in Brewer and Lichtenstein's title, "Stories Are to Entertain: A Structural-Affect Theory of Stories" (1982). Their attempted delimitation of "story" from the rest of narrative (hence of the approaches to them) by the presence or absence of surprise/suspense/curiosity goes with a dichotomy between affect and comprehension, enjoyable feeling and humdrum understanding. Stories alone "are to entertain," by playing on our feelings, the rest are to signify. From this further compartmentalizing, another package deal ensues: either of the subclasses of narrative discourse would answer, or appeal, to its own segment (faculty or perhaps module) of the mind.[43]

Now, the attempt at delimiting "story" by its monopoly on the three primary interests having already been refuted, we can stretch the question of responsive limits to the whole genre: Is narrative experience reducible

43. So hermetic is this compartmentalization that it disables even those composite responses admitted in principle. Brewer and Lichtenstein (1982: 477) thus single out "fables" as narratives "designed to entertain and to persuade" at once. Yet when the fable comes to be studied in Dorfman and Brewer 1994 (e.g., 105), we hear only about its instructive or persuasive "underlying message, or point," as though the twain can never meet across their respective subclasses.

to emoting for pleasure, our mental activity there to affectivity, interest to sheer arousal and release—or, indeed, to their meaning-laden contraries?

Such affect-bound reduction teems with oddities. We have already observed the irony of its echoing—only with the valuation reversed—a chorus of literary Puritans old and new, who animadvert on the low thrills supplied at the expense of higher interests. But the same reductiveness also compounds disciplinary with historical and generic incongruity.

Disciplinarily, the very terminology jars against the name and standard priority of the field, not least regarding the mind's engagement with storied discourse. "Affective" has long stood opposed to "cognitive" in the sense associated with knowing, perceiving or conceiving as a mental act or faculty distinct from emotion. And "cognitive study" has, indeed, typically suited its object to the name, thus restricting its scope the other way: to issues of comprehension or memory, exclusive of feeling or value judgment. Reading or "processing" a text amounts to understanding it, "mental representation" to organizing the text's meaning by and into a structure of "knowledge." So "cognitive" might, or at times does, interchange with epistemic, semantic, conceptual, propositional, informational in the narrowest world-oriented sense.[44] (This is indeed one reason for my own avoidance of the label, pointedly so after cognitivism's branching into narrative.)

By the nature and limits of their enterprise, computer scientists would be most tempted to push the cognition/emotion divide far beyond nominal or even mental apartness within a unitary, indivisible whole. So they do as a rule, some more consciously and openly than others. Let me exemplify from two, authors of the "script" and the "frame," respectively, whose influence has spread from Artificial Intelligence and adjacent psychological cognitivism to narratology. Here is Roger Schank, famous for his story-reading computer programs, introducing *Scripts, Plans, Goals, and Understanding: An Inquiry into Human Knowledge Structures* (1977), written in collaboration with the psychologist Robert Abelson:

> We are not interested in trying to get computers to have feelings (whatever that might turn out to mean philosophically), nor are we interested in pretending that feelings don't exist. We simply want to work on an important area of overlapping interest [between human and artificial, humanlike computation], namely a theory of knowledge systems . . . . For both people and machines, each in their own way, there is a serious problem in common of making sense out of what they hear, see, or are told about the world. The conceptual apparatus necessary

44. Robert Abelson, coauthor of the script pattern, played with the idea of substituting "epistology" or "representonomy" for "cognitive science" (quoted in Lehnert 1994: 149): different terms, kindred emphases.

> to perform even a partial feat of understanding is formidable and fascinating. Our analysis of this apparatus is what this book is about. (Schank and Abelson 1977: 2)

Elsewhere, the Yale group headed by Schank rather describe this apparatus as what the discipline is about. If "the best way to approach the problem of building an intelligent machine is to emulate human cognition, then the goal of AI converges with those of the other cognitive sciences, to understand what knowledge looks like and how it is used" (Schank and Kass 1988: 181). Here, the glance at "feeling" suggests this to be not so much the goal as an exigency, or a goal born of exigency, yet with its reasons and consequences left indeterminate.[45]

They never ask if, much less how, any pure, computational "theory of knowledge" could eventually incorporate the omitted emotive domain, or what a barrier to mergence would imply about the simulated process and processor vis-à-vis the real sentient being in face of a "world" observed or narrated in time. Given that feelings co-attend our response to narrative, as suggested here, merely acknowledging that they exist and disclaiming interest in endowing computers with them evades both key issues to leave the research program hole-ridden. Besides their fundamental importance, the two questions are conspicuously absent by the very rationale of the Artificial Intelligence project, in its strong and its weaker line, respectively.

First, can any pure, computational "theory of knowledge" eventually incorporate the emotive domain? Asking the question would at least present an ideal and challenge of mental synthesis to research, fueled by the strong AI hope of emulating as well as illuminating the real thing. Significantly, these researchers have done their utmost to meet an analogous challenge throughout their inquiry into cognition proper. For both computers and humans, understanding (of what a tale means, above all) supposedly has its "levels," turning not only on the sheer quantity of knowledge invested or desired or required but also on the kind and power of the internal knowledge structures brought to the narrative. Schank et al. often describe their project's evolution as an orderly climb up a hierarchy of story understanding. It rises in level from (1) Event Characterization

45. In retrospect, Abelson (1987) concedes the exigency, among other genuine or apparent obstacles to "literary appreciation." So does Schank 1984: 44ff. in drawing a three-point spectrum of comprehension. In its terms, an artificial intelligence can possibly advance from "Making sense" toward the intermediate "Cognitive Understanding," but always short of "Complete Empathy," which requires a personal involvement achievable by humans alone. Even so, note the knowledge-modeler's ongoing bias: the silence on emotivity other than empathetic, the reference of empathy itself to comprehension, as if devoid of independent value and working within our experience, or, inversely, the assumption that the two lower orders of reading performance may be achieved and simulated regardless of the third.

(making out a series of occurrences) to (2) Event Connection (inferring their causal sequentiality) to (3) decoding by Script (whose stereotypicality renders the bound world-items deducible or predictable or interrelatable in a top-down, computation-saving manner) to (4) an array of constructs that go beyond Script range (via Plan, Goal, Theme, Memory Organization Packet, Explanation Pattern), especially involving less routine, more flexible action sequences. So, despite the necessity to break down understanding and concentrate on a specific level at a time, the inquiry works toward the multiple- or ideally even inter-level response typical of humanity.[46] One might therefore expect feeling to be duly recognized as the other internal domain, its progressive study as an equal necessity, and the eventual correlation of the domains, if only at the end, as the supreme aim cum test.

The second question, presuming this machine-oriented research line unequal to the challenge of synthesis, would assume differential along with negative value. It would serve as a timely reminder of the emotivity, hence complexity, built into the human psyche, which discourse researchers nowadays, even outside cognitivism, tend to forget or marginalize in their rage for "meaning." If "the most important point to make about understanding is that it is not an all or nothing affair" (Schank and Lebowitz 1980: 251, Schank and Abelson 1995a: 19), then the point about the qualitative nature of the ability to feel would be at least as worth making, the speciality's discourse role as worth investigating, and its relation to the sharable ("overlapping") cognitive work even more so, particularly in comparison with the simulator's nothing along this line. Whether privileged or hindered by emotivity, a human at transmitting, receiving, communicating (as at observing and self-communing) is mentally sui generis, a processor apart.

Yet the authors keep silent on either principled consequence, getting down to their limited and ill-defined business with "knowledge" instead. There ensues a forced choice between evils: an enterprise either virtually dehumanized, as if machine capacity were explored for its own sake, against the authors' intention, or else irreparably split, against nature, because the missing half finds no place and no prospect, any more than priority, within the theory. However far the research may go this way, level by conceptual level, it must eventually take some quantum leap outside the system to get in touch with feeling as the extraconceptual other, then to draw together

46. The line of progress variously repeats itself, with updates, in Schank and Abelson 1977, Schank and Lebowitz 1980, Schank and Kass 1988, for example, or, more self-critically, Schank 1999. (Note that this progressive story understanding in turn follows and builds upon the Conceptual Dependency theory, developed to represent sentence meaning in a language-independent form.) For a sequel, cast in "brittle-to-robust" terms, see Lehnert 1994 and note 48 below.

our whole reading experience, where it should have started. (Compare the failure of would-be "story" delimitors to outline an advance toward an integrated narrative theory, or the tendency to isolate the actional sequence from the discourse as a whole, or the way analyses abstract certain actional parts, forms, levels, movements, e.g., those goal-driven and otherwise tractable, from the isolated sequence itself: the variations on piecemeal work typically co-occur here and will only multiply below.)

Nor do Schank and Abelson ask if the halving of the human mind, or the presumable emotionlessness of the machine, oversimplifies or skews their account of "knowledge systems . . . making sense . . . the conceptual apparatus necessary to . . . understanding" themselves: the narrowly "cognitive" operations on story, in brief. Part of our mental knowledge about the mind, as well as of our literary heritage, is exactly the interpenetration of feeling and understanding, evaluating and remembering, to the limit of interdependence for better or worse. (On how, long before modernism, Jane Austen dramatizes, indeed thematizes this juncture in her characters' readings of the world, parallel to the reader's own interpretive adventures, see Sternberg 1978 [1971]: 129–58. Taken together, the original and the published titles of her most brilliant novel—*First Impressions* and *Pride and Prejudice*—even foreground in advance the unreasonable side of humanity's encounter with any sequence of data.) How can would-be mind simulators, of all people, discount or neutralize that known interpenetration?

For that matter, how can such an assortment of other enterprises? Enthusiasts for machine understanding are not at all alone in artificially isolating this favored cold sector of psychological reality. And their fellow isolationists are not at all limited to fellow cognitivists in psychology as sworn upholders of that reality, would-be co-modelers of the human mind at story reading, for example. Even in the humanities—including the mainstream of literary study today as well as, more expectedly, pragmatics with its philosophical origins and aspirations to formalism—such denaturing of the discourse activity rather crosses disciplinary lines. Our research programs all too often suppress what we commonly know about inner interaction from life and art—as if they, or we, were computer programs, akin to the one in question here, only of a superior order[47]—with results to be discussed.

But then, neither do Schank and Abelson reduce the mind to a machine, except practically, in targeting the supposed common area of intelligence, natural or artificial. Even here, the commonality they affirm between "people and machines" advisedly falls well short of equality. "A partial feat of

47. According to John Searle (1980), our bodies with our brains even literally and uniquely form thinking machines, exclusive of computer simulation.

understanding," though remarkable for a machine, a tribute to its artificers' ingenuity, and a window on the human cognition simulated, remains partial still. Categorically so, it would appear, and admittedly so, for the visible future at least.[48] Feeling apart, recall the generic measure of partiality instanced by the authors themselves: the distance separating the barebones tales, schemata, routines under analysis from the art of the novel. Even on the lowly common ground, again, further measures of inequality betray themselves, starting with the neglect to explain why the telling (as distinct from and relative to the action told) should proceed or vary the way it does and, above all, what motivates the reading(s) in the first place: the holes typical of action-oriented cognitivism, on the mind's cognitive level itself, yawn with a vengeance. And small wonder, if only because knowledge, understanding, conceptualizing, inner representing, meaning derivation, all entail thought, and computers have yet to pass the Turing test for "Can machines think?"[49]

Though the analogy to the mind proves still narrower and weaker than they believe, Schank and Abelson do, in principle, guard against overstating their case, certainly apropos emotivity. The trouble is that their many followers outside computer science (a few recent narratologists among them) have done so little to repair the omissions, principled or otherwise, all-discoursive or generic, and to redress the human balance, by exploring the differences. If anything, these have at times suffered blurring, which perforce means illicit leveling up. Thus the misguided bids for "novelizing" the script, as in Tolliver 1994 or Herman 1997, complete with the hope of rec-

48. Here is an authoritative report on the state and prospects of the art after two hectic decades by Wendy Lehnert, a former student of Schank. Thus far, "no natural language [computer] system can claim to tackle general language in an open-ended domain or task orientation," such as would qualify it to "read fiction" sometime, the ultimate test of mindlike open-endedness. The best available systems apply, more or less, only to input regarding "a finite domain [e.g., tales of terrorism] that can be covered by a limited lexicon and limited domain knowledge." Accordingly, they "do not have a strongly analogical human counterpart. The closest analogy . . . is perhaps the notion of a pathological toddler with very narrow and thoroughly adult interests." With feeling unmentioned altogether, the toddler must be qualitatively deficient as well. Even in regard to understanding alone, the quantum leap "out of microworlds" depends on "fundamental questions about the nature of language and language acquisition": "I do not think we have a lot of the answers" and may never "come up with any" (Lehnert 1994: 170–71). All this from a True Believer on a wave of success.

49. Searle (1980), with the notorious thought experiment, goes so far as to challenge the adequacy of the Turing test itself. He denies that the appropriately programmed computer can be literally said to understand and have other cognitive states, thus qualifying for a real mind: even were some program to pass the test and fool the examiner into identifying it as human, it would still understand nothing. Interestingly, the paradigmatic target for this attack is the work done by the Schank group at Yale on machine simulation of the human story understander. See also their response, and others, in the same issue.

ommending the approach to literary theorists and historians, go counter to the originators' own warning about its modest range and role within story comprehension itself.

To sharpen the sense of difference, contrast the acrobatics performed by another leader in the field, Marvin Minsky, regarding the same crux:

> Our culture wrongly teaches us that thoughts and feelings lie in almost separate worlds. In fact, they're always intertwined. In the next few sections we'll propose to regard emotions not as separate from thoughts in general, but as varieties or types of thought, each based on a different brain-machine that specializes in some particular domain of thought. (1987: 163)

This amounts to the same halving of the inner world as preannounced by Schank and Abelson. Except that their avowal of practical exigency compares favorably with a "theory of mind" that appears to preach unity while bent on cognitive imperialism. Less open and defensible, the argument serves to bring out afresh the losses incurred either way.

Observe the slippage from the professedly countertrend "intertwining" of thoughts with feelings to the actual reduction of the whole mind to "varieties or types of thoughts," of emotion to reason. If thought and feeling do not occupy separate worlds, as "culture wrongly teaches," this is because the two allegedly occupy the same all-inclusive world of thought, rather than because they interact across mental (sub)worlds. On Minsky's image of nature, it turns out, culture has erred in dividing a single knowledge-bound family, all of it located within the brain's apparatus. To intertwine is to subsume under a mechanical umbrella, without bothering about differences. This twist in midargument goes to favor affectless cognition, as do silences on the disfavored, and expectedly so.[50] Such purified cognition suits one with a vested interest in artificial intelligence: for the machine to grow humanlike, humanity needs to lose the stubbornly unreplicable half of its mind.[51] The Intelligent Heart, the title of a D. H. Lawrence biography

50. Consider the items mentioned among the furniture of our psychology: "We live in a psychological world—inhabited by entities we call by names like 'meanings,' 'ideas,' and 'memories'" (Minsky 1987: 287).

51. And presumably, along a crosscutting axis, the whole of its body too. Here the idea of the mind as "the ghost in the machine" à la Descartes, and the classic attack on it by Ryle (1949), would literalize themselves. The two axes may, however, intersect in divergent ways. The recent cognitivist plea for "the embodied mind" thus sounds like a variant of Ryle's unitary account. Except that his attentive analysis of feeling, linguistic reflexes included, typically has no sequel in the gravitation toward the conceptual: another mental imbalance, or divorce, now across ostensible mind/body realignment. Abelson (1987: 42–34), indeed, admits that no story understanding program can appreciate the "feel" of "references to sensory and motor experiences. . . . Score one against the computer." The anchorage of the frame and script concepts in "human basic-level body experience" (Fludernik 1996: 17–19, 312–13) is therefore

(Moore 1960) and a key psychocultural topos since Romanticism at least, would thereby fall into downright oxymoron.

Characteristically, when Minsky turns to narrative, all operations and responses intractable to programming vanish from sight, theorized out of mind, as it were. Everything comes down again, by another route, to the problem of "understanding," which comes down, in turn, to how narrative inference and coherence emerge from the activity of his celebrated knowledge "frames" (Minsky 1987: 261–74, after Minsky 1975).[52]

Even so, what drives, channels, and inversely, blocks or restrains such work of inference? For example, "various frames are excited" (ibid.: 262): why, by what? If a "frame" or "subframe" has "question"-like "concerns" (ibid.), where do they originate and whereby turn operative? (Note also the latent slide toward anthropomorphism, crediting the machinery with the experiencer's affects.) Inversely, how to tell which narrative "questions" do not count as relevant, or "exciting," at least frame-exciting, but "drift away from the story's theme" (ibid.: 265)? Which of the many possible "concerns" are of little or unmindful or surface concern, if any, to the tale's reader?

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a possible, tricky extension, rather than the original intention, which disembodies the story understander into a computing mind: it includes knowledge of the agent's body, as of other world features, not body knowledge, least of all "experience."

52. A double comedown, let me emphasize, and typical of the field as such. Like the script, the frame pattern has a narrow elucidating and explanatory range beside the strategic (all-discoursive, generic) mechanisms at work here: they subsume it among the humblest aids to intelligibility—never mind affective impact, functional thrust, or differential value. This lowly part/whole relation needs emphasizing because it has at times been missed even in otherwise shrewd comparisons across disciplines. Mieke Bal (1987: 17ff.), citing the earliest version of the approach to narrative discourse as a system of gaps (Perry and Sternberg 1968), thus observes: "Long before Iser's reader-response theory and Minsky's frame-theory became fashionable," this line of research "integrated the idea of frame and the idea of gap and gap-filling into a theory of the reading process." So it did, only that more important than the temporal priority is the very unlike order and scale of discourse (hence of research) priorities. Where Bal's parallel-drawing foregrounds a common denominator among those "ideas," the integrative "theory of the reading process" actually forestalled, as it were, the atomistic, automatic, and nonfunctional bearing imposed on them elsewhere. The disparities later grew diametric with my theorizing of suspense/curiosity/surprise as the universals of narrative, our main present concern. Some of the implications will be outlined in the text below, others in the sequel. To begin with, I hope, they will negate Bal's impression that the gap-filling account, like its frame-oriented parallel, attempts "to give a basically affective theory a cognitive basis" (Bal 1987: 18): the reverse is equally true of the former, while neither affective/cognitive linkage holds for Minsky and his associates. Finally, a terminological caveat. My own use of *frame* as a term of art (e.g., Sternberg 1982a, 1982b, 1991, 1998: esp. 81 ff., 2001b: esp. 167 ff.) is reserved for quotation: it singles out the discourse that incorporates ("frames") another, quoted discourse ("inset") to establish a marked whole/part relationship within representation at large. As observed in note 8 above, with further references, this principle stretches to the limit of the global author/narrator, communicative/informative relationality.

What guidance system actually does (or, in the machine, hopefully will) forestall the combinatorial explosion of inferences, whose endless products, mixtures, branchings at any juncture would otherwise immobilize the reading process from the word go?

Minsky never asks, but (and, I will proceed to argue, because) the answer lies in the suspense/curiosity/surprise trio as generic processual forces. They all entail, among them exhaust, hence signal to the reader, gaps ("questions") opened by the narrative, *felt* discontinuities in the given event sequence. Together, they accordingly not only explain why but perforce determine where (to a large extent, also which, how, etc.) inferential counterwork will be brought to bear on the narrative. Where we experience trouble with coherence, there we seek an inferential remedy applicable to it; and the bigger the trouble, the more urgent the search. A fortiori, with a malaise bigger in kind, like the generically joint, affective/cognitive sense of disorder energized by narrative. In suspense, for example, our sense of an incomplete pattern, by itself a sheer unsettling affect, will grow a double edge when mapped onto an action (i.e., a cognized world-path) that generates a clash of hope and fear about some agent. And vice versa: the latter tension's absence in the narrative, or its reading, signals (e.g., apropos minor agents) an open future best left unpatterned, below notice, indifferent in every sense. Identical on the surface as prospective ellipses, the cases yet turn effectively, experientially diametric by a single rationale.

To introduce some additional terminology that will prove useful throughout, the first case of incompleteness energizes a gap, the second dismisses a mere "blank." And the rationale that draws them asunder is the law of communication that I have dubbed the "Proteus Principle": the many-to-many correspondence between form and function.[53] Applied to the workings of narrativity here, this means that the same formal lacuna regarding the outcome can activate suspense, given the mental triggers just exemplified, or neutralize it otherwise. Similarly, of course, with "gapping" as against "blanking" in curiosity and surprise contexts. The latter effect, at its most unexpected and thus sharpest, even involves a "protean" switch along the

53. On the "gap versus blank" distinction, see especially Sternberg 1985: 233–58. As indicated in note 52 above, both terms must be kept apart from their assorted and generally loose usages elsewhere: they refer to the discontinuity (perceptible or irrelevant, respectively) between the telling and the told sequence. As such, for example, they have little to do with their namesakes in Wolfgang Iser, which cover indeterminacies or missing elements of all kinds. (For details, see Sternberg 1978 [1971]: 311, n.29, 322, n.15; Bordwell 1985: 345 n.10.) The Proteus Principle was first conceptualized in Sternberg 1982a and has since been extended to a wide variety of mind/discourse phenomena: for some recent accounts, all with earlier references, see Jahn 1997 on third-person telling; Sternberg 1998: 155–205 on intercultural poetics or 2001b on inferencing; and Yacobi 2000, 2001 on (un)reliable narration.

narrative sequence, whereby the same ellipsis abruptly transforms from one extreme status to the other. What at the time passed for a negligible blank, if registered at all, (dis)closes itself behind time as a pregnant gap. And what then (dis)closes itself is not only (or, with a permanent gap, at all) the knowledge suppressed earlier (e.g., the missing link in the chain) but its very gappiness, relevance, necessity for a coherent reconstruction and response: our having read in ignorance, misapplied the Proteus Principle to the cunningly twisted tale. The misreading sprung on us grows strategic in discovery plots, from the joke's or the mystery's to that of *Oedipus Rex*, *Emma*, *Great Expectations*, or *The Usual Suspects*. Just as it enables the time-saving blank/gap distinction in suspense, or for that matter curiosity, so Proteus does the false temporary appearance of distinctness in surprise dynamics.[54]

To this functional principle, the trio of master interests owe their remarkable unity, diversity, selectivity, economy, convertibility, all at once, whereby they also gain the highest diagnostic, verifying, and explanatory power across the genre. Not only does storytelling live by them, willy-nilly, or readers look to it for them. As composite generic effects, information-bound states of unrest, their arousal in the reader's mind presses for, and their abeyance against, appropriate (prospective, retrospective, recognitive) gap-filling operations, via knowledge "frames," inter alia, or for that matter, "scripts." So excitement, pertinence, frame-work, and the rest of the unaccountables within the limits of the computer scientist's mechanical theory, go back to those unconsidered, and unwanted, states of mental disequilibrium that would right themselves in time.

As with the trigger for processing information, moreover, so with the process and the product: they too entail "feeling" irreducible, but rather joined, to "thought." A constant of referential discourse, this twinship governs, inter alia, the minimum inputs and schemata prevalent here. Given that the low-level narrative "frames" consist in internal representations of world knowledge, as do "scripts"—the routine event-line of a party, the happenings at an exam—their activity cannot possibly stop at "understanding": it must have an affective thrust as well, like all three master effects that activate and guide them, indeed, like all our responses to the world. Not the driest world-making possibly remains value-free, no agent fails to act somehow on our human nature, no movement in time leaves us unmoved.[55]

54. To sharpen the variety in unity the negative way round: according to Cupchick (1993: 179), Brewer and Lichtenstein 1981 focuses on "aspects of uncertainty (e.g., suspense, surprise, and curiosity) in literary reception." Of the three, however, the opposite actually holds true for surprise, which entails a false certainty, the result of an initial blanking misperception, or misreception, and the prelude to the shock of gap recognition.

55. Against the belief that the arousal of emotion is a literary specialty (e.g., Kneepkens and

Thus, such affectivity does not perhaps come to the fore in Minsky's illustrative "simplest children's tales" (simplified below their own norm at that, or below their schematic and admittedly unnovelistic equivalents in Schank and Abelson 1977). But a second look will yet reveal it at interactive work even there. Consider the example, "Mary was invited to Jack's party. She wondered if he would like a kite." One feels for Mary, the little party goer shown at a loss in the tale, even as we figure out her designs and attitudes: while sharing Mary's ignorance about what Jack would like—an unresolved enigma—what reader doesn't want her to pick the right gift? Amidst hope, who doesn't fear that she mistakes the boy? Again, were the text to resolve the little enigma at the outset, for our eyes only, we would still wish for her success, from a better informed yet always suspenseful, otherwise tense viewpoint. Multiply tense, indeed, because our superior knowledge would then pull against our fellow feeling to generate a mental (rather than, strictly, "cognitive") dissonance between irony and empathy as well, all the less conceivable in an "intelligent" humanlike processor.

Rudimentary tales, agents, unknowns, disorders, therefore, are no exceptions to the lawlike workings of narrative on the manifold that we call the human mind. In face of those simple quantities, emotion gets as unmistakably (if unobtrusively) twinned with comprehension as in high art's knottiest gaps. And so twinned that either dynamics of response enters into multiple relations with the other, shiftable relations at that. Affective and conceptual processing may join forces or join battle, as just illustrated, or run together between the extreme junctures: now in harmony, now in disharmony, for example, or now with this balance of power, now with that. The rhetoric of narrative thrives on such protean fact/feeling interdynamics. (Think only of limit cases, where attitude-building so proceeds that we find ourselves moved by or drawn toward known criminals: the Bible's Saul, Robin Hood, Macbeth, Lovelace, Raskolnikov, Ripley in Patricia Highsmith's thrillers.)

Along the sequence, no less fundamentally, either of the twinned dynamics (mis)directs the other. By the commonest two-way traffic, the reader must piece out the characters in order to side with or against them; but the deeper our involvement, the more energetic and targeted (curious, suspenseful) but also possibly the more biased and fallible (hence liable to surprise thereafter) the inference-making about them. Being interested or par-

Zwaan 1995: 125) or generally "rare" (e.g., Özyürek and Trabasso 1997: 322, 332–33): another cognitivist echo of an old aesthetic prejudice. Also against the illusions that such arousal depends on the teller's recourse to artifice or on charged subject-matter: the one has been exploded in narratology since Booth 1961; the other, a standard cognitivist premise, will be reviewed in a separate section below.

tial in one sense, as responsive emoter and evaluator, works both ways in another sense, geared to optimum ("objective," knowledge-bound) closure on the data available at the time.[56]

Why, then, does Minsky never ask where "excitement" of stored schemata finds its impetus, what leads to or away from inference, how characters in action can evoke knowledge without affect? Surely, he never asks because these key problems never arise with regard to the machine's simulation of the mind, which accommodates neither a driving force triggered by operative (i.e., experienced) gaps, nor a flexible, context-sensitive sense of relevance to match, nor a domain and process of feeling in interaction (tense, consonant, both) with those of reasoning. It just subjects oversimplified input to mechanical, algorithmic computations as programmed, for better or worse. In short, the workings of narrative demonstrate that the Proteus Principle constitutes a basic human differential—only radicalized by the supple dynamism of emotivity—while the machine occupies the Package Dealing extreme.

This is likewise why Schank and Abelson (1977: e.g., 45–46, 76–78, 149) mention the script's "predictive" power—due to its familiar causal enchainment—but not the resulting suspense in the encounter with script-based tales: will link x here indeed generate the predicted outcome y? Even if yes, how soon, by whose agency, in what textual form? To us humans alone can the hero's eating of a meal at a restaurant both predict (foreshadow) and suspend (gap, delay, forequestion) his tipping of the waiter. And the less routine or script-like the action pattern at work, or the less routinized or script-bound the narrative it works on, or the reading that works with it, the lower the predictability to the rise of suspensefulness. In brief, the less packaged the sequence, or the more protean, the sharper our sense of the future's openness and contingency. Again, they refer to "deviations" from the script as "unexpected" input but not as surprising or curious and, therefore, a spur to adjustment in retrospect, behind time. (Arguably, even the relatively objective terms used are anthropomorphic—no less than Minsky's "excited" above—rather than common to the two orders of "script applier.")

Here, as already in the mimeticist definition of narrative, cognitivism again meets instead of opposing Structuralism, its reputed antipole. In independent formalist zeal, Genette and company would substitute the

56. Such interactions (among them the models of impression formation cited earlier, first toward the end of section 2, then apropos Jane Austen) accordingly run through my 1978 [1971] and 1985 books. For a cognitivist variant of the empathy-to-comprehension line of influence, based on reading experiments with school children, see Bourg et al. 1993.

nonpsychological "analepsis/prolepsis" for "retrospection/anticipation," purified narratological "figures" for living narrative forces, objective taxonomic scientism for the human and humanly troubled dynamics of reading in time. This odd parallel, we will find, extends to the most assorted-looking fields and fashions concerned with the study of (literary) discourse. A unity of mental negatives, but usually continuous not, as here, contrastive with the declared premises.

Like comprehension minus emotion, so prediction minus suspense and deviation minus surprise or curiosity, hence also without their multiple roles (affective, driving, focusing, integrating, differential, explanatory) in the human sphere. Nor, finally, do these absentees (or the missing half generally) come into their own even in an otherwise shrewd revaluation of the project from within, which asserts that "current AI models of story understanding require some fundamental changes in order to handle literary narrative." Insofar as the more complex "handling" envisaged there remains a matter of "story understanding," I would argue, it is untrue that computer programs merely need upgrading, since they already "fundamentally behave as readers, although very naive ones in the state of the art" (Ide and Véronis 1990: 37, 55–56). They don't behave as readers, because they fundamentally can't. They feel nothing in the process, and so can't interrelate the dynamics of feeling even with what they do or might understand.[57] Their analogues rather manifest themselves either below or above the human norm. Below are victims of brain damage that leads to narrative impairment by disconnecting emotional and reasoning systems: Kay Young and Jeffrey Saver (2000) aptly call it "dysnarrativia." Above is James Joyce's God, "refined out of existence, indifferent, paring his fingernails" (1960 [1916]: 215).

No amount of finessing out of cognitive "naïveté" (and, if anything, naive readers arguably feel more than they understand) will therefore level the categorical man/machine disparity in emotion, hence in the overall reading activity and experience. Because of the disparity, in turn, such finessing will never equalize so much as the respective, apparently shared cognitions of the value-laden story world. Students of any variety of narrative, especially those tempted by the machinery's scientistic glamor into acceptance

57. In narratological cognitivism, see also Ryan's (1991: 248–57) frankly utopian blueprint for a story-generating automaton that will repair AI's long "theoretical isolation from poetics and narratology." All the more utopian because, even apart from the generator's affective deficiency, there are the apparently insuperable limitations on cognition itself (recall the obstacle to breaking out of a single world-domain underscored in note 48 above). The detail nevertheless makes Ryan's an instructive heuristic exercise.

and application beyond its proper artificial limits, would do well to bear the differences *in* mind.

The bent for "cognitivizing" narrative and mind has a parallel in psychology and its offshoots in research elsewhere. In this branch, man-centered by nature and ostensibly associated with the humanities, as well as larger and more diverse than AI, the story reader's affectivity would appear integral to the putative science of mind. Yet it again turns out so uncongenial as to be often left out of theoretical account altogether. Where acknowledged at all in cognitivist analyses of discourse, narrative or otherwise, emotion generally receives a still lower priority (if any) and a thinner and poorer coverage than in work on first-order, real-life psychology. Even so, moreover, thinnest and poorest of all is the coverage accorded to the reader's emotivity, as distinct from the agent's: agentive impulses fall under comprehension, along with the rest of the storyworld, belonging to an action (psycho)logic of the kind emulated in AI. Accordingly, for the common discourse psychologist in turn, cognitive study must run true to its name, as it were. Responding, processing, experiencing then amount to understanding what happened, mental representation to conceptualizing the represented actional/agentive object—with much the same losses and with certain exceptions whose assorted inadequacy proves the rule.

Let me exemplify this imbalance from some authoritative voices uncommonly aware of it, yet admittedly unequal to its redress. The first is Miller and Johnson-Laird's pioneering multidisciplinary study in the psychology of language. Having defined "a person" as a processor that can *Know*, *Perceive*, *Intend*, and *Remember* things, they admit that the resultant

> information-processing system . . . is fearfully cognitive and dispassionate. It can collect information, remember it, and work toward objectives, but it would have no emotional reaction to what it collected, remembered, or achieved. Since in this respect it is a poor model of a person . . . we will use *Feel* (person, *x*) to indicate that people have feelings as well as perceptions, memories, and intentions. It might be possible to subsume *Feel* under *Perceive* on the grounds that our feelings are a special class of perceptions of inner states. Or we might discuss feelings under *Remember*; the recognition that some word or object is familiar is, after all, a matter of feeling a certain way about it. Or, since we have already recognized that there is a strong affective component in our intentions, we might link *Feel* to *Intend*. Moreover, much of our speech expresses or inspires emotions; a complete account of the psychological foundations of language would have to treat *Feel* in considerable detail. All of these considerations testify to the systematic importance of this psychological predicate.
>
> Nevertheless, we will have little to say about *Feel* in the following pages. Our

> central interest is in the relation between perception and language and in the information processing they entail. Feelings do not respond to control instructions in the same way that perceptions, memories, or intentions do. It has been claimed that a major weakness of psychological theories deriving from the study of information-processing systems is that these systems do not provide any adequate way to represent the emotional forces that are such an important part of human life. Since we have not attempted to analyze this question in any detail, we must suspend judgment. It is obvious, however, that *Feel* is an indispensable predicate for any complete psychology and that it probably lies much closer than *Perceive*, *Remember*, and *Intend* to the basic sources of energy that keep the whole system running. If it were impossible to incorporate such a predicate into our theory, that fact would stand as an extremely serious criticism of the whole approach. In these pages, however, we have more than enough to employ us already, and therefore we leave the issue open. (1976: 111–12)

Amid the ostensible shift from the artificial to the natural human mind, from programs to "people," this sounds like a cross between Minsky and Schank and Abelson. The psychologists, too, highlight "information processing" at the expense of personhood. The depersonalizing into a "system," the reference by "it," the inbuilt "control instructions" to be executed, for example, are all too reminiscent of mechanical programming. Avowedly so, in effect, but also advisedly and, beyond the apology for the "poor model of a person," unrepentantly. One must settle for poverty, as it were, if trying to enrich and unify the extant model into the semblance of humanity would indefinitely defer and even jeopardize it. The authors never quite admit the jeopardy. However, given that "feelings do not respond to control instructions" nor have "propositional content" (ibid.: 624), any repair job would at best yield an inconsistent system, half meaning-bound and orderly and tractable, half visceral and out of control: a divided psychology, in short. The mechanical theory would again break down in attempting to image the real complex subject as language user.

Hence the wavering between familiar evasive tactics instead. First arises a Minsky-like idea of feelings being possibly subsumable under their cognitive mates; but it turns out unfeasible even in theory, once they emerge as both prevalent elsewhere "in our speech" and resistant to control directives. The ground then switches to their practical deferrability, seeing that the book centers in "information processing," a tall order by itself and reason enough to "leave the issue open." Another counsel of despair, obviously. Not just the zigzags but the very avowals—of emotion's range, its problematicness, its "systematic importance," its "being closest to the basic sources of energy that keep the whole system running"—show that the issue cannot wait, on pain of distorting the mind's workings as a whole in language

use. As with "story" defined by reference to "simplicity" under "methodical" constraint, so with the mind artificially rarefied afresh out of feeling: tail wags dog, and not for the last time.

We sometimes hear that cognitivism has lately repaired its early tendency to neglect emotion in favor of pure rationality, computerized or computer-like. Though generally true to an extent, this reputed change least applies to the field's practice of story analysis and the rest of discourse psychology. Over two decades after Miller and Johnson-Laird (1976), for example, Walter Kintsch published his magnum opus on *Comprehension* (2000), a book-length development of his widely followed comprehension-integration (CI) model. In line with the ambitious subtitle, *A Paradigm for Cognition*, he argues throughout for the model's inclusiveness as a grand cognitive architecture, extending it to areas (e.g., action planning) that have traditionally been located elsewhere. Among these, none stands higher than emotion on his ideal list of priorities, because none has suffered such "neglect" to such "intolerable" cost. The discipline's "all too narrow focus" must broaden. For the science and psychology of cognition, "progress beyond a certain point," toward "the study of the human mind and human behavior," depends on their "ability to reintegrate the cognitive and emotional-motivational aspects" involved in the comprehending self's affair with life or text (ibid.: 13).

Nor will merely juxtaposing them do, since "the continuous flow of emotions in interpersonal interactions, but undoubtedly also in less direct interactions, such as reading a story, functions as a modulator and motivator of cognition" (ibid.: 23). A tight nexus is wanted and, in "literary texts," even a fresh scaling, because "emotional reactions" there outrank cognition proper among "the effective constraints" on the text's integrity (ibid.: 206). Further, the principled turn away from oversystematic, mechanistic images of the psyche and its workings, as if they were amenable to a formal semantics, should enable the theory to accommodate such interlinkage, down to contextual variants. "The mind in this view is not a well-structured, orderly system but is a little chaotic, being Aristotelian rather than Cartesian"; and so are "mental representations" (ibid.: 5).

Kintsch's regretful ending will therefore come as a surprise: "cognition and emotion and cognition and motivation are research topics for the future. I have not much to say about these topics at present, except that they are important and should no longer be neglected" (ibid.: 421). An ongoing neglect, for all practical purposes, it must compromise the entire grand theory along the usual lines, as not only demonstrated above but foretold here in the theorist's own call for reorientation.

Why this chasm between program and performance? Kintsch himself

blames "the dearth of research" on emotion, owing to an endemic "all too narrow focus" (ibid.: 13, 33). Such a plea underrepresents certain widenings of interest lately attempted within the discipline itself, as well as ignoring the relevant wisdom accumulated since antiquity in aesthetics, philosophy, or noncognitive psychology. However, supposing the dearth enriched by all the wisdom on record, could the "paradigm for cognition" incorporate emotivity to the wanted balancing and bilateral effect?

No, if only because it runs in practice truer to the discipline's name and norms than to its own programmatic caveats and correctives. Two key drives back to such "intolerable" orthodox practice will ring a bell. One lies in a hallmark of Kintsch's cognitive architecture, as well as of the body of research incorporated or inspired or otherwise exemplified by him. "Both texts and knowledge are represented as networks of propositions," with a view to capturing those structures where "meaning matters most." So all the kinds of mental elements supposed to enter into the comprehension process—"perceptions, concepts, ideas, images, or emotions . . . memories, knowledge, beliefs . . . goals"—become significative atomic propositions (ibid.: 4, 13, 69). Of this miscellany, the emotive kind is foreseeably least tractable to propositionalizing, any more than to automating or to control directives. Kintsch himself describes the attempt as "not much," all "clearly speculation" at that and too ill-formulated to be even empirically testable, yet without questioning its viability, either (ibid.: 409–21). If "to squeeze all human cognition into a logical formalism" aggravates the "inevitable problem of [analytic] distortion," since its inflexibility makes it unsuitable for representing "natural language," a fortiori deeper levels of mental activity (ibid.: 33), then no propositional substitute can do much better. But then, the drive toward a uniform notational system overrides everything.

The logico-mathematical and the propositional formalisms grow still more kindred under the exigency of automatizing the latter as well. Indeed, the mind and its representations are somewhat "chaotic"—unorderly, unmachinelike—because nurtured by "lifelong experience . . . by observation, by talking to others, by reading stories." The trouble is that wide-ranging knowledge or discourse do not lend themselves to propositionalizing by hand. Kintsch therefore needs a machine that will "simulate human cognition," if only as the "second-best" choice, and finds one in the algorithms of Latent Semantic Analysis (ibid.: 86ff.). Under operational pressure, the model thus comes to incur the difficulties of AI, with affectivity at their head. In fact, the richer the picture of emotion available to it, the greater the difficulty or, for a Kintsch, the inconsistency with the new credo.

In and beyond the propositionalizing approach, moreover, conceptual bias also intersects with other "logistical constraints." From within the

schema-theoretic camp, Rand Spiro (1982: 78ff.) uses this phrase in explaining the imbalance found there between "the mechanically analytic and experiential aspects of text comprehension." That an early dissenting voice should yet bracket the two "aspects" under "comprehension," Minsky style, gives away the deeper reason for the majority's partiality. So does the vagueness of the remarks on the neglected aspect of "understanding" and the open question left as to how a more advanced theory than schematism would connect it with the established favorite. So, again, does the "logistical" ground that Spiro himself adduces instead to account for the disciplinary bias, namely, the experimenter's time pressure, which limits the test material to bare, orderly, routine, transparent stories. Doubtless true—what with further experimental constraints, such as the need for replicability—this does not yet suffice to explain the imbalance; nor would Spiro's otherwise helpful commendation of "longer texts" redress it. After all, even a minimum ("simple") narrative has its "experiential" (or "affective") as well as its "analytic" (or "cognitive") aspects—and vice versa with a novel—so that their (im)balance in the testing will hinge on what one tests *for*. Unlike the computer story programmer, psychologists always could if they would (as some have in a way done meanwhile) reorder, even invert the priorities between the "cognitive" and the "affective," with the logistics suitably adjusted where feasible.

Either way, practicalities again reflect matters of principle. Story grammars, for example, evidently have no place for discourse effects, and less if possible for affects, among their internalized rules of the event line's well-formedness (unless you take the overall sense of coherence to be one). Nor do other action-focused mental patterns that allegedly guide our understanding—schemas, scripts, frames—or not if consistent with their own representational logic. This explains why we have found the appeal variously made by exponents to "interest" and the like so out of keeping with the rationale of the grammar or schema concerned. If geared to comprehending the action within the represented world—on the model of the real, immediate thing—it cannot by itself encompass, let alone trace step-by-step, how that action affects us as presented, structured, and often twisted and gapped for interest, along the discourse. The more specific the response, the less encompassable by any model of intelligibility that abstracts the narrated occurrences (what the agents do and suffer) from the two-track narrative whole. In short, no logic of events can double as a teleologic of story telling/reading, because the one forms part of the other, to the exclusion of independent, never mind experiential operation.

This is also why the affects alone reasonably available and assimilable to such an action model (if at all, given that their reading depends in turn on

the whole text in context) are those felt by the agents within the narrated world. Hope, fear, anger, pity, secret designs of all kinds will inform their enacted doings, and need to be figured out, causally integrated, and possibly modeled as such. So they are, in otherwise divergent enterprises and action patterns within the discipline, beginning with Rummelhart's (1975) early grammar, since the event logic privileged there always implies them. Even when left unspecified and unnamed, the agents' inner life attaches to the strategic goal-drivenness of the action, entailing their desires, plans, problem solving, with terminal satisfaction or frustration, depending on the outcome. No human teleology enacted in the world's arena without a rudimentary psyche and psychology of behavior to motivate (actualize, unify, launch, forward, arrest) the drive; the agent must double as intentional subject, if only between the lines of the narrative and/or the theory.

In fact, though, Rummelhart (1975) already explicitly grammaticalizes a minimum of interiority: he defines the obligatory "episode" constituent as "event + reaction" and "reaction" as "internal response + overt response," all duly enchained (e.g., from misfortune to sadness to crying). Accordingly, where the internal response gets omitted—in summary or recall, or in "objective" storytelling or theorizing—it remains deducible from the overt one as its mate and cause (e.g., the sadness from the crying). Some accounts have variously followed this line, some turned more implicit, some gone further in exploring agentive mentality: witness the growing number of special studies, within the bounds of the grammar or the schema or the situation model proposed.[58] Of course, such references to motive will appear all too shallow, instrumental, underdeveloped, overrationalized, beside the narrative standard, and hopeless vis-à-vis modernism's turn inward. Allowing the secret life no functional autonomy, no intrinsic value, they echo Aristotle's (later, Propp's) subordination of character to plot as lifelike mainspring—only flattened out of comparison with his epic or dramatic exemplars. If an emotionless information-processing system, whether natural or

58. So, among others, Schank and Abelson 1977: e.g., 56, 119–22; Lehnert 1981; Stein 1982: 499–500; Wilensky 1982b: esp. 357ff.; Dyer 1983; Lehnert and Vine 1987; Gernsbacher et al. 1992; O'Rorke and Ortony 1994; de Vega et al. 1997; Trabasso and Stein 1997; Özyürek and Trabasso 1997. The last item exemplifies the latest variant, where character response to action assumes the quasi-narratological form of a "point of view." Throughout, note also the cooccurrence of psychologists and programmers, always a telling sign. O'Rorke and Ortony (1994), following the theory in Ortony et al. 1988, even describe a program that computes explanations of emotional states by means of abductive logic. It is therefore not true that cognitivism has given "very little attention" to inference about character emotivity, compared with that devoted to "causal events and relations" (Haenggi et al. 1994: 80), if only because the two objects of inference draw together there. But see also the response to an earlier criticism in the next paragraph.

artificial, whether operating on first-order reality or on discourse about it, "is a poor model of a person," then an instrumentally emoting agent is a poor model of a personage, let alone a protagonist.[59] Still, the private realm is doubtless there and, unlike the glances at the reader's "interest" or "pleasure," appropriately aligned with the focus on characters in action.

However, even where this restriction to the dramatis personae is observed, its consequences have often escaped notice to this day. Let me quickly illustrate from a defense mounted against Brewer and Lichtenstein's charge that standard cognitive approaches ignore affectivity. Stein (1982: 487–88) orthodoxly views the field as an attempt "to develop a theoretical framework for studying how people organize and acquire knowledge about stories. . . . These efforts have increased our understanding of the comprehension process." But she still rejects the criticism of affective deficiency, alleging instead that her kind of approach (as in Stein and Glenn 1979: esp. 64ff.) simply deals with another affected party. On the very story grammar agenda, one "must be able to infer the emotional reaction of the protagonist" from the given events, necessarily so because it will cause the goals pursued in and through them. (She might add, ad hominem, that if such instrumental agentive reaction looks like a pale image of inner life, it is no paler than the sheer hedonistic, virtually mindless arousals of suspense, curiosity, and surprise that her critics wish on the reader.) The difference therefore boils down to the location of the "affective response": in the comprehender or in the agent to be comprehended (Stein 1982: 499–500).

True enough, her comparison, except in the strange idea of alternative emotion domains: one theory opts for this, another for that. To be sure, the strange idea could arise only within a field whose mainstream views the narrated event-line as the exclusive dynamics—on a par with its real-life equivalent, including utilitarian agency—or as self-contained, isolable from the rest of the text. And to be sure, given that framework, the self-containment variant is the lesser evil, because it acknowledges in principle another, story-reading (narrational, communicative) track, order, domain of experience, if only as an alternative research option, self-contained in turn. However, such an argument for alternativity remains blind to everything that marks off the genre as an image of an action, hence, subjectively, as a discoursed experience of a lived experience: blind to the twinship of

59. This invites comparison with the notorious Structuralist flattening of character into "actant," discussed in Culler 1975: 230–38 and elsewhere. The topic is, if anything, even more neglected among cognitivists: a rare study, from a programming viewpoint, is Lebowitz 1984. Gerrig and Allbritton (1990), though beginning as usual with action logic and illustrating from the stylized James Bond novels, move toward a richer account of character, as does the cognitive-linguistic analysis in Martínez 2002.

the domains in narrative, to their power hierarchy in its communication, and to the categorical difference made by interdomain traffic vis-à-vis either alternative, especially when so impoverished.

To suggest this difference, we need not rehearse the play between actional and presentational sequence at large, which elicits the generic effects, any more than the interdependence of cognition and affection in the overall processing. Those interdynamics, already opposed to IA's pale and unreal image of "understanding," remain outside the psychologist's narrative model as well. Instead, advancing to yet another juncture, let us now concentrate on the genre's double order and arrow of feeling, on the mental reference between the narrated and the reading emoters: interaffective transactions, in short.

On the one hand, the reader's ("comprehender's") affectivity colors and shapes and incorporates the agent's among its objects: as an object of our multifold response at that, not just of our understanding, let alone mere causal understanding, nor just, inversely, of our "entertained" arousal and release. Even the goals, motives, reactions of an agent as such partly depend for their filling-in, never mind their judgment, on how we feel about the agent, on our predisposition, if you will. Though belonging to the objective represented world, they all emerge from an intersubjectivity in the discourse process, a meeting of two subjects across worlds.

As a simple test case, think of a gap in the hero's intentional state (Why did he do it?) that is amenable to negative or positive closure. In face of it, a Iago will surely elicit the worse resolution (e.g., Coleridge's "motiveless malignity"), a Father Zossima the better, while the usual mixed quantity may or may not enjoy the benefit of the doubt. How much more so with the finessing of psychic open-endedness. We readers, or spectators, then encounter internals kept as dark, yet unconstrained by sheer action logic; ambiguities left permanent, hence never forcing us to resolve them in the sequel against our desire; closures other than binary, hence easier to modulate the positive or negative way; or affairs univocal in their what's and why's but intricate enough (e.g., mixing positives with negatives) to accommodate a gamut of ambivalence. The ensuing divergent responses pile up steadily in the library, if not yet in the laboratory.

At its most extreme, the influence of the reader's affective viewpoint on the constitution of the enacted subject manifests itself in the interpretive licenses taken by fashion, partisanship, zeitgeist, scholarly bent, not to mention ignorance and wishful reading. The output can stretch to the limit of inverting accepted portraits. Examples would be Milton's Satan as Romantic hero, or the digging for ignoble unconscious motive since Freud, or the

(re)polarizing of the sexes in feminism. A character's secret life is what we make of it, or simply make it, and what we make of it, however equal and attuned and responsive to the text's guidance, is inseparable from our own makeup.

At the same time, the influence between the experiential domains operates the other way, from the enacted to the reading subject. Our feeling may run with or against the hero, but we feel as we do, about him and his world, partly because of what we take him to feel.[60] As a master practitioner put it, "there are degrees of feeling—the muffled, the faint, the just sufficient, the barely intelligent . . . and the acute, the intense, the complete, in a word—the power to be finely aware and richly responsible. . . . We care, our curiosity and sympathy care, comparatively little to what happens to the stupid, the coarse, and the blind; care for it, and for the effects of it, at most as helping to precipitate what happens to the more deeply wondering, to the really sentient" (James 1962: 62; further discussed in Sternberg 1978 [1971]: 292ff., 1984). Feeling covers here the whole subjective life (awareness, ethics, intensity, delicacy, imagination), so that the more responsive the protagonist to the world, the more and the higher will the protagonist carry us with him. Other artistic credos may differ in the parameters, the relations, the interworking of subjectivity (e.g., a tale that, like *Madame Bovary*, Chabrol's as well as Flaubert's, or *The Good Soldier*, would have "our curiosity and sympathy care" exactly about "the stupid, the coarse, and the blind"). Yet the line of influence between experiencers (our implied mind-set varying for better or worse with theirs) nevertheless persists.

Also, where the order of telling distorts that of happening-and-feeling, happening as feeling, our response to the enacted subjects, high or low, negative or positive, may undergo anything from mild to violent change in the tortuous process of discovery about them: the primacy-to-recency models of impression-formation complicate things yet again. Thematically so, too, because they hammer home the point in and through the more or less drastic shifts of attitude devised from one stage to another. If our initial impression forms and its subsequent adjustment to data reforms the character's image, then the converse likewise holds. In other words, what we think about the character is both a determinant and a product not just of his or her apparent thought but also of their thought as it appears at the moment, always subject to all kinds of disclosure and development next: from well- to ill-disposed, say. Where would the bilaterality of the states of mind activated, ours and the dramatis personae's, so come to the fore as

60. On the need to correlate "virtual" with "actual" affectivity, see also Ryan 1991: 219–20.

under mutual revision in sequence? (On which more later.) Across all variables, though, the two-way traffic between domains of affect rules out the option for either experiencer per se, whether Brewer and Lichtenstein's for the audience or Stein's for "the protagonist."

This highlights a difference in typicality, at the time and beyond. The references given above (in note 58) already establish that Stein's impossible choice, with or without the idea of optionality, is nothing like a false start made by early cognitivism alone. Far from outgrown among psychologists—any more than the eye to the single, actional track that drives and circumscribes it—this agent-mindedness has gained breadth, elaborateness, even independence of "story" representation and analysis.[61]

As it happens, the later Stein herself has come to specialize in emotion proper, but without changing her old focus. Along with the persistent, only now concentrated interest in agentive affectivity, moreover, there recur kindred hallmarks of the story analytical line, such as the bias toward *enacted* response, knowledge, intentionality, goal-directedness, problem-solving. Thus, the inquiry will study either "how people [in life] represent and understand events that lead to emotional reactions and subsequent actions (Stein et al. 1993: 279) or how we comprehenders relate a narrative's "external events" to the character's "internal states of emotions, thoughts, beliefs, and goals" (Trabasso and Stein 1997: 265). So the experience in focus is either first-order, actual, lived *or* second-order, vicarious (virtual, mediate), lifelike. Where lived, there is of course no discourse frame around it to enable and guide and at will twist our own sequent experience of other "people." Where lifelike, the approach does not reckon with any such frame, as though people's immediate and personages' narrated "internal states" were one. Either way, the correlation between affective levels fails to materialize again, with the category mistake underlying the failure now in plain view and unmistakably traceable to the larger disciplinary action-mindedness or, largest, world-centerness.

61. "Readers make inferences about a character's emotional state. . . . A separate issue addresses the *reader's* affective responses to story events" (Magliano and Graesser 1991: 199). A recent article devoted to "narrative evaluation" will supply an example. "As readers understand each sentence, they have options as to whose perspective they take" in monitoring the "life experience" (e.g., "thoughts and feelings") of a character: the character's own perspective, from within the story world, or the author's, or in a think-aloud experiment, the experimental framework's (Özyürek and Trabasso 1997: 326ff). As typically, regardless of the viewpoint taken, the so-called evaluative performances documented and analyzed there bear no comparison, and indeed no relation at all, to the literary critical standard. Nor does the isolation from accepted wisdom on character and thought report help. Once the "internal response" of the agent as such becomes the focus of analysis even in a rudimentary tale, cognitivism is simply out of its depth without the necessary poetic tools and training: the incongruity of the Bakhtinian quote at the end (ibid.: 333) only points the moral.

Far less does Stein try, or any cognitivist account known to me nearly manage, to integrate the yet larger dynamics of narrative—whether those of comprehension and emotion or what happens to the characters in or out of their mental worlds and what happens to the reader in the discourse process contrived about them. Of these pairs, a cross between the former members has instead stolen the show: the modelings of intelligence as conceptual knowledge and of narrative as actional intelligibility reinforce each other to justify, as it were, the cognitive field's name.

So much for the disciplinary incongruity of cognitivism veering toward the discoursively ("structurally") affective, à la Brewer and Lichtenstein: not, moreover, in touch with or even added to what the agents feel but in place of it. From a larger, historical, cross-disciplinary viewpoint, the emphasis on the audience's affectivity marks a regression to the very beginnings of inquiry into discourse—and into the mind at large—with the ancient Greek philosophers. First, in *The Republic*, Plato (inspiring a cavalcade of "Puritans" ever since) condemned the emotions stirred by literary art to the detriment of truth and reason. Whether sad or joyful, their vicariousness makes them insidious, because "what we enjoy in others will inevitably react upon ourselves." By their mimetic delight, they empower the soul's "irrational and idle part . . . curry favor with the senseless element . . . [become] our rulers when they ought to be ruled, to the end that we may be better and happier men" (603e–608b; trans. Paul Shorey). Then Aristotle built the emotions into a poetics of impact, chiefly regulated by affects of varying generality: from the pleasure given by all mimesis as such, literature included, through the startling turns of the complex plot, to tragic pity and fear. Similarly with his *Rhetoric*, only more foreseeably so, because in persuading an audience, the appeal to their feelings suggests itself even a means to the shaping of mind into the desired like-mindedness with the persuader.

From such classical beginnings, there issued a, if not the, tradition of literary, rhetorical, and aesthetic criticism that persisted in strength over the millennia, up to the early twentieth century at least. Throughout, in numberless variations, this line gears discourse to impact (comic, tragic, moral, persuasive, illusionist, beautiful, sublime, empathetic, etc.) rather than the postRomantic, Anglo-American way, to meaning. Taken as a matter of course nowadays, this rage for meaning—whether in literary critical, semiotic, deconstructionist, pragmaticist, or "cognitive" fashion—actually marks a recent turn in the priorities of discourse study. A victory of rationality, or of human symbolic agency, or of humanlike computational machinery, or of the dysnarrativia syndrome, or of Puritanism if you will,

for now at least.[62] The emphasis thrown by Brewer and company on affectivity accordingly emerges as a throwback toward the now disfavored, suppressed half: not such a bad re-turn, except that it newly overreaches itself in gravitating from the modern back to the premodern imbalance. Across the ups and downs of scholarly history, as I have often argued before, we must integrate feeling with meaning at long last within a unified approach to discourse; and the re-turning cognitivist imbalance (or, in immediate descent, translation) serves to show afresh how my narrative theory does precisely that, in line with the genre's own mental spectrum.

Generically, indeed, the affective reductionism à la Brewer and Lichtenstein is oddest of all. Not only does it freshly preclude the dynamics of what I called interaffective transactions, by keeping the emoter's role for the audience rather than, as usual, for the agent. The change of affected sides apart, it multiply confuses narrative, or "story," with the rest of discourse.

Even in its own terms, for one thing, this reduction does not nearly go far enough. Instead of properly keeping the germane constitutive affectivity down to the suspense/curiosity/surprise trio, we recall, Brewer et al. lump these together with the nongeneric "humor, sexual arousal, and anger." If so, what's more, then the list, in principle, extends to an assortment of affects that have elsewhere been mixed with or usually just mistaken for narrative differentials. Apart from umbrellas like interest or pleasure or enjoyment or reportability, the nondifferentials added since by other cognitivists include illusion ("transport"), irony, empathy, identification, sadness, happiness, tears, disgust, contempt, dishabituation ("making strange"), for example. (To extrapolate only from Wilensky 1983: 583; Oatley and Johnson-Laird 1987; Gerrig 1993; Miall and Kuinen 1994; Dijkstra et al. 1995; Oatley 1995.)[63] In turn, if the door (re)opens to these—all long known

62. Even when Fish (1980) defiantly embraces "the affective fallacy," long attacked by New Critics in their battle for "the cognitive" (Wimsatt 1958 [1954]), the emphasis on signification persists—only now as experienced, rather than objectified. In this usage, the diametric terms have changed status while always oriented to the modern object and product of study: the quarrel is really about where meaning exists in interpretation, between text and reader. Consider also the response to criticism made in these pages (Richardson and Steen 2003) by the guest editors of the special issue on "Literature and the Cognitive Revolution": "We have no interest in ignoring the 'visceral impact' of literary texts (in fact, we expect that recent work in neurobiology and cognitive neuroscience may do much to help elucidate that impact)." Quite true, complete with the opening double negative and the ensuing modalized prospection on the light derivable from brain science. Within the original issue, though, see Hernadi 2002 for more active interest in such "impact" and some reference to available wisdom nearer to home.

63. Some, moreover, proceed to subdivide narrative into varieties governed by one of these nondifferentials. E.g., "romances [make the subgenre] for feeling happy and overcoming difficulties, action stories for feeling anger, thrillers for feeling anxious, weeping for sadness, satires for contempt as well as erotic stories for sexual arousal" (Oatley 1995: 69). Even assum-

in general theories of literature or aesthetics—why exclude any affect from narrative? Such lists are, therefore, arbitrary and indiscriminate at once, over- and under-selective, indeed haphazard. So they will continue in the absence of a rationale, one that will sort out the miscellany by reference to a theory of narrative in both its narrativity and its protean surface textuality.

In my terms, order would emerge as follows. To start with the surface, or the finished discourse, narrative is incomparably protean: its boundless range of admissible elements (in the widest sense) matches and motivates its range of elicitable effects, affects included. Reconsider why cognitivist action-mindedness so goes against the grain and the practice of the genre. Among discourse kinds, the narrative text is the most composite in its basics and the most hospitable to cross-discourse properties but also the most encyclopedic, virtually all-assimilative, regarding components proper to other kinds. As early as the Bible's historiography, the genre swallows up its rivals—law, poetry, prophecy, catalogue, wisdom, epigram—including those deployed on their own elsewhere in the canon. With the advent of the novel, a *Tristram Shandy* will incorporate the entire repertoire of writing, even beyond literature (e.g., homily, criticism, philosophy, medicine, jurisprudence), as well as an array of storytelling forms, into its twisted autobiographical march. Nor will it draw the line at graphics or musical scores. Outside language, in film, opera, or the theater, the syncretism of the telling already begins with the medium. Where such heterogeneous elements enter and compose ad lib, response follows suit: the Proteus Principle, celebrating the many-to-many correspondence between forms and functions, reaches its optimum.

Far from affectless, as the sheer action understander would have it, the narrative corpus therefore elicits the most assorted, and potentially all, discourse affects. But, against the casual or wholesale affect-importer, their elicitability there does not yet make them integral or exclusive to narrative—conditions for narrativity—on a par with the dynamics of suspense/curiosity/surprise between times. Rather, it challenges narrative theory both to mark off in sharp, principled terms the genre's affective constants from cross-discourse variables *and* to systematize their flexible interrelation in generic practice.[64] How, that is, would the working of humor, anger, empathy, disgust, making strange (etc.) within narrative differ from their counterparts outside the genre? If shared, or rather sharable, because dis-

ing that the affects named fit the respective corpora, all have extranarrative triggers and manifestations as well.

64. On this double challenge, with assorted subject matter and immediate bearings on the case in point, see Sternberg 1978 [1971]: esp. 70–89, 93–98, 134–55, 161–64, 221–25; 1984; 1985: esp. 268ff.; 1990a; 1992: 528ff.; 1999: 330–76; and 2001a.

pensable, how will these affects yet grow special? What can a tale do with them, or with us regarding and through them, that can't be done by an aphorism, a homily, a still life, a descriptive passage, a "projectible" figure of or in "space," a treatise on cabbages and kings?

As with all common discourse properties incorporated in narrative, the difference lies in their amenability to its unique prospective/retrospective/recognitive dynamics between the narrated and the narrating order: humor may turn bitter in the process, illusion shatter, irony grow double-edged, anger change targets, empathy deepen or evaporate or reverse, making strange pall. Once narrativized, the variables of response come to operate on us not just protractedly (as they would if elicited by an arresting state on view) nor just sequentially (as they might elsewhere, if experienced in a time order) but intersequentially, for so unfold the events and characters to which we respond in narrative, and the three constant gap-filling processes by and along which we respond to them. Attached to the genre's universals, in other words, those variables of affectivity enjoy for once the maximum operative strength and suppleness given to represented experience, since they likewise compound at will all temporal resources: both sheer duration with endless linear changeability and, apropos the twin forces for change, belated disclosure in the telling with new development in the told world itself. And their operation, moreover, forks out into the basic strategies of attitude-molding already invoked with respect to value judgment and inter-affective play.

Reconsider in this light the presentational models I term the "Rise and Fall of First Impressions," "First Impressions Complicated and Qualified," and the "Rhetoric of Anticipatory Caution" (Sternberg 1976; 1978 [1971]: 90ff.; 1985, esp. 309–64, 445–74). Each boasts its own hierarchy of generic master interests, hence its own gapping way with the order of occurrence, hence its own twofold dynamics whereby to absorb, energize, and co-process (inter alia) all extrageneric affects as well. The Rise-and-Fall model, for example, specializes in narrative surprise, hence in covert gaps about the narrated world to be abruptly disclosed, hence in reversals of viewpoint that may extend to every feeling generated in blissful ignorance and then twisted round under the pressure of belated knowledge. The extrageneric feelings that thus become reversible via narrativizing (as also, within the other strategies, complicable or anticipatable) are too numerous to list here, or so much as to extrapolate from my detailed analyses of how they transform under co-option. But they ineluctably include all those that have been studied in poetics or aesthetics at large, and the haphazard subset that cognitivists have recently misattributed per se to narrative, even narrativity. The glances above at the genre-specific metamorphoses of humor, illusion,

anger, irony, empathy, defamiliarizing, and so forth will suffice to establish the rule they exemplify. Try thinking of equivalent affects in the rest of discourse—a portrait in color or words, say—and you will appreciate the categorical difference that intersequencing makes to response as a whole.[65]

The difference sharpens afresh from another angle, suggested by another misapplication of this theory in transfer to cognitivism. At the same time that variables get lumped together (instead of being synthesized) with narrative constants, the reduction perpetrated on the generic constants of response themselves goes much too far. Their flattening to sheer affectivity à la Brewer and Lichtenstein is inconsistent with the authors' own repeated appeal to storied meaning ("information," "significance," "event," "character," "outcome," all semantic, narrowly "cognitive" entities) in defining them.[66] Nor could it be otherwise. If consistent, it would virtually denarrativize narrative in pushing the genre down to the lowest common denominator of temporal experience—even outside art, language, representation. Among other key distinctions vanished here in cognitivist transfer is that I draw between suspense/curiosity/surprise as universals of sequence and as universals of narrative sequence: the former invariants possibly coming down to pure, referenceless as well as actionless affectivity, the latter necessarily subsuming, referentializing, and emplotting them to engage our whole mind.

As universals of sequence at large, briefly, the three master interests attach to any discourse and any experience that unfolds in time, regardless of medium, genre, text level, or text element. Thus *suspense*, as the cross-

65. Closer comparisons with the descriptive, space-oriented text—polar to the temporality of narrative—abound in the references given in note 64. See also Sternberg 1981, 1983a, 1990a: 72–85 for how this polar intergeneric disparity persists even amid apparent cosequencing, and Yacobi 1995 for its effect on interart traffic.

66. For a large-scale cognitivist parallel, see the antithesis in world-orientedness drawn by Zwaan (1993: 38, 61–121, 1996: 249–50) between news report and literary narrative, or their readings. The first discourse kind allegedly privileges, while the second weakens, the buildup of a "situation model," i.e., of the text's image of reality, from the enchained action to its arena. (In Kintsch 2000: 204–14, the originator of the situation model draws an analogous line.) This taxonomy also appeals to a similar teleology: "the conventional goals of newspaper reading (the acquisition of knowledge about real world events) vs. literary reading (reading for pleasure)." The differences amid parallelism are no less suggestive, especially Zwaan's replacement of "storied" by "literary" narrative as the report's subgeneric other and the absence in his account of any specific narrativizing of the "pleasure" catchall. His bid for interdisciplinarity is actually grounded in Jakobson's (1960) idea of the poetic function as antireferential, modeled upon poetry instead and dubious even there. Jakobson himself, though, might well shy at the thesis that "literary [and, specifically, narrative] readers activate *no referential expectations whatsoever*" (Zwaan 1993: 139). And were it not for such expectations about some future development, how would "a successful literary author" create the pleasurable "aesthetic effect" of "suspense" (Zwaan 1996: 243, 247)?

sequential dynamics of prospection, arises whenever we look ahead to a resolution: the uncertainty and expectancy and drive toward closure may then bear on a paradoxical theme, on a seesawing argument, on a retardatory (e.g., Jamesian) sentence, on an analogy oscillating between likeness and antithesis, on a metaphor equivocally projectible into space, on a tense sound pattern in verse or in music, no less than on a conflictual action. "What will happen in the sequel?"—in the open discoursive "future" yet to be actualized, traversed, experienced, if possible finalized—recurs across the suspended forms. Similarly with their mates hinging on the textual "past," on the disclosure rather than the development of (in)coherence: the remedy (if any) to ill-formedness lies ahead of us processors, as always, but the trouble has already been sown in the partial givens behind us. *Curiosity*, with its dynamics of retrospection, then adheres to any question mark that lingers and pulls our mind backward while we go forward. The lingering retrospective puzzlement may concern a verbal ambiguity yet unsettled, a musical dissonance, an opaque cinematic montage, a breach of thematic or stylistic norm, *or* a felt gap in event order, among the rest. So can these all generate a *surprise* dynamics, if unperceived at the time: first mistaken by us for coherent, then disclosed to enforce a repatterning of the hidden trouble spot and whatever has intervened in regard to it. Throughout, as a force for unrest, a spur to well-formed arrest, the effect must have an affective component; and, where involving a nonsemantic discourse or level (e.g., pure sound organization), need have no other.

This disproves the near-axiomatic belief in the field that affection entails cognition, cognition precedes and triggers and shapes affection. The very title of one important book, *The Cognitive Structure of Emotions*, encapsulates the discipline-wide premise: "Taking the perspective of empirical psychology and cognitive science, we start with the assumption that emotions arise as a result of the way in which the situations that initiate them are construed by the experiencer"; and "construing the world is a cognitive process," a matter of "knowledge representation" (Ortony et al. 1988: 1, 4). By now, this misbelief recalls the misfortunes of feeling at the hands of others: its neglect vis-à-vis, or its divorce from, or its annexation to, understanding. Across wide disparities in enterprise and treatment, these all ring the changes on the party line that would put the cognitive *before* the affective (in temporal, causal, analytic, and/or scalar order).

On the Ortony at al. variant as elsewhere, the "beforeness" is predetermined by the kind of stimuli or triggers stipulated, namely, "events, agents, or objects" (ibid.: 18ff.). Inversely, the priority of affective variables greeting us in the discourse (e.g., the label "tragedy") or brought by us to it (e.g., individual mood), and in either case predisposing us somehow toward

the represented arena, gets forgotten. With world-items alone triggering response—and the frame of mind in which we encounter these phenomena left out of account—cognition must indeed come, and come first, to provide matter and impetus for emotion. Even with these provisos, however, once emotion has been aroused, it would in turn operate on all subsequent cognition: the two-way traffic, or feedback, for which I have been arguing in various junctures would reestablish itself. Granted that readers need some data to form an attitude toward Elizabeth Bennet, the more you come to like her, the more vulnerable you become to her overdrawn image of Darcy: less attentive to the cautions latent in the data about *him*. As already argued, such running bilateral influence between faculties of the human mind is necessarily the rule, however numberless its options in practice. The posited before/after, concept-hence-affect order of mental workings holds at most (discounting *pre*disposition at large) for the first occurrence, or better, the first registering, of the first world-item encountered.

More principled yet, while affectless cognition is humanly impossible—as against the reading machine or Joyce's God—cognitionless affectivity is a fact, and always a factor, of experience. Life and discourse, especially that of art, abound in extracognitive, purely affective elements, aspects, configurations, sequences of the kinds I instanced: sound, style, color, abstract form . . .

Even among approaches to mind, cognitive psychology has much to learn and to adapt from Gestaltist works on such nonconceptual pattern-formation, as already done elsewhere in and beyond visual aesthetics, their forte. A classic of musical theory nicely generalizes the option of linear gestalt-without-reference for the entire art. "What a musical stimulus or a series of stimuli indicate and point to," Leonard Meyer (1970 [1956]: 35) insists, "are not extramusical concepts and objects but other musical events which are about to happen." And once the prospective, suspenseful intramusical "events" have happened to us, you might add, their resolution also affects the "happenings" that went before, with retrospective/recognitive adjustments, which in turn affect our further prospection on what will ensue. The nonrepresentational, one-track sequence then moves within the mind only, constructing its own past, present, and future as a history of experienced emotion, regardless of the outside world. Across the verbal/musical line, the sequential constant is one, independent of cognition, though twinnable with it, its own lifelike past-present-future sequentiality included.

This last, richest variant is the law, and strength, of narrative. Among all genres, narrative alone perforce makes things happen to characters inhabiting and traversing some represented spacetime, as well as to ourselves in

developing and disclosing their fortunes along another, plotted, trajectory. Narrative therefore uniquely carries movement in time to the limit of interplay between the times of real or fictional living and discoursed telling/reading, between action and communication. Hence the widest possible spectrum of mental response comes into play—subsuming those of other genres, levels, elements, under its all-assimilative teleologic—and the universals of suspense/curiosity/surprise thicken accordingly. As either definitional temporality involves a world in motion, so that we shuttle between the reconstructed and the communicated flux, narrative could not, even if it would, reduce to a line of affects, in the manner of sound sequence. How could it when its very genre-specific interests entail gaps in the mobile world's representation—in chronology, occurrence, character, thought, enchainment, perspective, ontic key—and representation in turn entails signification, comprehension, evaluation? Just compare the makings of suspense about the destiny of a favorite protagonist and of a formal pattern.

Further, what with the narrative process subsuming other lines and levels, why even reduce it to bridging the emotion/signification extremes, to a simple both/and, as if human discourse or psychology or their encounter were bipolar? And while the poles cover too little between them, doesn't each cover too many loosely kindred experiences? Instead, the dynamics of reading ramifies into a whole network, where the traditional cognitive/affective forces decompose and newly compose with others. "It may therefore play on such axes of response to discourse as the formal, the perceptual, the representational, the otherwise semiotic or semanticized, the psychic, the aesthetic, the logical, the ideological, all variously interpenetrating" (Sternberg 1992: 522). The more variously because the network played on can shift with each mindscape implicit in discourse or invoked by it—as well as among our performances—so that the variants will resist standardizing even within a future theory of mind attuned to the manifold of experience. Whatever will emerge as the truth about the branching out of inner life, if humanly constant, it needn't govern communicative, least of all narrative activity. Discourse constructs and fiction invents at will images of such truth, as of others, to the endless pluralizing of mental plurality, with radical interdisciplinary implications. (Compare Bruner 1990: 13–15, 31–65 on folk psychology.) Assuming the standard bipolar account, however, the coordination would grow less versatile, not more reducible to either unipolarity.

Indeed, this irreducibility would go without saying did Brewer et al. think through so much as the world-bound, representational concepts of gap and gap-filling hypothesis, perceptibly elided by them in transfer. As it is, since their imbalance and disjuncture of human faculties inverts cogni-

tivism's cognitive bias, the redress has to change emphases accordingly. Vis-à-vis narrative, making sense of the gappy represented sequence, between sequences, among sequential forces, leads the way to everything: even in order to feel the generic suspense/curiosity/surprise, we must first understand as best we can at the time what happened, is happening, and might happen in the world's arena. Characters or doings (unlike sounds or shapes) must form objects of intelligible reference, if short of univocal representation at the moment, before we can start to form attitudes about them that will color this reference and launch the two-way, manifold play of responses thereafter. So, when Spiro (1982: 81) deplores "the bias toward considering cold cognition as antecedent to affect," or Brewer et al. polarize the two between narrative varieties or theories, or Miall (1988: 259–61) declares literary affect "logically prior" as well as superior to the "cognitive processes of comprehension" modeled in story grammars and schemas, or Zwaan (1993, 1996) de-referentializes poetic narrative in favor of "pleasure," the overreaction in disciplinary infighting only obscures anew the generic must (as against the universal, reality-free minimum) of sequence processing. While activating the entire mind—however you choose to divide it—the genre yet begins with an order of mental priorities in the reading amid principled equality and co-determination.

(To be continued in the next issue)

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