Passions and Affections in British Philosophy of the seventeenth Century

Almost every major British philosopher of the seventeenth century, as well as many a minor one, wrote extensively on the passions: Francis Bacon, Thomas Hobbes, Henry More and Lord Shaftesbury incorporated them as basic elements in their psychology and ethics, and sometimes even their ontology. Only Locke appears to have had little to say about the passions, and his disregard may itself be philosophically significant. Yet curiously little philosophical secondary literature examines what were then dubbed 'passions' and 'affections', roughly coinciding with our 'emotions'. This indifference contrasts sharply with the recent proliferation of intellectual histories of the passions during the general early modern period; whereas Descartes and Spinoza are popular subjects, and Hobbes is included in most surveys, other British authors rarely receive more than a mention.[1] Their neglect cannot be attributed to any shortage of material, whether in philosophy or in other fields. Restricting the scope to uncontroversially philosophical literature still leaves us with a mass of material and no obvious framework for understanding it. For not only is the period intellectually unsettled, discussions of the passions typically exist at the intersections of several philosophical sub-disciplines, without fitting fully in any.

Yet over eight thousand books published in English during the seventeenth century mention 'passion' in one or more places, and the count grows if we include 'affection'.[2] Although not all of those works address the passions thematically, many do. Some are works of largely forgotten figures, but they nonetheless reward

[1] Surveys include Levi 1964, Gardiner 1970, Rorty 1982, James 1997, 1998a and 1998b, and Schmitter 2008; a few recent anthologies are Gaukroger 1998, Kahn, Saccamano & Coli 2006, and Paster, Rowe & Floyd-Wilson 2004.
[2] See 'Early English Books On-Line' (2010), which records at least one instance of 'passion' in over eight percent of its database of seventeenth-century Anglophone works.

investigation, since they are typically erudite and informative, and often cast familiar patterns of early modern thought in a new light. What follows is an attempt to furnish a template for interpreting the hold the passions had on British philosophical thought of the seventeenth century. A noteworthy feature is the practical approach most authors adopt to the topic: the passions, they declare, are an inescapable part of human life, and often a salutary one, but also prone to excess, error, and misdirection. As such, they offer techniques of remediation and proper government to promote the ends of morality, happiness, health, civil peace, human management and whatever else is part of human flourishing. In doing so, many also venture into ontology, philosophical psychology, and natural philosophy.

1. Texts

Preceded by such sixteenth-century works as Juan Luis Vives's *de Anima et Vita* (1538), and Timothy Bright's *Treatise of Melancholy* (1586), the century began with Thomas Wright's *Passions of the Mind in General* (1604, 1st edition 1601 as *The Passions of the Mind*).[3] Wright was a Jesuit, although with royalist allegiances, and his work showed the broad erudition typical of his time. Using a largely Aristotelian-Scholastic framework informed by humanist learning, it aimed to show how to moderate 'inordinate passions'. At much the same time, Francis Bacon was at work on his *Essays* (1st edition 1597, multiple subsequent editions), which treated particular passions and their management, along with lengthy discussions of the virtues, temperaments, and conditions that shape the dynamics of human life. His *Advancement of Learning* (1605), and even more, the Latin version *De dignitate et augmentis scientiarum* (1623), explained the importance of examining the passions

[3] In the case of texts where there is no modern edition, I have preferred the earliest complete edition, but modernized spelling, capitalization and punctuation.

and affections under the rubric of moral philosophy, and the 'culture of the mind' in general. Other works of interest appeared in the early decades, including Robert Burton's remarkable *Anatomy of Melancholy* (1st edition 1621, multiple subsequent editions), which combined humanist learning and medical theory within a sometimes comic and often ironic framework, as well as the short play *Pathomachia, or the Battle of the Affections* (1630). In 1640, the Protestant divine Edward Reynolds published *A Treatise of the Passions and Faculties of the Soul of Man*, a bulky work offering another roughly Aristotelian-Scholastic approach to the management of the passions. Reynolds was most concerned with the 'middle' passions distinctive to humans by their sensitivity to reason. He aimed to treat them in a 'moral' discourse, supplemented by 'natural' and 'civil' ones, to equip us with the self-knowledge to correct the errors of the passions. In 1644, Sir Kenelm Digby published *Two Treatises* in Paris; a London edition followed the next year. Both treatises discuss the passions, with the first offering a comprehensive account of physiology and philosophical psychology framed by Digby's own novel physical theory, which melded aspects of the mechanism coming into vogue with Aristotelian principles. Hobbes wrote no single work on the passions, but they figure in almost every general account he gave of the body, human being and the state. Although his views changed over time, works such as the *Elements of Law* and *Leviathan* generally understood the passions in naturalist and materialist terms as a set of motions within the flux induced in the human body through interactions with its environment. The passions are the motions proximate to our voluntary actions, and as such, they constitute our motives, making them fundamental to both our psychology and political life.

English booksellers also published books from continental, particularly French authors, and there was a lively trade in the translations of major works. For this

reason, as well as through personal contacts, French approaches to philosophical psychology and natural philosophy became increasingly important (see S. Brown 1996: 4), while the influence of Aristotelian accounts of the soul waned during the second half of the century, at least outside the universities (see Kraye 2002: 283, S. Brown 1996: 6, Rogers 1996: 46). Thomas Stanley's massive *History of Philosophy* (1655–1662) explicitly took the French atomist Pierre Gassendi as its model for discussing Plato, Aristotle, Zeno, and the Epicureans, with particular attention to their various understandings of passions and affections. An even more prominent devotee of neo-Epicureanism was the royal physician Walter Charleton, who published his *Natural History of the Passions* in 1674 (2nd edition 1701). The work as a whole endorsed an Epicurean ethical practice valorizing psychological tranquility, although it relied just as heavily on Descartes's *Passions of the Soul* (1649) for its details. Descartes was also an important source for Henry More, whose *Enchiridion Ethicum* was published in 1668, and translated as *An Account of Virtue* in 1690. More lacked Charleton's interests in physiology and medicine, but borrowed extensively from Descartes to explain the role of the passions in achieving virtue and happiness.

Towards the close of the century, John Norris and Mary Astell (the latter anonymously) published their correspondence as *Letters concerning the Love of God* (1695). This exchange began with Astell's querying the consequences of the occasionalist view Norris had adopted in his *Theory and Regulation of Love* (1688). Astell argued that Norris's position made God responsible for all our perceptions, even painful sensations and passions and devalued love directed at our neighbors and fellows. The subsequent correspondence not only clarified Norris's views, it allowed them jointly to develop accounts of the nature of the passion of love, the relation between the love of God and the love of fellow humans, and the place of other virtues

and pleasures. Yet another interlocutor joined the fray when Damaris Masham published her *Discourse Concerning the Love of God* (1696). But Masham took exception to the Malebranchian view that only God could be credited as the agent of our pleasures, and thus was the only proper object of love; indeed, she maintained that rather than describing a passion central to human morality and happiness, the view promoted by Norris and Astell substituted a dangerous emphasis on the contemplative for the true virtues of the active life. Shortly thereafter, in 1699, Shaftesbury published an early version of the *Inquiry Concerning Virtue and Merit*, later incorporated into his *Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times* (1711). The passions and 'affections' were central to the work: as motives for the actions of sentient creatures, they form the focus of evaluative judgments. Those evaluations take on a genuinely moral character for creatures with the additional ability to reflect on and respond affectively to their own affections. Shaftesbury argued that properly moderated, our natural affections incline towards the public good, the touchstone of all judgments of worth. Since indulging our natural impulses is the surest path to happiness, he concluded that 'virtue and interest may be found at last to agree' (1999: 167). In taking this stance, Shaftesbury showed himself indebted to More, but his work was also a turning point, inaugurating the theories of moral sense and sentiments developed by such eighteenth-century philosophers as Francis Hutcheson, David Hume and Adam Smith.

2. Terminology

In the early decades of the seventeenth century, talk of the passions surfaced most commonly in religious tracts, particularly sermons; other sources included medical treatises, works on rhetoric, plays, political texts, poetry, drama, pedagogical

discourses, guides for self- and other-improvement, and even drawing manuals. Such works provide a kind of folk-theory of the passions that shaped the available vocabulary, all the more so since the boundaries between philosophy and other scholarly letters were not marked as they are now. The most common use of 'passion' in the first two decades of the century, however, was to refer to Christ's passion, and by extension the sufferings of martyrs. This use waned over the course of the century, even in sermons. But a sense of the ancient usage from which it derived lingered: in keeping with its Latin etymology and ultimate derivation from the Greek *pathos*, 'passion' often simply meant the inverse of action, something undergone, or as *An English Expositor, or Complete Dictionary* put it, 'a suffering' (Bullokar 1680: n.p., see also Wright, 1604: 7). Because activity takes ontological priority, passions were often considered imperfections or corruptions. In this sense, passions could be identified with disturbances, perturbations, and illness. But this use too lost ground over the century.

In many cases, 'passion' was used interchangeably with 'affection' (e.g., Wright 1604: 7–8; Reynolds 1640: 45; Stanley 1701: 590) to mean a modification, or changeable property induced in a thing, although 'affection' might cover any attribute of the body or soul. But 'passion' and 'affection' were commonly restricted to the 'passions of the mind,' understood as 'motions in the soul', a psychological sense that grew strongly in the second half of the century. They often referred particularly to affective states — those states understood to involve pain, pleasure, or some mental disturbance (Stanley 1680: 202). Sometimes they were restricted yet further: 'affections' to benevolent or amorous emotions, and 'passions' to vehement emotions, or the outbursts expressing them. Drawing from the associations with perturbation or illness gave 'passion' a flavor of violence and irrationality, although it could also

simply describe either the object of pursuit or the zeal of the pursuing. Although these senses came to supersede the earlier ones, they were not predominant in the seventeenth century. At the same time, familiar terms such as 'emotion' or 'sentiment' lacked their current meanings: 'emotion' did not name a general psychological category until the early nineteenth century, while the understanding of 'sentiment' as a feeling, opinion or emotion showed up late in the seventeenth century and only spread in the eighteenth century.

3. Background and Context

Tracing how various authors drew from their intellectual roots can help guide us through the thicket of available concepts. Most of the works are littered with allusions to other writers, sometimes to display humanist credentials, as in Wright, Reynolds, and Burton, sometimes to pledge fealty to philosophical positions, as in Charleton, More, and later, Norris and Astell, and sometimes simply to identify a target for attack — as almost all authors did with the Stoics. What follows are only the more obvious influences for deciphering the palimpsest of the texts.

3.1 *Augustinianism*

As in most other arenas of seventeenth-century life, religious doctrines shaped approaches to the passions, with original sin providing a ready explanation of why our passions stand in need of correction (Wright 1604: 2, Reynolds 1640: 44). One Calvinist catechism of the late sixteenth century indicted our passions as part of our corrupted state, requiring children to declare 'the affections of the heart, as love, joy, hope, desire, etc., are moved and stirred to that which is evil to embrace it, and they are never stirred unto that which is good unless it be to eschew it' (Perkins 1970: 151; see Gill 2006: 8). Yet despite the long shadow Calvinism cast over the first half of the

century, none of the authors considered here issued blanket condemnations of the passions, even when seeking remedies for the passions. Instead, many cited Augustine with approval, whose temperate anti-Pelagianism allowed him to acknowledge our passions as fallen without denouncing them wholesale. Wright, Reynolds, and Burton all referred to Augustine (or 'Austin') repeatedly, and both Wright (1604: 15–17) and Reynolds (1640: 48–50) borrowed his criticisms of Stoic ideals of *apatheia*. Augustinian influence also grew as it was filtered through the French neo-Augustinians of the Congregation of the Oratory, such as Jean-François Senault, whose *De l'Usage des Passions* was translated in 1649 (reissued in 1671), followed by other works. Towards the end of the century, Norris and Astell relied heavily on the thought of Nicolas Malebranche; several translations of the *Search After Truth* appeared in 1694–5, and again in 1700. The Augustinian approach informed a number of defenses for the passions: both the Jesuit Wright (1604: 13) and the conciliatory Protestant Reynolds claimed that only our corruption has set the passions against reason, concluding that 'the passions are the 'best servants, but the worst masters which our Nature can have' (Reynolds 1640: 46). It also explains the focus of those authors who, like Senault, 'embrace the opinion of Saint Augustine, and . . . maintain with him, that love is the only passion which doth agitate us, or hath operation in us' (1649: 26, cf. More, Norris and Astell). Norris and Astell later adopted Malebranche's views to maintain that original sin has diverted our love from its proper object and mixed it with desire (1695: 48–9, 95). Astell particularly identifies 'Misapplication and unsuitable Management' of the passions as the source of emotional woe (1695: 130), for which the proper remedy is to cultivate a 'regulated' love for God.

3.2 *Aristotelianism & the Schools*

For all Augustine's popularity, Aristotle's philosophical and moral psychology remained a touchstone for almost all authors. Most writers in the first half of the century adopted the Aristotelian tripartite soul, which located the passions in the sensitive part, yet made them answerable to reason (e.g., Wright 1604: 46f; Reynolds 1640: 62; and in idiosyncratic fashion, Charleton 1701: 54–5). But the importance of the model diminished over the century: Norris suggested that use of the Aristotelian division had become a mere 'popular mode of speaking', which he rejected (1695: 110). Aristotle's account of virtue as hitting a mean between extremes likewise informed the commonplace that moderation in the passions is desirable and excess to be avoided, although this too became something of a cliché. Most importantly, many authors (Wright 1604: 22; Burton 2001: 258; Reynolds 1640: 39–40; Senault 1649: [22]–23) took over the canonical list of eleven passions first formulated in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*: love, hate, desire (concupiscence, coveting), aversion (flight), joy (delight, pleasure), sadness (grief, pain), hope, despair, fear, daring (audacity), anger (ire, indignation). Yet widespread influence did not preclude criticism (e.g., Reynolds 1640: 42). For instance, Henry More situated his account of virtue and happiness within Aristotle's (1690: 4–10), and tried to assimilate Aristotle to his own notion of our 'boniform faculty' (1690: 16). At the same time, he criticized Aristotle for failing to grant the full worth of the passions (e.g., 1690: 18). In contrast, Bacon pretty much ignored Aristotle in his *Essays* (see Vickers 1996: 207), while Hobbes denounced Aristotle for spreading 'darknesse from vain philosophy' (*Lev* 46.32), and dismissed the view that a 'mediocrity' of passions is desirable *(EL* 17.14; see also *Behemoth* in Hobbes 1839–45: 218). Even so, both Hobbes and Bacon seem to have valued Aristotle's *Rhetoric*.

3.3 *Stoicism, Epicureanism and their Critics*

The Stoics came in for much censure for their supposedly sweeping dismissal of the passions in favor of 'a *Stoical Apathy*' (Astell 1695: 130; cf. *Pathomachia* 1630: 50; More 1690: 34, but contrast Wright 1604: 50). Although most treated them simply as a group, a few authors singled out Cicero or Seneca. Burton cited the *Tusculan Disputations*' characterization of the passions as perturbations and disease (2001: 40), a view he exploited for 'melancholia'. Yet Burton also maintained that our dispositions for such diseases are part of our natural condition, so that only fools and Stoics are untroubled by passions (2001: 172). A few authors advanced criticisms of specific Stoic tenets: Bacon, for one, defended anger (1858: 510), and Reynolds found the basis for their diagnosis of passions as '*Aegritudo Animi,* a sickness and Perturbation', in the Aristotelian view that motion involves some kind of imperfection (1640: 47, see also 59). In contrast to their 'senseless apathy', he defended the passions as good 'in act', a form of 'natural motion, ordained for the perfection and conservation of the Creature'.

But the Stoics did not figure merely as a target for defenders of the passions. Although 'senseless apathy' won few champions, the ideal of freedom from 'perturbation' held wide appeal as the goal for rehabilitating the passions. This conception came very close to the Epicurean ideal of *ataraxia* (see Kraye 1998: 1295, 1298), and many of the terms British authors favored, such as quietness, or tranquility, could express *apatheia* or *ataraxia* equally well (especially since *tranquillitas* was used by Latin authors to translate both Greek terms). Some authors also emphasized the importance of not being committed to what lies outside of our control (Charleton 1701: 175–9), an emphasis often associated with the Stoics, but found in several traditions and probably transmitted to Charleton through Descartes.

As this example shows, it is often difficult to identify a particular source for such early modern concepts. Still, some terminology seems distinctively Stoic, such as *perturbatio* (Reynolds 1640: 49), 'watchfulness' (Digby 1644: 389–391), and 'circumspection or caution' (Charleton 1701: 96). Nonetheless, neo-Stoicism appears to have held sway less among early modern English theorists of the passions than with continental ones, even though such important works as Justus Lipsius's *de Constantia* and Guillaime du Vair's *Morall Philosophy of the Stoicks* went through several printings in England during the century.

The reception of Epicureanism was also mixed. Astell condemned the school as advocating mere pleasure-seeking, displaying a 'sottishness' both 'vain and unsatisfactory', and 'childish and unwise' (1695: 128). Despite his associations with Epicureanism (Kraye 1998: 1297–8), Hobbes criticized those who suppose 'that the felicity of this life consisteth . . . in the repose of a mind satisfied', arguing 'there is no such *Finis ultimus* (utmost aim) nor *Summum Bonum* (greatest good)' since life itself is restless pursuing and procuring (*Lev* 11.1). But others endorsed at least some Epicurean psychological ideals. Bacon, for one, described the foolishness of fearing death in terms reminiscent of Epicurean teachings (1858: 379), despite including the school in his attack on Greek contemplative ideals (1858–V: 9, 14). And once Gassendi reconciled Epicurean physics and ethics with Christian doctrine, his neo-Epicureanism and atomism gained advocates, most notably Charleton, for whom he was the 'immortal' and 'incomparable Gassendus' (1701: 16, 19). Charleton seems to have mixed up Epicurean views with Stoic accounts of the relation between passions and false judgment (1701: 2); still, he left no doubt about his allegiances, calling Epicurus's *Ethics* '(after Holy writ) the best dispensatory I have hitherto read of Natural Medicines for all distempers incident to the mind of man . . . [containing] as

good Precepts for the moderating your Passions, as Human wisdom can give' (1701: 186–7).

3.4 *Medicine*

Until the last decades of the seventeenth century, almost every major work treating the passions of the mind also discussed the bodily states that accompanied, preceded or followed them, using medical frameworks. That discussions of the passions took a turn toward medicine should not be surprising: as we have seen, some authors identified passions wholesale with disease, many sought remedies for unruly passions, and several identified diseases of the passions, such as melancholia. Moreover, physiology and medical theory were integral parts of natural philosophy. Indeed, Charleton was a prominent physician and founding member of the Royal Society. Holding passions to be 'in general, only certain commotions of the spirits and blood, . . . propagated through the pathetic nerves to the heart and thence transmitted up again to the brain', he maintained that 'knowledge of the Passions [is not] to be acquir'd without frequenting the schools of anatomists' (1680: n.p.). Charleton's medical allegiances were complicated (see Henry 2004: 173, and Booth 2005: 1–2, 5), but he that did not prevent him from describing Hippocrates as 'our master' (1701: 11). Authors of very different stripes were comfortable using 'animal spirits' and Galenic 'humours' to explain the operations of the passions within human bodies (e.g., Burton 2001: 147). Several also relied heavily on 'sympathy' and 'antipathy' as explanatory tools, concepts used by a number of traditions in medicine and natural philosophy to account for psychosomatic and other causal relations, particularly those operating without direct contact (Wright 1604: 4; Digby 1644: 295).

Another piece of common currency can be illustrated by Charleton's claim that 'all the various motions of the Spirits and blood, or of the Sensitive Soul, excited in the various Passions, may likewise be conveniently reduced to two general heads, namely Contractions, and Effusions . . ." (1701: 83). Wright, Reynolds, and particularly Digby (1644: 294) likewise appealed to contractions and dilations, which they associated with pain or pleasure in the face of evil or good, to explain the effects of the passions on bodily health. Such accounts also figured in the widespread debates about whether the seat of the passions was in the heart or in the brain. Many of the earlier authors elected the heart, while acknowledging some sort of strong and direct connection with the brain (see Wright 1604: 59–63; *Pathomachia* 1630: 50; Reynolds 1640: 74, 216; Digby 1644: 293). Notably, Hobbes did not rely so much on the schema of contraction and expansion as on the pushes and pulls typical of continental mechanism, although he located the passions in the continuation of motions from the imagination to the heart (*EL* 7.1, 8.1, 1994b: 43, 46). Hobbes, however, seemed less interested in debating points of physiology than earlier authors, and many after him avoided such issues altogether: More explicitly abjured speculating about 'those deep and natural causes of [the] passions, which lie abstruse and remote' (1690: 53).

3.5. *Plato and Aquinas*

Other classical and medieval authors also shaped British early modern debates on the passions, but in less salient ways than those already considered. Plato's influence was often filtered through other authors, even among the Cambridge Platonists. More, for instance, gave a very Platonic reading of the Cartesian 'generosity', taking it to shape an individual's character so that 'while he steadily aims at virtuous things, [he] wants no courage to enterprise what reason dictates' (1690: 57). Norris took Platonic love as

his model for the 'abstracted' love of God in the *Theory and Regulation of Love* (1690: 46). Broadly Platonic metaphors of government were applied widely both to the structure of the soul and to its states of order or disorder (e.g., Wright 1604: 68; Reynolds 1640: 46). The distinction in the *Republic* between the spirited and the appetitive parts of the soul may also have been the origin of the contrast between concupiscible and irascible passions.

However, the clearest source for the distinction was Thomas Aquinas, who took the concupiscible passions to be those directed at good or evil as such (mere desire or avoidance), while the irascible passions were directed to good or evil considered as arduous, thereby arising only in the face of an impediment. Aquinas took some such division to be necessary to the experience of emotional conflict. In this, he was followed by Wright, who separated 'coveting' from 'invading' passions (1604: 19; see also Burton 2001: 258). The contrast remained important throughout the period, particularly for those who adopted the Aristotelian list of eleven passions, but even for some who did not. More, for instance, tried to adapt the distinction to fit his Cartesian inventory of six passions, despite Descartes's rejection of any such account as implying partitions within the soul (CSM I: 352, AT XI: 379). More, however, reinterpreted the distinction to align simply with the formal objects of the passions: evil objects awaken irascible passions, and good ones spur concupiscence (1690: 46).

3.6 *Contemporary Influences*

Descartes's importance for British philosophy of the latter half of the century is well documented (see Chapter 10). For one, a translation of his *Passions of the Soul* appeared a mere year after the French original (1650). Descartes also had direct

contact with several authors considered here, including Henry More, to whom he recommended his 'treatise on the affections' (AT V: 347, trans. alt. CSMK: 375), which became an important source for the latter's *Enchiridion Ethicum* (1690: 43). Indeed, many authors lifted passages wholesale from Descartes's last work (cf. Charleton 1701: 102–3, 126, 131, 169, 175, and Norris 1687: 295, 425), albeit usually for idiosyncratic ends (Charleton 1701: 171–3, 181). At the same time, most rejected the Cartesian account of the pineal gland (see Digby, who preferred the 'septum lucidum' or 'speculum,' 1644: 296–7; More 1690: 38; and Charleton 1701: 'Epistle Prefatory', n.p., also 62–3).

Like Descartes (AT XI: 422, CSM I 372), a number of British authors drew from the late work of Juan Luis Vives, *De Anima et Vita* (1538), whose discussion of the affections was influential throughout the late Renaissance and early modernity (Fantazzi 2004: 571). Vives was established at Oxford for several years, and his work was widely disseminated among British authors: Burton (2001: 258) and Charleton (1701: 147) cited him as an authority, while many were influenced by his insistence that philosophy have practical utility (see Kusukawa 2002: 50, 65–6). Bacon (1858–V: 24) and Hobbes (*Lev* 14.31) adopted Vives's view that the proper way to manage and control the affects was by invoking other affects. He may also have been the source of the taxonomic principle of differentiating passions by the temporality of their formal object (most generally, good or evil), used by Reynolds (1640: 40), early Hobbes (*EL* 8.3, 1994b: 48) and Charleton (1701: 87). Vives's influence was also channeled through other figures, such as Michel de Montaigne, whose *Essais* were widely read (cf. Bacon 1858: 503; and Montaigne 1958: 187). Other French authors were translated early in the century: Nicolas Coëffeteau's *Tableau des passions humaines* (1619) appeared as *Table of Humane Passions* by Edward Grimeston (or

Grimston) in 1621; Marin Cureau de la Chambre's *Les charactères des passions*, went through several editions (though with little apparent impact), as did several of Senault's works .

British philosophers also read each other. Wright seems to have been a source for many (e.g., Burton 2001: 252), transmitting both the Thomist taxonomy of passions and a defense of them against Stoic defamation. Reynolds' *Treatise of the Passions* remained a common undergraduate text at Oxford until the end of the seventeenth century (Atherton 2004: 531). Hobbes's infamy in his lifetime guaranteed that he became a prominent target. Although Charleton cited Hobbes approvingly among his pantheon of sources (yet without the glowing epithets granted Descartes and Gassendi), the typical tone for subsequent philosophers was taken by More, who held that 'those, who place the highest wisdom in self-preservation, . . . do sin against the light of nature' (1690: 62, see Hutton 1996: 33). More himself exercised a constructive influence on his successors; in particular, the passionate dispositions given by our 'boniform faculty' prefigure much of what Shaftesbury and eighteenth-century authors would say about the benevolent impulses of our natural affections and sentiments.

4. General Topics and Themes

4.1 *The Passions in Practice*

The approach seventeenth-century British philosophers took to the passions was uniformly practical (see Gaukroger 2002: 298). Wright, Bacon, Burton, Reynolds, Digby, Charleton, More, and Norris and Astell all emphasize their practical aims. Hobbes is a tricky case, but suggestions for managing the passions fall under the policies recommended by *Leviathan* and related works (e.g., *Lev* 31.41). More typical

is Wright, who argues that knowledge of the passions furthers our interests, since 'there be few estates or conditions of men, that have not interest in this matter' (1604: 2). Above all, Wright advertises the subject for its role in self-knowledge; self-knowledge leads to the restraint of 'inordinate passions', and thus is key to happiness (1604: 7).

Wright is not alone: authors throughout the century take the path to virtue and happiness to lie in moderating, governing, or regulating one's passions. Bacon's *De augmentis* presents a 'Georgics of the mind,' an art of governing and cultivating human nature in a way that is supposed to 'instruct and suborn action and active lives (1858–V: 5). This art shows 'how a man may take aim at' the objects of moral philosophy: 'good, virtue, duty and felicity' (1858–V: 3). On Bacon's view, the affections fall squarely within the domain of moral philosophy (1858–IV: 281; 1858–V: 19), which seeks 'to procure the affections to fight on the side of reason, and not to invade it' (1858–IV: 456). Charleton offers a remedy in a similar spirit: mental distress, he argues, is a matter of false opinions and the exorbitant desires they excite, and as such, is remedial through the 'part of human science' that teaches us 'how to moderate our Affections to the deceitful and transitory things of this life', so as to reap 'the happy fruit of internal Acquiescence and Satisfaction' (1701: n.p.). More too sets out to 'principally treat of the virtues, and of the passions' in order to advance 'knowledge of happiness and the acquisition of it' (1690: 3–4). Norris gives the love of God central place in a happy life and ties theory and practice together in his account of such happiness: since 'an affectionate sense of God will discover more of him to us, than all the dry study and speculation of scholastic heads'. In the prefatory letter to Astell, he claims that love is 'the best practice', and 'contrary to the method of other sciences, 'tis practice here that begets theory, and those only who have their

hearts thoroughly warmed and animated with the love of God can either know or describe its properties' (1695: n.p.). None of these protestations, however, impressed Masham, who argued that Norris's vision undermined our practical duties to other intelligent beings (1696: 19).

Authors besides Wright also make self-knowledge the crux of their practical aims. Reynolds's preface specifies that the work delivers 'knowledge of our Selves, and the Direction of our Lives' (1640: n.p.). In contrast, Bacon insists we need a dose of self-deception: naked self-knowledge would leave many minds 'poor shrunken things, full of melancholy and indisposition, and unpleasing to themselves' (1858–VI: 378). This does not stop him, however, from striving to gain insight into various passions, virtues and conditions of human life in subsequent essays, perhaps because he understands human goods and virtues to be heterogenous (see Box 1996: 266). Other authors express further doubts that self-knowledge leads directly to the reformation of the passions and happiness: Burton famously '[wrote] of melancholy, by being busy to avoid melancholy' (2001: 20). Digby seems to have it both ways: on the one hand, he frames his account with expressions of hope that the work will help his son cope with the vicissitudes of life; on the other, he expresses orthodox doubts about the possibility of happiness in this world. And in fact, Digby's work is largely theoretical.

Hobbes does not consider the passions so much to be means to happiness as directly constitutive of happiness. Again and again, he insists that we cannot think of human happiness as a state of satisfaction or rest, since 'life is but motion, and can never be without desire . . . ' (*Lev* 6.58). Instead, the *Elements of Law* maintains 'felicity, therefore (by which we mean continual delight), consisteth not in having prospered, but in prospering' (*EL* 7.7, 1994b: 45). As a form of delight, felicity is a

passion, located in Hobbes's footrace catalogue of the passions:

> To endeavour is appetite
> To be remiss is sensuality.
> To consider them behind is glory.
> …
> Continually to be out-gone is misery.
> Continually to out-go the next before is felicity.
> And to forsake the course is to die. (*EL* 9.21, 1994b: 59–60)

In contrast to the competitive metaphor in this passage, Hobbes's later *Leviathan* does not suppose that one person's happiness must come at another's cost. There felicity is simply a 'continual success,' or 'continual prospering' (*Lev* 6.58), that is, 'a continual progress of the desire, from one object to another, the attaining of the former being still but the way to the latter' (*Lev* 11.1). This view makes felicity less a passion or appetite than the future-indexed object of a particularly complex desire: 'to assure forever the way of his future desire'. Because non-human animals lack any conception of the future, their felicity is mere quotidian enjoyment (*Lev* 12.4).

Particularly in the first half of the century, many authors directed their practical interests in the passions to political ends. Wright devotes more books of his *Passions of the Mind* to governing others' passions than to self-management. He also frames his account in a kind of comparative politics: every nation in Europe, he explains, has a ruling passion or 'extraordinary affection' to which they are disposed, and in teaching Englishmen to bear a 'prudent carriage', his 'desire is the good of [his] country' (1604: n.p.). And although he first locates the doctrine of the 'affections' under the philosophy that considers individuals 'segregate', Bacon also finds a place for them in 'civil philosophy'. Even for the individual, Bacon insists that the 'good of communion' is higher than 'individual or self-good', and thus, the active life of politics worth more than the contemplative life (1858–V: 7–8). Knowledge of individuals should serve practical ends of communion; in particular, knowing how to

govern their affections is of use both 'in moral and civil matters' (1858–V: 23–4). Bacon takes the affections of individual and society to run parallel and describes the practical knowledge of how to manage the affections in terms of a social dynamic, something he thinks poets and historians convey particularly well (1858–V: 23–4).

Hobbes too takes the management of the passions to be an important element of statecraft. The fundamental function performed by the sovereign within a commonwealth is to make those covenants possible that the risk of default would render 'null and void' in the state of nature. The sovereign accomplishes this by wielding a coercive power of enforcement, which is effective because it appeals to our fear of punishment, just as fear of death moved us to give up our natural rights and establish a commonwealth, thereby obeying the first law of nature. The sovereign also allows social life to flourish by promoting the social passions 'that incline men to peace', e.g., 'the fear of death, desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living, and a hope by their industry to obtain them' (*Lev* 13.14). In so doing, the 'artificial' person of the commonwealth is itself moved by the passion for self-preservation (*Lev,* Introduction).

In entertaining largely practical goals, authors of the period by no means exclude theoretical discussion, for (with the possible exception of Norris and Astell) they consider practice best built on a sound foundation of theory. Digby illustrates the view nicely: on the one hand, he holds 'the art of a statesman' the highest among secular arts, to which all others are subordinate (1644: n.p.); on the other, he insists the statesman must consult the metaphysician or divine. Digby's *Two Treatises* attempts to put theory at the service of practice, sandwiching a mostly theoretical investigation within brief discussions of 'this *science* of governing a man in order to Beatitude in the next world' (1644: n.p., my emphasis). As Digby's use shows,

'science' need not be purely speculative, as long as it organizes a body of knowledge from theoretical first principles to more particular consequences. Until the end of the century, many philosophic writers on the passions have pretensions to 'science' in this sense.

At the same time, most concentrate on concrete and practicable techniques for remedying 'errors' of the passions, often giving their texts the flavor of manuals or handbooks. This is particularly true of Wright, Charleton, and parts of Reynolds. Book Three of Wright's *Passions of the Mind in General* claims to deliver 'the means to know and mortify passions, [and] what prudence and policy may be practiced in them'; to this end, it offers a series of tips for managing and moderating passions in ourselves and others (1604: 77). The remaining three books explain how to diagnose passions in others, arouse and manipulate their passions (using devices of rhetoric), and manage 'the defects or imperfections of men's souls' to prevent inordinate passions. Although Reynolds does not offer such copious advice, he diagnoses the particular causes of passions, their errors, and the 'powers' of our faculties to allow for the self-knowledge that directs us to happiness. And Charleton stresses the importance of concrete techniques 'which teacheth us how to moderate our affections [and] . . . regulate our Actions' (1701: n.p.).

Many authors are at their most concretely practical when they turn to concerns of health. Bacon's essay 'Of the Regiment of Health' recommends specific psychic exercises, such as avoiding 'envy; anxious fears; angers fretting inwards', while entertaining 'hopes; mirth rather than joy; [and] variety of delights, rather than surfeit of them' (SEH 6 453). Bacon's main concern is to promote physical health, but he supposes it to run parallel to psychic health, with passions linking mental to bodily states. As such, friendship is a particularly effective remedy, offering 'ease and

discharge of the fullness and swellings of the heart, which passions of all kind do cause and induce' (SEH 6 437). Wright too discusses how 'passions alter the body' (1604: 59), and affect our health, insofar as 'passions engender Humors, and Humors breed Passions' (1604: 63, 64). Conversely, many authors defend the passions by recounting how their pleasures benefit the health of the body. Reynolds, for one, considers the effects of corporeal delight to be 'medicinal' for individuals — as well as for humanity at large, since it leads us to populate the world (1640: 216).

4.2 *The Classifications of the Passions*

4.2.1 Causal & Explanatory Frameworks for the Passions: Early in the century, Wright insisted that 'the order of method' required explanation through 'the four causes of our passions, formal, material, efficient, and final' (1604: [47]). Reynolds also adopted Aristotelian-Scholastic causal approaches, appealing to the ends appointed 'by the Wisdom and Power of Him that made [us]' (1640: 33), With the new science and other new 'orders of method', philosophers fought over the nature, relation, and intelligibility of each of the four causes, and mechanists such as Hobbes took aim at the notion of final cause in general. His *de Corpore* declares 'a *final cause* has no place but in such things as have sense and will' (*DCo* X. 7). Elsewhere, Hobbes undermines the applicability of final causes even to our volitions, introducing the passions as a way to reduce voluntary action to the forward-driving motion of efficient causation. Rather than being drawn by antecedent good and evil, our actions are pushed by the passions, for 'whatsoever is the object of any man's appetite or desire that is it which he for his part calleth good', and *mutatis mutandi* for 'evil' (*Lev* 6.7). Others who dabbled in the new science, such as Digby, did not cede explanation completely to moving causes, and a revival of teleological approaches to the passions

— albeit newfangled ones — emerged towards the end of the century. More, Norris, and Shaftesbury particularly attribute a teleological drive to the will and passions, but rather than reduce it to other kinds of motion, they take it to show our place in the global beneficence.

The late seventeenth-century rehabilitation of teleology particularly informs More's conception of 'the boniform faculty of the soul', which he develops as a counter to Hobbes. The faculty allows us to determine and relish the highest good (see Schneewind 1998: 203ff). As such, it has a complicated relation to our passions. It does not directly receive blind instincts resulting from bodily causes, which More counts as passions in the proper sense (1690: 16, 34–6). Instead, the boniform faculty both forms a part of the intellect and 'much resembles' the will in aiming at the unconditional best (1690: 6). It cannot simply be identified with virtue, by which the soul 'overrules the animal impressions or bodily passions' (1690: 11), but it does furnish the *felt* inward sense for right reason (1690: 15–16). So the boniform faculty allows us to enjoy the sense of virtue, and because More takes the feeling of pleasure to be intrinsic to happiness, it is also the seat of human happiness (1690: 7–8). Thus, More attributes a host of affective states to the faculty, albeit not passions proper. The passions are commendable in their own right: 'not only good, but singularly needful to the perfecting of human life' (1690: 41). But as sensations and blind instincts, they differ from the affective states of the boniform faculty, which follow a mind-to-world direction of fit dictated by the natural teleology of the faculty. That teleology is behind More's complaint that Hobbes reduces good to the mere 'delectation of . . . animal appetite', rather than making the latter 'grateful' and 'suitable' to the boniform faculty (1690: 30).

Norris shows similar teleological tendencies, although informed by Malebranche rather than More. On the one hand, the bodily, occasional causes of our passions can be explained in purely mechanical terms, on the other: 'the natural motion of the will is to good in general' (1695: 224), a motion explained by the priority of the non-particularized love of God among our passions. As such, Norris declares God to be 'the true final cause of the will of man' (1695: 227). Shaftesbury goes even further, though on less theocentric grounds, to attribute a full-blown teleology to our 'natural affections', part of the general harmony fitting individuals to the world. So important is this natural teleology to Shaftesbury that he dismisses any other form of explanation (1999: 131).

4.2.2 The Place of the Passions in Moral Psychology: The passions occupied a protean role in seventeenth-century moral psychologies. They include species such as wonder, cowardice and general benevolence, falling under various categories of affective episodes, habits, dispositions, and even character traits. Wright, for instance, fluctuates among diverse kinds of states in describing geographical peculiarities of temperament and our passionate susceptibilities to differences in body composition, temperature, opportunity, experience, age, and sex (1604: 37). Although this variety of usage may seem chaotic, it probably reflects the Aristotelian view that supposes dispositional states of the soul to be constituted mediately through affective responses to the environment: we gain a character by internalizing, appropriating and habituating our affective responses, which in turn manifests itself in patterns of responses to the world. The passions can thus comprise both permanent dispositions and ephemeral episodes and straddle the gap between what is internal to the self and

the world outside. As such, they lie beyond our immediate control, yet susceptible to indirect remediation.

Wright and Reynolds both adopt simplified faculty psychologies derived from Scholastic models (e.g., Reynolds 1640: 32, 62). Wright follows Aquinas in locating the passions in the appetitive soul shared with the beasts, along with sensing (1604: 7). They are 'sensual motion[s] of our appetitive faculty, through imagination of some good or ill thing', called 'passions' and 'perturbations' because of their effects on our bodies (1604: 8). Reynolds comes to much the same position as Wright, while making less of the distinction between passion and action, and more of the guidance the passions offer. His account allows him a very broad sense of 'passion', in which passions can be formed in several divisions of the soul, including the rational and the sensitive. Thus, he admits purely 'spiritual passions' of love, fear, joy, horror, and (even) despair, but focuses on those passions arising in the interaction between soul and body, particularly the 'middle passions' that are answerable to reason, yet identified with 'motions of persecutions or flight, . . . grounded on the fancy, memory, and apprehensions of the common sense', and so akin to the purely 'sensitive passions' of the beasts (1640: 37). Such passions are both responses to our perceptions of the external world, and appetitive acts directed at what we perceive. They can, nonetheless, be governed and corrected by reason. For this reason, Reynolds refuses to count our passions as corruptions, instead describing them as 'natural motion, ordained for the perfection and conservation of the Creature' (1604: 47).

Later authors jettison many of the Scholastic elements of these psychological frameworks. Although Hobbes does not abandon faculty psychology, he reinterprets such capacities of the soul as sensing, memory, understanding, imagination, and

willing in terms of the 'animal motion' ebbing and flowing within the human body (see Gert 1996: 159ff), which starts with sensation and is discharged in voluntary action. In the *Elements of Law*, Hobbes simply locates different faculties in different parts of the body: sense and imagination are attributed to the brain, while the continuation of those motions to the heart produces passions (*EL* 7.1, 8.1, 1994b: 43, 46). The *Leviathan* is less clear-cut about the location of various faculties and instead concentrates on their functional relations. Imagination arises in the motions of 'decaying sense', which echo the impacts of external objects on our sense organs. These motions provide 'endeavour', or 'conatus': the small, barely perceptible beginnings of voluntary motion. Passions likewise are identified as interior beginnings of voluntary motion, writ larger and clearly directed either to or from the objects that cause endeavour (see *Lev* 6.1–2). Passions are thus placed squarely within the imagination, the means by which it spurs us to action. They are also 'only motion caused by the action of external objects' within a cycle of bodily changes:

> . . . so when the action of the same object is continued from the eyes, ears, and other organs to the heart, the real effect there is nothing but motion or endeavour . . . But the appearance, or sense of that motion, is that we either call DELIGHT or TROUBLE OF MIND (*Lev* 6.9).

Alterations in the interior motions constituting our passions produce 'deliberation', and the last such passion 'immediately adhering to the action, or to the omission thereof' is the will, the source of voluntary action (*Lev* 6. 53).

Like Hobbes, Digby holds that passions begin with sensation and culminate in 'moving us to, or from objects' (1644: 295). These objects typically either please or displease us, although Digby admits we may find some 'indifferent' (1644: 293). A passion proper is just a change in motion, part of a 'circuit':

> made from the object to the sense, and from it, by the common sense and fantasy, to the heart, and from the heart back again to the brain; which then setteth on work those organs or parts the animal is to make use of in that occasion, and they either bring him to, or carry him from the object, that at the first caused all this motion, and in the end becometh the period of it (1644: 306).

Depending on the valence of the object, the heart is either compressed or dilated, which in turn determines whether the passion is joy, anger and grief. Whereas joy involves dilation and grief compression, the description of anger is more complicated, for it arises 'when the abundance of spirits in the heart is little check'd by the contrary stroke of sense, but . . . having overcome the contraction, . . . dilates itself with a fury, and makes its motion smart and vehement . . .' (1644: 299). Digby thereby translates the irascible nature of anger into his preferred framework of dilation and compression. Although overly strong motions of any kind of passion 'oppress' the heart, moderate motions travel to the brain, and from thence to the nerves and muscles to produce voluntary action. By filtering the motions and parts of the blood, the brain determines how they move our limbs. The phenomenology of the passions arises because we feel these circulating motions, particularly those around the heart and expressed in the pericardium. Since the back-and-forth motions between brain and heart take place along the same channels and passages, whoever 'is more attentive to outward sense, less considers or reflects on his passions, and who is more attentive to observe and be governed by what passes in his heart is less wrought upon by external things' (1644: 303). Nonetheless, Digby holds that we are commonly 'blinded by passion' when the spirits pumped up by heart overwhelm the brain (1644: 305).

Digby is far from a materialist, but in his account of the psychology of our passions, he might as well be; understanding our passions is largely a matter of explaining their physiology. Like Descartes, he wants to show 'how all the natural operations of the body follow, by natural consequence, out of the passions of the mind, without needing to attribute discourse or reason, either to men or beasts' (1644: 301–2). Explanation requires only 'local motion and material application of one body to another' (1644: 306). Digby has an ulterior motive in calling a body a 'mere passive thing, consisting of diverse parts, which by motion may be diversely ordered . . .' (1644: 342); he wants to leave room for the workings of an incorporeal, rational soul, which can exercise 'watchfulness' over unruly bodily motions (1644: 389–90).

Charleton's philosophical psychology is even more of a hybrid than Digby's, with elements of both Cartesian and Gassendian psychologies superimposed on a distinction between 'rational' and 'sensitive' souls (1701: 47). Our rational soul is immaterial, indivisible and the seat of the 'faculties' of reasoning, judging, and willing (1701: 32). But Charleton deems it 'not a little improbable' to attribute 'all acts of the senses, and animal motions, as likewise the passions', to something immaterial (1701: 51). Thus, he introduces the sensitive soul: 'a most subtle body contained in a gross one' (1701: 13), consisting of 'fire or some matter analogous to fire' (1701: 9) and receiving sulpherous and nitrous respiration from blood and air (1701: 10–11). It acts as intermediary between the rational soul and the 'gross' material of the body, with which it has 'less of disproportion' than the rational soul (1701: 52; Charleton here seems unworried by the threat of regress). It also 'is of her own nature subject to passions' (1701: 45). Non-reasoning beasts likewise have sensitive souls, which give them a wide range of perceptual and cognitive powers, including limited consciousness and intentionality (1701: 43). But because of our

rational souls, we have 'two distinct faculties of knowing' and 'a twofold appetite' (1701: 54). As 'president of all the inferior faculties', the acts of the rational soul transform those of the sensitive (1701: 32). Charleton thereby reintroduces a hierarchy within the soul. Unfortunately, our passions often revolt against this order. Such insubordination arises from the sensitive soul's affiliation with the body, for which it is the 'immediate guardian'. So that 'this province may be more grateful and agreeable to so delicate a governess, she is continually courted and presented by all the senses with variety of blandishments and tempting delights'. Thus, the sensitive soul 'often proves deaf to the voice of reason, . . . [refusing] to be diverted from her sensual to nobler affections' (1701: 57–8). The remedy is to restore the natural hierarchy, on which 'depends all the happiness, or misery of not only [our] present life, but that which is to come' (1701: 54). The rational soul has affections of its own, such as the love of God and other real goods and the detestation of vice. But these are not passions strictly speaking. Following the division of the soul, our affects split into 'pure and simple affects arising and continuing without perturbation or disquiet' and 'vehement affections or perturbations of the Mind . . . ascribed to the Corporeal soul, [which] seem to have their original in the seat of the Imagination' (1701: 56). Only the latter need remedy.

Another curious mix of psychologies appears in More. A passion understood broadly is any corporeal impression (1690: 33). But More is most concerned with passion taken narrowly as 'a vehement sensation of the soul which refers especially to the soul itself, and is accompanied with an unwonted motion of the spirits' (1690: 43). This account clearly borrows from Descartes (cf. CSM I 337, AT XI: 347–8). But unlike Descartes, More counts all life functions as soul functions, while distinguishing appetitive animal souls from vegetative souls. He can thus identify

passions with 'blind instincts of nature, such as are perhaps found in the very plants' (1690: 36). Passions belong to the 'plastic' part of the soul, seated in the heart. But they can become insubordinate, thereby forfeiting much of their natural value (1690: 37, see also 79). More sometimes dubs unruly passions 'animal appetites' (1690: 30), probably because we animals also feel the passions in the perceptive part of the brain, and feel them so strongly that this part can be 'solicited and wrought upon, and even hurried away by the passions' (1690: 36). All these parts are located within a 'certain government or empire' of the soul, which charges the intellect with instructing the appetitive and the plastic parts of the soul (1690: 35–6), and disciplining them should they grow wayward. Above the intellect, at the very acme of the soul, perches the boniform faculty. Unlike the intellect, this faculty experiences affections and is responsible for both the sense and 'relish' for virtue, which give it an affective drive akin to the will (1690: 7). More even declares that the seed of the boniform faculty lies in divine 'love, benignity, and . . . beneficence, or well-doing' (1690: 18–9, see Schneewind 1998: 205). This sort of love is not itself a passion, but can and should be joined to passionate love (1690: 40).

Norris and Astell avoid relying on faculty psychology, even in name. Norris chides Astell for distinguishing higher and lower parts of the soul. No such differentiation is required to explain the passions: 'the same essence of the soul being variously modified may be variously affected, and be capable of different sentiments' (1695: 60–1). Astell agrees with Norris's characterization of a simple, uniformly intellectual entity, ceding that dividing the soul into inferior and superior parts makes it difficult to locate the self (1695: 84). Against their spartan view of the soul's structure, Shaftesbury introduces a novel approach that locates passions and affections within our capacities for various kinds of responses to sensed properties, including

beauty and goodness. Shaftesbury thereby launches the accounts of inward senses and moral sentiments that proliferate in the eighteenth century.

4.2.3 Taxonomies of Particular Passions: Conflicts about the ordering, ranking and affiliations of various passions form the heart of the short play *Pathomachia or, The Battle of Affections Shadowed by a Feigned Siege of the City Pathopolis*, published anonymously in 1630. Gripping drama it is not, but it does illustrate the importance accorded issues of taxonomy. Some of the most common taxonomies derived from Aristotle's and Aquinas's canonical list of six concupiscible and five irascible passions. This list, with some modifications, is endorsed by Wright (1604: 25–6), and Reynolds (1640: 40), and forms the basis for Locke's catalogue 'Of Modes of Pleasure and Pain' in the *Essay concerning Human Understanding* (II. xx. 4–14). Yet the division into concupiscible and irascible came in for much criticism over the century, while other principles of classification proved more fundamental. As Burton notes (2001: 258), most classificatory schemes were shaped by forms of pleasure and pain, or love and hatred, insofar as passions are directed at good or at evil (e.g., Wright 1604: 24; Reynolds 1640: 39, 74; Stanley 1701: 202; Digby 1644: 293: More 1690: 44–6; Norris and Astell 1695: 11, 26). Pain and pleasure could count either as primitive passions, or as the overarching genera under which passions could be sorted into contrasting pairs. But Descartes also allowed a neutral passion of wonder, followed by Charleton and More (1701: 88; 1690: 44). Digby admitted neutral passions even earlier (1644: 293), while Hobbes described contempt, but not admiration, as indifferent (*Lev* 6.5, 6.38). Descartes also provided another general taxonomy built on the six simple passions of wonder, or admiration ('the first of all the passions'); love and hatred; joy and sadness; and desire, under which he included

aversion. All others are either mixtures or species of these. Versions of this list of basic passions appear in Charleton and More, who nonetheless takes issue with the scope of Descartes's classification, proposing to reduce the six simple passions to a mere three: admiration, love and hatred (1690: 45). These would suffice for explanatory purposes, More argues, with admiration seated in the brain, and the two remaining located in the heart.

Some taxonomies were structured around the guiding role given a particular passion. Both Wright and Reynolds single out 'self-love,' or '*amor proprius*', which Wright names the 'nurse, mother, or rather stepdame of all inordinate affections' (1604: 11). Such self-love is a perversion of our God-given inclination for self-care, which remains moderate and proper when guided by reason (1604: 13–14). It makes the passions inordinate by allying itself with the senses to subvert the rule of reason, prudence and the love of God. Self-love seems to spring from the intrinsic nature of love, which Wright holds to be 'the fountain, root and mother' of all other passions, yet most clearly expressed when lover and beloved coincide (1604: 216). Reynolds also takes self-love to be embedded in the nature of love, itself one of the 'two first and fundamental passions of all the rest' (1640: 74). The root of our self-love, he declares, is the 'unity and identity' we have with ourselves (1640: 84), for it lies in the nature of love to strive for union with its object (1640: 98–9). But Reynolds insists that self-love is equally grounded on the love of God, since the pleasure of self-love stems from delight in the simplicity of our being, a sign of our metaphysical perfection and likeness to God (1640: 84–5). And so, he splits the difference, declaring 'the rule of all love is by divine truth prescribed to be God, and a man's self' (1640: 81).

Despite his popular reputation as a psychological egoist, Hobbes does *not* give self-love a prominent place in his taxonomies.[42] It appears not once in the enumerations of the passions given in Chapter 9 of the *Elements of Law*, or Chapter 6 of *Leviathan*, despite the former naming almost twenty passions, and the latter over three dozen, including several species of love. More conspicuous in Hobbes's thought is the rather different 'glory', which arises directly from the dynamics of our striving for power and its relation to felicity (see Slomp 1998: 553). Glory seems a pleasing, self-directed passion: an 'internal gloriation or triumph of the mind'. But in the *Elements of Law* Hobbes makes it a special kind, a species neither of love nor joy (*EL* 9.16, 1994b: 56). It is 'that passion which proceedeth from the imagination or conception of our own power, above the power of him that contendeth with us' (*EL* 9.1, 1994b: 50). Although closely related psychologically to the felicitous prospect of success, glory-seeking also seems a zero-sum pursuit, destined to thwart any chances at mutual felicity (e.g., *Lev* 13.6). But in *Leviathan*, Hobbes no longer treats glory as a fixture of human psychology (see *Lev* 13.6, 14.31 and Slomp 1998: 567), and reduces the competitive element considerably, identifying glory simply with 'confidence'. *Leviathan* also describes how the commonwealth provides outlets for the pursuit of glory that minimize its deleterious effects and even allow it to be jointly realized (e.g., *Lev* 10.17). This change may explain why Hobbes reclassifies glory as a joy 'arising from imagination of a man's own power and ability' (*Lev* 6.39). So, not only does Hobbes refuse ever to identify glory and self-love, he comes to reduce the centrality of glory to his account of the passions. In short, he does not orient our psychology exclusively around forms of self-interest.

[42]On this topic, cf., E. Curley in Hobbes (1994a: xv), B. Gert (1996: 165–8; 2001: 243), and Lloyd & Sreedhar (2009). Note that Hobbes's few comments about self-love make it a source of unreason (*Lev* 15.35; *EL* 10.11, 1994b: 63–4).

The neo-Augustinian tendency in More and Norris and Astell leads them to focus on love above all other passions. But their approach differs from the earlier views of Wright, and even of Augustine and Malebranche, by making its priority more normative than taxonomic. Other passions do not reduce to love; rather, love takes precedence in an ideally ordered psyche. More gives the love that informs the boniform faculty a central normative status, and Astell dubs it the 'leading and master passion' (1695: 130). Shaftesbury characterizes our other-directed passions differently than these predecessors, but likewise finds the remedy for disordered passions in affection directed at public good, calling it 'the master-pleasure and conqueror of the rest' (1999: 202). Shaftesbury's view anticipates the importance of benevolence to such eighteenth-century sentimentalist philosophers as Hutcheson.

4.3 *The Passions and Reason*

One theme that appeared again and again throughout the century, even in writers of various different stripes, was the relation between reason and the passions (e.g., Hobbes, *EL* 1994b: 19, Digby 1644: 305, Charleton 1975: 42). And many supposed the relation to be antagonistic. Thus, *Pathomachia* calls reason 'the conquering Alexander of the soul', without which the order of the passions dissolves (1887: 6). Left without 'remedy', this antagonism threatens the rightful preeminence of reason, leading to such disorders of practical reason as weakness of will, when like Ovid's Medea, we see the better, but follow the worse. In a common diagnosis, weakness of will arises when reason loses to passion in a direct contest for control over our bodies and will. This view makes reason and passion distinct faculties, but unlike belief-desire models of practical reason, considers both capable of determining ends.

Digby presents a vivid analysis of how reason and passion constitute two autonomous and competing 'centers' from which human actions flow (1644: 387), particularly in his account of the physiology of those 'blinded by passion' (1644: 305). Strong passions translate into vigorous motions that pump up the animal spirits from the heart (1644: 305). Reason too 'hath a great strength and power in opposition of sense' and can rule 'over sense and passion' (389–90). But it requires the use of animal spirits in the brain to work its will. When the motion of the spirits stirred up by passion is particularly violent, they may reach to the brain and there overwhelm the spirits 'in the jurisdiction and government of reason' (1644: 391). Digby (a former privateer) depicts the struggle as a sea-battle and the remedies as military strategy. Weakness of will arises when 'the throng of those [spirits] that are sent up into the brain by the desired object . . . come thither so thick and so forcibly that they displace the others which fought under reason's standard . . . [and so] possess the fancy with their troops' (1644: 392). To keep spirits in the brain under reason's control, Digby recommends a constant 'watchfulness', by which reason herds the spirits and marks them 'with power to recall our strayed thought' (1644: 390–1). Other tactics to repel invasion include weakening the rebellious spirits, diverting them, or increasing the forces of reason (1644: 392). Bodily remedies, such as corporeal 'mortifications', can also help subject the spirits to reason's command.

Although he lacks Digby's colorful metaphors, Locke presents a somewhat similar picture of the relation between passion and reason in *Some Thoughts concerning Education*. He there argues against the use of corporal punishment for disciplining children since 'they distinguish early between passion and reason; and . . . quickly grow into a contempt of the former' (§75, 1693: 82). Children themselves are first motivated by the passions; socialization requires that they 'submit their

passions, and make their minds supple and pliant to what their parents' reason advises them now, and so prepare them to obey, what their own reasons shall advise hereafter' (§103, 1693: 125). Here Locke treats reason and passion as competing counselors, but elsewhere he uses the language of rebellion to describe how upstart passions threaten legitimate reason: whereas the 'government of our passions [is] the right improvement of liberty', liberty of thought vanishes when are possessed by 'an impetuous uneasiness, as of love, anger, or any other violent passion'. Instead, we should strive for 'moderation and restraint of our Passions, so that our Understandings may be *free* to examine, and reason unbiassed give its judgment, being that, whereon a right direction of our conduct to true Happiness depends' (*Essay* II. xxi. 54). Continuing the political metaphor, Locke describes 'civil government' as 'the proper remedy' for excesses of the passions (TT II. 13). One of the chief 'inconveniences' of the state of nature is that it leaves judgment and execution of the law of nature in the hands of individuals who 'being partial to themselves' are likely to act on the basis of 'passion and revenge' (TT II. 125). And so psychic anarchy and rebellion lead to motivational disorders in civil society.

In contrast to their continental counterparts, British authors say little about the passions as a source of theoretical error. Descartes, Malebranche, and early Spinoza address the passions to further their projects for epistemic method, seeking remedies both to avoid passion-induced theoretical error and to harness the passions to the search for truth. But in segregating passion and reason into autonomous spheres of agency, few British authors seem to worry that the passions might disrupt the internal operations of reason and cause it to malfunction. Thus, they tend to treat disorders of the passions less as causes of stupidity than of madness, such as 'enthusiasm' or 'melancholy' (Burton 2001: 140; More,1656: 14). To be sure, some British authors

nod at connections between the passions and cognitive error. Wright, for instance, claims that inordinate passions follow from ignorance and error in the understanding (1604: 295), but not that passions produce ignorance or error. Reynolds considers cognitive and affective reliablility to be mutually reinforcing. Not only does he declare 'men of the most staid and even judgments [to] have the most unresisted power in the government of passions' (1640: 496), he also maintains that 'fastening too great an affection on some particular objects' makes us prone to the cognitive error of conceiving 'in them some excellencies, which nature never bestowed on them' (1640: 494). Reynolds likewise spares some thoughts for those passions directed at knowledge, issuing warnings against the desire for 'novelties', and cautioning us that curiosity, a passionate desire for knowledge, can lead to error (1640: 497–8). Even so, he devotes much more attention to the effects of the passions on our practical reason. Locke too indicates some role for the passions in our taking 'wrong measure[s] of probability', but leaves it at a hint (*Essay* II. ixx. 17). And whereas More endorses Descartes's claim that passions induce errors in our conception of the physical world, he states his view using 'passion' to mean 'sensation' in general (1690: 84 f.). Likewise Charleton adopts Descartes's theory of judgmental error, but uses the mismatch between volition and intellectual perception to explain *practical* error. We direct 'our desires aright', he states, if we refrain from willing until we clearly understand that which is 'recommended to us by our passions' (1701: n.p.).

In this context, Hobbes presents a complicated case. On the one hand, he repeats many of the old canards opposing passion to reason: 'the *understanding* is by the flame of the passions, never enlightened, but dazzled' (*Lev* 19.5; cf. *Lev* 26.21; 27.4; 27.18, *inter alia*). On the other, because thought itself is a form of animal

motion, and reasoning a form of thought, he cannot simply segregate reason from passion. Hobbes does, in fact, suppose a causal connection between the force and degree of passion and the vigor of reasoning, and maintains that 'wit' in general is driven by desires (*Lev* 8.13–15). Nor are our passions and desires restricted to providing an initial impetus for our thinking; they hold it on course: 'for the thoughts are to the desires as scouts and spies, to range abroad and find the way to the things desired; all steadiness of the mind's motion, and all quickness of the same, proceeding from thence' (*Lev* 8.16). Thinking in general appears a *product* of passionate drives and an expression of our basic 'endeavor'.

What seems to worry Hobbes most about the passions, and leads him to condemn them as dangerously irrational, is their tendency to sow social discord. But it is not because the passions oppose reason that they spread social conflict; rather they count as opposing reason because they spread conflict — because the condition of war is 'necessarily consequent [. . .] to the natural passions of men' (*Lev* 17.1; see also *Lev* 5.16). This worry, however, arises from the passions as they exist in the state of nature: idiosyncratic, partisan, and uncoordinated. There, the unaligned, passion-driven deeds of individuals work at cross-purposes to push them into zero-sum and less-than-zero-sum conflicts. The characteristic feature of such actions is that they spring from notions of good and evil determined by the individual's passions used as 'private measures' (*Lev* 46.32), which are 'different and mutable' (*Lev* R&C.1). To 'remedy' this feature of the passions, we need a 'common measure', which Hobbes identifies with reason, even as he declares that only passions can bridle passions (*Lev* 14.31). We can reconcile these claims by understanding that passions constrain passions to produce an outcome conforming to reason. The common measure thus emerges as a result of properly aligning the passions. Reason constitutes this

'common measure' because it is the metric for measuring affective calibration; passions that accord with the common measure count as 'rational'. In short, rational passions are simply *coordinated* passions. But coordinating our passions requires a sovereign power able to direct our strivings and reckonings for future felicity so that they do not jointly result in prisoners' dilemma-like conflicts.

Turning to the social conditions for a 'common measure' gives Hobbes a new way to conceive of the relation between reason and the passions. Reason discovers the laws of nature (*Lev* 14.3), including the fundamental injunction of justice: that persons are duty-bound to 'perform their covenants made' (*Lev* 15.1). Yet Hobbes deems 'the bonds of words . . . too weak to bridle men's ambition, avarice, anger, and other passions, without the fear of some coercive power' (*Lev* 14.18). Such coercive power resides in the sovereign, who uses it to put pressure on our passions; by deploying threats, it generates fear and respect to force our passions into line with the passions and actions of others. This is a necessary condition for the possibility of covenants not immediately beneficial to both parties, and hence of justice itself (*Lev* 15.4). The sovereign, in turn, is itself subject to natural laws enjoining justice, equity, perspicuity, mercy, prudence, publicity, and the like (see *Lev* 15, 30). Although natural laws are simply precepts of reason and binding on anyone who finds herself in the appropriate conditions for their application, the motive for obedience lies in our passions, particularly fear of the consequences for disobedience. In playing upon fear to motivate actions that are coordinated with the actions of others, the sovereign instantiates the common measure for our passions, while determining what constitutes right reason. Only so can reason come to govern our actions.

Hobbes allows that natural individuals are individually capable of various means-end calculations. But in the absence of a common measure, such reckoning is

not 'right reason' (see Gert 2001: 253). Right reason arises when persons settle controversies by setting up 'the reason of some arbitrator or judge to whose sentence they will both stand' (*Lev* 5.3). Indeed even individual reckoning may require the stability provided by a common measure (*Lev* 5.3, see also Ridge 1998: 544–6; Gauthier 1992: 24–32, Baier 1987: 163–6). When Hobbes turns to how the sovereign power functions as a public reason, he stresses that it determines good and evils of all kinds. In contrast, individuals in the condition of mere nature retain the 'right of nature': the liberty of each to use 'his own judgment and reason' to decide 'the aptest means' of self-preservation (*Lev* 14.1). Such decisions are driven by momentary passions without any guarantee of consistency even with other passions of the same individual across time. When individuals establish a commonwealth, they transfer the right of nature to the sovereign, and thereby make themselves subject to *its* determination of apt means. It provides a standard outside of private individuals, one that can impose normative demands on both their passions and their reckonings. And so, individuals become fully rational only by submitting to the determinations of a public reason instantiated in the sovereign power. The remedy for the passions must come from the top down, even though the motivations for applying it flow from the bottom up.

Although Hobbes's view of the relation between reason and passion may be unusually sophisticated, neither he, nor any of the other seventeenth-century authors under consideration here adopt anything like the belief-desire model found in many contemporary accounts of practical reason. Not only do they entertain conceptions of reason more robust than instrumental ones, they also envision the passions as much more than mere end-directed desires. They are traces of how the world marks itself in

the material of our bodies and expressions of our responses to its impressions. For some, they are also what drive us to unite with God, or the cosmos as a whole. They are critical to our happiness, but in constant need of 'remedy'. We must appeal to them to manage others, yet they are unruly and idiosyncratic. They are utterly personal and central to individual character, both shaping it and manifesting it. At the same time, they are only poorly integrated with the rest of the self, and can seem alien intrusions, or fractures in the unity of the psyche. Weaving together these different threads into a unified account of the passions challenged seventeenth-century conceptions of the soul and its faculties, and raised a host of questions about its relation to reason, the body in which it lodged, the material world with which it interacted and the society in which it moved. But starting early in the next century, philosophers began forming a very different picture of the mind and its passions, which raised new questions about the nature, activity and value of our sentiments. Some of that difference might be measured by the fact that in less than two generations, the most prominent philosophers would move from asking about 'remedies' of the passions to declaring that 'reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions' (Hume 1978: 415).[49]

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(spelling and punctuation corrected and modernized)

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